共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):419-437
I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception?
Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal”
or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections
to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action
in a way that exemplifies the motivational role of belief. Furthermore, by applying independent criteria of what it is for
a mental state to be a belief, I defend the more intuitive view that being self-deceived that p entails believing that p. Beliefs (i) are the default for action relative to other cognitive attitudes (such as imagining and hypothesis) and (ii)
have cognitive governance over the other cognitive attitudes. I explicate these two relations and argue that they obtain for
the product of self-deception.
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D. S. Neil Van LeeuwenEmail: |
2.
Yujin Nagasawa 《Sophia》2007,46(1):65-67
I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His
other attributes.
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Yujin NagasawaEmail: |
3.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
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Stewart CohenEmail: |
4.
David Braun 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):243-262
I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.”
King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
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David BraunEmail: |
5.
Jesse R. Steinberg 《Sophia》2007,46(1):1-5
Numerous examples have been offered that purportedly show that God cannot be omnipotent. I argue that a common response to
such examples (i.e., that failure to do the impossible does not indicate a lack of power) does not preserve God’s omnipotence
in the face of some of these examples. I consider another possible strategy for preserving God’s omnipotence in the face of
these examples and find it wanting.
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Jesse R. SteinbergEmail: |
6.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
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Jeff WisdomEmail: |
7.
Mark Siebel 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(3):417-426
In part 4 of Meaning, Expression, and Thought, Davis rejects what he calls Fregean ideational theories, according to which the meaning of an expression is an idea; and
then presents his own account, which states that, e.g., the meaning of ‘Primzahl’ in German is the property of meaning prime number. Before casting doubt on the latter ontology of meanings, I come to Frege’s defence by pointing out that he was not an advocate
of the position Davis named after him because Fregean senses are not lexical meanings and Fregean thoughts are not types of
mental events.
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Mark SiebelEmail: |
8.
Patrick Hutchings 《Sophia》2007,46(1):79-89
A review of Peter Steele’s Plenty, a book in which each poem is faced by a colour plate of the painting or object which sparked it off. Hollander’s ecphrasis
and Krieger’s ekphrasis are held in – possibly unresolvable – dialectic by Steele’s poems. The only resolution which one can
find is one of wit rather than of philosophy.
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Patrick HutchingsEmail: |
9.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):1-19
The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents
any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could
have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct
Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing
counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.
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Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
10.
Veronica Vasterling 《Human Studies》2007,30(2):79-95
In this essay I compare Nussbaum’s and Arendt’s approach to narrativity. The point of the comparison is to find out which
approach is more adequate for practical philosophy: the approach influenced by cognitive theory (Nussbaum) or the one influenced
by hermeneutic phenomenology (Arendt). I conclude that Nussbaum’s approach is flawed by methodological solipsism, which is
due to her application of cognitive theory.
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Veronica VasterlingEmail: |
11.
Christian Miller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):551-561
The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival
approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
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Christian MillerEmail: |
12.
Marc V. P. Slors 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):321-336
In the first section of this paper I argue that the main reason why Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory (IST) has
been perceived as behaviourist or antirealist is its inability to account for the causal efficacy of the mental. The rest
of the paper is devoted to the claim that by emending the theory with a phenomenon called ‘empathic resonance’ (ER), it can
account for the various explananda in the mental causation debate. Thus, IST + ER is a much more viable option than IST, even
though IST + ER assigns a crucial role to the phenomenology of agency, a role that is incompatible with Dennett’s writings
on consciousness.
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Marc V. P. SlorsEmail: |
13.
Brendan O’Sullivan 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):531-544
In “Max Black’s Objection to Mind–Body Identity,” Ned Block seeks to offer a definitive treatment of property dualism arguments
that exploit modes of presentation. I will argue that Block’s central response to property dualism is confused. The property
dualist can happily grant that mental modes of presentation have a hidden physical nature. What matters for the property dualist
is not the hidden physical side of the property, but the apparent mental side. Once that ‘thin’ side is granted, the property
dualist has won. I conclude that although Block is wrong to think that the property dualist must argue for so-called thin
mental properties, Block, and the physicalist, are able to resist property dualism. But any attempt to bolster this resistance
and do more than dogmatically assert the crucial identity runs a serious risk of undermining the physicalism it is meant to
save.
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Brendan O’SullivanEmail: |
14.
Supernatural Miracles and Religious Inclusiveness 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Morgan Luck 《Sophia》2007,46(3):287-293
In this paper I shall assess Clarke’s assertion that all definitions of miracles that purport to satisfy the criterion of
religious inclusiveness should substitute the term ‘supernatural’ for ‘non-natural’. In addition, I shall attempt to strengthen
Clarke’s conception of the supernatural by offering an analysis of what it means for something to be ‘above’ nature. Lastly,
I shall offer a new argument as to why Clarke’s intention-based definition of miracles is necessarily less religiously inclusive
than Mumford’s causation-based definition.
相似文献
Morgan LuckEmail: |
15.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
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Phillip MontagueEmail: |
16.
Benjamin Mossel 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):307-333
Some philosophers have argued that refraining from performing an action consists in actively keeping oneself from performing
that action or preventing one’s performing it. Since activities must be held to be positive actions, this implies that negative
actions are a species of positive actions which is to say that all actions are positive actions.
I defend the following claims:
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(i) | Positive actions necessarily include activity or effort, negative actions may require activity or effort, but never include the activity or effort which may be required. |
(ii) | Unless it is, or was, at some time in P’s power to Q, P does not refrain from Q-ing. |
(iii) | Negative actions are actions, they are causings of negative facts. |
Benjamin MosselEmail: |
17.
Daniel E. Flage 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):379-380
This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”
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Daniel E. FlageEmail: |
18.
Scott Hill 《Argumentation》2009,23(2):277-283
Toomas Karmo claims that his taxonomy of ethical sentences has the result that there does not exist a sound argument with
all non-ethical premises and an ethical conclusion. In a recent paper, Mark T. Nelson argues against this claim. Nelson presents
a sound argument that he takes to be such that (i) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s single premise as non-ethical
and (ii) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s conclusion as ethical. I attempt to show that Nelson is mistaken about
(ii). For any possible world at which the premise of Nelson’s argument is true, Karmo’s taxonomy classifies the conclusion
of Nelson’s argument as non-ethical.
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Scott HillEmail: |
19.
Wing-Chung Ho 《Human Studies》2008,31(3):323-342
This paper points to two little-discussed interrelated features—among sociologists—about the nature of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt): that the experience of transcendence is an essential component of human actions, and that lived experience (Erlebnis) is founded on the non-discursivity of the lifeworld, i.e., the pre-predicative background expectancies from which the discursive
arises. I examine the intellectual route of Alfred Schutz who developed his mundane lifeworld theory from appropriating Edmund
Husserl’s notions of appresentation and apperception. Harold Garfinkel later extended Schutz’s concept of lifeworld to the
empirical investigations of constitutive social orders. By way of conclusion, I warn against a strain of constructionism in
sociology, which tends to ignore the two said features of lived experience and inaccurately conceives social realities as
essentially the actor’s discursive accomplishments.
相似文献
Wing-Chung HoEmail: |
20.
Bas van der Vossen 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):299-302
In this paper I respond to Bernd Krehoff’s article ‘Legitimate Political Authority and Sovereignty: Why States Cannot Be the
Whole Story’. I criticize Krehoff’s use of Raz’s theory of authority to evaluate the legitimacy of our political institutions.
Krehoff argues that states cannot (always) claim exclusive authority and therefore cannot possess exclusive legitimacy. Although
I agree with his conclusion, I argue that the questions of legitimacy and (Razian) authority are distinct and that we need
to focus more on the former in order to really support and defend Krehoff’s conclusions.
相似文献
Bas van der VossenEmail: |