Enactive or inactive? Cranially envatted dream experience and the extended conscious mind

When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically on Alva Noë’s enactive view, according to which the vehicles of perceptual experience extend beyond the brain, I argue that dreams are a quandary. Noë’s view is that dreaming is consistent with enactivism because even if dreams are inactive and shut off from the external environment, they are not “full-blown” perceptual consciousness, and also, there is some reason to reject the inactive claim. However, this view rests on an unjustified and reductive account of dreams which is not supported by empirical evidence. Dreams can indeed replicate waking phenomenal experience during inactive periods of sleep, and we have no reason to suspect that dreams which are more inactive are less “full-blown”. Taken together, this shows that dreams are indeed relevant to extended conscious mind theories and need to be taken into account by enactivists.     

Dreams: Everyone’s Guide to Inner Space

This broad discussion of dreams and dreaming begins with a consideration of “outer” as opposed to “inner” psychological space—rational outer life in the world contrasted with the inner life of dreams, fantasies, and creativity. Dream theories and many examples of actual present-day dreams follow, often showing the dream’s relationship to the dreamer’s outer life.     

To the Nothingnesses Themselves: Husserl’s Influence on Sartre’s Notion of Nothingness

In this article I argue that Sartre’s notions of nothingness and “negatity” are not, as he presents it, primarily reactions to Hegel and Heidegger. Instead, they are a reaction to an ongoing struggle with Husserl’s notion of intentionality and related notions. I do this by comparing the criticism aimed at Husserl in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness to that presented in his earlier work, The Imagination, where he discusses Husserl more elaborately. Furthermore, I compare his criticism to Husserl’s own criticism of the “doctrine of immanent objects”, in order to show that Sartre’s notion of nothingness is a continuation of Husserl’s criticism, and that he turns Husserl’s own arguments against himself.     

Allport's Life and Allport's Psychology

ABSTRACT This article addresses some of the relations between Gordon Allport's life and his psychological theories, focusing on two themes: (a) Allport's junior-year prize-winning recounting of Harvard's “Rinehart” legend–the changes and distortions he introduced in his version of the core legend suggest altruistic sublimation of motives for power and prestige; and (b) Allport's relationship with “Jenny,” the mother of “Ross,” his college roommate (he twice published her letters to him as Letters from Jenny.). I suggest that the need to differentiate himself from Ross was one contributing factor to such Allportian theoretical notions as the functional autonomy of motives and the sharp differentiation between “normal” and “abnormal.”     

Truth in the Investigations

According to a widespread interpretation, in the Investigations Wittgenstein adopted a deflationary or redundancy theory of truth. On this view, Wittgenstein’s pronouncements about truth should be understood in the light of his invocation of the equivalences ‘p’ is true = p and ‘p’ is false = not p. This paper shows that this interpretation does not do justice to Wittgenstein’s thoughts. I will be claiming that, in fact, in his second book Wittgenstein is returning to the pre-Tractarian notion of bipolarity, and that his new development of this notion in the Investigations excludes the redundancy-deflationary reading. Wittgenstein’s thoughts about truth are instead compatible with another interpretative option: Wittgenstein remains faithful to his methodological pronouncements, and he merely presents us with (grammatical) platitudes about the notions of “true” and “false”.

     

论儒家伦理道德的普遍性与特殊性——以北宋理学家吕大临的思想的个案分析为例

本文试图以北宋理学家吕大临的思想的个案分析为例,探讨儒家伦理道德的普遍性与特殊性。文章通过对吕大临思想中的“性”、“仁”、“理义”、“天理”、“时中”等观念的解析,讨论了吕大临对儒家“道德法则”的普遍性和特殊性的看法以及他在处理两者之间关系方面的观点。     

“Stony ground but not entirely”

Even though Alain Badiou depicts himself and his philosophy as “militant atheist” there is, as he himself has pointed out, nevertheless several theological notions present in his work. This presence of theological language is not restricted to his book on the Apostle Paul, but can be found throughout his work. This paper focuses on Badiou’s substantial use of the term “grace” as a metaphor for the exceptional occurrence that he defines in philosophical terms as an “event”. The aim of the paper is to identify the context in which Badiou comes to use, and the sources from which he draws the metaphor of “grace”, and thus to contribute to a more precise understanding of what he means by this metaphor. The paper will identify the key instances in which Badiou employs the term “grace” in an effort to clarify how he understands it and what ends he intends it to serve. And in contrast to the existing research concerning the issue of grace, in which there has been a tendency to centre the attention almost entirely on Badiou’s book on Paul, it will consider a number of different instances in which he uses this term.     

N. A. Vasil’ev’s Logic and the Problem of Future Random Events

The solution of the problem of the future random events truth is considered in Vasil’ev’s logic. N. A. Vasil’ev graded the logic according to two levels—the level of facts, i.e. time fixed events, and the level of notions or rules, governing these facts. The mathematical construction previously suggested for imaginary Vasil’ev’s logic, extends to the early variant of his logic—a logic of notions. In the paper, we investigate the meaning of problematic and uncertain assertions introduced by Vasil’ev. As a result, we developed a model of Vasil’ev’s logic of facts that resolves also the truth problem of future random events. The imaginary logic has also been extended to the level of notions, and the law of the excluded eighth is gotten in it. The correspondence between Vasil’ev’s terms “some” and “all” and modern quantifiers is discussed.     

Concerning Gibson's ‘on the face of it’: Immediate perception and single-glance face recognition

The paper notes (1) that “thinking Gibsonian” is to be torn between two loves: cognition and reality, (2) that just because of this the cognitive scientist may beneficiently and more thoroughly rediscover that they are only two faces of his one true love: Meaning. This issue is elaborated as “the problem of intentionality” and culminates in the conclusion that Gibson's direct ecological approach to visual perception is not a theory about the constitution of perceptual meaning, which is the domain of the indirect cognitive approach. Therefore the constant Gibsonian attacks on indirect theories might be both misled and misleading. The second half of the paper begins with noting that this may be due to a confounding of the “direct” level of explanation of the perceiver with the “indirect” levels of phenomenologist and visual scientist. Next the scientist's process notions of direct and indirect theories are discussed with respect to single-glance face recognition. Within this second half of the paper about 20 different meanings of “direct” or “immediate” are presented (printed in italics). Most of these are generally acceptable and should, thus, not be invoked in support of entirely different notions, which are very problematic because these seem to eliminate the concept of mind-as-cognitive-process.     

Pragmatic,Existentialist and Phenomenological Interpretations of Marxism

In his book, Hermeneutics and Reflection (2013), Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann outlines what he sees as the fundamental differences between Edmund Husserl’s “theoretical” phenomenology and Martin Heidegger’s “a-theoretical” phenomenology, which he frames in terms of the distinction between “reflective observation” and “hermeneutic understanding”. In this paper, I will clarify the sense of these terms in order to elucidate some of the crucial similarities and differences between Husserl and Heidegger. Against von Herrmann’s characterization of the Husserlian project, I argue that we should not consider these differences in terms of “reflection”, since this runs the risk of misconstruing Husserlian phenomenology with the philosophical tradition he was striving against. Taken together, by way of a close reading of von Herrmann, the following discussion will serve as a brief sketch of the early Heidegger’s turn away from Husserlian phenomenology and toward his own hermeneutic phenomenology.     

Memories,or attempts to dream undreamt traumas? Souvenirs dormants (Sleeping memories) by Patrick Modiano,under the gaze of Thomas Ogden

Abstract

In “Sleeping memories”(2017), French writer Patrick Modiano confronts the past and his memories in a different way compared with his previous novels, as he keeps trying to revisit and reprocess them. In this book he adds a new method, the dreaming revision of memories, especially traumatic ones, turning to the work of Marquis d’Hervey de Saint-Denys, “Les rêves et les moyens de les diriger: Observations pratiques.” I would suggest that in this way he dreams undreamt traumas, thereby transforming them. In doing so, Modiano meets Thomas Ogden’s art of psychoanalysis.     

The idea of will and organic evolution in Bergson’s philosophy of life

The idea of the élan vital is crucial for an understanding of Bergson’s metaphysical method, underpinning the way in which philosophy stands with other forms of creative activity as an endeavour of “self-overcoming,” the self or subject no longer being at the centre of thought, but understood rather as a product of the process of thinking. In placing a special emphasis on Bergson’s 1907 work, Creative Evolution, the present essay is both an acknowledgement and challenge to the shift from early interpretations of Bergson in which comparisons were made with thinkers such as Schelling and Schopenhauer, to more recent engagements centred on the theories of perception and memory. The aim of this essay is to formulate a response to the marginalized status of Creative Evolution in the “perception-based” strands of Bergson scholarship, by emphasising how Bergson’s theories of memory and consciousness are a means for understanding his definition of evolutionary “creativity.” Bergson suggests that the analysis of consciousness or “will” can provide us with a way of thinking about this creative movement of life, which is not a concept of a “cause” or “origin” in the sense of a “state of nature” (substance, essence, or “being”), but rather the operation of pure tendency.     

Das Traumgenerierungsmodell von Ulrich Moser und die Codierung von Traumprozessen

Under the conditions of sleeping, mental activity creates a psychic microworld “dream” experienced as the present, running predominantly in a pictorial and sensual way in a sequence of situations and sometimes containing verbal relations and cognitive processes. Together with Ilka von Zeppelin, Ulrich Moser has developed a model of the emergence of sleep dreams with the aim to reconstruct the dreaming process, which is normally concealed under the verbal structure of the dream report and to explain this sequence as the result of a cognitive affective regulatory process. In accordance with the theory of French, dreaming is seen as an attempt to cope in a simulative mode with unresolved neurotic conflicts and traumatic experiences. To make this process visible, the authors developed a very differentiated model-guided coding system, a form of operationalization of the “dream work” that records and describes all cognitive elements and all interactive behavior in the dream. This analysis provides the formal and structural characteristics of the dream that precede every interpretation of content or biographical meaning. In this way, dream series in a single person, as well as dreams in different groups, can be objectively studied and compared. A presentation of the dream model is followed by an introduction into the basic principles of the coding system. This dream process coding and the interpretation based on it are demonstrated on a specimen dream. This dream is Freud’s “Dream of Irma’s injection”, which he selected himself to demonstrate his method of dream interpretation in Die Traumdeutung and which was also used by Erikson to illustrate his “configurational analysis”.     

Foucault and the Glamazon: The Autonomy of Ronda Rousey

In this paper, we examine the case of Ronda Rousey, a high profile female Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) fighter in the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC). We argue that Rousey represents a female athlete who can be considered a gender transgressor yet simultaneously a Glamazon. The case of Rousey will be applied to gender transgressor theories to demonstrate that Rousey counters traditional discourse which holds that exhibiting stereotypically masculine traits implies not being an authentic woman. Female fighters face criticisms for being “unfeminine” or “manly” because they participate in such an aggressive sport. Despite her gender divergent behaviour, as much as she transgresses, Rousey is also pinned by sporting and societal sexist culture that reinforces sex binaries and exposes pressures to adhere to hyperfemininity and heterosexual ideals. Finally, using the notions of self and power found in Michel Foucault’s later work as a springboard, we examine whether Rousey’s embrace of the Glamazon identity is an act of autonomy or evidence of false consciousness.     

Faith and belief in The Anti-Christ: A re-evaluation of Nietzsche’s relation to Jesus

This paper re-evaluates the significance of Jesus for Nietzsche by looking at The Anti-Christ. Specifically we will ask whether a re-evaluation of this relation can shed new light on Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity. And we will do this first by surveying the standard interpretations of this issue, as well as the existing literature on The Anti-Christ. Arguing that the latter picks out nothing new regarding a critique of Christianity, we nonetheless suggest that a new criticism can be developed via the discussion of Jesus there. Further, this can be done by looking at the account given of faith and belief in that text. That is, we will explore the status of Jesus for Nietzsche by looking at the origins and development of “faith” as a mode of belief. In particular, we trace the former’s development as a type from a basic mode of faith. As such, we begin by looking at the psychological origins of this kind of belief in “decadence”, and why Nietzsche is critical of this. However, we will then discuss the emergence of a more positive faith in the form of Buddhism, and see how this represents an analogue for Jesus’s faith. Continuing, we will see how Jesus signifies a similar problematic development, but also “overcoming”, of initial decadence faith. And we will argue, also, that this overcoming is rooted in his emphasis on the immediacy of lived experience. Finally though, we will look at how Christianity returns Jesus’s more productive relation to the world again to a primitive mode of faith. In other words, we will see how Christianity converts the fluid, lived, “faith” of Jesus into something again based on transcendent belief. And lastly, we will ask what new light this point sheds on Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, and his affinity with Jesus the man.     

The present and absent object—on thinking and the capacity to symbolize

In this paper, Bion's different theories on the development of thinking will be introduced: on the one hand, his theory of thoughts as resulting from tolerance for the absence of the object, and on the other hand, dream thoughts and thoughts as resulting from the presence of the object, originally through the mother's containing function. The effects of failures in this development will be discussed; among other things, a hypertrophy of the apparatus of projective identification at the expense of thinking capacities. Briefly, a comparison will be made between a facilitating relation between container and contained and the oscillation between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive position, which Bion describes as a prerequisite for open symbolizing processes. Bion's theories and concepts will be supplemented by Winnicott's theories on the “creative illusion” and the breast/the mother as a “subjective object” as a precondition for the symbolizing capacity that later develops in the “potential space”. Very briefly, a comparison is made between Winnicott's term “the subjective object” and Segal's term “symbolic equation”. Clinical vignettes are interpolated.     

LANGUAGE,MIND, AND WORLD: CAN'T WE ALL JUST GET ALONG?

Abstract: This article addresses recent claims made by Richard Rorty about antirepresentationalist theories of meaning. Rorty asserts that a faithful rendering of the core antirepresentationalist assumptions precludes even revised pieces of representationalist semantics like “refers” or “true” and epistemological correlates like “answering to the facts.” Rorty even asserts that such notions invite reactionary authoritarian elements that would impede the development of a democratic humanism. I reject this claim and assert that such notions (suitably constructed) pose no greater threat to democratic humanism than the alternatives and in fact are crucial to its maintenance and continuing success. These notions (suitably constructed) reflect a metatheoretical stance that I call “openness,” which I believe lies at the heart of both democratic humanism and the pragmatism from which Rorty claims to take his inspiration.     

Honoring the Mantis Between Our Toes

Sir Laurens van der Post, friend to Jung and fierce advocate for the Bushmen of the Kalahari, expressed his protean gifts and passionate spirit as a novelist, journalist, statesman, and conservationist. His oeuvre of more than twenty-five published books includes A Mantis Carol, his memoir of a synchronistic series of events that led him to travel from his home in London to visit a New York analyst who had been tantalized for many years by near-nightly dreams of a praying mantis. That visit led him to befriend a young woman who related her childhood relationship with circus performer and family friend Hans Taaibosch, who’d become a magical and precious soul friend to her despite remaining in some ways a profound mystery. Together, she and van der Post pieced together Taaibosch's likely origins as a Kalahari Bushman, whose capacity to experience and give joy van der Post saw as an outgrowth of the deeply earthed spirituality of a people whose god, Mantis, is guided by his dreams. One hallmark of Bushman culture is their ritual dancing, their most important dances being “The Dance of the Little Hunger” for food and “The Dance of the Big Hunger” for meaning. The author describes her own synchronistic encounters with mantises and what they and van der Post taught her about the instinctually healing properties of our embodied relationship with one another, our fellow creatures, our dreams, our bodies, and the earth from which all possibilities are born.     

Looking back and looking in: Rethinking adaptation strategies of Ghanaian immigrant women in Canada

Based on research that the author conducted in 1998 this paper re-examines theories of immigrant adaptation by relating Philomena Essed's three-point framework of immigrant adaptation to the settlement of Ghanaian immigrant women in Canada. Essed identifies three phases of the adaptation process that she categorizes as “when are we going back”, “are we going back”, and “here to stay.” This paper examines what it meant for Ghanaian women to “look back” and how “looking back” dictated their adaptation strategies. The paper moves beyond notions of adaptation that stress measurable and quantifiable outcomes to one that stresses the agency of immigrant women. The author argues that Ghanaian immigrant women's seemingly low status in the economy was not a reflection of poor adaptation but rather a measure to help them connect with people in the homeland.     

The local problem of God’s hiddenness: a critique of van Inwagen’s criterion of philosophical success

In regards to the problem of evil, van Inwagen thinks there are two arguments from evil which require different defenses. These are the global argument from evil—that there exists evil in general, and the local argument from evil—that there exists some particular atrocious evil X. However, van Inwagen fails to consider whether the problem of God’s hiddenness also has a “local” version: whether there is in fact a “local” argument from God’s hiddenness which would be undefeated by his general defense of God’s hiddenness. This paper will argue that van Inwagen’s present account contains no implicit response to the “local” argument from God’s hiddenness, and, worse, the “local” argument brings to the fore crucial inconsistencies in van Inwagen’s account. These inconsistencies concern van Inwagen’s criterion for philosophical success—his methodological use of an “ideal audience” in an ideal debate—and a crucial premise in his argument: namely, that people who do not believe in God are culpably deceiving themselves regarding the manifest presence of God. These considerations will be a platform for my arguing that the failures of van Inwagen’s account amount to his ignoring the extra-rational, concrete aspect of grasping “spiritual propositions”—propositions which, in order to be affirmed, require the full self-understanding which precipitates out of the mind, body, and will of a particular existing individual.