Uninformative Anchors Have Persistent Effects on Valuation Judgments

Anchoring effects influence a wide range of numeric judgments, including valuation judgments, such as willingness‐to‐pay (WTP). However, prior research has not established whether anchoring only temporarily distorts responses or exerts persistent influence on preferences. This article presents three incentive compatible experiments examining the long‐term effects of random anchoring on WTP. Study 1 evaluated the persistence of anchoring effects over long durations, and showed that the strength of the effect decayed but did not disappear completely even 8 weeks later. In Study 2, a random anchor significantly influenced WTP after one week, regardless of whether WTP was also elicited immediately following the anchoring procedure, showing that consistency motivations do not account for persistence of anchoring effects. Study 3 showed relatively low anchors resulted in more stable valuations, compared with participants who reported WTP with no anchoring procedure. Together with the pattern of decay over time in Study 1, this suggests that anchoring facilitates the “imprinting” of valuation judgments for later retrieval. These studies show that anchoring effects can lead to lasting changes in valuation judgments, providing the first demonstration of long‐term persistence of constructed preferences as a result of an uninformative and arbitrary manipulation.     

The anchoring effect in metamemory monitoring

Judgments about future memory performance (metamemory judgments) are known to be susceptible to illusions and bias. Here we asked whether metamemory judgments are affected, like many other forms of judgment, by numerical anchors. Experiment 1 confirmed previous research showing an effect of informative anchors (e.g., past peer performance) on metamemory monitoring. In four further experiments, we then explored the effects of uninformative anchors. All of the experiments obtained significant anchoring effects on metamemory monitoring; in contrast, the anchors had no effect on recall itself. We also explored the anchoring effect on metamemory control (restudy choices) in Experiment 4. The results suggested that anchors can affect metamemory monitoring, which in turn affects metamemory control. The present research reveals that informative and, more importantly, uninformative numbers that have no influence on recall itself can bias metamemory judgments. On the basis of the current theoretical understanding of the anchoring effect and metamemory monitoring, these results offer insight into the processes that trigger metacognitive biases.     

When effortful thinking influences judgmental anchoring: differential effects of forewarning and incentives on self‐generated and externally provided anchors

Two experiments examined the impact of financial incentives and forewarnings on judgmental anchoring effects, or the tendency for judgments of uncertain qualities to be biased in the direction of salient anchor values. Previous research has found no effect of either manipulation on the magnitude of anchoring effects. We argue, however, that anchoring effects are produced by multiple mechanisms—one involving an effortful process of adjustment from “self‐generated” anchors, and another involving the biased recruitment of anchor‐consistent information from “externally provided” anchors—and that only the former should be influenced by incentives and forewarning. Two studies confirmed these predictions, showing that responses to “self‐generated” anchors are influenced by both incentives and forewarnings whereas responses to “externally provided” anchors are not. Discussion focuses on the implications of these effects for debiasing efforts. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Anchors aweigh: a demonstration of cross-modality anchoring and magnitude priming

Research has shown that judgments tend to assimilate to irrelevant "anchors." We extend anchoring effects to show that anchors can even operate across modalities by, apparently, priming a general sense of magnitude that is not moored to any unit or scale. An initial study showed that participants drawing long "anchor" lines made higher numerical estimates of target lengths than did those drawing shorter lines. We then replicated this finding, showing that a similar pattern was obtained even when the target estimates were not in the dimension of length. A third study showed that an anchor's length relative to its context, and not its absolute length, is the key to predicting the anchor's impact on judgments. A final study demonstrated that magnitude priming (priming a sense of largeness or smallness) is a plausible mechanism underlying the reported effects. We conclude that the boundary conditions of anchoring effects may be much looser than previously thought, with anchors operating across modalities and dimensions to bias judgment.     

锚定判断中的心理刻度效应：来自ERP的证据

当前主要有两种理论解释锚定效应的发生机制：锚定调整启发模型和选择通达模型。同样,锚值可能是自发产生的,也可能是外部提供的。本研究用两个ERP实验分别探讨了不同精细程度的心理刻度对自发锚定加工和外部锚定加工的影响。结果表明,只有在自发锚引起的锚定加工中才出现心理刻度效应：在目标呈现后250~800ms之间,精细心理刻度比粗糙心理刻度诱发一个更大的波形正走向,支持锚定调整启发模型。在外部锚引起的锚定加工中,没有出现心理刻度效应,却出现了一个与通达有关的N300成分,支持选择通达加工模型。总的结果支持了锚定加工的双重属性：锚定判断是主动调整还是选择通达取决于不同的情境     

Taking the High (or Low) Road: A Quantifier Priming Perspective on Basic Anchoring Effects

ABSTRACT

Current explanations of basic anchoring effects, defined as the influence of an arbitrary number standard on an uncertain judgment, confound numerical values with vague quantifiers. I show that the consideration of numerical anchors may bias subsequent judgments primarily through the priming of quantifiers, rather than the numbers themselves. Study 1 varied the target of a numerical comparison judgment in a between-participants design, while holding the numerical anchor value constant. This design yielded an anchoring effect consistent with a quantifier priming hypothesis. Study 2 included a direct manipulation of vague quantifiers in the traditional anchoring paradigm. Finally, Study 3 examined the notion that specific associations between quantifiers, reflecting values on separate judgmental dimensions (i.e., the price and height of a target) can affect the direction of anchoring effects. Discussion focuses on the nature of vague quantifier priming in numerically anchored judgments.     

The More You Ask For,the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts

The ‘anchoring and adjustment’ bias was demonstrated in a personal injury case using mock jurors. In Experiment 1, the ad damnum, or requested compensation, was manipulated across participants. In Experiment 2, anchors were operationalized as the strength of the legal evidence. Both monetary and causal anchors systematically influenced judgments of the probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries, compensation awarded, and perceptions of the litigants. These results indicate that anchoring occurs in legal applications, and that plaintiffs would do well to request large compensation awards. In addition, anchors expressed on one scale affected judgments expressed on another scale. This cross-modality anchoring stands in contrast to previous studies. Finally, these anchoring effects are unlikely to be explained by either demand effects or perceived relevance of the anchor.     

锚定效应的产生前提及作用机制

为了探讨锚定效应的产生前提以及基础锚定效应的理论解释,设计了两个实验。实验一选取高、低、无三种锚值,设置了15ms、45ms、75ms、1000ms四种呈现时间,结果发现只有15ms条件下未出现锚定效应,随着呈现时间增加,锚定效应不断增大,低锚下的锚定效应高于高锚下的锚定效应。实验二设置了语意相同但表述形式不同的两种水平的锚值,结果发现两者引发的锚定效应不同。锚定效应的产生前提是注意,数字启动假说可以更好地解释基础锚定效应。     

Anchoring,Activation, and the Construction of Values

Anchoring is a pervasive judgment bias in which decision makers are systematically influenced by random and uninformative starting points. While anchors have been shown to affect a broad range of judgments including answers to knowledge questions, monetary evaluations, and social judgments, the underlying causes of anchoring have been explored only recently. We suggest that anchors affect judgments by increasing the availability and construction of features that the anchor and target hold in common and reducing the availability of features of the target that differ from the anchor. We test this notion of anchoring as activation in five experiments that examine the effects of several experimental manipulations on judgments of value and belief as well as on measures of cognitive processes. Our results indicate that prompting subjects to consider features of the item that are different from the anchor reduces anchoring, while increasing consideration of similar features has no effect. The anchoring-as-activation approach provides a mechanism for debiasing anchoring and also points to a common mechanism underlying anchoring and a number of other judgment phenomena.     

Elaboration and consequences of anchored estimates: An attitudinal perspective on numerical anchoring

In the standard numerical anchoring paradigm, the influence of externally provided anchors on judgment is typically explained as a result of elaborate thinking (i.e., confirmatory hypothesis testing that selectively activates anchor-consistent information in memory). In contrast, theories of attitude change suggest that the same judgments can result from relatively thoughtful or non-thoughtful processes, with more thoughtful processes resulting in judgments that last longer over time and better resist future attempts at change. Guided by an attitudinal approach to anchoring, four studies manipulated participants’ level of cognitive load to produce relatively high versus low levels of thinking. These studies show that, although anchoring can occur under both high and low thought conditions, anchoring based on a higher level of thinking involves greater use of judgment-relevant background knowledge, persists longer over time, is more resistant to subsequent attempts at social influence, and is less likely to result from direct numeric priming.     

The contributions of anchoring and past-test performance to the underconfidence-with-practice effect

In the underconfidence-with-practice effect, people's judgments of learning (JOLs) typically underestimate memory performance across multiple study-test phases. Whereas the past-test hypothesis suggests that this underconfidence stems from participants' reliance on earlier test performance to make subsequent JOLs (despite new learning), the anchoring hypothesis suggests that the underconfidence stems from participants' reliance on a fixed psychological anchor point low on the JOL scale to make their JOLs. To contrast the predictions of these hypotheses, we had college students study, make JOLs, and test over several dozen paired-associate items across two study-test phases. We parametrically manipulated the presence or absence of testing and judging within participants during Phase 1. Contrary to the past-test hypothesis, items tested during Phase 1 demonstrated less underconfidence during Phase 2 than did nontested items. Furthermore, participants did not increase JOLs from Phase 1 to Phase 2 for items that they had not recalled or for items that had not been tested at all, suggesting that the underconfidence stemmed largely from participants' overreliance on a psychological anchor point to make their JOLs. Past test performance, however, seems to be a major cue that participants use to adjust their JOLs away from the anchor, reducing underconfidence. This was most evident when we used a between-participants manipulation (Exp. 2) to cause our participants to anchor their JOLs either high or low on the JOL scale, producing differential underconfidence independent of any adjustment. Taken together, these results support the anchoring hypothesis over the past-test hypothesis for explaining underconfidence with practice.     

意识锚定加工对潜在锚定加工的影响

潜在锚定效应是指阈限下的启动锚定数字导致的锚定效应现象。本研究通过2个实验探讨了意识锚定加工对潜在锚定加工的影响。实验一考察了意识层面的外在锚对潜在锚定效应产生的影响,实验二则进一步探讨了意识层面的自发锚对潜在锚定效应的影响。实验一发现,在不存在外在锚时高锚与低锚的估计有显著性差异;实验二发现,在不存在自发锚时高锚与低锚的估计有显著性差异。研究结果表明,外在锚定加工和自发锚定加工的效应都强于潜在锚定加工。     

认知决策中锚定效应的量子模型研究

文章回顾了锚定效应研究中个体层面和群体层面的相关文献,认为选择易得性模型理论能够很好地解释锚定效应的发生机制。同时,通过回顾决策认知领域的最新研究观点——量子模型,包括从只利用量子论空间性质到使用薛定谔方程的两种表述,阐述了这一领域的研究趋势。并通过为锚定效应建立量子模型(个体层面和两人层面),拓展了锚定效应的研究。     

Putting adjustment back in the anchoring and adjustment heuristic: differential processing of self-generated and experimenter-provided anchors

People's estimates of uncertain quantities are commonly influenced by irrelevant values. These anchoring effects were originally explained as insufficient adjustment away from an initial anchor value. The existing literature provides little support for the postulated process of adjustment, however, and a consensus that none takes place seems to be emerging. We argue that this conclusion is premature, and we present evidence that insufficient adjustment produces anchoring effects when the anchors are self-generated. In Study 1, participants' verbal reports made reference to adjustment only from self-generated anchors. In Studies 2 and 3, participants induced to accept values by nodding their heads gave answers that were closer to an anchor (i.e., they adjusted less) than participants induced to deny values by shaking their heads—again, only when the anchor was self-generated. These results suggest it is time to reintroduce anchoring and adjustment as an explanation for some judgments under uncertainty.     

The De‐biasing Effect of Incidental Anger on Other‐provided Anchors

The current research investigates the effect of incidental anger on anchoring bias. We hypothesized that feeling angry will make people less influenced by other‐provided anchors because of the moving against action tendency associated with anger. That is, individuals in an angry state will be likely to perceive a given anchor as a viable target for their desire to attack and actively seek out anchor‐inconsistent information, thereby committing less anchoring bias. To examine our hypothesis, in Study 1, we manipulated emotions using film clips and administered a general knowledge task with other‐provided anchors. As predicted, participants in the anger condition showed less anchoring bias to the other‐provided anchors than those in the sad or neutral condition. Study 2 replicated the finding with a different emotion manipulation technique and different anchoring questions. More important, consistent with the moving against action tendency explanation, we also found that people in an angry state committed more anchoring bias for self‐generated anchors, compared with people in a sad or neutral state. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

时距估计中的锚定效应

采用两种时距估计方法,检验时距锚定值对时距估计的影响,并探讨了时距信息的心理表征方式。63名在校大学生参加了本次实验。实验1采用口头报告法,表明较大的时距锚定值（5s,5000ms）条件下,被试估对时距的估计值较大,而较小时距锚定值（1s,1000ms）条件下被试估计的时距值较小;语义相同但表述方式不同的锚定值（1s与1000ms,5s与5000ms）条件下的时距估计值没有显著差异。实验2采用产生法,进一步表明时距表述方式对产生时距没有显著影响。以上结果表明,时距估计受时距锚定值的影响,时距信息可能以语义形式进行表征,而不是简单的数字加单位的表层表征形式     

Accurate monitoring leads to effective control and greater learning of patient education materials

Effective management of chronic diseases (e.g., diabetes) can depend on the extent to which patients can learn and remember disease-relevant information. In two experiments, we explored a technique motivated by theories of self-regulated learning for improving people's learning of information relevant to managing a chronic disease. Materials were passages from patient education booklets on diabetes from NIDDK. Session 1 included an initial study trial, Session 2 included self-regulated restudy, and Session 3 included a final memory test. The key manipulation concerned the kind of support provided for self-regulated learning during Session 2. In Experiment 1, participants either were prompted to self-test and then evaluate their learning before selecting passages to restudy, were shown the prompt questions but did not overtly self-test or evaluate learning prior to selecting passages, or were not shown any prompts and were simply given the menu for selecting passages to restudy. Participants who self-tested and evaluated learning during Session 2 had a small but significant advantage over the other groups on the final test. Secondary analyses provided evidence that the performance advantage may have been modest because of inaccurate monitoring. Experiment 2 included a group who also self-tested but who evaluated their learning using idea-unit judgments (i.e., by checking their responses against a list of key ideas from the correct response). Participants who self-tested and made idea-unit judgments exhibited a sizable advantage on final test performance. Secondary analyses indicated that the performance advantage was attributable in part to more accurate monitoring and more effective self-regulated learning. An important practical implication is that learning of patient education materials can be enhanced by including appropriate support for learners' self-regulatory processes.     

Primacy Effects in Justice Judgments: Testing Predictions from Fairness Heuristic Theory

We tested predictions from fairness heuristic theory that justice judgments are more sensitive to early fairness-relevant information than to later fairness-relevant information and that this primacy effect is more evident when group identification is higher. Participants working on a series of three tasks experienced resource failures that interfered with their productivity and always had the possibility of explaining problems to a supervisor. In a manipulation of the timing of fairness-relevant experiences, the supervisor refused to consider explanations on the first, second, or third of three work trials (but did consider explanations on the other two trials) or the supervisor never refused to hear the explanations. Prior to the work periods, the participants either had or had not undergone a manipulation designed to induce greater identification with the work group. As predicted, the timing of fairness-relevant experiences showed a primacy effect on fairness judgments and acceptance of authority in the high identification conditions and no evidence of such an effect in the low identification conditions. The implications of the findings for understanding the psychology of justice and for real-world justice phenomena are discussed.     

Memory modulation in the classroom: selective enhancement of college examination performance by arousal induced after lecture

Laboratory studies examining moderate physiological or emotional arousal induced after learning indicate that it enhances memory consolidation. Yet, no studies have yet examined this effect in an applied context. As such, arousal was induced after a college lecture and its selective effects were examined on later exam performance. Participants were divided into two groups who either watched a neutral video clip (n=66) or an arousing video clip (n=70) after lecture in a psychology course. The final examination occurred two weeks after the experimental manipulation. Only performance on the group of final exam items that covered material from the manipulated lecture were significantly different between groups. Other metrics, such as the midterm examination and the total final examination score, did not differ between groups. The results indicate that post-lecture arousal selectively increased the later retrieval of lecture material, despite the availability of the material for study before and after the manipulation. The results reinforce the role of post-learning arousal on memory consolidation processes, expanding the literature to include a real-world learning context.     

Elaboration and numerical anchoring: Implications of attitude theories for consumer judgment and decision making

Researchers across many domains have examined the impact of externally presented numerical anchors on perceiver judgments. In the traditional paradigm, “anchored” judgments are typically explained as a result of elaborate thinking (i.e., confirmatory hypothesis testing that selectively activates anchor-consistent information in memory). Consistent with a long tradition in attitude change, we suggest that the same judgments can result from relatively thoughtful or non-thoughtful processes, with more thoughtful processes resulting in judgments that have more lasting impact. We review recent anchoring research consistent with this elaboration-based perspective and discuss implications for past anchoring results and theory in judgment and decision making.