Four‐month‐old infants individuate and track simple tools following functional demonstrations

Two experiments examined whether 4‐month‐olds (n = 120) who were induced to assign two objects to different categories would then be able to take advantage of these contrastive categorical encodings to individuate and track the objects. In each experiment, infants first watched functional demonstrations of two tools, a masher and tongs (Experiment 1) or a marker and a knife (Experiment 2). Next, half the infants saw the two tools brought out alternately from behind a screen, which was then lowered to reveal only one of the tools (different‐objects condition); the other infants saw similar events except that the same tool was shown on either side of the screen (same‐object condition). In both experiments, infants in the different‐objects condition looked reliably longer than those in the same‐object condition, and this effect was eliminated if the demonstrations involved similar but non‐functional actions. Together, these results indicate that infants (a) were led by the functional demonstrations they observed to assign the two tools to distinct categories, (b) recruited these categorical encodings to individuate and track the tools, and hence (c) detected a violation in the different‐objects condition when the screen was lowered to reveal only one tool. Categorical information thus plays a privileged role in individuation and identity tracking from a very young age.     

When and why do we want to know? How experienced regret promotes post‐decision information search

The effect of emotional and situational factors on the decision to seek out post‐decision information about un‐chosen alternative was examined in five experiments. Experiment 1 tested participants' willingness to find out the outcome of an un‐chosen investment that was likely to have a higher value than the chosen investment. It was found that participants were more willing to acquire information when they were responsible for the decision. Experiment 2 showed that responsibility affects information seeking, in particular when one suspects that a wrong decision was made. Experiments 3–5 examined the role of regret on information seeking. It was shown that regret about making the wrong investment (Experiment 3), forgetting to send in a lottery ticket (Experiment 4), and missing an opportunity to use a discount card after spending a month in Australia (Experiment 5), mediates the information‐seeking behavior. Experiment 5 also demonstrated that the experience of regret (and not its anticipation) influences post‐decision information seeking even when the information is of no future use. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Six-month-olds’ ability to use linguistic cues when interpreting others’ pointing actions

The present research investigated whether six-month-olds who rarely produce pointing actions can detect the object-directedness and communicative function of others’ pointing actions when linguistic information is provided. In Experiment 1, infants were randomly assigned to either a novel-word or emotional-vocalization condition. They were first familiarized with an event in which an actor uttered either a novel label (novel-word condition) or exclamatory expression (emotional-vocalization condition) and then pointed to one of two objects. Next, the positions of the objects were switched. During test trials, each infant watched the new-referent event where the actor pointed to the object to which the actor had not pointed before or the old-referent event where the actor pointed to the old object in its new location. Infants in the novel-word condition looked reliably longer at the new-referent event than at the old-referent event, suggesting that they encoded the object-directedness of the actor’s point. In contrast, infants in the emotional-vocalization condition showed roughly equal looking times to the two events. To further examine infants’ understanding of the communicative aspect of an actor’s point using a different communicative context, Experiment 2 used an identical procedure to the novel-word condition in Experiment 1, except there was only one object present during the familiarization trials. When the familiarization trials did not include a contrasting object, we found that the communicative intention of the actor’s point could be ambiguous. The infants showed roughly equal looking times during the two test events. The current research suggests that six-month-olds understand the object-directedness and communicative intention of others’ pointing when presented with a label, but not when presented with an emotional non-speech vocalization.     

Counterfactual thinking about actions and failures to act

When people think counterfactually about how a situation could have turned out differently, they mentally undo events in regular ways (e.g., they focus on actions not failures to act). Four experiments examine the recent discovery that the focus on actions in the short term switches to inactions in the long term. The experiments show that this temporal switch occurs only for particular sorts of situations. Experiment 1 showed no temporal pattern to the agency effect when 112 participants judged emotional impact and frequency of "if-only" thoughts from both short- and long-term perspectives for an investment scenario. Experiment 2 showed no temporal pattern when 190 participants considered a college choice scenario with a good outcome. Experiment 3 showed no temporal pattern when 131 participants considered an investment scenario even when the situation for the actor and nonactor was bad from the outset. Experiment 4, with 113 participants, showed a focus on actions even when the investment loss was equal for both the actor and nonactor. The implications of the results are discussed in terms of what is explicitly available in the mental representation of actions and inactions.     

Two‐year‐old children preferentially transmit simple actions but not pedagogically demonstrated actions

Children are sensitive to both social and non‐social aspects of the learning environment. Among social cues, pedagogical communication has been shown to not only play a role in children's learning, but also in their own active transmission of knowledge. Vredenburgh, Kushnir and Casasola, Developmental Science, 2015, 18, 645 showed that 2‐year‐olds are more likely to demonstrate an action to a naive adult after learning it in a pedagogical than in a non‐pedagogical context. This finding was interpreted as evidence that pedagogically transmitted information has a special status as culturally relevant. Here we test the limits of this claim by setting it in contrast with an explanation in which the relevance of information is the outcome of multiple interacting social (e.g., pedagogical demonstration) and non‐social properties (e.g., action complexity). To test these competing hypotheses, we varied both pedagogical cues and action complexity in an information transmission paradigm with 2‐year‐old children. In Experiment 1, children preferentially transmitted simple non‐pedagogically demonstrated actions over pedagogically demonstrated more complex actions. In Experiment 2, when both actions were matched for complexity, we found no evidence of preferential transmission of pedagogically demonstrated actions. We discuss possible reasons for the discrepancy between our results and previous literature showing an effect of pedagogical cues on cultural transmission, and conclude that our results are compatible with the view that pedagogical and other cues interact, but incompatible with the theory of a privileged role for pedagogical cues.     

Anticipatory representation of visual basketball scenes by novice and expert players

This paper studies the anticipatory nature of perception in relation to subjects' expertise in basketball. The two experiments conducted showed that experts encode game situations by automatically building a representation of the next‐likely state of the observed scene. In Experiment 1, subjects had to quickly compare pairs of configurations presented in succession. The results indicated that expert subjects differentiated the second configuration from the first less accurately and more slowly when the second configuration was the next‐likely state of the first, than when it was a possible previous state. In Experiment 2, subjects had to study game configurations and then perform a recognition task. The results showed that experts more often falsely recognized new configurations when they were the next‐likely state of an already‐encoded configuration than when they represented a possible previous state. Based on these results, we discuss the nature of expert knowledge, the integration of anticipatory components in perceptual processes, and the impact of expert knowledge on visual‐scene encoding and memorization.     

The influence of motor expertise and motor experience on action and actor recognition

Two experiments examined whether different levels of motor and visual experience influence action perception and whether this effect depends on the type of perceptual task. Within an action recognition task (Experiment 1), professional basketball players and novice college students were asked to identify basketball dribbles from point-light displays. Results showed faster reaction times and greater accuracy in experts, but no advantage when observing either own or teammates’ actions compared with unknown expert players. Within an actor recognition task (Experiment 2), the same expert players were asked to identify the model actors. Results showed poor discrimination between teammates and players from another team, but a more accurate assignment of own actions to the own team. When asked to name the actor, experts recognised themselves slightly better than teammates. Results support the hypothesis that motor experience influences action recognition. They also show that the influence of motor experience on the perception of own actions depends on the type of perceptual task.     

There are Non‐Causal Explanations of Particular Events

A defence of non‐causal explanations of events is presented in cases where explanation is understood as modal explanation. In such cases the source of modal information is crucial. All explanations implicitly use contrast classes, and relative to a particular contrast we can privilege some difference makers over others. Thinking about changes in these privileged “actual” difference makers is then the source of modal information for any given explanandum. If an actual difference maker is non‐causal, then we have a principled definition of a non‐causal explanation of an event regardless of how much causal information is also contained in the explanans. A demarcation of explanation into causal and non‐causal in this way recovers ordinary language about explanation as well as reflecting genuine differences in practice, such as the in‐principle evidential base for any modal claim.     

Magical thinking in judgments of causation: Can anomalous phenomena affect ontological causal beliefs in children and adults?

In four experiments, 4‐, 5‐, 6‐ and 9‐year‐old children and adults were tested on the entrenchment of their magical beliefs and their beliefs in the universal power of physical causality. In Experiment 1, even 4‐year‐olds showed some understanding of the difference between ordinary and anomalous (magical) causal events, but only 6‐year‐olds and older participants denied that magic could occur in real life. When shown an anomalous causal event (a transformation of a physical object in an apparently empty box after a magic spell was cast on the box), 4‐ and 6‐year‐olds accepted magical explanations of the event, whereas 9‐year‐olds and adults did not. In Experiment 2, the same patterns of behaviour as above were shown by 6‐ and 9‐year‐olds who demonstrated an understanding of the difference between genuine magical events and similarly looking tricks. Testing the entrenchment of magical beliefs in this experiment showed that 5‐year‐olds tended to retain their magical explanations of the anomalous event, even after the mechanism of the trick had been explained to them, whereas 6‐ and 9‐year‐olds did not. In Experiment 3, adult participants refused to accept magical explanations of the anomalous event and interpreted it as a trick or an illusion, even after this event was repeated 4 times. Yet, when in Experiment 4 similar anomalous causal events were demonstrated without reference to magic, most adults acknowledged, both in their verbal judgments and in their actions, that the anomalous effects were not a fiction but had really occurred. The data of this study suggest that in the modern industrialized world, magical beliefs persist but are disguised to fit the dominant scientific paradigm.     

Learning From Peers’ Eye Movements in the Absence of Expert Guidance: A Proof of Concept Using Laboratory Stock Trading,Eye Tracking,and Machine Learning

Existing research shows that people can improve their decision skills by learning what experts paid attention to when faced with the same problem. However, in domains like financial education, effective instruction requires frequent, personalized feedback given at the point of decision, which makes it time‐consuming for experts to provide and thus, prohibitively costly. We address this by demonstrating an automated feedback mechanism that allows amateur decision‐makers to learn what information to attend to from one another, rather than from an expert. In the first experiment, eye movements of N = 100 subjects were recorded while they repeatedly performed a standard behavioral finance investment task. Consistent with previous studies, we found that a significant proportion of subjects were affected by decision bias. In the second experiment, a different group of N = 100 subjects faced the same task but, after each choice, they received individual, machine learning‐generated feedback on whether their pre‐decision eye movements resembled those made by Experiment 1 subjects prior to good decisions. As a result, Experiment 2 subjects learned to analyze information similarly to their successful peers, which in turn reduced their decision bias. Furthermore, subjects with low Cognitive Reflection Test scores gained more from the proposed form of process feedback than from standard behavioral feedback based on decision outcomes.     

Two‐year‐olds are vigilant of others’ non‐verbal cues to credibility

Data from three experiments provide the first evidence that children, at least as young as age two, are vigilant of others’ non‐verbal cues to credibility, and flexibly use these cues to facilitate learning. Experiment 1 revealed that 2‐ and 3‐year‐olds prefer to learn about objects from someone who appears, through non‐verbal cues, to be confident in performing actions on those objects than from someone who appears uncertain when performing actions on those objects. Experiment 2 revealed that when 2‐year‐olds observe only one model perform a single action, either confidently or unconfidently, they do not use the model’s level of confidence in this single instance to influence their learning. Experiment 3 revealed that 2‐year‐olds will use a single model’s level of confidence to guide their learning if they have observed that the model has a history of being either consistently confident or consistently uncertain. These findings reveal that young children selectively alter their learning based on others’ non‐verbal cues of credibility, and underscore the importance of an early sensitivity to socio‐cognitive cues for human learning and development.     

When do children trust the expert? Benevolence information influences children's trust more than expertise

How do children use informant niceness, meanness, and expertise when choosing between informant claims and crediting informants with knowledge? In Experiment 1, preschoolers met two experts providing conflicting claims for which only one had relevant expertise. Five‐year‐olds endorsed the relevant expert's claim and credited him with knowledge more often than 3‐year‐olds. In Experiment 2, niceness/meanness information was added. Although children most strongly preferred the nice relevant expert, the children often chose the nice irrelevant expert when the relevant one was mean. In Experiment 3, a mean expert was paired with a nice non‐expert. Although this nice informant had no expertise, preschoolers continued to endorse his claims and credit him with knowledge. Also noteworthy, children in all three experiments seemed to struggle more to choose the relevant expert's claim than to credit him with knowledge. Together, these experiments demonstrate that niceness/meanness information can powerfully influence how children evaluate informants.     

The actions of others as determinants of behavior in social trap situations

Three studies were conducted to determine the effects of observing the behaviors of others upon an individual's actions in a simulated social trap situation. In Experiment 1, it was found that merely having the opportunity to make comparative appraisals of the actions of others led to greater competition for a finite common resource than when subjects were physically isolated from one another. In Experiment 2, false feedback was given to subjects to determine if the actions of others alone were responsible for the deleterious effects of having the opportunity for comparative appraisal; it was found that subjects quickly conformed to the behavior pattern of the interacting others, regardless of whether the false feedback indicated that the other subjects were consuming more or less than no-treatment control subjects. Experiment 3 was conducted to determine the motivation of subjects reacting to the actions of others; differential predictions based upon a competition/relative outcome explanation and upon an information search explanation were made. The data were consistent with the information search explanation.     

Mortality salience and evaluations of in‐group versus out‐group critics: The role of criticism legitimacy and perceived threat

Significant terror management research has examined the impact of mortality salience on evaluations toward in‐group versus out‐group and attitudinally similar versus dissimilar others. However, relatively little research has examined evaluations when group membership is disentangled from attitude similarity. The current research examined the impact of mortality salience on evaluations toward in‐group and out‐group critics when people are less likely to rely on group membership as a heuristic. In Experiment 1, the results showed that in the control condition, participants rated an in‐group member who provided unjustified criticism more positively than an out‐group member who provided the same criticism. Under mortality salience, the reverse occurred: An in‐group member who provided unjustified criticism was rated more negatively than an out‐group member. Experiment 2 showed that under mortality salience, the derogation of an in‐group critic who provided unjustified criticism was mediated by perceptions of threat. Implications for reactions to group‐directed criticism as well as mortality salience effects are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Eponymous verb phrases and ambiguity resolution

To understand eponymous verb phrases such as "do a John Travolta," readers cannot merely select a sense out of a mental lexicon (sense selection). They must create new senses (sense creation) by retrieving salient information from memory. We conducted two experiments to test the hypothesis that these processes of memory retrieval parallel those used for ordinary lexical ambiguities. To prepare for Experiment 1, we gathered readers' interpretations of eponymous verb phrases like "do a John Travolta" to establish dominant and subordinate interpretations. We then wrote story contexts that biased comprehension toward one or the other interpretation. In Experiment 1, paraphrase judgment times were used to demonstrate that dominant meanings are privileged in the sense that they are accessible even when the story creates a subordinate bias. In Experiment 2, this privilege faded somewhat when there was a delay before the paraphrase judgment. We discuss the results with respect to the distinction between sense selection and sense creation.     

Memory for "mean" over "nice": the influence of threat on children's face memory

Adults remember faces of threatening over non-threatening individuals. This memory advantage could be indicative of a system rooted deeply in cognitive evolution to track and remember individuals who have been harmful in the past and therefore might be harmful again. Conversely, adults may have learned through experience that it pays to be vigilant. In the present research, we investigated whether attention to threatening individuals is privileged in young children's face memory. In Experiment 1, preschool-age children showed a face recognition memory advantage for individuals who were said to have committed harmful rather than helpful actions. In a further experiment, children did not selectively remember individuals who were described as the recipients of these actions, suggesting that the memory enhancement was produced by threat rather than negative valence. Together, these findings provide evidence for an early-developing system for remembering threatening individuals, consistent with an evolutionary account of its origins.     

Visual experience influences 12-month-old infants' perception of goal-directed actions of others

In the present study, we investigated whether infants' own visual experiences affected their perception of the visual status of others engaging in goal-directed actions. In Experiment 1, infants viewed video clips of successful and failed goal-directed actions performed by a blindfolded adult, with half the infants having previously experienced being blindfolded. The results showed that 12-month-old infants who were previously blindfolded preferred to look longer at the demonstrator's successful actions, whereas no such preference was observed in 8-month-old infants. In Experiment 2, infants watched the same 2 actions when the adult demonstrator was not blindfolded. The responses of 12-month-old infants were the opposite of those observed in Experiment 1: they showed a preference for the failed actions. These findings suggest that previous experience influenced the subsequent perception of others' goal-directed actions in the 12-month-old infants. We favor the interpretation that the preference for the successful actions in the 12-months-old infants provided with blindfolded experience demonstrates the influence of perceptual experience on considering the visual status of others engaging in goal-directed actions.     

When focusing on differences leads to similar perspectives

The current research investigated whether mind-sets and contexts that afford a focus on self-other differences can facilitate perceptual and conceptual forms of perspective taking. Supporting this hypothesis, results showed that directly priming a difference mind-set made perceivers more likely to spontaneously adopt other people's visual perspectives (Experiment 1) and less likely to overimpute their own privileged knowledge to others (Experiments 2 and 3). Given that intergroup encounters typically evoke a difference mind-set, we also explored the possibility that such contexts might help perceivers to step outside their own perspectives. As predicted, perceivers were less "cursed" by their own privileged knowledge when mentalizing about out-group targets than when mentalizing about in-group targets (Experiment 4) and communicated more effectively with interaction partners whose minimal-group membership differed from their own (Experiment 5). Overall, acknowledging self-other differences allowed perceivers to look beyond the limits of their own perspectives and thereby provided an efficacious route to intuiting other people's minds.     

Working memory for ballet moves and spatial locations in professional ballet dancers

The aim of the present study was to investigate working memory for ballet moves in expert dancers. Experiment 1 showed that a concurrent spatial task did not interfere with the recall of a sequence of ballet moves when these were encoded alone without being associated with spatial locations. Experiment 2 showed that a concurrent motor task selectively interfered with the recall of ballet moves while neither a concurrent motor task nor a spatial task affected recall of the specific locations where each ballet move had to be performed. Experiment 3 showed that spatial interference affected recall of sequences of locations when these were encoded alone. Finally, in Experiment 4, a similarity effect for patterned ballet movements was shown. Taken together results show that spatial interference does not affect short‐term memory for ballet moves thus suggesting that working memory might contain a system for motor configurations. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Young children overimitate in third-party contexts

The exhibition of actions that are causally unnecessary to the outcomes with which they are associated is a core feature of human cultural behavior. To enter into the world(s) of their cultural in-group, children must learn to assimilate such unnecessary actions into their own behavioral repertoire. Past research has established the habitual tendency of children to adopt the redundant actions of adults demonstrated directly to them. Here we document how young children will do so even when such actions are modeled to a third person regardless of whether children are presented with the test apparatus by the demonstrating, and assumedly expert, adult or by the observing, and assumedly naive, adult (Experiment 1), whether or not children had opportunity to discover how the apparatus works prior to modeling (Experiment 1), and whether or not children's attention was drawn to the demonstration while they were otherwise occupied (Experiment 2). These results emphasize human children's readiness to acquire behavior that is in keeping with what others do, regardless of the apparent efficiency of the actions employed, and in so doing to participate in cultural learning.