Professional Politics and the Concepts of Family Therapy, Family Consultation, and Systems Consultation

At a time when an increasing number of professionals are calling themselves "family therapists," many teachers and theorists in this field are troubled that the term "family therapy" no longer adequately characterizes the concepts or activities of the field. Recently, clinical, political, and economic circumstances have emerged that suggest the need for alternatives to the role of "family therapist." By adding the roles of family consultant and systems consultant, we can open up new options for ourselves and our clients. During initial contacts with families, agencies, and other professionals, we can heighten our therapeutic potential by proceeding with consultative stocktaking, not starting with therapy. Family consultation also can assist in redirecting therapy when a new problem or an impasse develops, in focusing on competency rather than on pathology, and in engaging constructively with families that have a physically or mentally ill member.     

Aristotle's De Anima: On Why the Soul is Not a Set of Capacities

Although it is common for interpreters of Aristotle's De Anima to treat the soul as a specially related set of powers of capacities, I argue against this view on the grounds that the plausible options for reconciling the claim that the soul is a set of powers with Aristotle's repeated claim that the soul is an actuality cannot be unsuccessful. Moreover, I argue that there are good reasons to be wary of attributing to Aristotle the view that the soul is a set of powers because this claim conflicts with several of his metaphysical commitments, most importantly his claims about form and substance. I argue that although there are passages in the De Anima in which Aristotle discusses the soul in terms of its powers or capacities, these discussions do not establish that the soul is a set of capacities.     

BROADENING THE DEFINITION OF DECISION MAKING:

Decision theory and research have focused almost exclusively on choice—the selection of the best option from a choice set containing two or more options. Largely overlooked is the question of how those particular options got there in the first place—why them and not others? This article describes a theory, called image theory, about how prechoice screening of options governs the contents of the set from which a choice is made and summarizes empirical tests of the theory. The research results suggest that screening plays afar more important role in decision making than is generally appreciated and that our view of decision making must be broadened accordingly.     

Family Boundaries in Transition: A Search for Alternatives

This paper attempts to clarify Minuchin's concept of family boundaries and to modify the original definition to one based on social systems concepts that are neutral with respect to pathology. The authors distinguish between logical and physical conceptualizations of “boundary” and differentiate the broad metaphor of family boundaries into proximity (i.e., interpersonal boundaries) and hierarchy (i.e., generational boundaries). Assuming that the nature of a relationship is reflected by the extent of overlap or sharing of interpersonal territories, Wood ( 14 ) adapted Goffman's ( 2 ) concept of territorial preserve to encompass six types of territories family members may share to a greater or lesser extent, reflecting the family's pattern of proximity. The family's hierarchy is reflected by who is “in charge,” parents or children. We explore the process of boundary reorganization in families in transition, offering a nonstatic and health-oriented view of boundary permeability. Using the anthropological concept of “rite of passage,” we suggest an alternative view of stressful transitional events such as marriage and divorce. We illustrate with examples the reorganization of proximity and hierarchy that occurs during periods of transition.     

Does the brain calculate value?

How do people choose between options? At one extreme, the 'value-first' view is that the brain computes the value of different options and simply favours options with higher values. An intermediate position, taken by many psychological models of judgment and decision making, is that values are computed but that the resulting choices depend heavily on the context of available options. At the other extreme, the 'comparison-only' view argues that choice depends directly on comparisons, with or even without any intermediate computation of value. In this paper, we place past and current psychological and neuroscientific theories on this spectrum, and review empirical data that have led to an increasing focus on comparison rather than value as the driver of choice.     

The Authority Account of Prudential Options

The Authority Account provides a new explanation why commonsense morality contains prudential options—options that permit agents to perform actions that promote their own wellbeing more than the action they have most reason to do, from the moral point of view. At the core of that explanation are two claims. The first is that moral requirements are traditionally widely taken to have an authoritative status; that is, to be rules that morality (or more specifically some suitable agent or agency, acting on behalf of morality) imposes by right. The second is that in order for moral requirements to have such a status, morality must contain prudential options. If both of these claims are true, then they will create a (rational) pressure to think of morality as containing prudential options. And according to the Authority Account, the fact that commonsense morality contains such options is (at least in significant part) the result of this pressure.     

The Open Door: A Structural Approach to a Family With an Anorectic Child

This commentary on a videotape of an initial interview with a family of an anorectic girl demonstrates a set of therapeutic techniques based on a structural view of family organization and dysfunction. In the commentary, the interventions of the therapists are analyzed move by move throughout the session. The goal of the therapists is to assist the family to reorganize itself so that its dysfunctional structure will not support the symptom in the child. During the interview, they probe the characteristic interaction patterns of the family and engage with the family subsystems, making changes in the husband-wife relationship, the parent-child relationships, and the sibling relationships. The connection between the anorectic symptom and the structural organization of the family becomes clearer as the interview unfolds, with the result that the child's eating at the end seems incidental compared to the many changes in family relationships that precede it.     

WORLDS OR WORDS APART? WITTGENSTEIN ON UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

In this paper I develop an account of Wittgenstein's conception of what it is to understand religious language. I show that Wittgenstein's view undermines the idea that as regards religious faith only two options are possible – either adherence to a set of metaphysical beliefs (with certain ways of acting following from these beliefs) or passionate commitment to a ‘doctrineless’ form of life. I offer a defence of Wittgenstein's conception against Kai Nielsen's charges that Wittgenstein removes the ‘content’ from religious belief and renders the religious form of life ‘incommensurable’ with other domains of discourse, thus immunizing it against rational criticism.     

Feminism,Adaptive Preferences,and Social Contract Theory

Feminists have long been aware of the pathology and the dangers of what are now termed “adaptive preferences.” Adaptive preferences are preferences formed in unconscious response to oppression. Thinkers from each wave of feminism continue to confront the problem of women's internalization of their own oppression, that is, the problem of women forming their preferences within the confining and deforming space that patriarchy provides. All preferences are, in fact, formed in response to a (more or less) limited set of options, but not all preferences are unconscious, pathological responses to oppression. Feminist theory therefore requires a method for distinguishing all preferences from adaptive or deformed preferences. Social contract theory provides such a tool. Social contract theory models autonomous preference‐acquisition and retention at both the external level of causation and the internal level of justification. In doing so, social contract theory exposes preferences that do not meet those standards, acting as both a conceptual test that identifies adaptive preferences and as a practical tool for personal and social clarification. A social contract approach helps persons and societies to identify and to confront preferences rooted in unconscious response to oppression.     

Go big or go home: Risk seeking for experiential choices

In decision making under risk, do consumers evaluate intangible, experiential options in a choice set in the same way they evaluate tangible, material options? Prior research on prospect theory, typically using either monetary or material objects as choice options, demonstrates that consumers are risk averse for choices involving gains, with a fairly robust tendency to favor a more certain outcome even when that outcome is less desirable. The present research focuses on decision making under risk for experiential options (from movies to concert tickets to hotel stays)—identifying choices between experiential options as a realm in which prospect theory's pattern of risk aversion is weakened and sometimes reversed. Across six studies, this research demonstrates that consumers are more risk seeking for experiential choices and thus more likely to prefer more desirable options, even options that are less certain. Further, the stronger personal connection fostered by experiential (vs. material) choice options mediates risk‐seeking preferences. This work demonstrates a moderator for prospect theory and investigates the tendency toward increased risk seeking among experiential options, in this paper termed a “go big or go home” strategy. Conversely, consistent risk aversion is evidenced for choices involving material options (from clothing to accessories and furniture).     

Benefits and Challenges of Dual-Earning: Perspectives of Successful Couples

The purpose of this study was to discover the benefits and challenges derived from the dual-earner lifestyle for couples who successfully balance family and work. The data for the study are part of a larger data set drawn primarily from in-depth interviews with 47 couples. While the intent of the overall project was to discover the adaptive strategies that these couples utilized at home and work to successfully balance family and work, this paper focuses specifically on the couples’ perceived benefits and challenges of dual earning. Many therapists harbor negative and stereotypical assumptions of the quality of dual-earner family life and appear to believe there are inevitable and significant challenges that are intrinsic to the dual-earner family arrangement (Haddock & Bowling, 2001), but the findings of this study are helpful in providing a more balanced, informed view of the possibilities of this family arrangement.     

Infant care from infants' viewpoint: the views of some professionals

Debate about infant care tends to focus on still unresolved questions about whether or not day care is harmful, while research studies often confine care options to an unrealistic axis of choice between group care and mother care. Research that delineates constituents of day care quality in relation to measurable outcomes for different groups of children is urgently needed and should be based on a broader view of infant care options. A postal opinion survey sought the confidential views of members of an international organization of infant mental health professionals as to the kinds of care they considered likely to be best for infants from birth to 36 months, assuming that all types of care were of equally high quality and availability. Surprisingly lengthy periods of care by mothers were consistently endorsed; fathers were almost entirely disregarded as principal or joint caregivers; all forms of family care were endorsed over all forms of purchased care, but all forms of individual care were preferred to full-day group care for all age groups and to half-day group care up to the age of 2. The patterns of care judged by these respondents as likely to be best for infants are very different from those which most infants experience now, and from those which policy- and opinion-makers, practitioners and parents aspire, publicly at least, to provide for infants in the future. ©1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

J.L. Moreno: An Unrecognized Pioneer of Family Therapy

J.L. Moreno's fundamental and pioneering contributions to the development of group therapy, encounter, transactional analysis, and especially psychodrama are well known. However, most family therapists seem unacquainted with the fact that from his earliest writings in 1923 J.L. Moreno developed an interactional view of psychotherapy that in 1973 already resulted in formulations of a true systems orientation and very concrete ideas about marital therapy, family therapy, and network therapy. He probably is the first (1937!) therapist that actually involved a husband's lover in conjoint marital therapy. His general theoretical formulations about the pathology of interpersonal relations as well as his practical suggestions for the therapy of the interpersonal relations seem to be insufficiently known to workers and researchers in the field of family therapy.     

Dominance violations in judged prices of two- and three-outcome gambles

The dominance principle states that one should prefer the option with consequences that are at least as good as those of other options for any state of the world. When applied to judged prices of gambles, the dominance principle requires that increasing one or more outcomes of a gamble should increase the judged price of the gamble, with everything else held constant. Previous research has uncovered systematic violations of the dominance principle: people assign higher prices to a gamble with a large probability of winning an amount, Y, otherwise zero, than they do to a superior gamble with the same chance of winning Y, otherwise winning a small amount, X! These violations can be explained by a configural-weight theory in which two-outcome gambles are represented with two sets of decision weights; one set for outcomes having values of zero and another set for lower-valued outcomes that have nonzero values. The present paper investigates whether dominance violations are limited to two-outcome gambles. Results show that people violate the dominance principle with three-outcome gambles even with financial incentives. Furthermore, results could be predicted from the configural-weight theory. The data do not support the view that configural weighting is caused by a shift in strategy that would apply only to two-outcome gambles.     

Theories of family pathology: In what direction

Although specific typologies, classifications, or taxonomies of family pathology have been demonstrated to have research merit, it is clear that their practical or clinical application has been at best marginal. The general theories in family therapy have not yet led to the development of viable typologies.I believe there are three general theories which perhaps converge only in their acceptance of a process of victimization in families that may lead to the outbreak of psychiatric symptoms in members: the intergenerational, the communicational, and scapegoat theory. The paper describes these theories and suggests their strengths and limitations. The dominant family therapies that have arisen in the late 1970s are short-term approaches. These are especially favorable to the development of scapegoat theory, fit reasonably well with communicational theory, but are inconsistent with intergenerational theory.An invited lecture at the 11th International Congress of Psychotherapy in Amsterdam, August 28, 1979.     

Odd Choices: On the Rationality of Some Alleged Anomalies of Decision and Inference

This paper presents a number of apparent anomalies in rational choice scenarios, and their translation into the logic of everyday reasoning. Three classes of examples that have been discussed in the context of probabilistic choice since the 1960s (by Debreu, Tversky and others) are analyzed in a non-probabilistic setting. It is shown how they can at the same time be regarded as logical problems that concern the drawing of defeasible inferences from a given information base. I argue that initial appearances notwithstanding, these cases should not be classed as instances of irrationality in choice or reasoning. One way of explaining away their apparent oddity is to view certain aspects of these examples as making particular options salient. The decision problems in point can then be solved by ‘picking’ these options, although they could not have been ‘chosen’ in a principled way, due to ties or incomparabilities with alternative options.     

The role of free choice in memory for past decisions

After choosing between different options, people tend to remember the features of the options in ways that favour the chosen alternative. The present experiment examined how limitations on freedom to choose between options affected this memory bias. Participants were given a series of two-option choices and were either allowed free choice between options or were assigned to an option. Participants assigned to an option were led to believe that either the selection was random or was made in their best interest based on their personality profile. Results indicated that the choice and best interest conditions demonstrated memory attributions that favoured their received options, whereas the assignment condition did not. These findings support the view that memory biases towards received options are not unique to free choice situations, but may stem from expectations and implicit theories about how and why the choice was made.     

The role of free choice in memory for past decisions

After choosing between different options, people tend to remember the features of the options in ways that favour the chosen alternative. The present experiment examined how limitations on freedom to choose between options affected this memory bias. Participants were given a series of two-option choices and were either allowed free choice between options or were assigned to an option. Participants assigned to an option were led to believe that either the selection was random or was made in their best interest based on their personality profile. Results indicated that the choice and best interest conditions demonstrated memory attributions that favoured their received options, whereas the assignment condition did not. These findings support the view that memory biases towards received options are not unique to free choice situations, but may stem from expectations and implicit theories about how and why the choice was made.     

Choice-Process Satisfaction: The Influence of Attribute Alignability and Option Limitation

This research investigates how choice-process satisfaction is influenced by limitation of choice option and by the types of features used to represent the options. Studies of choice satisfaction have focused on how satisfied the decision maker feels about the choice that has been made and have overlooked the importance of the process through which the decision maker makes a choice, i.e., choice-process satisfaction. We show that the comparability of choice options through alignable features increases choice-process satisfaction, whereas option limitation (i.e., making one option unavailable from a set of equally attractive options) decreases choice-process satisfaction. Further, this decrease in satisfaction, relative to all options being available, occurs for people who are given a set of options in which the difference features are alignable (i.e., differences of a corresponding dimension) but not for people who are given a set of options in which the difference features are nonalignable (i.e., differences of unique dimensions). We propose that alignable differences are easier to compare and have more weight in people's attribute processing, and thus give rise to a perception of a greater amount of information about the option set that is relevant for choice. Making an option unavailable in this case would have a bigger impact than in a situation in which all options have nonalignable differences. Nonalignable differences are difficult to process and are less likely to make people aware that there is very much information about the options for decision making. This explanation and the interaction effect between option limitation and feature alignability are tested in four experiments.     

The role of the symptom in psychopathological states

Abstract.— Four approaches to the role of symptoms in psychopathological states are discussed. These are: Prepsychoanalytic psychiatry, psychoanalysis, family communication theory, and the view that symptoms as a sign of mental illness do not exist. The latter comprises labelling theory and social learning theory. Particular interest is attached to the contentions of symptom substitution and symptomatic treatment. Both are rejected as myths. A theory of action is briefly outlined, and on the basis of this, an alternative interpretationof phenomena ordinarily conceptualized as mental pathology is suggested. The concepts of "psychopathology" and "symptoms" are redefined in accordance with present knowledge, and the importance of formulating human action in an ethical frame of reference is pointed out.