The role of individual differences in the accuracy of confidence judgments

Generally, self-assessment of accuracy in the cognitive domain produces overconfidence, whereas self-assessment of visual perceptual judgments results in underconfidence. Despite contrary empirical evidence, in models attempting to explain those phenomena, individual differences have often been disregarded. The authors report on 2 studies in which that shortcoming was addressed. In Experiment 1, participants (N= 520) completed a large number of cognitive-ability tests. Results indicated that individual differences provide a meaningful source of overconfidence and that a metacognitive trait might mediate that effect. In further analysis, there was only a relatively small correlation between test accuracy and confidence bias. In Experiment 2 (N = 107 participants), both perceptual and cognitive ability tests were included, along with measures of personality. Results again indicated the presence of a confidence factor that transcended the nature of the testing vehicle. Furthermore, a small relationship was found between that factor and some self-reported personality measures. Thus, personality traits and cognitive ability appeared to play only a small role in determining the accuracy of self-assessment. Collectively, the present results suggest that there are multiple causes of miscalibration, which current models of over- and underconfidence fail to encompass.     

Cognitive processes and individual differences in judgments relevant to drunk driving

The present study explored cognitive processes in judgments of drunkenness relative to legally allowable blood alcohol levels for driving. Judgments were based on the manipulation of three cues in hypothetical scenarios in a 3 X 4 X 3 factorial design (Type of Drink X Number of Drinks X Time to Consume). In addition, personality and behavioral characteristics influencing the accuracy of judgments of drunkenness relative to true blood alcohol levels were examined. Results indicated the presence of several misperceptions and inappropriate response tendencies that potentially can be modified with educational efforts.     

An analysis of individual differences in similarity judgments about complex random forms

A variation of the method of graded dichotomies was used to obtain judgments of interstimulus similarity for all pairings of 21 12-turn random shapes. Using the Tucker-Messick procedure, a six-dimensional spatial model, representing individual variation in performance on the task, was derived. Six “idealized individuals” (IIs) were isolated. A five-dimensional Euclidean spatial model was obtained for each II using the Shepard-Kruskal scaling technique. The resulting psychological dimensions of perceived form were related to two sets of physical measures on the forms: the factor space suggested by Brown and Owen and a set of more basic physical measures. These basic measures allowed interpretation of most of the psychological dimensions and revealed differences between IIs in patterns of cue utilization.     

Attentional interference in judgments of musical timbre: individual differences in working memory

Researchers have shown that working memory is related to a variety of high-level cognitive processes. However, the results of recent research have suggested that may be because of its role in attentional control. In the present experiment, the authors investigated that hypothesis by using an attentional interference task with musical stimuli. Listeners were asked to monitor one ear for either a clarinet or violin tone and to ignore any information in the other ear. On some of the trials, they heard only one tone and on other trials, either the same instrument in both ears or different instruments. Individual differences were measured in working memory and musical experience. The results showed more attentional interference in the different-instrument condition for participants with lower working memory scores, which suggested that working memory involves the ability to control attention to inhibit irrelevant information.     

Instability of individual differences in the association between confidence judgments and memory performance

There are large individual differences in the degree of association between the accuracy of memories and subjective confidence in those memories. Are these differences stable within the same test, and between alternate forms of a test? In Experiment 1, college students were tested on 3 recognition memory tasks, then retested 2 weeks later on alternate forms of the same tasks. The relationship between confidence judgments and recognition performance displayed low split-half stability and low alternate-forms stability. A second experiment with elderly adults replicated these findings. In a third experiment, college students recalled answers to general knowledge questions and rated confidence in the correctness of each answer. Individual differences in the association between confidence and recall performance were not stable across the odd- and even-numbered items on the test. These data indicate the need for the development of procedures that will produce stable estimates of individuals’ metacognitive accuracy.     

Happiness as a belief system: individual differences and priming in emotion judgments

Three studies involving 104 undergraduates sought to examine how an individual's level of life satisfaction organizes their knowledge concerning the self's emotions. Participants judged the self's positive and negative emotions within a computerized task. Key results sought to determine whether judging two positive emotions in a consecutive sequence speeds the second judgment--a pattern of priming that would suggest a tighter, more interconnected structure in semantic memory related to one's positive emotions. As expected, individual differences in life satisfaction predicted the magnitude of this priming effect (Studies 1 & 2), which appeared to be unique to judgments of the self's emotions (Study 3). The results indicate that happy, relative to less happy, individuals organize information concerning their positive emotions in a qualitatively different and tighter semantic manner.     

Social inference and individual differences in aggression: Evidence for spontaneous judgments of hostility

This research examined the hypothesis that aggressive vs. nonaggressive individuals differ in their spontaneous trait inferences, i. e., inferences made without any conscious intention of inferring characteristics of an actor. We anticipated that spontaneous processing conditions would be more revealing of aggressive/nonaggressive differences than would conditions that prompt deliberate inference processes. We used a cued-recall paradigm. Aggressive and nonaggressive subjects were instructed to memorize sentences that were open to either hostile or nonhostile interpretations. Sentence recall was then cued by either hostile dispositional terms or by words that were linked semantically to the element of the sentences. Within the spontaneous inference condition, semantic cues prompted twice as much recall as hostile cues among nonaggressive subjects, whereas dispositional cues aided recall more than semantic cues among aggressive subjects. As predicted, within the delinerate inference conditions there were no aggressive/nonaggressive differences. The nature of spontaneous vs. deliberate inferential processes and the advantages of spontaneous inference paradigms for testing predictions about schema-based processing in aggression are discussed. © 1995 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

The effect of individual differences in act prototypicality judgments on trait-behaviour correlations and cross-situational consistency

Individuals differ in their perceptions of actprototypicality. This study examined whether incorporating such individual differences enhances trait-behaviour correlations and provides stronger evidence for cross-situational consistency. Three hundred and fifty-three subjects rated the dominance prototypicality of 100 acts, indicated how often they performed each of these acts, and provided trait ratings of how dominant they were in general. There were substantial and reliable individual differences in prototypicality judgements over a 4–5 month period. A variety of weighting schemes were used to incorporate these individual differences, but none dramatically increased the trait-behaviour correlation. Similarly, incorporating individual differences did not increase the magnitude of cross-situational consistency correlations. However, incorporating individual differences did enhance the pattern of trait-behaviour and consistency correlations from less prototypical to highly prototypical acts. Differences in perceptions of act prototypicality thus do not affect the magnitude of the correlations that can be obtained, but they are useful in revealing theoretically meaningful patterns of relationships.     

Confidence judgments by humans and rhesus monkeys

Researchers have begun to evaluate animals' metacognitive capacities. Continuing this evaluation, the present authors asked whether monkeys could use the analog of a confidence-rating scale to judge retrospectively their accuracy in a psychophysical discrimination. Monkeys and human participants classified stimuli as dense or sparse without feedback. Then, they made a secondary confidence judgment by choosing responses that risked different levels of timeout but could earn different levels of reward. Human participants were instructed to use these responses to express levels of confidence. They used 2- and 3-level confidence-rating scales appropriately. Monkeys used the 2-level scale appropriately--especially one who performed almost identically to humans. Neither monkey used the 3-level scale as the humans did. These studies place humans and animals for the first time in the identical risk-taking situation that collects declarative confidence judgments from humans. They demonstrate the first retrospective reports of uncertainty by non-human primates while also suggesting their limits in this area.     

Hemispheric differences in semantic-relatedness judgments

Subjects judged the semantic relatedness of word pairs presented to the left or right visual field. The word pairs were presented one below the other. On critical trials, the words' referents had a typical spatial relation, with one referent oriented above the other (e.g. ATTIC/BASEMENT). The spatial relation of the words either matched or mismatched the spatial relation of their referents. When presented to the left hemisphere, the match or mismatch did not have an effect. However, there was a reliable mismatch effect for pairs presented to the right hemisphere. The results are interpreted in the context of perceptual theories of mental representation.     

Gender-related differences in moral judgments

The moral sense is among the most complex aspects of the human mind. Despite substantial evidence confirming gender-related neurobiological and behavioral differences, and psychological research suggesting gender specificities in moral development, whether these differences arise from cultural effects or are innate remains unclear. In this study, we investigated the role of gender, education (general education and health education) and religious belief (Catholic and non-Catholic) on moral choices by testing 50 men and 50 women with a moral judgment task. Whereas we found no differences between the two genders in utilitarian responses to non-moral dilemmas and to impersonal moral dilemmas, men gave significantly more utilitarian answers to personal moral (PM) dilemmas (i.e., those courses of action whose endorsement involves highly emotional decisions). Cultural factors such as education and religion had no effect on performance in the moral judgment task. These findings suggest that the cognitive–emotional processes involved in evaluating PM dilemmas differ in men and in women, possibly reflecting differences in the underlying neural mechanisms. Gender-related determinants of moral behavior may partly explain gender differences in real-life involving power management, economic decision-making, leadership and possibly also aggressive and criminal behaviors.     

Differences between probability and frequency judgments: The role of individual differences in working memory capacity

Most theories of probability judgment assume that judgments are made by comparing the strength of a focal hypothesis relative to the strength of alternative hypotheses. In contrast, research suggests that frequency judgments are assessed using a non-comparative process; the strength of the focal hypothesis is assessed without comparing it to the strength of alternative hypotheses. We tested this distinction between probability and frequency judgments using the alternative outcomes paradigm (Windschitl, Young, & Jenson, 2002). Assuming that judgments of probability (but not judgments of frequency) entail comparing the focal hypothesis with alternative hypotheses, we hypothesized that probability judgments would be sensitive to the distribution of the alternative hypotheses and would be negatively correlated with individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity. In contrast, frequency judgments should be unrelated to the distribution of the alternatives and uncorrelated with WM-capacity. Results supported the hypotheses.     

Confidence judgments in children's and adults' event recall and suggestibility

The present work investigated the role of children's and adults' metacognitive monitoring and control processes for unbiased event recall tasks and for suggestibility. Three studies were conducted in which children and adults indicated their degree of confidence that their answers were correct after (Study 1) and before (Study 2) answering either unbiased or misleading questions or (Study 3) forced-choice recognition questions. There was a strong tendency for overestimation of confidence regardless of age and question format. However, children did not lack the principal metacognitive competencies when these questions were asked in a neutral interview. Under misleading questioning, in contrast, children's monitoring skills were seriously impaired. Within each age group, better metacognitive differentiation was positively associated with recall accuracy in the suggestive interview.     

How people make support judgments: individual differences in the traits used to infer supportiveness in others.

Social support and other social judgments are composed of several distinct components, of which relationship effects are an important part. With regard to support judgments, relationship effects refer to the fact that when judging the same targets, people differ systematically in whom they see as supportive. One explanation for this effect is that people differ in how they combine information about targets to judge supportiveness. Participants rated the supportiveness of hypothetical targets and targets from their own social networks. Multilevel modeling identified the traits participants used to make support judgments. There were significant differences in the extent to which participants used different target personality traits to judge supportiveness. In addition, participant neuroticism predicted the extent to which participants used target neuroticism and agreeableness to judge supportiveness.     

Affective influences on individual and group judgments

Do emotional states influence the social judgments made by groups and individuals? Based on affect-cognition theories and research on group judgmental shifts, we predicted that group discussion will enhance positive mood effects on judgments, but inhibit affectively-based distortions in dysphoric moods. Positive, neutral and negative moods were induced using audiovisual presentations. Individual and group consensus judgments of nine person categories on three judgmental dimensions (evaluation, competence and self-confidence) were obtained in two experimental sessions separated by a two-week interval. Results showed that individuals made more positive judgments when happy, and more negative judgments when sad than did controls. Group discussion resulted in a further polarization of positive judgments, and the attenuation of negative judgments. The findings are interpreted as evidence for the important role affect plays in mediating both individual cognitive processes and interactive social behaviours. The implications of the results for contemporary affect-cognition theories and models of group behaviour are considered.     

Picture-word differences and conceptual frequency judgments

Recent evidence suggests that while pictures are more easily recognized, discriminated, associated, and recalled than their corresponding verbal labels, this is not the case in concept acquisition/utilization tasks. If such evidence is interpreted in terms of a "frequency theory" perspective, one would expect the typically obtained frequency judgment differences between pictures and words to be reduced if "conceptual" frequency judgments are required. This expectation was confirmed in three experiments.     

Confidence of social judgments is not just error: Individual differences in the structure,stability, and social functions of perceptual confidence

The present research uses a Social Relations Model approach to focus on individual differences in perceptual confidence – a person’s confidence in her or his impressions of others. Across two samples of group interactions, we found that the majority of variance in perceptual confidence was explained by individual differences in how people tended to perceive others (i.e., perceiver effects). A smaller percentage of variance was explained by differences in how people tended to be perceived by others (i.e., target effects). Both these individual differences were stable over time, were related to relevant personality measures, and group outcomes. Together, these results demonstrate that although perceptual confidence may not be substantially related to accuracy, it exists as a stable individual difference dimension that has important consequences for social interactions.     

Confidence in masked orientation judgments is informed by both evidence and visibility

How do human observers determine their degree of belief that they are correct in a decision about a visual stimulus—that is, their confidence? According to prominent theories of confidence, the quality of stimulation should be positively related to confidence in correct decisions, and negatively to confidence in incorrect decisions. However, in a backward-masked orientation task with a varying stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), we observed that confidence in incorrect decisions also increased with stimulus quality. Model fitting to our decision and confidence data revealed that the best explanation for the present data was the new weighted evidence-and-visibility model, according to which confidence is determined by evidence about the orientation as well as by the general visibility of the stimulus. Signal detection models, postdecisional accumulation models, two-channel models, and decision-time-based models were all unable to explain the pattern of confidence as a function of SOA and decision correctness. We suggest that the metacognitive system combines several cues related to the correctness of a decision about a visual stimulus in order to calculate decision confidence.     

Developmental differences in frequency judgments of words and pictures

Children in kindergarten, third, and fifth grades were presented a list of either pictures or words (with items presented for varying numbers of times on the study trial). In both picture and word conditions, half of the Ss estimated how many times each item had been presented (absolute judgments) and the other half judged which of two items had occurred more often on the study trial (relative judgments). The primary finding was that while frequency judgment performance improved with age for both pictures and words, there was relatively greater improvement for pictures (i.e., the picture-word difference increased with age). These results lend strong support to the frequency theory of discrimination learning and, in particular, may be useful in accounting for effects associated with age and with age by stimulus mode interactions.     

Own-other differences in the realism of some metacognitive judgments

The present study investigated differences in judgments of one's own and others' knowledge (the own-other difference). Consistent with the below-average effect (e.g., Kruger, 1999), our main results showed that the participants gave lower knowledge ratings of their own extent of knowledge than of another person's extent of knowledge (Experiment 1). Furthermore, lower and more realistic judgments were found when the participants judged their own as compared with when judging another person's overall accuracy (frequency judgments) of answering knowledge questions correctly (Experiment 1 and 2). On the basis of these results it is argued that judgmental anchoring may be important also in the context of indirect comparisons, and that previous conclusions of cross-cultural psychology regarding the above-average effect may be oversimplified.