Single-trace fragility theory of memory dynamics

In single-trace fragility theory, forgetting is produced by two factors, time and interference. Memory traces are assumed to have two partially coupled dynamic properties, strength and fragility. Strength determines the probability of correct recall and recognition, while fragility determines the susceptibility of the trace to the time-decay process but not to the interference process. Consolidation is assumed to be a continual reduction in the fragility of the memory trace rather than any change in strength or availability. Decreasing fragility accounts for the continually decreasing forgetting rate, the temporal character of retrograde amnesia and recovery therefrom, and the type of internal clock necessary for nonassociative recency judgments. Data are presented to indicate that interference is independent of the interval between original and interpolated learning, that nonassociative recency discriminability approaches a limit at about 30 min, and that the decay rate of long-term retention in amnesic patients is the same as in normal Ss.     

Are multiple-trial experiments appropriate for eyewitness identification studies? Accuracy,choosing, and confidence across trials

Eyewitness identification experiments typically involve a single trial: A participant views an event and subsequently makes a lineup decision. As compared to this single-trial paradigm, multiple-trial designs are more efficient, but significantly reduce ecological validity and may affect the strategies that participants use to make lineup decisions. We examined the effects of a number of forensically relevant variables (i.e., memory strength, type of disguise, degree of disguise, and lineup type) on eyewitness accuracy, choosing, and confidence across 12 target-present and 12 target-absent lineup trials (N?=?349; 8,376 lineup decisions). The rates of correct rejections and choosing (across both target-present and target-absent lineups) did not vary across the 24 trials, as reflected by main effects or interactions with trial number. Trial number had a significant but trivial quadratic effect on correct identifications (OR?=?0.99) and interacted significantly, but again trivially, with disguise type (OR?=?1.00). Trial number did not significantly influence participants’ confidence in correct identifications, confidence in correct rejections, or confidence in target-absent selections. Thus, multiple-trial designs appear to have minimal effects on eyewitness accuracy, choosing, and confidence. Researchers should thus consider using multiple-trial designs for conducting eyewitness identification experiments.     

Biased lineups: sequential presentation reduces the problem.

Biased lineups have been shown to increase significantly false, but not correct, identification rates (Lindsay, Wallbridge, & Drennan, 1987; Lindsay & Wells, 1980; Malpass & Devine, 1981). Lindsay and Wells (1985) found that sequential lineup presentation reduced false identification rates, presumably by reducing reliance on relative judgment processes. Five staged-crime experiments were conducted to examine the effect of lineup biases and sequential presentation on eyewitness recognition accuracy. Sequential lineup presentation significantly reduced false identification rates from fair lineups as well as from lineups biased with regard to foil similarity, instructions, or witness attire, and from lineups biased in all of these ways. The results support recommendations that police present lineups sequentially.     

Environmental context-dependent eyewitness recognition

The present study helped resolve the apparent conflict between many laboratory list-learning studies, which have not found environmental context-dependent recognition memory, and staged field studies (e.g. Malpass and Devine, 1981), whose results with ‘guided memory’ techniques suggest that eyewitness face recognition should depend upon environmental context reinstatement. It was found in two different experiments that, relative to testing in a new place, returning participants to the environment where a live staged event had occurred improved performance on identification of a confederate's face (i.e., hit rate). Although physical reinstatement improved identification performance in Experiment 1, mental reinstatement instructions to subjects tested in a new environment did not improve identification performance over an uninstructed group. The environmental reinstatement effect did not interact with test delay or confederate. In Experiment 2 it was found that environmental reinstatement improved accuracy (hit rate and foil identification rate) when the correct target was present in the test line-up, and that false identifications were not significantly affected by contextual manipulations when the correct target was absent from the line-up. The results provide an empirical basis for the hypothesis that returning to the scene of an event improves eyewitness face recognition.     

Asking an eyewitness to predict their later lineup performance could harm the confidence–accuracy relationship

Few studies have investigated eyewitnesses' ability to predict their later lineup performance, known as predecision confidence. We applied calibration analysis in two experiments comparing predecision confidence (immediately after encoding but prior to a lineup) to postdecision confidence (immediately after a lineup) to determine which produces a superior relationship with lineup decision accuracy. Experiment 1 (N = 177) featured a multiple-block lineup recognition paradigm featuring several targets and lineups; Experiment 2 featured an eyewitness identification paradigm with a mock-crime video and a single lineup for each participant (N = 855). Across both experiments, postdecision confidence discriminated well between correct and incorrect lineup decisions, but predecision confidence was a poor predictor of accuracy. Moreover, simply asking for predecision confidence weakened the postdecision confidence–accuracy relationship. This implies that police should exercise caution when interviewing eyewitnesses, as they should not be asked to predict their ability to make an accurate lineup decision.     

Need probability affects retention: A direct demonstration

Recent memory theory has emphasized the concept ofneed probability—that is, the probability that a given piece of learned information will be tested at some point in the future. It has been proposed that, in real-world situations, need probability declines over time and that the memory-loss rate is calibrated to match the progressive reduction in need probability (J. R. Anderson & Schooler, 1991). The present experiments were designed to examine the influence of the slope of the need-probability curve on the slope of the retention curve. On each of several trials, subjects memorized a list of digits, then retained the digits in memory for 1, 2, 4, 8, or 16 sec. Some trials ended with a recall test; other trials ended with the message, “no test.” In Experiment 1, the likelihood of encountering a memory test (i.e., the need probability) was made to either increase or decrease as the retention interval increased; in Experiment 2, need probability either was flat (invariant across retention intervals) or decreased as the retention interval increased. The results indicated that the shape of the need-probability curve influenced the slope of the retention curve (Experiment 1) and that the effect became larger as the experimental session progressed (Experiment 2). The findings support the notion that memory adapts to need probabilities and that the rate of forgetting is influenced by the slope of the need-probability curve. In addition, all of the forgetting curves approximated a power function, suggesting that need probability influences the slope but not the form of forgetting.     

Can Questioning Induce Forgetting? Retrieval‐Induced Forgetting of Eyewitness Information

In eyewitness situations, questioning can be seen as a form of retrieval practice that may have detrimental effects on eyewitness memory. Memory research has demonstrated that retrieval practice may not only enhance memory for practiced information but also induce forgetting of related information. The present study examined the effect of retrieval practice on forgetting in eyewitness memory. First, we investigated whether asking questions about particular offender characteristics can induce forgetting of other offender characteristics. Second, we examined whether this forgetting effect is limited to information from the practiced offender or may also influence memory for characteristics of others present in the crime scene. Third, we studied whether forgetting of eyewitness information occurs in the absence of output interference effects. We found that questioning induced forgetting of offender characteristics. Moreover, the forgetting effect was not limited to information about the practiced offender. Finally, forgetting was found even when output order was experimentally controlled. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of cannabis on eyewitness memory: A field study

Eyewitnesses to crimes are regularly under the influence of drugs, such as cannabis. Yet there is very little research on how the use of cannabis affects eyewitness memory. In the present study, we assessed the effects of cannabis on eyewitness recall and lineup identification performance in a field setting. One hundred twenty visitors of coffee shops in Amsterdam viewed a videotaped criminal event, were interviewed about the event, and viewed a target‐present or target‐absent lineup. Witnesses under the influence of cannabis remembered significantly fewer correct details about the witnessed event than did sober witnesses, with no difference in incorrect recall. Cannabis use was not significantly associated with lineup identification performance, but intoxicated witnesses were significantly better at judging whether their lineup identification was accurate. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.     

Memory systems in the rat: effects of reward probability,context, and congruency between working and reference memory

The interaction of working and reference memory was studied in rats on an eight-arm radial maze. In two experiments, rats were trained to perform working memory and reference memory tasks. On working memory trials, they were allowed to enter four randomly chosen arms for reward in a study phase and then had to choose the unentered arms for reward in a test phase. On reference memory trials, they had to learn to visit the same four arms on the maze on every trial for reward. Retention was tested on working memory trials in which the interval between the study and test phase was 15 s, 15 min, or 30 min. At each retention interval, tests were performed in which the correct WM arms were either congruent or incongruent with the correct RM arms. Both experiments showed that congruency interacted with retention interval, yielding more forgetting at 30 min on incongruent trials than on congruent trials. The effect of reference memory strength on the congruency effect was examined in Experiment 1, and the effect of associating different contexts with working and reference memory on the congruency effect was studied in Experiment 2.     

Witnesses’ memories for lineup fillers postdicts their identification accuracy

Witnesses who have quick, automatic recognition experiences when viewing a lineup tend to make more accurate decisions than witnesses who engage in slower, more deliberative processes. A novel postdictor of identification accuracy is predicted from these findings: memories for lineup fillers should be stronger among inaccurate, rather than accurate, witnesses. Undergraduate students (N = 320) viewed a mock crime, made a lineup identification decision, and were given a surprise test for their memory for the lineup fillers. Consistent with predictions, better memories for lineup fillers postdicted mistaken identifications and the suspect's innocence. Information gain analyses showed that under some conditions, memory for lineup fillers provided as much information about the suspect's guilt as a lineup identification. Findings are consistent with the idea that postdictors of eyewitness accuracy are valuable to the extent that they measure the automaticity or deliberativeness of the witness's experience when viewing the lineup.     

Alcoholic intoxication and memory storage dynamics

Strength retention functions were obtained for English words from 2 min to 50 min within a continuous recognition memory session and from I to 14 days subsequent to the session, with subjects being sober or moderately intoxicated. A small, but significant, decrement was obtained in memory performance under alcoholic intoxication. However, there was no difference in forgetting rate either within the continuous session or over the subsequent 1- to 14-day period. Single-trace fragility theory provided an excellent fit to the data. The entire effect of alcoholic intoxication was on degree of learning with no effect on the form of the retention function or rate of forgetting. No state-dependent retrieval effects were obtained. White noise during learning and/or retrieval had no effect on acquisition, storage, or retrrieval.     

A cross-race effect in metamemory: Predictions of face recognition are more accurate for members of our own race

The Cross-Race Effect (CRE) is the well-replicated finding that people are better at recognizing faces from their own race, relative to other races. The CRE reveals systematic limitations on eyewitness identification accuracy, suggesting that some caution is warranted in evaluating cross-race identification. The CRE is problematic because jurors value eyewitness identification highly in verdict decisions. We explore how accurate people are in predicting their ability to recognize own-race and other-race faces. Caucasian and Asian participants viewed photographs of Caucasian and Asian faces, and made immediate judgments of learning during study. An old/new recognition test replicated the CRE: both groups displayed superior discriminability of own-race faces. Importantly, relative metamnemonic accuracy was also greater for own-race faces, indicating that the accuracy of predictions about face recognition is influenced by race. This result indicates another source of concern when eliciting or evaluating eyewitness identification: people are less accurate in judging whether they will or will not recognize a face when that face is of a different race than they are. This new result suggests that a witness's claim of being likely to recognize a suspect from a lineup should be interpreted with caution when the suspect is of a different race than the witness.     

Individual differences in face identification postdict eyewitness accuracy

Eyewitnesses frequently mistake innocent suspects for the culprits of an observed crime, and such misidentifications have caused the wrongful convictions of many innocent people. This study attempted to establish the accuracy of individual eyewitnesses by assessing their ability to process unfamiliar faces. Observers viewed a staged crime and later tried to select the culprit from an identity lineup. This was followed by a face test that provides a laboratory analogue to lineup identifications. We found that this face test could determine the reliability of individual witnesses when a positive eyewitness identification had been made. Importantly, this was possible based on the specific response that a witness had made and without prior knowledge of whether the culprit was actually present in the lineup. These findings demonstrate that individual differences in face processing provide a potential instrument for postdicting eyewitness accuracy and for preventing miscarriages of justice.     

The contextual change paradox is still unresolved: comment on Bouton, Nelson, and Rosas (1999)

According to the contextual change theory of memory loss, spontaneous forgetting reflects a retrieval impairment due to subtle and unprogrammed shifts in environmental cues over a retention interval. However, Riccio, Richardson, and Ebner (1984) noted an apparent paradox in this model; specifically, laboratory studies inducing explicit shifts in contextual cues found less disruption of performance as retention intervals increased. Bouton, Nelson, and Rosas (1999) critiqued several of the claims made by Riccio et al. and concluded that the contextual cue theory is still a valid account of spontaneous forgetting. In this comment, the authors address the 3 major criticisms offered by Bouton et al., point out an inconsistency in their argument, and conclude that the original paradox still poses problems for the contextual change theory of forgetting.     

Very rapid forgetting: Reply to Muter

We reply to the commentary in which Muter (1995) disputes the findings and arguments of Cunningham, Healy, Till, Fendrich, and Dimitry (1993) concerning the rate of forgetting from primary memory. Although Muter (1980) had reported very rapid forgetting when secondary memory processes were minimized, Cunningham et al. found that the rate of forgetting from primary memory was no more rapid when secondary memory processes were minimal than it was when secondary memory processes were substantial. We locate the discrepancy between the two studies specifically at recall performance on the 0-sec retention interval, and we argue that the very rapid forgetting found by Muter (1980) can be attributed in large part to the fact that although subjects in his experiments did not expect to recall the letters after a filled retention interval, at the time of encoding and after an unfilled delay they did have a high overall expectancy to recall the letters.     

Buffered forgetting: When targets and distractors are both forgotten

In three experiments, we investigated prior findings that, following some memory tasks, essentially flat d' or forced-choice retention curves are produced. These curves have been interpreted as indicating that forgetting is not present over the intervals examined; however, we propose in this article that forgetting is actually present whenever hit rates and false alarm rates are both declining, despite the result being a flat retention curve. We demonstrate that such curves can be produced using a pair recognition procedure, a plurality discrimination task, and a verbal discrimination task. For all of these tasks, we provide either new evidence or refer to evidence already in the literature that tends to contradict alternative explanations. Then we show how the failure to consider both signal strength and noise has led to distortions in theoretical thinking about forgetting.     

Recognition-induced forgetting of faces in visual long-term memory

Despite more than a century of evidence that long-term memory for pictures and words are different, much of what we know about memory comes from studies using words. Recent research examining visual long-term memory has demonstrated that recognizing an object induces the forgetting of objects from the same category. This recognition-induced forgetting has been shown with a variety of everyday objects. However, unlike everyday objects, faces are objects of expertise. As a result, faces may be immune to recognition-induced forgetting. However, despite excellent memory for such stimuli, we found that faces were susceptible to recognition-induced forgetting. Our findings have implications for how models of human memory account for recognition-induced forgetting as well as represent objects of expertise and consequences for eyewitness testimony and the justice system.     

A model for stochastic drift in memory strength to account for judgments of learning

Previous research has shown that judgments of learning (JOLs) made immediately after encoding have a low correlation with actual cued-recall performance, whereas the correlation is high for delayed judgments. In this article, the authors propose a formal theory describing the stochastic drift of memory strength over the retention interval to account for the delayed-JOL effect. This is done by first decomposing the aggregated memory strength into exponential functions with slow and fast memory traces. The mean aggregated memory strength shows power-function forgetting curves. The drift of the memory strength is large for immediate JOLs (causing a low predictability) and weak for delayed JOLs (causing a high predictability). Consistent with empirical data, the model makes a novel prediction of JOL asymmetry, or that immediate weak JOLs are more predictive of future performance than are immediate strong JOLs. The JOL distributions for immediate and delayed JOLs are also accounted for.