Extreme‐Right Voting in Western Europe: The Role of Social‐Cultural and Antiegalitarian Attitudes

The joint impact of antiegalitarian attitudes and social‐cultural attitudes on citizens’ tendency to vote for extreme right‐wing political parties was investigated. In the first study, we explored these attitudes in representative samples of seven Western European countries. In a follow‐up study, we predicted respondents’ likelihood of voting for a Dutch right‐wing party on the basis of the measures of social‐dominance orientation (as an indicator of antiegalitarian attitudes) and right‐wing authoritarianism (as an indicator of social‐cultural attitudes). Our findings demonstrated that voting for extreme right‐wing parties was associated more consistently with antiegalitarian attitudes than with social‐cultural attitudes. Moreover, the effect of antiegalitarian attitudes was partly mediated by migration attitudes (Study 1) and ethnic prejudice (Study 2). We discuss the finding that antiegalitarian attitudes are more strongly related to extreme right‐wing voting than social‐cultural attitudes.     

Blacks,Jews and the racial imagination in the writings of Sephardim in the long seventeenth century

This essay explores facets of the Sephardic racial imagination. Early Modern Catholic Iberian discourse generally scorned Jews and linked them, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, with denigrated Africans, or Blacks. Marginalized and often persecuted, conversos and Sephardim of the sixteenth through the eighteenth century resorted to hegemonic discourse about Blacks to construct their own identity. Central to Sephardic discourse about Blacks was its redemptive logic. In both Iberian Catholic and northwest-European Protestant colonial spheres, conversos and Sephardim sought through anti-Blackness to identity themselves (and hopefully for others to identify them) as members of the dominant White culture and ruling class, their religious otherness aside.Some of the material presented here comes from Jonathan Schorsch, Jews and Blacks in the Early Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own, for which I gratefully acknowledge the help of Hazel Gold, Viviana Grieco and Julia R. Lieberman. In order to convey the meaning of the often overwrought Baroque style of the Spanish originals, my translations are of necessity sometimes rather loose. I would also like to thank Yosef Kaplan, Lisa Moses Leff, Julia R. Lieberman and Kenneth Stow for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this essay.     

The closed mind: ‘Experience’ and ‘cognition’ aspects of openness to experience and need for closure as psychological bases for right‐wing attitudes

Openness to Experience and Need for Closure (NFC) are dispositional variables related to social‐cultural right‐wing attitudes. The present study investigated their joint effects. Factor analysis revealed an ‘experiential’ dimension with high loading openness items, and a ‘cognition’ dimension with high loadings for most NFC items and about a quarter of the openness item set. The experiential openness items were weakly related to right‐wing attitudes, demonstrating little predictive value. Conversely, the cognitive openness and NFC items were powerful predictors of right‐wing attitudes, and also played an important role in integrative models, both as a predictor of authoritarianism‐based racism and as a mediator of age related increments in right‐wing attitudes. It is concluded that right‐wing attitudes should be primarily understood in terms of (motivated) cognition, and to a smaller extent in terms of experiential openness. The distinction between ‘experiential’ and ‘cognitive’ openness is critically assessed, and it is asserted that because cognition is a multifaceted construct openness contains more than one cognitive dimension. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Environmentalism,right‐wing extremism,and social justice beliefs among East German adolescents

This study uses a representative population (N = 3331) of East German mainstream adolescents to examine how the competing worldviews of environmentalism and right‐wing extremism differently structure social justice beliefs. Integrating three theoretical considerations (object of worry, scope of justice, and underlying values) it suggests that these two worldviews have implicit assumptions that associate them in subtler ways with some specific conceptions of justice. The environmentalist worldview was found to be associated with egalitarianism, which may be explained by environmentalism's concern with societal and global problems, its broad inclusionary scope of justice, and the self‐transcendent values it advocates. In contrast, right‐wing extremism was found to be associated with anti‐egalitarianism, which can be attributed to its concern with the welfare of the in‐group, its relative narrow exclusionary scope of justice, and its self‐interest values of competition and individualism. After controlling for the possible effects of gender and socioeconomic status, these claims were mostly supported by hierarchical regression empirical analyses. Moreover, findings showed that endorsement of the environmentalist stance is more common than endorsement of the right‐wing extremist stance. Finally, females tend to endorse the environmentalist stance and prefer egalitarianism, while males tend to endorse the right‐wing extremist stance and prefer the equity principle. Further internal and external validation of the constructs by means of the examination of their nomological network is recommended. Moreover, results of this study are discussed in light of globalization processes and recent developments regarding a “third position,” according to which pro‐environmental and right‐wing extremist views are intermingled, i.e., right‐wing extremist groups can advocate a pro‐environmental view just as pro‐environmental groups can adopt a right‐wing extremist position.     

On the (dis-)confirmability of stereotypic attributes

Two experiments investigated the linguistic abstractness and confirmability of elements contained in ingroup and outgroup stereotypes. The first experiment shows that positive elements of the ingroup stereotype (Italians) and negative elements of the outgroup stereotype (Jews, Germans) tended to be particularly abstract. Also, negative elements contained in the outgroup stereotypes required relatively little evidence to be considered ‘true’ but much disconfirming evidence to be rejected as ‘false’. No such bias emerged for ingroup stereotypes. The second experiment compared the abstraction of four outgroup stereotypes (Jews, Blacks, homosexuals, career women) finding the greatest abstraction for the oldest stereotype (Jews), and least abstraction for the most recent stereotype (career women) with the remaining two groups (Blacks, homosexuals) occupying an intermediate position. Results are interpreted as suggesting that stereotypes may become more abstract over time as they lose the concrete elements that are easier to disconfirm while maintaining the abstract elements that are more resistant to change. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political and clinical developments in analytical psychology, 1972‐2014: subjectivity,equality and diversity—inside and outside the consulting room

Utilizing Jung's idea of theory as a ‘personal confession’, the author charts his own development as a theorist, establishing links between his personal history and his ideas. Such links include his relationship with both parents, his sexuality, his cultural heritage, and his fascination with Tricksters and with Hermes. There follows a substantial critical interrogation of what the author discerns as the two main lines of clinical theorizing in contemporary analytical psychotherapy: interpretation of transference‐countertransference, and the relational approach. His conclusion is that neither is superior to the other and neither is in fact adequate as a basis for clinical work. The focus then shifts to explore a range of political and social aspects of the clinical project of analytical psychology: economic inequality, diversity within the professional field, and Jung's controversial ideas about Jews and Africans. The author calls for an apology from the ‘Jungian community’ for remarks about Africans analogous to the apology already issued for remarks about Jews. The paper is dedicated to the author's friend Fred Plaut (1913‐2009).     

The Consequences of Collective Discontent: A New Measure of Zeitgeist Predicts Voting for Extreme Parties

In recent years, extreme right‐wing and left‐wing political parties and actors have gained popularity in many Western countries. What motivates people to vote for extreme right‐ or left‐wing parties? In previous research, we showed that a collectively shared sense of doom and gloom about society can exist among citizens who, individually, experience high well‐being. Previous research developed an operationalization of this collective societal discontent as an aspect of Zeitgeist, which can be compared to personal experiences (van der Bles, Postmes, & Meijer, 2015 ). In the present research, we investigated whether this Zeitgeist of societal discontent predicts voting for extreme parties. We conducted a field study during the 2015 Dutch provincial elections (N = 407). Results showed that collective societal discontent (Zeitgeist) predicted voting for extreme parties but that personal discontent did not. Results also showed that pessimistic Zeitgeist was associated with lower education levels and tabloid‐style media consumption. These findings advance our understanding of the discontents that fuel extreme voting outcomes: Global and abstract (negative) beliefs about society are more consequential than concrete personal experiences.     

Going to political extremes in response to boredom

Boredom makes people attempt to re‐establish a sense of meaningfulness. Political ideologies, and in particular the adherence to left‐ versus right‐wing beliefs, can serve as a source of meaning. Accordingly, we tested the hypothesis that boredom is associated with a stronger adherence to left‐ versus right‐wing beliefs, resulting in more extreme political orientations. Study 1 demonstrates that experimentally induced boredom leads to more extreme political orientations. Study 2 indicates that people who become easily bored with their environment adhere to more extreme ends of a political spectrum compared with their less easily bored counterparts. Finally, Study 3 reveals that the relatively extreme political orientations among those who are easily bored can be attributed to their enhanced search for meaning. Overall, our research suggests that extreme political orientations are, in part, a function of boredom's existential qualities.     

Does authoritarianism imply ethnocentric national attitudes: A revised look at the “authoritarian triad” and right‐wing ideology

Dozens of studies have shown that authoritarian people are ethnocentric. They are described as nationalistic, prejudiced, and hostile toward ethnic/national out‐groups. However, it can be argued that this critical claim remains unproven, as researchers do not take into consideration the very conservative right‐wing views typical of authoritarian people. To address this problem, two theoretical approaches were contrasted: the most commonly used right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) approach and the group authoritarianism approach. Both approaches define authoritarianism as the covariance of submission, aggression, and conventionalism, but they differ in that the former is inextricably related to right‐wing ideology while the latter is not. This paper presents the results of two survey studies conducted on samples of 600 and 400 respondents. In Study 1, it was found that RWA and group authoritarianism had different patterns of relationships with in‐group and out‐group national attitudes, providing strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that the right‐wing ideology generated ethnocentric national attitudes. Study 2 showed a strong direct effect of right‐wing ideology on ethnocentric national attitudes, while the impact of “pure” authoritarian covariance is marginal and sometimes even seems to be negative (e.g., ethnic prejudices). These findings suggest that authoritarianism has little to do with ethnocentric national attitudes. It is not the covariance of authoritarian attitudes that results in growing ethnocentrism. The true perpetrator can be found in the large component of right‐wing ideology contained in such measurement instruments as the RWA scale.     

Political Intolerance,Right and Left

Research recently published in Political Psychology suggested that political intolerance is more strongly predicted by political conservatism than liberalism. Our findings challenge that conclusion. Participants provided intolerance judgments of several targets and the political objective of these targets (left‐wing vs. right‐wing) was varied between subjects. Across seven judgments, conservatism predicted intolerance of left‐wing targets, while liberalism predicted intolerance of right‐wing targets. These relationships were fully mediated by perceived threat from targets. Moreover, participants were biased against directly opposing political targets: conservatives were more intolerant of a left‐wing target than the opposing right‐wing target (e.g., pro‐gay vs. anti‐gay rights activists), while liberals were more intolerant of a right‐wing target than the opposing left‐wing target. These findings are discussed within the context of the existing political intolerance and motivated reasoning literatures.     

Social Distance as a Measure of Prejudice Among Ethnic Groups in the United States

Data from surveys representative of the population of the United States were used to investigate 2 aspects of social distance as a measure of prejudice among Hispanics, non-Hispanic Whites, Jews, Asians, and Blacks. The results extended through 2000 a 65-year decline in prejudice. But, contrary to expectations, these groups were, on average, significantly opposed to virtually all other ethnic groups living in their neighborhoods or marrying their close relatives. The findings suggest that the popular hierarchical explanation of social distances with Whites at the top, Jews next, followed by Asians and Hispanics, and Blacks at the bottom is incorrect. A more accurate explanation is proposed.     

The Relationship Between Right‐wing Attitudes and Cognitive Style: A Comparison of Self‐report and Behavioural Measures of Rigidity and Intolerance of Ambiguity

Two recent meta‐analytic studies addressing the relationship between cognitive style and right‐wing attitudes yielded some discrepancies. We argue that these discrepancies can be accounted for when one considers the types of cognitive style measures included in those analyses. One of these analyses primarily relied on self‐report measures, whereas the other relied on behavioural measures of cognitive style. Based on a new meta‐analysis of 103 samples (total N = 12 714) focussing on behavioural and self‐report measures of rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity, we confirmed the hypothesis that self‐report scales yield stronger relationships with right‐wing attitudes than behavioural measures. We point out potential conceptual and validity issues with both types of cognitive style measures and call for cautiousness when interpreting the magnitude of their relationships with ideology. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

When threat to society becomes a threat to oneself: Implications for right‐wing attitudes and ethnic prejudice

The relationships between threat on one hand and right‐wing attitudes and ethnic prejudice on the other were investigated in a heterogeneous sample (N = 588). Specifically, we considered the perception of economic and terroristic threats in terms of their consequences at the societal and personal levels. Previous studies revealed that societal consequences of threat, rather than personal consequences, are related to right‐wing attitudes. However, the present results challenge these findings. More specifically, three important results emerged. First, items probing the distinct threat levels loaded on separate dimensions for economic and terroristic threat, validating the distinction between societal and personal threat consequences. Second, consistent with previous research, this study revealed that perceived societal consequences of threat yield strong and robust relationships with all target variables. However, personal consequences of threat were also associated with higher levels of right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), and ethnic prejudice in particular. Third, societal and personal consequences of threat interacted in explaining the target variables. More specifically, feeling personally threatened by terrorism was only related to higher levels of RWA in the presence of low levels of threat to society, whereas experiencing personal economic threat was only related to higher levels of SDO and ethnic prejudice when high societal economic threat was experienced. In sum, although the perception of societal consequences of threat plays a prominent role in explaining right‐wing attitudes and ethnic prejudice, the perception of being personally affected by threat is also associated with higher levels of RWA and SDO, and especially ethnic prejudice.     

When Authoritarians Confront Prejudice. Differential Effects of SDO and RWA on Support for Hate‐Speech Prohibition

Two nationwide representative studies (N = 653 adolescents; N = 1007 adults) investigated the psychological correlates of the intention to penalize public expressions of prejudice in the form of support for hate‐speech prohibition. We presented participants with preselected examples of hate speech from the Internet and other mass media and assessed their willingness to support the prohibition of public expressions of such remarks. Both studies found that social dominance orientation and right‐wing authoritarianism are positively correlated with outgroup prejudice, but they have differential effects on hate‐speech prohibition. Social dominance orientation was positively related to the acceptance of hate speech, whereas right‐wing authoritarianism was positively related to hate‐speech prohibition. In discussing this counterintuitive finding, we suggest that right‐wing authoritarians are particularly vigilant toward norm violations—and this makes them more punitive toward counternormative expressions of prejudice, such as hate speech.     

The Mobilizing Effect of Right‐Wing Ideological Climates: Cross‐Level Interaction Effects on Different Types of Outgroup Attitudes

The present research investigated a multilevel person‐context interactionist framework for the relationship between right‐wing ideologies and prejudice across two large, representative samples (Study 1: European Social Survey: N = 56,752; Study 2: World Values Survey: N = 74,042). Across three different operationalizations of right‐wing ideology, two contextual levels (regional and national) of right‐wing climate, and three types of outgroup attitudes (i.e., age‐, ethnicity‐, and gender‐based), the analyses consistently revealed cross‐level interactions, showing a strong association between right‐wing attitudes and negative outgroup attitudes at the individual level in contexts with a low right‐wing climate, whereas this relationship is weaker and often even absent in contexts with a high right‐wing climate. These cross‐level interactions remained significant after controlling for statistical artefacts (i.e., restriction of range and outliers). The authors propose norm setting as the mobilizing mechanism through which a right‐wing climate develops and curbs the influence of individual right‐wing social‐ideological attitudes on outgroup attitudes.     

Self‐affirmation,political value congruence,and support for refugees

This research tested the potential for self‐affirmation on left‐ and right‐wing political values to increase behavioral intentions to provide help and assistance to refugees. We present a pilot study defining left‐ and right‐wing values, and a main study in which participants completed either a self‐affirmation task, a group‐affirmation task, or participated in a control condition on values that were either congruent or incongruent with their own political views. Results show that left‐wing oriented participants showed more supportive intentions in the self‐affirmation condition compared to the group‐affirmation and control conditions, independent of values congruency. In contrast, right‐wing participants showed more supportive intentions in the self‐affirmation condition, but only when they affirmed on values that were congruent with their own political views.     

Cooperation in Turbulent Times: Strategies of Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam

Relations between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam grew tense after the conflicts between Gaza and Israel in 2014, the violent attacks on Jewish targets in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015) and Copenhagen (2015) and local incidents of online, verbal and sometimes physical discrimination. Nevertheless, these factors also inspired Jews and Muslims to launch cooperation projects and strengthen the bonds already existing between them. Cooperation in turbulent times is not always easy. The data collected for this research show how Jews and Muslims in cooperation projects use to strategies to solve some of the problems confronting them. The three most widely used strategies that were found are ‘searching for similarities’, ‘decategorizing’ and ‘avoidance’. These strategies do not emerge in a vacuum, however, but at a certain moment in time, in specific fields. Therefore, this article, will describe the usage of the three strategies and explain the interaction between strategies and their contexts.     

The Suppression and Justification of Prejudice as a Function of Political Orientation

Politically conservative (versus liberal) individuals generally report more prejudice towards various low‐status out‐groups. Three studies examined whether prejudice suppression factors—specifically, internal and external motivation to suppress (IMS and EMS, respectively) prejudice—can help explain the relationship between political orientation and prejudice. Study 1 showed that IMS and EMS partially mediated the relationship between political orientation and affective prejudice towards Arabs. Study 2 demonstrated that when justification [right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation] and suppression (IMS and EMS) factors are simultaneously tested as mediators, only RWA partially mediated the relationship between political orientation and prejudice towards deviant (e.g. gay men) out‐groups, whereas RWA and IMS fully mediated the relationship between political orientation and prejudice towards derogated out‐groups (e.g. Blacks). Intriguingly, IMS rendered social dominance orientation effects non‐significant for derogated out‐groups. Study 3 showed that anticipating an out‐group interaction (with a Black or lesbian confederate) diminished the mediational contribution of IMS in the political orientation–prejudice relationship because of increased IMS among participants; yet the increases in IMS did not completely eliminate differences in prejudice as a function of political orientation. Ultimately, these three studies demonstrate that suppression (in addition to justification) factors do help explain the relationship between political orientation and prejudice. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology.     

Threat and Right‐Wing Attitudes: A Cross‐National Approach

Threat relates to right‐wing ideological attitudes at the individual level. The present study aims to extend this relationship to the national level. More specifically, in a sample of 91 nations, we collected country‐level indicators of threat (including inflation, unemployment, gross national product, homicide rate, and life expectancy). Moreover, we analyzed data from the European and World Value Survey (total N = 134,516) to obtain aggregated country‐level indicators for social‐cultural and economic‐hierarchical right‐wing attitudes for each of these countries. In accordance with previous findings based on the individual level, a positive relationship between threat indicators and right‐wing attitudes emerged. This relationship was stronger than what was usually reported at the individual level. In the discussion, we focus on the mutually reinforcing influence at the individual and national levels in terms of right‐wing attitudes.