Implicit and explicit memory without awareness

Summary Three experiments are reported which investigate the conscious status of subjects during an implicit-memory test. In all experiments the subjects either named each visually presented target item or generated each item from an anagram in a first phase of incidental learning. In a second phase, they were either given a visual word-stem completion task as an implicit-memory test or given a recognition task (Experiment 1), or a cued-recall task (Experiments 2 and 3) as explicit-memory tests. Finally, in a third phase the subjects were required to make decisions about the input status (i. e., they had to decide whether the item was present in the first phase) as well as about the output status of information (i. e., they had to decide whether the item had been completed, recognized or recalled in the second phase). A generation effect (i. e., generated items were remembered better than named items) was evident in the recognition and recall data, but only for items whose recognition or recall was accompanied by conscious recollection of their previous occurrence in the study list. Judgments about the input status were more precise, given that items had been consciously recognized or recalled rather than completed. The same pattern of findings was observed for judgments about the output status. The results are interpreted as evidence that subjects in implicit-memory tests are less aware of the fact that some of their productions are relevant to prior experiences. In addition, they are less aware of the fact that they are retrieving information from their memories. However, the same state of nonawareness may be present in explicit-memory tests, as was revealed by the performance of subjects on those items whose recognition or recall was not accompanied by conscious recollection.     

Implicit working memory

Working Memory (WM) plays a crucial role in many high-level cognitive processes (e.g., reasoning, decision making, goal pursuit and cognitive control). The prevalent view holds that active components of WM are predominantly intentional and conscious. This conception is oftentimes expressed explicitly, but it is best reflected in the nature of major WM tasks: All of them are blatantly explicit. We developed two new WM paradigms that allow for an examination of the role of conscious awareness in WM. Results from five studies show that WM can operate unintentionally and outside of conscious awareness, thus suggesting that the current view should be expanded to include implicit WM.     

Attention during memory retrieval enhances future remembering

Memory retrieval is a powerful learning event that influences whether an experience will be remembered in the future. Although retrieval can succeed in the presence of distraction, dividing attention during retrieval may reduce the power of remembering as an encoding event. In the present experiments, participants studied pictures of objects under full attention and then engaged in item recognition and source memory retrieval under full or divided attention. Two days later, a second recognition and source recollection test assessed the impact of attention during initial retrieval on long-term retention. On this latter test, performance was superior for items that had been tested initially under full versus divided attention. More importantly, even when items were correctly recognized on the first test, divided attention reduced the likelihood of subsequent recognition on the second test. The same held true for source recollection. Additionally, foils presented during the first test were also less likely to be later recognized if they had been encountered initially under divided attention. These findings demonstrate that attentive retrieval is critical for learning through remembering.     

Islands of memory: Autobiographical remembering in amnestics

In amnestics with anterograde amnesia, memories of post-onset autobiographical experiences, if present at all, are typically barren and impoverished. However, there have been sporadic reports of islands of memory—memories that are vivid, detailed, and specific to time and place. The aim of this study was to verify the presence of such memories and examine their incidence rate. Anterograde amnestics were interviewed in their home using a narrative interviewing strategy with a view to describing memory in everyday life. Each autobiographical memory of a post-onset event was coded for quantity-length, and quality-episodicity. In just over half of the amnestics (8 out of 14), a memory that was lengthy, rich in personal details, and localisable was recollected. The quantitative and qualitative aspects of these island memories were significantly different from the other autobiographical memories that the amnestics supplied. These memories were at odds with what would be expected on the basis of their performance on standardised memory instruments. Our findings suggest there is occasionally more variability in remembering of autobiographical experiences in some amnestics than has traditionally been believed.     

Reading and visual memory: remembering scenes that were never seen.

In Experiment 1 (N = 16), under conditions of high memory load (60 pictures and 50 paragraphs) and a 1-week retention interval, undergraduate subjects reported their memory for photographs of scenes (cued recall and free-recall tasks). Subjects frequently reported memory for photographs that they had actually never seen, but had read about in a brief paragraph. In Experiment 2 (N = 40), the same pattern of results was obtained with immediate testing. Experiment 2 also demonstrated that the likelihood of subjects falsely attributing scene memory (based on reading) to actually having viewed a photograph was reduced when metacognitive awareness of imaging during reading was made salient. Awareness of image creation was induced by requiring subjects to rate the paragraphs with respect to imagery vividness. Although other measures of memory remained the same, subjects in the induced-imagery condition made 50% fewer confusion errors than subjects who read the paragraphs without imagery instructions. The results are discussed in the context of Johnson and Raye's (1981) reality monitoring model.     

Islands of memory: Autobiographical remembering in amnestics

In amnestics with anterograde amnesia, memories of post-onset autobiographical experiences, if present at all, are typically barren and impoverished. However, there have been sporadic reports of islands of memory--memories that are vivid, detailed, and specific to time and place. The aim of this study was to verify the presence of such memories and examine their incidence rate. Anterograde amnestics were interviewed in their home using a narrative interviewing strategy with a view to describing memory in everyday life. Each autobiographical memory of a post-onset event was coded for quantity-length, and quality-episodicity. In just over half of the amnestics (8 out of 14), a memory that was lengthy, rich in personal details, and localisable was recollected. The quantitative and qualitative aspects of these island memories were significantly different from the other autobiographical memories that the amnestics supplied. These memories were at odds with what would be expected on the basis of their performance on standardised memory instruments. Our findings suggest there is occasionally more variability in remembering of autobiographical experiences in some amnestics than has traditionally been believed.     

The screen memory and the act of remembering

Screen memories, seen by Freud, Greenacre and other analysts of a past generation as a key source of data for the reconstruction of psychic and historical reality, have been relatively neglected in contemporary analysis. A fresh look shows that these durable, constant memories have a dual relation to childhood experience: they memorialize both a specific organization of trauma, wish and defense, and a private childhood act of remembering. Close attention to the screen memory itself and the context in which it appears indicates that both aspects of screen memory have meaning for the individual and are represented in fantasy. Both currents of meaning can be seen in a literary screen memory and in the clinical situation, where both play out in transference and countertransference.     

Intentional and unintentional memory in young children: remembering vs. playing

In an exploration of Istomina's (1975) paradigm contrasting children's recall from an involuntary or game-like context with recall from an intentional or lesson-like context, this study investigated the relative efficacy of asking 4- and 5-year-olds "to remember" or "to play with" a set of 16 pictures or toys in a naturalistic or laboratory setting. The children's behavior and language were measured during two 2-min study phases, after which recall was assessed. Toys promoted different study phase activities and better retention than pictures, asking a child "to remember" a set of toys led to less recall than asking the child "to play" with the toys, and, across all conditions, instructions "to play" and "to remember" elicited differentiated study phase responses but similar levels of retention.     

非临床抑郁个体内隐心境一致性记忆的意识加工和无意识加工的差异：一项ERP研究

以情绪面孔为刺激材料,采用改进的内隐知觉记忆测验任务,考察非临床抑郁个体在内隐心境一致性记忆的意识加工和无意识加工差异。结果发现：在150ms—200ms时间窗内隐记忆的无意识和意识加工过程存在重叠现象。在250ms—350ms时间窗个体就表现出了意识加工过程和无意识加工过程的分离现象,并且非临床抑郁组的无意识加工过程存在负性心境一致性记忆偏向。在400ms-800ms时间窗内,两组被试均表现出无意识加工过程中存在负性心境一致性记忆偏向。表明在250ms-350ms,非临床抑郁个体内隐记忆的无意识加工过程存在缺陷,表现出负性心境一致性记忆偏向。     

Implicit memory and test awareness

In three experiments we examined whether normal subjects can perform an implicit test without becoming aware that the test items were previously encountered in the study phase of the experiment. Experiment 1 assessed single word priming with the stem completion task, and subjects who reported awareness/unawareness that the test items were previously encoded in the study task showed equivalent priming. Experiments 2a-c and 3 assessed associative priming with the stem completion task, and in this case, only subjects who were aware that the test items were previously encountered showed associative priming effects. These findings suggest that single word priming and associative priming reflect different memory processes because the former and not the latter effect can be observed in unaware subjects.     

Implicit memory for textual materials

As a word moves from isolation in a list to being contextually bound in meaningful discourse, its probability of priming in tests of implicit memory decreases. The present experiments explore whether considerable priming effects can be revealed with conceptual tests of implicit memory as compared to perceptual tests. In the study phase, meaningful actions were described within a coherent text. In Experiment 1 subjects elaborated half of the actions by visual imagery. In Experiment 2, subjects elaborated the actions by enacting them symbolically. In both experiments, subjects in a control condition were simply required to read the same activities. In Experiment 2, a further group of subjects had to detect orthographic errors. The results demonstrated reliable effects of implicit memory in terms of associations with verbs repeated from the studied text. This form of repetition priming for textual materials in a conceptual test of implicit memory was enhanced by both types of elaboration. A word-stem completion task for the same targets revealed a less pronounced and inconsistent priming effect, uninfluenced by both types of elaboration. But the latter form of perceptual priming was found to be more pronounced within the error-detection condition. Measures of explicit memory showed similar effects of elaborative encoding conditions but there were some dissimilarities to measures of implicit memory, too. In general and in accordance with a transfer-appropriate processing view, conceptual tests rather than perceptual tests may be more suitable for detecting effects of implicit memory within the domain of text processing.     

Directed forgetting and directed remembering in visual working memory

A defining characteristic of visual working memory is its limited capacity. This means that it is crucial to maintain only the most relevant information in visual working memory. However, empirical research is mixed as to whether it is possible to selectively maintain a subset of the information previously encoded into visual working memory. Here we examined the ability of participants to use cues to either forget or remember a subset of the information already stored in visual working memory. In Experiment 1, participants were cued to either forget or remember 1 of 2 groups of colored squares during a change-detection task. We found that both types of cues aided performance in the visual working memory task but that observers benefited more from a cue to remember than a cue to forget a subset of the objects. In Experiment 2, we show that the previous findings, which indicated that directed-forgetting cues are ineffective, were likely due to the presence of invalid cues that appeared to cause observers to disregard such cues as unreliable. In Experiment 3, we recorded event-related potentials and show that an electrophysiological index of focused maintenance is elicited by cues that indicate which subset of information in visual working memory needs to be remembered, ruling out alternative explanations of the behavioral effects of retention-interval cues. The present findings demonstrate that observers can focus maintenance mechanisms on specific objects in visual working memory based on cues indicating future task relevance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Directed remembering: Subliminal cues alter nonconscious memory strategies

Much research on memory function has focused on changes in recognition performance brought about by differences in the processes engaged during encoding. In most of this work, participants either receive explicit instructions to remember particular items or they perform orienting (i.e., encoding) tasks that support different levels of memory performance. In daily life, however, the retention or dismissal of information often occurs without conscious intent, thereby suggesting an alternative, nonconscious route through which purposive remembering and forgetting can occur. Based on this line of reasoning, we speculated that recognition performance in a standard item-based forgetting paradigm may be moderated by subliminal cues that trigger the automatic activation of different mnemonic strategies. We report the results of two experiments that supported this prediction. In each experiment, the basic item-based forgetting effect was replicated, but via the subliminal presentation of “remember” and “forget” cues. In addition, cue-dependent differences in memory performance were traced to the operation of a covert rehearsal mechanism during encoding. We consider the implications of these findings for the non-conscious operation of memory processes in everyday life.     

The influence of decision criteria upon remembering and knowing in recognition memory.

One may recognise an item as 'old' on basis of a recollective experience or by a feeling of familiarity without specific recollection. The former is called a 'remember' judgement; the latter a 'know' judgement. It has been claimed that remember and know responses reflect qualitatively distinct components of recognition memory, and not just derive from gradual differences in perceived trace strength or subjective certainty (i.e. remember judgments include memories of which one is more confident). Nonetheless, the present study examined the possibility that the distinction does relate to decision criteria placed upon a single familiarity axis (see Donaldson, 1996; Hirshman & Master, 1997). To this purpose, two groups of subjects were compared: one, which was instructed to be very conservative in their old-new judgements, while the other group was stimulated to be very lenient instead. Remember hit rates increased with more lenient criteria, whereas know hit rates did not, but false alarm rates did. While remember sensitivity was equal in the two groups, know sensitivity was lower with liberal criteria. Also it correlated with overall response bias. This lends support to the possibility that subjects not only apply an old-new decision criterion, but also set a remember-know criterion, which is affected in a similar way by liberal versus conservative instructions.     

Implicit memory for negative and positive social information in individuals with and without social anxiety

Studies of memory bias for threat-relevant information in individuals with social anxiety have produced mixed results. These discrepancies may be because investigators have studied different memory processes or have used different memory tasks. We employed a video clarity judgement task to investigate implicit (capacity-free, automatic, unconscious) memory and a recognition task to investigate explicit (effortful, strategic, conscious) memory for threat in socially anxious individuals and nonanxious controls. Implicit memory for "old" (i.e., seen before) videos was defined as rating "old" videos as more clear than "new" (i.e., never seen before) videos. We created brief video clips that involved an actor or actress approaching the camera and commenting on some aspect of the viewer's actions, physical appearance, or belongings. Twenty-four videos were positive (e.g., "I really like your shoes"), and 24 were negative (e.g., "That is a horrible haircut"). Results revealed that the video clarity test was an effective measure of implicit memory. Furthermore, socially anxious individuals showed a larger implicit memory index for negative videos than did nonanxious and dysphoric controls. No group differences emerged for implicit memory for positive videos. Similarly, groups did not differ in recognition of, or false alarms for, positive and negative videos. These results demonstrate the role of implicit memory in social anxiety implying that information about threat may be automatically primed in these individuals.     

When remembering the past suppresses memory for future actions

Remembering planned actions at the correct time in the future is an integral component of prospective cognition. Recent studies on future remembering have led to suggestions that prospective cognition might be based on past experience. To test this hypothesis, we focused on retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF), which usually indicates that remembering past events suppresses memory for related but different past events. The current study assessed RIF in two kinds of event-based prospective memory (PM) tasks using either focal or non-focal cues for ongoing tasks. Participants studied six members from each of eight taxonomic categories and then practiced recalling three of the six members from four of the eight categories using category-stem cues. This retrieval practice suppressed the detection of non-practiced members of the practiced categories during the PM task with non-focal cues (Experiment 1) but not with focal cues (Experiment 2). The results suggest that recall of certain items inhibits the function of the others as PM cues, but only if the PM task does not largely share its processing with the ongoing task.     

Reminders supporting spontaneous remembering in prospective memory tasks1

Abstract: The objective of this study was to identify the reminders that facilitate prospective memory. A total of 64 participants were either provided with three types of reminders for a prospective memory task (to circle a question number when prescribed target words appear) during the retention interval, or not reminded of the task. In addition, an articulatory suppression task was imposed halfway through the test phase to examine whether verbal rehearsal is related to the effects of the reminders. The reminders that referred to the intended activity (to circle the number) did not improve prospective memory. However, both of the reminders that notified that there was something to do and the reminders that referred to the target events (the prescribed words) improved prospective memory. Imposing the suppression task abolished the benefit of the former, but not that of the latter. This result suggests that only the effect of the reminders that referred to the existence of intention is mediated by verbal rehearsal. These data imply that there are some differences in the functions of these reminders.     

Directed remembering: subliminal cues alter nonconscious memory strategies

Much research on memory function has focused on changes in recognition performance brought about by differences in the processes engaged during encoding. In most of this work, participants either receive explicit instructions to remember particular items or they perform orienting (i.e., encoding) tasks that support different levels of memory performance. In daily life, however, the retention or dismissal of information often occurs without conscious intent, thereby suggesting an alternative, nonconscious route through which purposive remembering and forgetting can occur. Based on this line of reasoning, we speculated that recognition performance in a standard item-based forgetting paradigm may be moderated by subliminal cues that trigger the automatic activation of different mnemonic strategies. We report the results of two experiments that supported this prediction. In each experiment, the basic item-based forgetting effect was replicated, but via the subliminal presentation of "remember" and "forget" cues. In addition, cue-dependent differences in memory performance were traced to the operation of a covert rehearsal mechanism during encoding. We consider the implications of these findings for the non-conscious#10; operation of memory processes in everyday life.