共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Antony Duff 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):277-281
Richard Dagger (in this issue) provides perhaps the most persuasive version of a ‘fair play’ theory of criminal punishment,
grounded in an attractive liberal republican political theory. But, I argue, his version of the theory still faces serious
objections: that its explanation of why some central mala in se are properly criminalised is still distorting, despite his
appeal to the burdens of ‘general compliance’; and that it cannot adequately explain (as it should explain) the differential
seriousness and wrongfulness of different kinds of crime.
相似文献
Antony DuffEmail: |
2.
Kious BM 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(4):213-234
There is currently much concern over the use of pharmaceuticals and other biomedical techniques to enhance athletic performance—a
practice we might refer to as doping. Many justifications of anti-doping efforts claim that doping involves a serious moral
transgression. In this article, I review a number of arguments in support of that claim, but show that they are not conclusive,
suggesting that we do not have good reasons for thinking that doping is wrong.
相似文献
Brent M. KiousEmail: |
3.
Richard Dagger 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):259-275
This article defends the fair-play theory of legal punishment against three objections. The first, the irrelevance objection, is the long-standing complaint that fair play fails to capture what it is about crimes that makes criminals deserving of
punishment; the others are the recently raised false-equivalence and lacks-integration objections. In response, I sketch an account of fair-play theory that is grounded in a conception of the political order
as a meta-cooperative practice—a conception that falls somewhere between contractual and communitarian conceptions—and draw on this
account to show how the theory can overcome the objections.
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Richard DaggerEmail: |
4.
Kelly Oliver 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(1):63-80
In this essay, I argue that the contemporary notion of law has been reduced to regulations and disciplinary codes that do
not and cannot give meaning to our emotional lives and moral sensibilities. As a result, we have increasing numbers of what
I call “abysmal individuals” who suffer from a split between law—broadly conceived as that which gives form and structure
to social life—and personal embodied sensations of pain and pleasure. My attempt to understand the place of Abu Ghraib within
American culture leads to an analysis of our valorization of innocence and ignorance that not only becomes the grounds on
which we morally (if not legally) excuse abusive behavior as “fun,” but also becomes part of the justification for condoning
some forms of violence while condemning others. In addition, I argue that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
violence trades on underlying assumptions about the relationship between culture and nature, technology and bodies, wherein
bodies are imagined as natural and outside of the realm of law.
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Kelly OliverEmail: |
5.
Frank Arntzenius 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):277-297
I argue that standard decision theories, namely causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, both are unsatisfactory.
I devise a new decision theory, from which, under certain conditions, standard game theory can be derived.
相似文献
Frank ArntzeniusEmail: |
6.
Enactive appraisal 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Giovanna Colombetti 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(4):527-546
Emotion theorists tend to separate “arousal” and other bodily events such as “actions” from the evaluative component of emotion
known as “appraisal.” This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and
personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called “enactive approach.”
I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective
notion of personhood.
相似文献
Giovanna ColombettiEmail: |
7.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Sophia》2009,48(1):1-14
In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum
is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the
actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical
reasons to create the actual world.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
8.
Chris R. Schlauch 《Pastoral Psychology》2007,56(2):199-221
Diverse religious communities and traditions share certain common notions among the ways of life they seek to cultivate, notions
that contemporary psychoanalysis can illumine. This essay offers three contributions: (a) substantive—characterizing features
of a way: being-there-with-and-for; (b) methodological—outlining genres of relating psychology and religion; (c) philosophical—discussing
relations between epistemology and ontology (that is, between maps and territory).
Chris R. Schlauch is Associate Professor of Counseling Psychology and Religion, and Psychology of Religion at Boston University. 相似文献
Chris R. SchlauchEmail: |
Chris R. Schlauch is Associate Professor of Counseling Psychology and Religion, and Psychology of Religion at Boston University. 相似文献
9.
Gabriele Contessa 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):187-190
In this note, I argue that a dynamically shifted world—i.e. a world identical to our own except for a fixed constant difference
in the absolute acceleration of each object—is nomically impossible in a Newtonian world populated by finitely many objects.
A dynamic shift however seems to be nomically possible in a world populated by infinitely many objects, but only in a broad
sense of nomic possibility.
相似文献
Gabriele ContessaEmail: |
10.
11.
Michael E. Bratman 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):149-165
Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations.
I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what
in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest
sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency
and modest sociality. In pursuit of these theoretical aims, I propose that a central phenomenon is shared intention. I argue
that an adequate understanding of the distinctiveness of the intentions of individuals allows us to provide a construction
of attitudes of the participants, and of relevant inter-relations and contexts that constitutes shared intention. I explain
how shared intention, so understood, differs from a simple equilibrium within common knowledge. And I briefly contrast my
views with aspects of views of John Searle and Margaret Gilbert.
相似文献
Michael E. BratmanEmail: |
12.
Michael Nelson 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):455-471
I discuss Stalnaker’s views on modality. In particular, his views on actualism, anti-essentialism, counterpart theory, and
the Barcan formulas.
相似文献
Michael NelsonEmail: |
13.
Barry L. Bull 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2008,27(6):449-460
Liberal political theory is widely believed to be an inadequate source of civic commitment and thus of civic education primarily
because of its commitment to what is perceived as a pervasive individualism. In this paper, I explore the possibility that
John Rawls’s later political philosophy may provide a response to this belief. I first articulate a conception of liberal
politics derived from Rawls’s idea of reflective equilibrium that generates an overlapping consensus about political principles
among those who hold a wide variety of cultural and personal conceptions of the good. Next I develop the aims for civic education
in a society that employs such a politics. Then I suggest the elements of the public school curriculum appropriate for such
a civic education, including a robust multicultural education, intellectual reflection on the society’s history, and philosophical
training that enables children to understand the events and policies of their nation as following from general political principles.
I also consider the kinds of classroom practice that seem necessary to provide the motivation to engage in the process of
the emergence of an overlapping consensus, including opportunities to develop and to reflect on the principles that may be
included in the current consensus and to understand the way in which those principles relate to children’s developing conceptions
of the good. Finally, I compare this conception of civic education to those of other liberal theorists.
相似文献
Barry L. BullEmail: |
14.
Censure Theory <Emphasis Type="Italic">Still</Emphasis> Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply to Montague 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
T. Metz 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):113-123
In an article previously published in this journal, Phillip Montague critically surveys and rejects a handful of contemporary
attempts to explain why state punishment is morally justified. Among those targeted is one of my defences of the censure theory
of punishment, according to which state punishment is justified because the political community has a duty to express disapproval
of those guilty of injustice. My defence of censure theory supposes, per argumentum, that there is always some defeasible moral reason for the state to proportionately punish the guilty, and then demonstrates
that censure theory best entails and explains this intuition. Montague does not question the intuition, but instead argues
that three rival theories of punishment, including his societal-defence view, account for it to no worse a degree than my
censure theory. In this article I defend my initial argument, noting resources for its defence that Montague does not appreciate
and that, I maintain, provide those who believe that there is always pro tanto injustice in the state failing to proportionately punish the guilty reason to adopt censure theory over all competitors,
including Montague’s societal-defence theory.
相似文献
T. MetzEmail: |
15.
James D. Marshall 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2007,26(1):67-75
First I would like to thank Clarence Joldersma for his review of our Poststructuralism, Philosophy, Pedagogy (Marshall, 2004-PPP). In particular, I would thank him for his opening sentence: “[t]his book is a response to a lack.” It
is the notion of a lack, noted again later in his review, which I wish to take up mainly in this response. Rather than defending
or elaborating our particular contributions to PPP—the latter would be a great indignity to my colleagues as I would not write
over them—I will take the opportunity to develop the theme of a lack, as I believe that Joldersma has raised a very important issue. But first I will respond briefly to some of Joldersma’s general
and opening statements about the book, and my philosophical position in particular.
相似文献
James D. MarshallEmail: |
16.
Per Albert Ilsaas 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):313-316
The article is a brief response to Jacob Blair’s critique of David Rodin’s argument in War and Self-Defense that there are circumstances in which war conceivably could be justified not as self-defence, but as law enforcement or punishment.
It argues that while Rodin’s position potentially is less dilemmatic than Blair suggests, Blair nevertheless usefully highlights
tensions within it. Blair’s own argument in favour of ar as law-enforcement is suggestive, but in no way conclusive.
相似文献
Per Albert IlsaasEmail: |
17.
Greg Janzen 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):355-366
According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's
intentional (or representational) content. In this article I attempt to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called
change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. Specifically, I argue that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it
should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist
strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores
an alternative antiintentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can
vary despite sameness of phenomenal character.
相似文献
Greg JanzenEmail: |
18.
The compatibility between Western democracy and other cultures, and the desirability of democracy, are two important problems
in democratic theory. Following an insight from John Rawls’s later philosophy, and using some key passages in Mencius, I will show the compatibility between a ‘thin’ version of liberal democracy and Confucianism. Moreover, elaborating on Mencius’s
ideas of the responsibility of government for the physical and moral well-being of the people, the respectability of the government
and the ruling elite, and the competence-based limited political participation, I shall explore the Mencian criticisms of
some ‘thick’ democratic ideas. Through the discussion in this paper, I hope to show the relevance of Confucianism to contemporary
political philosophy and society.
相似文献
Tongdong BaiEmail: |
19.
Christian Piller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(4):413-428
The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism,
not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing
those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as
we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest in justification depends on our interest
in truth, we value believing with justification on non-instrumental grounds. A deontological understanding of justification,
thus, solves the Value of Knowledge Problem.
相似文献
Christian PillerEmail: |
20.
Frank Hofmann 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):173-182
Sydney Shoemaker has attempted to save mental causation by a new account of realization. As Brian McLaughlin argues convincingly,
the account has to face two major problems. First, realization does not guarantee entailment. So even if mental properties
are realized by physical properties, they need not be entailed by them. This is the first, rather general metaphysical problem.
A second problem, which relates more directly to mental causation is that Shoemaker must appeal to some kind of proportionality
as a constraint on causation in order to avoid redundant mental causation. I argue that, in addition, a “piling problem” arises,
since causal powers seem to be bestowed twice. Then, I try to sketch an alternative view of the relation between causal powers
and properties—a reductionist view—which fares better on some accounts. But it may have to face another and, perhaps, serious
problem, the “problem of the natural unity of properties”. Finally, I will pose a question about the relation between causal
powers and causation.
相似文献
Frank HofmannEmail: |