Okasha on Inductive Scepticism

In a recent paper replying to the inductive sceptic, Samir Okasha says that the Humean argument for inductive scepticism depends on mistakenly construing inductive reasoning as based on a principle of the uniformity of nature. I dispute Okasha's argument that we are entitled to the background beliefs on which (he says) inductive reasoning depends. Furthermore, I argue that the sorts of theoretically impoverished contexts to which a uniformity-of-nature principle has traditionally been restricted are exactly the contexts relevant to the inductive sceptic's argument, and ( pace Okasha) are not at all remote from actual scientific practice. I discuss several scientific examples involving such contexts.     

Two kinds of reasoning

According to one view of reasoning, people can evaluate arguments in at least two qualitatively different ways: in terms of their deductive correctness and in terms of their inductive strength. According to a second view, assessments of both correctness and strength are a function of an argument's position on a single psychological continuum (e.g., subjective conditional probability). A deductively correct argument is one with the maximum value on this continuum; a strong argument is one with a high value. The present experiment tested these theories by asking participants to evaluate the same set of arguments for correctness and strength. The results produced an interaction between type of argument and instructions: In some conditions, participants judged one argument deductively correct more often than a second, but judged the second argument inductively strong more often than the first. This finding supports the view that people have distinct ways to evaluate arguments.     

Who is susceptible to conjunction fallacies in category-based induction?

Recent evidence suggests that the conjunction fallacy observed in people’s probabilistic reasoning is also to be found in their evaluations of inductive argument strength. We presented 130 participants with materials likely to produce a conjunction fallacy either by virtue of a shared categorical or a causal relationship between the categories in the argument. We also took a measure of participants’ cognitive ability. We observed conjunction fallacies overall with both sets of materials but found an association with ability for the categorical materials only. Our results have implications for accounts of individual differences in reasoning, for the relevance theory of induction, and for the recent claim that causal knowledge is important in inductive reasoning.     

A relevance theory of induction

A framework theory, organized around the principle of relevance, is proposed for category-based reasoning. According to the relevance principle, people assume that premises are informative with respect to conclusions. This idea leads to the prediction that people will use causal scenarios and property reinforcement strategies in inductive reasoning. These predictions are contrasted with both existing models and normative logic. Judgments of argument strength were gathered in three different countries, and the results showed the importance of both causal scenarios and property reinforcement in categorybased inferences. The relation between the relevance framework and existing models of category-based inductive reasoning is discussed in the light of these findings.     

Mental models and probabilistic thinking

This paper outlines the theory of reasoning based on mental models, and then shows how this theory might be extended to deal with probabilistic thinking. The same explanatory framework accommodates deduction and induction: there are both deductive and inductive inferences that yield probabilistic conclusions. The framework yields a theoretical conception of strength of inference, that is, a theory of what the strength of an inference is objectively: it equals the proportion of possible states of affairs consistent with the premises in which the conclusion is true, that is, the probability that the conclusion is true given that the premises are true. Since there are infinitely many possible states of affairs consistent with any set of premises, the paper then characterizes how individuals estimate the strength of an argument. They construct mental models, which each correspond to an infinite set of possibilities (or, in some cases, a finite set of infinite sets of possibilities). The construction of models is guided by knowledge and beliefs, including lay conceptions of such matters as the “law of large numbers”. The paper illustrates how this theory can account for phenomena of probabilistic reasoning.     

Properties of the diversity effect in category-based inductive reasoning

Four experiments investigated how people judge the plausibility of category-based arguments, focusing on the diversity effect, in which arguments with diverse premise categories are considered particularly strong. In Experiment 1 we show that priming people as to the nature of the blank property determines whether sensitivity to diversity is observed. In Experiment 2 we find that people's hypotheses about the nature of the blank property predict judgements of argument strength. In Experiment 3 we examine the effect of our priming methodology on people's tendency to bring knowledge about causality or similarity to bear when evaluating arguments, and in Experiment 4 we show that whether people's hypotheses about the nature of the blank property were causal predicted ratings of argument strength. Together these results suggest that diversity effects occur because diverse premises lead people to bring general features of the premise categories to mind. Although our findings are broadly consistent with Bayesian and Relevance-based approaches to category-based inductive reasoning, neither approach captures all of our findings.     

Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity

Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I defend a normative claim that it is reasonable to accept the general reliability of our perceptual judgments, instead of a factual claim that our perceptual judgments are generally reliable. More specifically, I offer a normative practical argument which explains why it is reasonable to accept the general reliability of our perceptual judgments, even though we cannot establish the general reliability of our perceptual judgments by means of theoretical reasoning.     

Closed systems,explanations, and the cosmological argument

Examples involving infinite suspended chains or infinite trains are sometimes used to defend perceived weaknesses in traditional cosmological arguments. In this article, we distinguish two versions of the cosmological argument, suggest that such examples can only be relevant if it is one specific type of cosmological argument that is being considered, and then criticize the use of such examples in this particular type of cosmological argument. Our criticism revolves around a discussion of what it means to call a system closed, and what it means to call an explanation complete. Our analysis makes no suppositions about the nature of the infinite, and is therefore independent of many of the issues around which contemporary discussions of the cosmological argument have tended to revolve.     

归纳推理中的属性中心性效应

通过三个实验研究了属性的中心性程度对归纳推理的影响,结果表明,在归纳推理中存在属性中心性效应,中心属性比其他属性（次中心属性、再次中心属性）更能影响归纳推理。但属性中心性效应的出现受到了前提对象和结论对象相似性程度的制约,当前提对象和结论对象的相似程度高时,中心属性比其他属性更能影响归纳推理;随着相似性水平的降低,中心属性的归纳推理力度越来越弱,而次中心属性、再次中心属性的归纳推理力度则会依次表现出越来越强的趋势,到最后当前提对象和结论对象的属性完全不相似时,最次中心属性的归纳推理力度达到最高水平,而中心属性的归纳推理力度则降低到最低水平。由于再次中心属性的归纳推理力度的最高水平没有显著高于随机水平,而中心属性的归纳推理力度的最低水平却显著低于随机水平,因此,研究者认为,在前提对象和结论对象完全不相似的情况下,被试将确信不能采用中心属性来进行归纳推理的力度判断,而采用猜测的方式选择了肯定可以排除的项目之外的其他项目,这体现了具有不确定的归纳推理活动的过程的典型特征     

儿童归纳推理中的标签作用

传统的归纳推理观主要包括特征相似性观和概念观。在基于这两种传统观点的研究过程中,研究者逐渐发现类别知识,特别是标签起到的独特作用,但目前关于不同类型标签作用的分析还缺乏系统性。该文从分析目前两大主要标签研究现状——语言标签和类别标签入手,试图明确标签作用和关系、解释混淆和误解;同时,作者就以标签为载体的研究同儿童语言发展间存在的密切联系提出了儿童归纳推理发展的语言认知模式。文章最后认为未来的研究方向应集中在对机制、技术和深层次内部关系三方面问题的探讨上。     

Self‐supporting Arguments*

Deductive and inductive logic confront this skeptical challenge: we can justify any logical principle only by means of an argument but we can acquire justification by means of an argument only if we are already justified in believing some logical principle. We could solve this problem if probative arguments do not require justified belief in their corresponding conditionals. For if not, then inferential justification would not require justified belief in any logical principle. So even arguments whose corresponding conditionals are epistemically dependent upon their conclusions—epistemically self‐supporting arguments—need not be viciously circular. R.B. Braithwaite and James Van Cleve use internalist and externalist versions of this strategy in their proposed solutions to the problem of induction. Unfortunately, their arguments for self‐support are unsound and any theory of inferential justification that does not require justified belief in the corresponding conditionals of justification‐affording arguments is unacceptably arbitrary. So self‐supporting arguments cannot be justification‐creating.     

Explaining our Moral Reliability

I critically examine an evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism. The key premise of the argument is that there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability. I search for the strongest version of the argument; this involves exploring how ‘adequate explanation’ could be understood such that the key premise comes out true. Finally, I give a reductio: in the sense in which there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability, there is equally no adequate explanation of our inductive reliability. Thus, the argument that would debunk our moral views would also, absurdly, debunk all inductive reasoning.     

Proper bootstrapping

According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type of reasoning suffices to block the anti-reliabilist argument.     

Comparisons in research and reasoning: Toward an integrative theory of social induction

Strong scientific theories give coherence to a body of research findings, make precise predictions about key phenomena, and guide the search for new discoveries. In social psychology, some contemporary theories fall short of this ideal. Mini-theories are prevalent (cf. Van Lange, Higgins, & Kruglanski, 2011), many predictions are merely directional (like this one!) and theorizing post-hoc. Guided by experimental reasoning, many researchers emphasize—and reify—empirical differences. Taking the experimental method as an epistemological gold standard, they regard comparative thinking as a criterion of rational thinking. Using examples from social judgment and decision making, we show how comparative reasoning can constrain theoretical development and bias assessments of human rationality. To encourage movement toward stronger theory, we describe a model of inductive reasoning in social contexts.     

归纳推理和演绎推理的关系理论及其模型

推理是人类高级认知过程的一种,相关的心理学研究一般将其分为归纳推理和演绎推理两个方面。归纳推理是从特殊到一般的推理过程,与之相对的演绎推理则是从一般到特殊的过程。归纳推理和演绎推理的关系问题是当前心理推理研究领域的一个重点问题。这一问题主要有两种理论解释：一种是单过程理论,该理论认为归纳推理和演绎推理本质上是同一个认知过程,以单过程理论为基础构建的推理模型称为单维模型;另一种是双过程理论,认为归纳推理和演绎推理是两个不同的认知过程,并不同程度地受到启发和分析过程的影响。未来研究可多关注推理的时间进程,以及采用不同的研究方法对各自理论提供数据支持。     

Embodied cognition and abstract concepts: Do concept empiricists leave anything out?

According to the embodied cognition hypothesis, the mental symbols used for higher cognitive reasoning, such as the making of deductive and inductive inferences, both originate and reside in our sensory-motor-introspective and emotional systems. The main objection to this view is that it cannot explain concepts that are, by definition, detached from perception and action, i.e., abstract concepts such as TRUTH or DEMOCRACY. This objection is usually merely taken for granted and has yet to be spelled out in detail. In this paper, I distinguish three different versions of this objection (one semantic and two epistemic versions). Once these distinctions are in place, we can begin to see the solutions offered in the literature in a new, more positive, light.     

Mathematical Reasoning: Adults' Ability to Make the Inductive-Deductive Distinction

In this study, I examined adults' ability to distinguish necessary deductive and indeterminate inductive forms of argument in mathematics. Only 30% of a sample of college students distinguished deductive and inductive forms of argument and experienced deductively derived conclusions as necessary and inductively derived conclusions as uncertain. Forty percent failed to distinguish deductive and inductive forms and experienced inductively derived and deductively derived conclusions as necessary. Thirty percent distinguished deductive and inductive arguments but experienced deductively derived and inductively derived conclusions as uncertain. As observed in other reasoning domains, the introduction of personal beliefs or knowledge about the argument content appeared to affect adult reasoners' application of knowledge about forms of argument and judgments of necessity. The results suggest the following conclusions. Adults' experience of the conclusions from mathematical inductive and deductive arguments as provisional conclusions or necessary conclusions depends on a complex coordination involving ability to attend to abstract premise-conclusion relations and beliefs about the nature of mathematical objects and regularities. Thus, two major achievements are involved, explaining the low numbers able to judge necessity in mathematics.     

Why Induction Is No Cure For Baldness

The paper aims at establishing that the premises of both the inductive and the multi‐premised versions of the sorites argument are not apparently acceptable and that, therefore, sorites‐type arguments do not constitute logical or conceptual paradoxes. Rather, it is suggested that such arguments are most properly and fruitfully described as skeptical challenges. A secondary goal of the paper is to focus attention to the unduly neglected inductive version of the argument.     

Infinite Reasoning

Our relationship to the infinite is controversial. But it is widely agreed that our powers of reasoning are finite. I disagree with this consensus; I think that we can, and perhaps do, engage in infinite reasoning. Many think it is just obvious that we can't reason infinitely. This is mistaken. Infinite reasoning does not require constructing infinitely long proofs, nor would it gift us with non-recursive mental powers. To reason infinitely we only need an ability to perform infinite inferences. I argue that we have this ability. My argument looks to our best current theories of inference and considers examples of apparent infinite reasoning. My position is controversial, but if I'm right, our theories of truth, mathematics, and beyond could be transformed. And even if I'm wrong, a more careful consideration of infinite reasoning can only deepen our understanding of thinking and reasoning.     

Logical Argument Structures in Decision-making

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's practical reasoning theory has attracted a great deal of interest since its publication in 1969. Their most important assertion, however, that argument is the logical basis for practical decision-making, has been under-utilized, primarily because it was not sufficiently operationalized for research purposes. This essay presents an operationalization of practical reasoning for use in analyzing argument logics that emerge through group interaction. Particular elements of discourse and argument are identified as responding to principles put forward by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and are viewed as fitting together in a kind of logical argument structure that is well suited to the study of practical arguments in decision-making. Both the content elements and the logical argument structure are illustrated using examples from two studies examining decision logics in public participation and jury decision-making. Advantages of this approach and proposed recognition of a new `filtered' type of argument structure are discussed.