Can fabricated evidence induce false eyewitness testimony?

False information can influence people's beliefs and memories. But can fabricated evidence induce individuals to accuse another person of doing something they never did? We examined whether exposure to a fabricated video could produce false eyewitness testimony. Subjects completed a gambling task alongside a confederate subject, and later we falsely told subjects that their partner had cheated on the task. Some subjects viewed a digitally manipulated video of their partner cheating; some were told that video evidence of the cheating exists; and others were not told anything about video evidence. Subjects were asked to sign a statement confirming that they witnessed the incident and that their corroboration could be used in disciplinary action against the accused. See‐video subjects were three times more likely to sign the statement than Told‐video and Control subjects. Fabricated evidence may, indeed, produce false eyewitness testimony; we discuss probable cognitive mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Task framing reduces emotion decoding negativity biases in social anxiety

Social anxiety is associated with difficulty in decoding emotional expressions. In this work, we present two experiments demonstrating that manipulating the apparent social relevance of an emotion‐identification task can reduce these difficulties. In Experiment 1, we find that social anxiety predicts an oversensitivity to anger expressions when participants are told they are completing a task that measures social skills. However, when the same task is framed as a measure of intellectual skills, this oversensitivity to anger is eliminated. Experiment 2 finds that social anxiety interferes with participants' ability to discriminate real from fake smiles when participants are told they are completing a test of social skills, but not when they are completing an ostensible measure of intellectual skills.     

Getting ready for the bad times: self‐esteem and anticipatory coping

When we cannot alter the characteristics of an aversive event, we are still able to prepare ourselves for what is to come. In other words, we can engage in ‘anticipatory coping.’ Known self‐esteem differences in self‐regulation led to the prediction that low self‐esteem (LSE) individuals would evidence different anticipatory coping patterns than high self‐esteem (HSE) people. HSE and LSE participants were faced with either a low or high probability of engaging in a painful task. They were told about, and given the opportunity to engage in, a preparatory strategy aimed at minimizing discomfort during the painful task. Those participants in the low probability condition prepared for the painful task less than did those participants in the high probability condition. As hypothesized, the effect of probability condition was more pronounced for HSE, compared to LSE, participants. Also, in the low probability condition, there was a trend towards LSE participants preparing more than HSE participants. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Memory distortions: When suggestions cannot be easily ignored

In the present study, the persistence of personal false memories (FMs) after social feedback that denies their truth was assessed. Participants imitated actions performed by the experimenter (Session 1) and watched a doctored video with performed and critical “fake” actions (Session 2), followed by a memory rating and a recognition task. A few days later (Session 3), participants were clearly told that some memories were false and received daily reminders of the correct list of objects/actions before testing their memory again in Session 4. Results of both memory ratings and recognition indicated effective FM implantation. Interestingly, response times for correct rejections were longer for fake than true objects, suggesting participants struggled to ignore false suggestions. Crucial for our aim, Session 4 showed that FM persisted also after the debriefing and repeated presentations of correct list of objects/actions, suggesting that FMs for actions are rather difficult to discard.     

Fakability of a commercially produced pre-employment integrity test

Three groups of male inmates were given the PSC Survey ADT, a commercially available integrity test, under differing instructional conditions. Subjects told to fake good were able to provide more favorable test profiles than those who were told to respond truthfully or who were given no specific response set to follow. However, no differences were observed among groups on the Drinking and Drugs subscale. Using only recommended cut scores as criteria, subjects in the fake good condition would have been hired in greater numbers than subjects in the other two conditions. Practical implications of this study include the use of social desirability scales along with integrity tests, and the avoidance of inducing inappropriate response sets by strictly adhering to test instructions.This study was supported by a grant from Auburn University at Montgomery.We gratefully acknowledge the support and assistance of Warden Leoneal Davis and Dr. Paul Van Wyk of the Bullock County Correctional Facility and the Alabama Department of Corrections in conducting this study.     

Performance of an unpleasant task: Effects of over- vs under-payment on perception of adequacy of rewards and task attractiveness

Subjects who came to an experiment expecting to receive a moderate amount of money for performing a task were then told, either before or after performing it, that their pay would be higher than, equal to, or less than they had expected. When the actual payment was announced after the task was performed, subjects' evaluations of the task increased with the amount they were paid; however, they estimated a higher rate of pay to be appropriate if they received either more or less than they expected than if they received what they expected. When the actual payment was announced before the task was performed (and before subjects made their decision to perform it), a different pattern emerged. Subjects rated the task more attractive when they were offered either more or less than the expected amount, while their judgments of the appropriateness of the pay offered increased with the amount of the offer. Implications of the results for incentive and dissonance theories as well as self-perception and equity theories are discussed.     

Delay and déjà vu: Timing and repetition increase the power of false evidence

False images and videos can induce people to believe in and remember events that never happened. Using a novel method, we examined whether the timing of false evidence would influence its effect (Experiment 1) and determined the relationship between timing and repetition (Experiment 2). Subjects completed a hazard perception driving test and were falsely accused of cheating. Some subjects were shown a fake video or photograph of the cheating either after a 9-min delay (Experiment 1) or more than once with or without a delay (Experiment 2). Subjects were more likely to falsely believe that they had cheated and to provide details about how the cheating happened when the false evidence was delayed or repeated—especially when repeated over time—relative to controls. The results show that even a strikingly short delay between an event and when false evidence is disclosed can distort people’s beliefs and that repeating false evidence over a brief delay fosters false beliefs more so than without a delay. These findings have theoretical implications for metacognitive models of autobiographical memory and practical implications for police interrogations.     

Second-Guessing the Jury: Stereotypic and Hindsight Biases in Perceptions of Court Cases1

This research examined the effects of stereotypic beliefs and hindsight biases on perceptions of court cases. Subjects read evidentiary material pertaining to a criminal trial in which the defendant either was a stereotyped offender or was not. Additionally, some subjects were given outcome information about the verdict attained in the trial; half of these subjects were told that the defendant had been found guilty, and the other half were told that he had been found not guilty. The remainder were not given any outcome information. Subjects were than asked to predict the likely outcome of a trial based on the presented evidence. Typical hindsight bias effects were expected and obtained for nonstereotyped offenders; subjects considering these cases viewed the evidence as less incriminating when they were told the defendant had been found not guilty, and they found it to be more incriminating when they were told the defendant had been found guilty, when compared to the no-outcome-information group. However, no hindsight biases were evident in judgments of cases involving stereotyped defendants, who were seen as relatively more likely to be guilty regardless of the nature of outcome information presented. Particularly striking was the lack of impact of the “not guilty” outcome information on perceptions of the guilt of stereotyped defendants. These findings suggest that strong expectations held in foresight may not be amenable to modification in hindsight.     

Effects of being observed on learning following success and failure experiences

In two experiments female subjects performed a task either alone or while being observed by a female experimenter, after which they were told that they had performed well or poorly. On a paired-associates (PA) learning task that followed, subjects who performed in the presence of the observing experimenter required more trials to criterion and committed more errors than those who worked alone only if they had supposedly done poorly on the preceding task. Subjects who had done well on the prior task performed better on the PA task when observed than when alone provided that the preliminary task had also measured verbal learning. A measure of skin conductance indicated increased arousal under conditions of observation on the PA task only after a poor performance on the preceding task. The results are discussed in terms of the drive theory of social facilitation and the conditions under which being observed produces evaluation apprehension.     

The Effect of Perceived Control on Risk Taking1

The experiment investigates the effect of perceived control on risk taking in a dynamic, everyday task. Using established and validated video simulation techniques, the risk-taking preferences for 96 drivers were measured for a range of driving activities (speed choice, following distance, gap acceptance, and overtaking). The perceived control manipulation was as follows: Half of the participants were told to imagine they were driving the vehicle, and the other half were told to imagine they were passengers. Those who were told to imagine they were driving chose significantly faster speeds than did those who were told to imagine they were passengers. Differences for the other risk-taking measures were not significant. For speed choice, it could be argued that an illusion of control was in operation, such that those who were in control (i.e., drivers) were comfortable with a higher level of risk than those who were not in control (i.e., passengers).     

Equity,equality, and the protestant ethic: Allocating rewards following fair and unfair competition

Female undergraduates scoring high and low on the Mirels-Garrett Protestant Ethic (PE) Scale divided a fixed reward between themselves and a co-worker following competition on a clerical task. Half the subjects were told that they had either won or lost in fair competition. The remaining subjects were told they had either won or lost because of an error that gave a favorable advantage to one of the performers. When the competition was fair, high PEs distributed the rewards available according to an equity norm, keeping more than half when they won and less than half when they lost. When the competition was unfair, high PEs attempted to reestablish fairness by compensating the performer with the unfair disadvantage. However, low PEs kept approximately half the reward regardless of fairness and regardless of whether they won or lost.     

Intentional versus unintentional use of contingencies between perceptual events

In three experiments we studied human ability to use statistical contingencies between visual stimuli (flankers and targets) to improve performance in a letter-digit classification task. We compared the performance of explicitly informed subjects with that of subjects who were told nothing of the contingencies. Simultaneous presentation of flankers and targets (Experiment 1) produced evidence of unintentional contingency use by both informed and uninformed subjects. When stimuli on trialn predicted target stimuli on trialn+1 (Experiment 2) there was no evidence of unintentional processes, but informed subjects showed strong evidence of using intentional prediction strategies. When flanker onset preceded target stimuli presentation (Experiment 3), evidence of contingency use by both informed and uninformed subjects was found, but the data illustrated qualitative differences in response style (e.g., speed-accuracy tradeoffs) between the two groups. Intentional and unintentional uses of contingencies between perceptual events are qualitatively distinct with respect to the time frame in which they can be applied and the performance patterns they produce. Finally, we argue that the unintentional processes studied here are implicit in nature.     

Actually,a picture is worth less than 45 words: Narratives produce more false memories than photographs do

Most memory “implantation” studies have elicited false memories by using fake narratives. Recently, Wade, Garry, Read, and Lindsay (2002) showed that doctored photographs can be used to create false childhood memories in adults. Fifty percent of Wade et al.’s sample reported details of taking a childhood hot air balloon ride, although they had never been in a balloon. In this experiment, we investigated whether photos or narratives influence memory more than the other. We exposed subjects to either a fake photograph or a fake narrative of a childhood hot air balloon ride. Subjects tried to remember the false event and three real events over 1 week. Narratives were more likely to produce false memory reports than were photos. We offer a fluency-based account of our results and suggest that narratives promote more familiarity in subjects than do photographs.     

情绪和认知方式对个体建议采纳的影响*

通过电影诱发被试的情绪,利用两个实验探讨了情绪和认知方式对个体建议采纳的影响。实验一采用选择任务,实验二采用估计任务,研究发现:(1)愉快情绪状态下的被试建议采纳程度高于愤怒的被试,场依存型被试建议采纳程度高于场独立型被试,女性比起男性更易采纳他人建议;(2)在估计任务中,无论场依存者还是场独立者,在愤怒状态下建议采纳程度无显著差异,且均低于愉快状态下。     

Can't stop believing: inhibitory control and resistance to misleading testimony

Why are some young children consistently willing to believe what they are told even when it conflicts with first‐hand experience? In this study, we investigated the possibility that this deference reflects an inability to inhibit a prepotent response. Over the course of several trials, 2.5‐ to 3.5‐year‐olds (N = 58) heard an adult contradict their report of a simple event they had both witnessed, and children were asked to resolve this discrepancy. Those who repeatedly deferred to the adult's misleading testimony had more difficulty on an inhibitory control task involving spatial conflict than those who responded more skeptically. These results suggest that responding skeptically to testimony that conflicts with first‐hand experience may be challenging for some young children because it requires inhibiting a normally appropriate bias to believe testimony.     

Effects of Contrived information of Female and Male Performance on the Achievement Behavior of Preschool Girls and Boys1

Twenty-four girls and 24 boys enrolled in a university preschool were given two trials each to perform a marble-dropping task. After the first trial, subjects in the sex-appropriate condition were told that children of their sex perform the task better than children of the opposite sex. Subjects in the sex-inappropriate condition were told that children of their sex perform the task less well than children of the opposite sex. It was hypothesized that sex-appropriate subjects would set higher goals for Trial 2 than control subjects receiving no information and that sex-inappropriate subjects would set lower goals than control subjects. The hypotheses were not supported. Instead, children of both sexes set significantly higher goals when told that boys do better at the task. Interpretations of the results are offered.     

Dishonest Behavior: The Impact of Prior Self‐Regulatory Exertion and Personality

The current study examined how prior self‐regulatory exertion and the personality characteristics of self‐control, integrity, and conscientiousness contribute to dishonest behavior. Participants completed measures of these 3 personality characteristics, followed by either a self‐control typing task or a non‐self‐control version of the task. They were then told to complete a clerical task, for which they were compensated, until the end of the experiment session. Participants were left alone during this task, and had the opportunity to leave before the designated end time. Results indicated that participants who initially completed the self‐control task were more likely to leave the experiment early than were participants who initially completed the non‐self‐control task. In addition, self‐control and integrity were negatively associated with dishonest behavior.     

They do what they are told to do: the influence of instruction on (chess) expert perception-commentary on linhares and brum (2007)

Linhares and Brum (2007) argue that they provide evidence for analogy as the main principle behind experts' acquisition of perceptual knowledge. However, the methodology they used—asking players to pair positions using abstract similarity—raises the possibility that the task reflects more the effect of directional instructions than the principles underlying the acquisition of knowledge. Here we replicate and extend Linhares and Brum's experiment and show that the matching task they used is inadequate for drawing any conclusions about the nature of experts' perception. When expert chess players were instructed to match problems based on similarities at the abstract level (analogy), they produced more abstract pairs than pairs based on concrete similarity. However, the same experts produced more concrete pairs than abstract ones when instructed to match the problems based on concrete similarity. Asking experts to match problems using explicit instructions is not an appropriate way to show the importance of either analogy or similarity in the acquisition of expert knowledge. Experts simply do what they are told to do.     

Cognitive imitation in 2-year-old children (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Homo sapiens</Emphasis>): a comparison with rhesus monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>)

Here we compare the performance of 2-year-old human children with that of adult rhesus macaques on a cognitive imitation task. The task was to respond, in a particular order, to arbitrary sets of photographs that were presented simultaneously on a touch sensitive video monitor. Because the spatial position of list items was varied from trial to trial, subjects could not learn this task as a series of specific motor responses. On some lists, subjects with no knowledge of the ordinal position of the items were given the opportunity to learn the order of those items by observing an expert model. Children, like monkeys, learned new lists more rapidly in a social condition where they had the opportunity to observe an experienced model perform the list in question, than under a baseline condition in which they had to learn new lists entirely by trial and error. No differences were observed between the accuracy of each species' responses to individual items or in the frequencies with which they made different types of errors. These results provide clear evidence that monkeys and humans share the ability to imitate novel cognitive rules (cognitive imitation).