共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Michael Weber 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):209-226
Larry Temkin has shown that Derek Parfit’s well-known Mere Addition Paradox suggests a powerful argument for the intransitivity
of the relation “better than.” The crux of the argument is the view that equality is essentially comparative, according to
which the same inequality can be evaluated differently depending on what it is being compared to. The comparative view of
equality should be rejected, I argue, and hence so too this argument for intransitivity.
相似文献
Michael WeberEmail: |
2.
Mark Moyer 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):299-322
The fission of a person involves what common sense describes as a single person surviving as two distinct people. Thus, say
most metaphysicians, this paradox shows us that common sense is inconsistent with the transitivity of identity. Lewis’s theory
of overlapping persons, buttressed with tensed identity, gives us one way to reconcile the common sense claims. Lewis’s account,
however, implausibly says that reference to a person about to undergo fission is ambiguous. A better way to reconcile the
claims of common sense, one that avoids this ambiguity, is to recognize branching persons, persons who have multiple pasts
or futures.
相似文献
Mark MoyerEmail: |
3.
Scott Hill 《Argumentation》2009,23(2):277-283
Toomas Karmo claims that his taxonomy of ethical sentences has the result that there does not exist a sound argument with
all non-ethical premises and an ethical conclusion. In a recent paper, Mark T. Nelson argues against this claim. Nelson presents
a sound argument that he takes to be such that (i) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s single premise as non-ethical
and (ii) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s conclusion as ethical. I attempt to show that Nelson is mistaken about
(ii). For any possible world at which the premise of Nelson’s argument is true, Karmo’s taxonomy classifies the conclusion
of Nelson’s argument as non-ethical.
相似文献
Scott HillEmail: |
4.
Jim Stone 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(2):153-160
Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating
due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example
相似文献
Jim StoneEmail: |
5.
Christopher J. G. Meacham 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(2):245-269
This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David
Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account
does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not.
Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. The proposed
account also leads to counterintuitive consequences, but they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account, and no worse than
those of Lewis’ account.
相似文献
Christopher J. G. MeachamEmail: |
6.
Per Albert Ilsaas 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):313-316
The article is a brief response to Jacob Blair’s critique of David Rodin’s argument in War and Self-Defense that there are circumstances in which war conceivably could be justified not as self-defence, but as law enforcement or punishment.
It argues that while Rodin’s position potentially is less dilemmatic than Blair suggests, Blair nevertheless usefully highlights
tensions within it. Blair’s own argument in favour of ar as law-enforcement is suggestive, but in no way conclusive.
相似文献
Per Albert IlsaasEmail: |
7.
Nathan Salmon 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):263-280
Jeffrey King’s principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded
with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory
of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails.
相似文献
Nathan SalmonEmail: |
8.
Michael Martin 《Sophia》2007,46(1):75-77
In this note I show that Noreen Johnson misunderstands my argument and consequently fails to refute my thesis that God’s omnipotence
conflicts with his omniscience.
相似文献
Michael MartinEmail: |
9.
David Liggins 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):113-127
Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims
to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical
science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that
this attribution is mistaken. Quine’s argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument
which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to appearances, Putnam did not argue for the existence of
abstract mathematical objects at all. I close by suggesting that attention to Quine and Putnam’s writings reveals some neglected
arguments for platonism which may be superior to the indispensability argument.
相似文献
David LigginsEmail: |
10.
Charles B. Cross 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(2):173-188
In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle (CXM) in light of recent developments in the semantics of the
subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley’s recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative
world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity
of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley’s counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the subjunctive
conditional that is consistent with both CXM and Tooley’s counterexample.
相似文献
Charles B. CrossEmail: |
11.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):1-19
The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents
any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could
have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct
Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing
counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
12.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
相似文献
Jeff WisdomEmail: |
13.
Supernatural Miracles and Religious Inclusiveness 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Morgan Luck 《Sophia》2007,46(3):287-293
In this paper I shall assess Clarke’s assertion that all definitions of miracles that purport to satisfy the criterion of
religious inclusiveness should substitute the term ‘supernatural’ for ‘non-natural’. In addition, I shall attempt to strengthen
Clarke’s conception of the supernatural by offering an analysis of what it means for something to be ‘above’ nature. Lastly,
I shall offer a new argument as to why Clarke’s intention-based definition of miracles is necessarily less religiously inclusive
than Mumford’s causation-based definition.
相似文献
Morgan LuckEmail: |
14.
Joel Thomas Tierno 《Sophia》2008,47(2):223-230
In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning
the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately
explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques,
is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free
will is compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive.
相似文献
Joel Thomas TiernoEmail: |
15.
Daniel D. Novotny 《Axiomathes》2007,17(1):41-51
According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are
compatible and true—“the world is one”. The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between
mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The paper has three parts: first, I criticize drawing an analogy between solidity
and consciousness as macro-features of systems with micro-features. Second, I argue that Searle’s defence of the ontological
irreducibility of consciousness is terminologically confused and that his argument for the trivial nature of that irreducibility
is unsuccessful. Third, I defend Nagel’s argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds by answering some of Searle’s
objections to it.
相似文献
Daniel D. NovotnyEmail: |
16.
Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the (KK) principle (roughly, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson’s argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly
stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we
reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge
from prior knowledge by deduction.
相似文献
Levi Spectre (Corresponding author)Email: |
17.
Rasmus Thybo Jensen 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(3):371-388
I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational
motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous
preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest
we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance
both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
相似文献
Rasmus Thybo JensenEmail: |
18.
Jens Johansson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):247-256
Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable
in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic
value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to
the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism.
相似文献
Jens JohanssonEmail: Email: |
19.
Chris Calvert-Minor 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):67-86
Realism about the external world enjoys little philosophical support these days. I rectify this predicament by taking a relatively
pragmatist line of thought to defend commonsense realism; I support commonsense realism through an interpretation and application
of Donald Davidson’s notion of triangulation, the triangle composed of two communicators coordinating and correcting their
responses with a shared causal stimulus. This argument is important because it has a crucial advantage over the often used
abductive argument for realism. My argument avoids unwarranted conclusions, whereas the abductive argument is “inflationary”
because it reaches beyond the limits of evidence for its realist conclusion. To illustrate the problems of the abductive argument
and motivate my Davidsonian approach, I take a brief look at the abductive argument for realism in Frederick Will’s work.
相似文献
Chris Calvert-MinorEmail: |
20.
Anna Mahtani 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):171-180
Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is
unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through.
The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject
two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
相似文献
Anna MahtaniEmail: |