共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Chris R. Schlauch 《Pastoral Psychology》2006,55(1):61-80
This essay considers how we “create meaning” in the interplay of “felt sense” and “symbols,” and examines the direct and immediate interplay between some common everyday experiences and a series of concepts from psychoanalytic perspectives to reveal how this interplay has affinities with religion. Psychoanalysis and religion are overlapping projects. Psychoanalytic symbolizing of experience facilitates our knowing features of religion not previously known, as well as knowing features previously known, in new ways.
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Chris R. SchlauchEmail: |
2.
Enactive appraisal 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Giovanna Colombetti 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(4):527-546
Emotion theorists tend to separate “arousal” and other bodily events such as “actions” from the evaluative component of emotion
known as “appraisal.” This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and
personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called “enactive approach.”
I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective
notion of personhood.
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Giovanna ColombettiEmail: |
3.
David Braun 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):243-262
I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.”
King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
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David BraunEmail: |
4.
Michael Davis 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):211-225
Though this paper is mostly about a sense of “profession” common in much of the West, it explains how the term might apply
in any country (especially how the profession of engineering differs from the function, discipline, and occupation of engineering).
To do that, I have to explain the connection between “profession” (in my preferred sense) and another hard-to-translate term,
“code of ethics” (in the sense it has in the expression “code of engineering ethics”). To understand engineering (or any other
occupation) as a profession is to adopt a certain conception of it, one neither old nor (yet) universal. With that conception
in hand, it should be possible for social science to answer the question posed in the title.
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Michael DavisEmail: |
5.
In this article we defend the inferential view of scientific models and idealisation. Models are seen as “inferential prostheses”
(instruments for surrogative reasoning) construed by means of an idealisation-concretisation process, which we essentially
understand as a kind of counterfactual deformation procedure (also analysed in inferential terms). The value of scientific
representation is understood in terms not only of the success of the inferential outcomes arrived at with its help, but also
of the heuristic power of representation and their capacity to correct and improve our models. This provides us with an argument
against Sugden’s account of credible models: the likelihood or realisticness (their “credibility”) is not always a good measure
of their acceptability. As opposed to “credibility” we propose the notion of “enlightening”, which is the capacity of giving
us understanding in the sense of an inferential ability.
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Xavier de Donato RodríguezEmail: |
Jesús Zamora Bonilla (Corresponding author)Email: |
6.
Daniel E. Flage 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):379-380
This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”
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Daniel E. FlageEmail: |
7.
Imtiaz Moosa 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):159-182
In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical
claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing
how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent
conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not.
My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.
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Imtiaz MoosaEmail: |
8.
Stacy Lee Burns 《Human Studies》2009,32(2):109-131
This paper examines the intersection of technical law and common sense reasoning in small claims arbitration, a distinctive
and increasingly prevalent kind of legal work. Following (Garfinkel, Ethnomethodology’s program: Working out Durkheim’s aphorism, 2002), the study explores the “reform of technical reason” and what a “just outcome” means by focusing on the arbitration of actual
small claims cases and how technical-legal and non-technical/informal resources are brought into alignment to produce dispute
resolution. The arbitrator elicits discussions that establish consensual and commonplace formulations of “the case,” formulations
that foreshadow its disposition as technical matters of law. The research demonstrates how formal structures of equity, evenhandedness,
and decisions without bias have their production in vivo, and how a just and fair course becomes a “just outcome.”
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Stacy Lee BurnsEmail: |
9.
Over the past three decades, research on the social dimensions of emotions has grown exponentially, particularly in the area
of “emotion management.” In this project, we will attempt to add to this body of research by studying the social aspects of
labeling or “instantiating” feelings. The data for the project come from televised red-carpet interviews conducted with celebrities
immediately prior to awards ceremonies. By focusing on the generic aspects of the emotional claims-making put forth by interviewers
and interviewees, we demonstrate how the labeling of emotions is an interpretive, interactive task.
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Kerry O. FerrisEmail: |
10.
J. Angelo Corlett 《Journal of Academic Ethics》2008,6(3):205-209
This paper amounts to a reply to Professor Donald G. Brown’s thoughtful comment on my “Ethical Issues in Journal Peer-Review”,
which appeared in this journal.
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J. Angelo CorlettEmail: |
11.
Markus Knauff 《Topoi》2007,26(1):19-36
The aim of this article is to strengthen links between cognitive brain research and formal logic. The work covers three fundamental
sorts of logical inferences: reasoning in the propositional calculus, i.e. inferences with the conditional “if...then”, reasoning
in the predicate calculus, i.e. inferences based on quantifiers such as “all”, “some”, “none”, and reasoning with n-place
relations. Studies with brain-damaged patients and neuroimaging experiments indicate that such logical inferences are implemented
in overlapping but different bilateral cortical networks, including parts of the fronto-temporal cortex, the posterior parietal
cortex, and the visual cortices. I argue that these findings show that we do not use a single deterministic strategy for solving
logical reasoning problems. This account resolves many disputes about how humans reason logically and why we sometimes deviate
from the norms of formal logic.
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Markus KnauffEmail: |
12.
Gregory Landini 《Axiomathes》2009,19(2):115-142
This is a critical discussion of Nino B. Cocchiarella’s book “Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism.” It focuses on paradoxes
of hyperintensionality that may arise in formal systems of intensional logic.
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Gregory LandiniEmail: |
13.
Wolfgang Fasching 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(2):131-148
In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic
and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization.
Finally I suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”,
but should be conceived of as a dimension, namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences.
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Wolfgang FaschingEmail: |
14.
Mathematizing phenomenology 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jeffrey Yoshimi 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(3):271-291
Husserl is well known for his critique of the “mathematizing tendencies” of modern science, and is particularly emphatic that
mathematics and phenomenology are distinct and in some sense incompatible. But Husserl himself uses mathematical methods in
phenomenology. In the first half of the paper I give a detailed analysis of this tension, showing how those Husserlian doctrines
which seem to speak against application of mathematics to phenomenology do not in fact do so. In the second half of the paper
I focus on a particular example of Husserl’s “mathematized phenomenology”: his use of concepts from what is today called dynamical
systems theory.
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Jeffrey YoshimiEmail: |
15.
This Husserlian transcendental-phenomenological investigation of interkinaesthetic affectivity first clarifies the sense of
affectivity that is at stake here, then shows how Husserl’s distinctive approach to kinaesthetic experience provides evidential
access to the interkinaesthetic field. After describing several structures of interkinaesthetic-affective experience, I indicate
how a Husserlian critique of the presupposition that we are “psychophysical” entities might suggest a more inclusive approach
to a biosocial plenum that includes all metabolic life.
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Elizabeth A. BehnkeEmail: |
16.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):273-295
17.
Ahmad Ahmadi 《Topoi》2007,26(2):213-219
Regarding the exhaustive discussions of the fundamentality of existence versus the fundamentality of quiddity, it is a necessary
preliminary to examine and analyze the first documented statement of the fundamentality of existence. Following this, we must
inquire how the concept is obtained on the basis of which such a judgment could be formed. Then we must illuminate the meaning
of propositions that state only that an object is or exists (ontological propositions). Finally, by explaining the meaning
of the words “quiddity” and “existence” and comparing them, indications are found of confusion between epistemological and
ontological issues.
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Ahmad AhmadiEmail: |
18.
Ronald Lukens-Bull 《Contemporary Islam》2007,1(2):173-192
This paper examines some of the illustrative features of doing participant observation research with Muslims both in the field
and back “home.” It is based on my experiences of conducting research in East Java, Indonesia in the classicalist Islamic
boarding schools. My religious subjectivity was important to my research in a number of ways including: (1) the ways in which
the community tried to define my subjectivity; (2) the nature of my personal religious subjectivity; and (3) academic interpretations
of my role and my subject position vis-à-vis Islam and the profession of anthropology.
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Ronald Lukens-BullEmail: |
19.
Jason Kawall 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):153-156
In my “Promising and Supererogation” I argue that one cannot fulfill promises to perform supererogatory actions (such as “I hereby promise to perform one supererogatory action every month”). In a response to my paper, David Heyd argues that there is an alternative solution to the problem I raise. While I agree with much that Heyd says about the examples he discusses, his proposed solution involves a crucial alteration of the problem; his proposed solution does not solve the problem I present.
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Jason KawallEmail: |
20.
John J. Drummond 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(1):35-49
This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “phenomenology”: a narrow sense (drawn from Nagel) and a broader sense
(drawn from Husserl). It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology
cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds
by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it
notes the correlation between the phenomenal and intentional differences belonging to these experiences. The paper concludes
with some reflections on how the focus on the broader sense of “phenomenology” serves to provide a more precise sense of what
we might mean by “moral phenomenology.”
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John J. DrummondEmail: |