意义与逻辑——早期维特根斯坦哲学的困境及其出路

由于以有限的一阶逻辑为意义的标准,维特根斯坦早期哲学将很多哲学理论和学说甚至其自身都判定为没有意义,从而陷入困境。有的学者试图提供新的解读来解决问题,但这些解读回避了造成困境的逻辑标准从而显得不彻底。维特根斯坦后期彻底放弃逻辑标准,转而求助于模糊的自然语言的语法。这种做法同样不能彻底摆脱早期哲学的问题。要走出困境,还是需要回到其早期哲学,寻求对于逻辑标准的恰当修正。     

从世界到生活形式--维特根斯坦前后期哲学转变原因探析

一般认为,维特根斯坦前后期哲学转变的原因是语言观的变化。本文结合维特根斯坦跨越两种哲学传统的背景,认为哲学转变的根本原因是由于前期本体论的内在缺陷而导致的本体论变化,维特根斯坦前期哲学本体论只局限于可说的“世界”,而不可说的神秘之物则被排除在世界之外,这与维特根斯坦珍视神秘之物的初衷相悖,这种内在矛盾促成了前期本体论向后期本体论的转变,这一转变的重大意义在于后期本体论消泯了可说与不可说的界限,是人类社会实践的坚实基础。     

《逻辑哲学论》中的无意义界定问题——传统解读与决然解读之争

关于维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中究竟是如何界定一个命题有无意义的,一直是一个有争议的问题。在传统解读看来,维特根斯坦结合“图像论”和“真值函项论”建立了一个意义理论,以此来界定一个命题有无意义。而与之对立的决然解读则认为维特根斯坦所持的是一种简约的无意义观,因而是拒斥任何意义理论的,对无意义的界定仅通过我们日常的语言能力就足够了。两种解读有着各自的长处,但也都面临着相应的困难。然而在一些关键方面,这两种解读其实是可以契合的。此外对无意义界定问题的讨论,最终还会牵涉到《逻辑哲学论》中的张力问题,而如何理解这种张力其实也就意味着如何看待前后期维特根斯坦所存在的核心差异。     

维特根斯坦存在之思——《逻辑哲学论》的一种现象学素描

存在学可被视为“真（理）一逻辑地说（命题）一现成存在者”^＊＊的三方关联。存在学的主题是：为获得作为命题之正确性的真（理）,存在必须被命题规定为怎样的现成存在者。存在令维特根斯坦毕生惊异。存在问题作为灯塔,照耀、牵引维氏哲思始终。在以《逻辑哲学论》为代表的前期思想中,他以显示“开路”,划分出多种不可说者,展示了让不可说者显示自身于其中的7种言说方式（特别包括命题的澄清活动与沉默）;存在展开为“不可说者——7种言说方式——不可说者在7种言说方式中显示自身”。维氏以其独特的存在之思超越了传统存在学。     

维特根斯坦《逻辑哲学论》中的践言意义

维特根斯坦的《逻辑哲学论》以"划界与批判"为中心,其核心内容是由规范性语句及其阐释构成的,具有践言意义而非断言涵义。对践言意义的分析不仅能够凸显《逻辑哲学论》内在的践言冲突,而且能够深入说明这一类哲学活动的阐释性和规范性特征,为普遍性的元哲学思考提供有效思路。这种解读方式要求我们将语义学和语用学更为充分而有效地结合起来,批判性地反思哲学的表达方式,探明意义的界限,防止貌似深刻的"胡说"和呓语。     

维特根斯坦《逻辑哲学论》分析

1．主旨、特点和结构1·1《逻辑哲学论》的主旨可以归结为两个字：划界。事实上,维特根斯坦本人在序言中就明确宣称：“本书将为思维划定一个界限,或者不如说不是为思维,而是为思想的表达划定一个界限”。这一界限同时也是语言、逻辑和世界的界限。但是,界限（limit）在此是一种隐喻,它不是隔离空间领域的围墙,因为它不是世界、思想、语言和逻辑的组成部分。对此,我们不能采取这样的方法来加以界定：首先选择两个区域,然后确定它们之间的分界线,或者反之。界限甚至不能逻辑地思考和言说,而只能显示：说清楚那些能够说清楚的东西,…     

《逻辑哲学论》的“思想”CSSCI

“思想”是《逻辑哲学论》中一个很重要但又很不清晰的概念;维特根斯坦本人,以及常见的哲学文献,都没有为此概念提供清晰可把握的解说。如何准确理解这一概念,仍然是诠释《逻辑哲学论》需要克服的困难。首先,论文从《逻辑哲学论》提供的直接文本依据出发,立足于“思想的本质是逻辑”这个较通行的解读,对青年维特根斯坦关于“思想”的主要论题作学理上的梳理;其次,以维特根斯坦致罗素的信件为线索,论文尝试收集一些间接证据,讨论将“思想”解读为心理对象的可能性,并阐明这一解读会产生的一些困难;再次,基于一些认识论上的理由,论文建议:对“思想”概念作逻辑主义解读更契合《逻辑哲学论》的文本和早期维特根斯坦的心理–历史实际。     

《逻辑哲学论》中的真理概念

维特根斯坦在其《逻辑哲学论》中集中讨论了真理概念,他处理这个概念的方式表明了如何理解语言与实在的关系,以及在何种意义上没有否定记号所代表的实在之物。本文从维特根斯坦关于真理符合论的表述是否会遭到弗雷格的批评这个问题入手,对照戴尔蒙德关于维特根斯坦真理概念的解释,给出了自己的解读,按照这种解读,真内在于使用命题的活动。     

维特根斯坦的“千高原”——《哲学研究》的一种现象学素描

存在之思即存在-语言-真理的三维拓扑结构。存在之思在传统存在学(实体或主体-逻辑地说-正确性)的领地内已思虑殆尽,它在经历存在学后还能后存在学地、非存在学地思存在吗?后期维特根斯坦(以《哲学研究》为代表)为我们提供了一种崭新的后存在学的存在之思:生活形式-语言游戏-生活形式在语言游戏中的自行显示(缩写为LSZ);每一LSZ即为一块高原,诸高原相互间有着交错复杂、亲疏不等和方向各异的诸家族相似性,我们将它们喻为维氏千高原。     

生活形式与伦理反应——基于实践指引的维特根斯坦行动伦理探析

维特根斯坦的“生活形式”显明了日常实践的一个基本组织特性,即一种广泛运作在话语实践中的自主调适是促成日常生活的整体趋向性与个体行动的情境自主性之间的平衡的重要条件;基于此,“生活形式”无疑标示着一种实践策略,它旨在印证一种“日常—生活—实践”之联动场域的内在规范;进一步地,这一实践化的伦理品格呈现在日常实践的两种组织层面,即基于规则叙事的情境认定和基于意向叙事的行动导向,二者合力在时间构型中将话语实践的自主调适深化为一种非范导的、动态自主的“伦理反应”,后者为一种基于实践指引的行动伦理权衡提供了新的思考契机。     

The Disenchantment of Nonsense: Understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus

This paper aims to argue against the resolute reading, and offer a correct way of reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus. According to the resolute reading, nonsense can neither say nor show anything. The Tractatus does not advance any theory of meaning, nor does it adopt the notion of using signs in contravention of logical syntax. Its sentences, except a few constituting the frame, are all nonsensical. Its aim is merely to liberate nonsense utterers from nonsense. I argue that these points are either not distinctive from standard interpretations or incorrect. Instead, the Tractarian elucidations help to shed light on the nature of language and logic, and introduce the correct method in philosophy. Philosophy deals with philosophical utterances and Tractarian elucidations by pointing out that they are nonsensical. By doing this, one is helped to see that what they appear to be saying is shown by significant propositions saying something else.     

The Philosopher's Baedeker: Wittgenstein's Tractatus as Guidebook

The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus is committed to four central and interlocking claims: a limit to sense and nonsense can be drawn in logic; a limit to meaningful and meaningless language – to meaningful and meaningless nonsense – cannot be drawn in logic; whether nonsense is meaningful is shown in its use rather than its form; the Tractatus consists largely of meaningful nonsense. Undergirding these commitments is an account of language‐to‐world picturing in which shared “mathematical multiplicities” play a key role. Picturing as a global phenomenon – language‐to‐world, rather than proposition‐to‐fact – has not been well understood. The Tractatus is not a textbook. No doctrines are developed in it. No problems solved. Instead, it is a kind of Baedeker, a guidebook for those who want “to see the world aright.”     

The Proofs Of The Grundgedanke In Wittgenstein's Tractatus

The Tractatus contains twodifferent proofs of the Grundgedanke, or thenonreferentiality of logical constants. In thispaper, I explicate the first proof in TLP 5.4s andreconstruct the less explicitly stated second proof. My explication of the first proof shows it to beelegant but based on an invalid inference. In myreconstruction of the second proof, the main argumentis that the sign of a logical constant does not denotebecause it possesses the punctuation-mark-nature. Andit possesses the punctuation-mark-nature because,given the analyticity thesis in TLP 5, one canestablish for everyday language an adequate symbolismwith N as the sole fundamental operation such that itssign is a bar indicating merely the order and scope ofits application.     

The Unity of Language and Logic in Wittgenstein's Tractatus

The purpose of this paper is to offer an interpretation of the Tractatus’ proof of the unity of logic and language. The kernel of the proof is the thesis that the sole logical constant is the general propositional form. I argue that the Grundgedanke, the existence of the sole fundamental operation N and the analyticity thesis, together with the fact that the operation NN can always be seen as having no specific formal difference between its result and its base, imply that NN is intrinsic to every elementary proposition. I also argue that the picture theory of proposition is an account of the generation of propositions via naming, and that its crucial idea is that naming is the instantiation of the form of a name, which consists in arbitrarily picking out an object as the meaning of the name from those objects sorted out by the form of the name. It follows that the existential quantifier, that is, NN, is intrinsic to naming (and therefore to every elementary proposition). It is then proven that the sole logical constant is the general propositional form. This, together with the truth‐functionality of logical necessity, implies that logic and language are unified via a general rule – logical syntax.     

On the Unintelligibility of Wittgenstein's Tractatus

“Resolute” readings of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus maintain that the book is divided into two parts: an intelligible “frame” and an unintelligible “body.” This article questions the validity of the “frame/body distinction” and, by extension, the resolute reading itself. It first establishes the tenability of the resolute programme as entirely dependent upon such a frame/body distinction. It then explores three possible ways the claim that the Tractatus contains such a distinction might be grounded, arguing in each case why it cannot do so. It therefore concludes that the frame/body distinction is unjustified, and the resolute reading untenable.