Charged experiences of natural environments

Natural environments often generate experiences that combine great emotional and moral power—“charged” experiences. Their characteristics are explored through writings that capture them convincingly. They appear to have a perceptual character. Perception of the scene is invested with a sense of something beyond it, and much bigger. It may be God, or immensity in time or space, or the essence of a nation. This encounter is often connected with moral authority. A recurring theme is the sense that environment and the things in it—including the observer—are a self-similar pattern. People are not passive recipients of these experiences. They seek them out. Evoking the environment in words can often evoke the charged experience too—at least in part. The material suggests tasks for psychologists—most simply, finding systematic ways to describe these experiences. That may help other environmental disciplines, which face difficulty characterising the dimension of response. Theoretically, the material raises questions about the representations generated by perceptual processes. The observation that powerful moral imperatives seem to be given in the act of perceiving is also suggestive for the psychology of morality. Culture certainly plays a part in charged responses, but landscapes have the power to be invested with an emotional and moral charge where other stimuli may not. I am indebted to Helen Ross for provoking this article; to Bert Hodges, Eamonn Hughes, David Hale and most particularly to Edna Longley for ideas and examples; and to Noel Sheehy for encouragement. They cannot be blamed for my misunderstandings.     

Charged experiences of natural environments

Natural environments often generate experiences that combine great emotional and moral power—“charged” experiences. Their characteristics are explored through writings that capture them convincingly. They appear to have a perceptual character. Perception of the scene is invested with a sense of something beyond it, and much bigger. It may be God, or immensity in time or space, or the essence of a nation. This encounter is often connected with moral authority. A recurring theme is the sense that environment and the things in it—including the observer—are a self-similar pattern. People are not passive recipients of these experiences. They seek them out. Evoking the environment in words can often evoke the charged experience too—at least in part. The material suggests tasks for psychologists—most simply, finding systematic ways to describe these experiences. That may help other environmental disciplines, which face difficulty characterising the dimension of response. Theoretically, the material raises questions about the representations generated by perceptual processes. The observation that powerful moral imperatives seem to be given in the act of perceiving is also suggestive for the psychology of morality. Culture certainly plays a part in charged responses, but landscapes have the power to be invested with an emotional and moral charge where other stimuli may not. I am indebted to Helen Ross for provoking this article; to Bert Hodges, Eamonn Hughes, David Hale and most particularly to Edna Longley for ideas and examples; and to Noel Sheehy for encouragement. They cannot be blamed for my misunderstandings.     

No bare particulars

There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic—and, I shall argue, false—crowding consequence.     

Form and meaning in early morphological processing: Comment on Feldman, O'Connor, and Moscoso del Prado Martin (2009)

Feldman, O’Connor, and Moscoso del Prado Martín (2009) reported evidence for differential priming of semantically transparent (talker—talk) and semantically opaque (corner—corn) morphological pairs under masked presentation conditions. The present commentary argues that these data should not call into question the theory that morphologically structured words undergo a segmentation process based solely on form, because (1) these results do not contradict existing evidence for morphoorthographic segmentation, (2) funnel plots suggest that the lack of priming observed for semantically opaque items in this study is inconsistent with findings in the existing literature, and (3) orthographic characteristics of the semantically opaque pairs in this study (rather than semantic factors) are the most likely explanation for these discrepant results.     

Topological explanations and robustness in biological sciences

This paper argues that besides mechanistic explanations, there is a kind of explanation that relies upon “topological” properties of systems in order to derive the explanandum as a consequence, and which does not consider mechanisms or causal processes. I first investigate topological explanations in the case of ecological research on the stability of ecosystems. Then I contrast them with mechanistic explanations, thereby distinguishing the kind of realization they involve from the realization relations entailed by mechanistic explanations, and explain how both kinds of explanations may be articulated in practice. The second section, expanding on the case of ecological stability, considers the phenomenon of robustness at all levels of the biological hierarchy in order to show that topological explanations are indeed pervasive there. Reasons are suggested for this, in which “neutral network” explanations are singled out as a form of topological explanation that spans across many levels. Finally, I appeal to the distinction of explanatory regimes to cast light on a controversy in philosophy of biology, the issue of contingence in evolution, which is shown to essentially involve issues about realization.     

Nothingness and the Human Umwelt

In the paper I argue that the great impact of empiricism on psychology and the enclosed dualist agenda traps psychological phenomena into subjectivism. By discussing the phenomena of nothingness in biological and cultural life it is argued that meaning must be considered as a phenomenon that represents both a fit and a misfit of the individual with the environment. By stressing the overall presence of nothingness phenomena it is argued how the reduced ontology of empiricism—and its blindness to relations and transformations out of which meaning grows—should be overcome. In human cultural life, transformations are constitutive and ongoing changes are being produced to make sure that continuity as well as discontinuity will happen. The analysis of especially one case—the removal of an Amish school after a shooting episode—serves to prove how meaning grows out of cultural processes as people produce their own conditions of life. From a cultural-ecological point of view, analyzing meaning at the level of individual phenomenology, hence, means analyzing the ‘total psychological situation’ (legacy of Kurt Lewin). This may for instance include analyzing how people live, what they consider important and worth preserving, what must be changed, what are their core values and how do institutional arrangements contribute to keeping up that which is valued or to changing that which is not, etc. Meaning may be viewed the lived-out experience—the domain of self-generativity in human life.     

Activity-Based Accounts of Mechanism and the Threat of Polygenic Effects

Accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as to provide an understanding of mechanism and of causation. Ontic accounts differ quite radically in their ontologies, and one of the latest additions to this tradition proposed by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver reintroduces the concept of activity. In this paper I ask whether this influential and activity-based account of mechanisms is viable as an ontic account. I focus on polygenic scenarios—scenarios in which the causal truths depend on more than one cause. The importance of polygenic causation was noticed early on by Mill (1893). It has since been shown to be a problem for both causal-law approaches to causation (Cartwright 1983) and accounts of causation cast in terms of capacities (Dupré 1993; Glennan 1997, pp. 605–626). However, whereas mechanistic accounts seem to be attractive precisely because they promise to handle complicated causal scenarios, polygenic causation needs to be examined more thoroughly in the emerging literature on activity-based mechanisms. The activity-based account proposed in Machamer et al. (2000, pp. 1–25) is problematic as an ontic account, I will argue. It seems necessary to ask, of any ontic account, how well it performs in causal situations where—at the explanandum level of mechanism—no activity occurs. In addition, it should be asked how well the activity-based account performs in situations where there are too few activities around to match the polygenic causal origin of the explanandum. The first situation presents an explanandum-problem and the second situation presents an explanans-problem—I will argue—both of which threaten activity-based frameworks.     

The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it,and how to cope with it

Metaethical—or, more generally, metanormative—realism faces a serious epistemological challenge. Realists owe us—very roughly speaking—an account of how it is that we can have epistemic access to the normative truths about which they are realists. This much is, it seems, uncontroversial among metaethicists, myself included. But this is as far as the agreement goes, for it is not clear—nor uncontroversial—how best to understand the challenge, what the best realist way of coping with it is, and how successful this attempt is. In this paper I try, first, to present the challenge in its strongest version, and second, to show how realists—indeed, robust realists—can cope with it. The strongest version of the challenge is, I argue, that of explaining the correlation between our normative beliefs and the independent normative truths. And I suggest an evolutionary explanation (of a pre-established harmony kind) as a way of solving it.     

Implicit sequence learning is represented by stimulus—response rules

For nearly two decades, researchers have investigated spatial sequence learning in an attempt to identify what specifically is learned during sequential tasks (e.g., stimulus order, response order, etc.). Despite extensive research, controversy remains concerning the information-processing locus of this learning effect. There are three main theories concerning the nature of spatial sequence learning, corresponding to the perceptual, motor, or response selection (i.e., central mechanisms underlying the association between stimulus and response pairs) processes required for successful task performance. The present data investigate this controversy and support the theory that stimulus—response (S—R) rules are critical for sequence learning. The results from two experiments demonstrate that sequence learning is disrupted only when the S—R rules for the task are altered. When the S—R rules remain constant or involve only a minor transformation, significant sequence learning occurs. These data implicate spatial response selection as a likely mechanism mediating spatial sequential learning.     

The Nature and Time Course of Pragmatic Plausibility Effects

The experiments reported in this article used a delayed same/different sentence matching task with concurrent measurement of eye movements to investigate the nature of the plausibility effect. The results clearly show that plausibility effects are not due to low level lexical associative processes, but arise as a consequence of the processing of the earliest or most basic form of sentential meaning. In fact, when sentential implausibility and lexical association are varied simultaneously, it is only sentential implausibility that exerts an effect. Effects of implausibility occur rapidly—sometimes parafoveally—and are localised in the regions of the sentence where the implausibility occurs, suggesting an incremental interpretive process progressing on a roughly word-by-word basis. It is suggested that plausibility effects result from the operation of a heuristically-driven process of sentential interpretation. This appears to behave in a ‘modular’ fashion, despite being influenced by real world knowledge and probabilities.Particular thanks are due to Ken Forster for kindling the ideas which led to much of this work and to Merrill Garrett for posing impossible challenges, which, probably to everyone’s surprise, could in fact be met. I am also much indebted to Claire Boissiere, Emma Clayes, Clare Dobbin, Alan Kennedy, Julie-Ann Marshall, Ashley Murray, and Murray Rowan for their collaboration in this research.     

Distinguishing the contributions of implicit and explicit processes to performance of the weather prediction task

Examinations of the cognitive neuroscience of category learning frequently rely on probabilistic classificationlearning Tasks—namely, the weather prediction task (WPT)—to study the neural mechanisms of implicit learning. Accumulating evidence suggests that the task also depends on explicit-learning processes. The present investigation manipulated the WPT to assess the specific contributions of implicit- and explicit-learning processes to performance, with a particular focus on how the contributions of these processes change as the task progresses. In Experiment 1, a manipulation designed to disrupt implicit-learning processes had no effect on classification accuracy or the distribution of individual response strategies. In Experiment 2, by contrast, a manipulation designed to disrupt explicit-learning processes substantially reduced classification accuracy and reduced the number of participants who relied on a correct response strategy. The present findings suggest that WPT learning is not an effective tool for investigating nondeclarative learning processes     

A Parent–Child Interactional Model of Social Anxiety Disorder in Youth

In this paper, one of the most common disorders of childhood and adolescence, social anxiety disorder (SAD), is examined to illustrate the complex and delicate interplay between parent and child factors that can result in normal development gone awry. Our parent–child model of SAD posits a host of variables that converge to occasion the onset and maintenance of this disorder. Specifically, five risk factors—temperamental characteristics of the child, parental anxiety, attachment processes in the parent–child dyad, information processing biases, and parenting practices—will be highlighted. While it is acknowledged that other factors including genetic influences and peer relationships may also be important, they are simply not the focus of this paper. Within these constraints, the implications of our parent–child interaction model for prevention, treatment, research, and practice will be explored.     

Local traditions in gorilla manual skill: evidence for observational learning of behavioral organization

Elaborate manual skills of food processing are known in several species of great ape; but their manner of acquisition is controversial. Local, “cultural” traditions show the influence of social learning, but it is uncertain whether this includes the ability to imitate the organization of behavior. Dispute has centered on whether program-level imitation contributes to the acquisition of feeding techniques in gorillas. Here, we show that captive western gorillas at Port Lympne, Kent, have developed a group-wide habit of feeding on nettles, using two techniques. We compare their nettle processing behavior with that of wild mountain gorillas in Rwanda. Both populations are similar in their repertoires of action elements, and in developing multi-step techniques for food processing, with coordinated asymmetric actions of the hands and iteration of parts of a process as “subroutines”. Crucially, however, the two populations deal in different ways with the special challenges presented by nettle stings, with consistently different organizations of action elements. We conclude that, while an elaborate repertoire of manual actions and the ability to develop complex manual skills are natural characteristics of gorillas, the inter-site differences in nettle-eating technique are best explained as a consequence of social transmission. According to this explanation, gorillas can copy aspects of program organization from the behavior of others and they use this ability when learning how to eat nettles, resulting in consistent styles of processing by most individuals at each different site; like other great apes, gorillas have the precursor abilities for developing culture.     

Decision noise: An explanation for observed violations of signal detection theory

In signal detection theory (SDT), responses are governed by perceptual noise and a flexible decision criterion. Recent criticisms of SDT (see, e.g., Balakrishnan, 1999) have identified violations of its assumptions, and researchers have suggested that SDT fundamentally misrepresents perceptual and decision processes. We hypothesize that, instead, these violations of SDT stem from decision noise: the inability to use deterministic response criteria. In order to investigate this hypothesis, we present a simple extension of SDT—the decision noise model—with which we demonstrate that shifts in a decision criterion can be masked by decision noise. In addition, we propose a new statistic that can help identify whether the violations of SDT stem from perceptual or from decision processes. The results of a stimulus classification experiment—together with model fits to past experiments—show that decision noise substantially affects performance. These findings suggest that decision noise is important across a wide range of tasks and needs to be better understood in order to accurately measure perceptual processes.     

Emergence and singular limits

Recent work by Robert Batterman and Alexander Rueger has brought attention to cases in physics in which governing laws at the base level “break down” and singular limit relations obtain between base- and upper-level theories. As a result, they claim, these are cases with emergent upper-level properties. This paper contends that this inference—from singular limits to explanatory failure, novelty or irreducibility, and then to emergence—is mistaken. The van der Pol nonlinear oscillator is used to show that there can be a full explanation of upper-level properties entirely in base-level terms even when singular limits are present. Whether upper-level properties are emergent depends not on the presence of a singular limit but rather on details of the ampliative approximation methods used. The paper suggests that focusing on explanatory deficiency at the base level is key to understanding emergence in physics.     

MISSing the World. Models as Isolations and Credible Surrogate Systems

This article shows how the MISS account of models—as isolations and surrogate systems—accommodates and elaborates Sugden’s account of models as credible worlds and Hausman’s account of models as explorations. Theoretical models typically isolate by means of idealization, and they are representatives of some target system, which prompts issues of resemblance between the two to arise. Models as representations are constrained both ontologically (by their targets) and pragmatically (by the purposes and audiences of the modeller), and these relations are coordinated by a model commentary. Surrogate models are often about single mechanisms. They are distinguishable from substitute models, which are examined without any concern about their connections with the target. Models as credible worlds are surrogate models that are believed to provide access to their targets on account of their credibility (of which a few senses are distinguished).     

Transformation of flow in rehabilitation: The role of advanced communication technologies

Authentic rehabilitation requires the active participation of patients and their involvement with opportunities for action and development. Within this framework, in this article we outline the possibility of using two emerging computing and communication technologies—ambient intelligence (AmI) and virtual reality (VR)—for a new breed of rehabilitative and clinical applications based on a strategy defined astransformation of flow. Transformation of flow is a person’s ability to exploit an optimal (flow) experience to identify and use new and unexpected psychological resources as sources of involvement. We identify the feeling ofpresence—the feeling of being in a world that exists outside oneself—as the theoretical link between the technology and rehabilitation. AmI and VR are used to trigger broad empowerment processes induced by a strong sense of presence, leading to greater agency and control over one’s actions and environment.     

Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction—traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism—can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.     

The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts

The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role.