The Beneficent Nudge Program and Epistemic Injustice

Is implementing the beneficent nudge program morally permissible in worlds like ours? I argue that there is reason for serious doubt. I acknowledge that beneficent nudging is highly various, that nudges are in some circumstances morally permissible and even called for, and that nudges may exhibit respect for genuine autonomy. Nonetheless, given the risk of epistemic injustice that nudges typically pose, neither the moral permissibility of beneficent nudging in the abstract, nor its case-by-case vindication, appears sufficient to justify implementing a nudge program in worlds like ours. Drawing on Miranda Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice, I argue that the cogent defense of any nudge program, relative to worlds like ours, stands in need of serious attention to its potential for fostering or sustaining epistemic injustice. A more specific point hinges on recognizing a form of epistemic injustice not enough attended to in the literature to date, which I call reflective incapacitational injustice. This includes relative disadvantages in the attaining of (or opportunity to exercise) the capacity to engage in critical reason, such as the capacity to go in for potentially critical reasoned deliberation and discursive exchange concerning ends. Since Cass Sunstein’s First Law of behaviorally informed regulation would be taken, in worlds like ours, to justify indeterminately many nudges leading to such epistemic injustice we have general grounds for doubting the moral permissibility of this nudge program. We should hence oppose the implementation of any such program until it is shown not to violate the demands of epistemic justice.     

Towards a theory of communicative competence

In this, the second of two articles outlining a theory of communicative competence, the author questions the ability of Chomsky's account of linguistic competence to fulfil the requirements of such a theory. ‘Linguistic competence’ for Chomsky means the mastery of an abstract system of rules, based on an innate language apparatus. The model by which communication is understood on this account contains three implicit assumptions, here called ‘monologism’, ‘a priorism’, and ‘elementarism’. The author offers an outline of a theory of communicative competence that is based on the negations of these assumptions. In opposing the first two assumptions he introduces distinctions, respectively, between semantic universals which process experiences and those that make such processing possible, and between semantic universals which precede all socialization and those that are linked to the conditions of potential socialization. Against elementarism, he argues that the semantic content of all possible natural languages does not consist of combinations of a finite number of meaning components. Differences in systems of classification preclude this, and such differences can be seen to infect all respects of intercultural comparison. Using the notion of ‘performative utterance’, the author elucidates the role of dialogue‐constitutive universals as part of the formal apparatus required of a”; speaker's capacity to communicate. He then notes what would be required of a general semantics based on a theory of communicative competence; and finally points out how this theory might be used for social analysis.     

Comment on “Nudges and Cultural Variance”

In this brief commentary, I suggest Selinger and Whyte are essentially correct in their criticism of the Nudge approach advocated by Thaler and Sunstein. I use some examples from road behavior and traffic planning to amplify the criticism that the simple behavioral economics approach fails to take account of the embedding of humans and technology in the wider social and cultural context.     

Why Nudges Coerce: Experimental Evidence on the Architecture of Regulation

Critics frequently argue that nudges are more covert, less transparent, and more difficult to monitor than traditional regulatory tools. Edward Glaeser, for example, argues that “[p]ublic monitoring of soft paternalism is much more difficult than public monitoring of hard paternalism”. As one of the leading proponents of soft paternalism, Cass Sunstein, acknowledges, while “[m]andates and commands are highly visible”, soft paternalism, “and some nudges in particular[,] may be invisible”. In response to this challenge, proponents of nudging argue that invisibility for any given individual in a particular choice environment is compatible with “careful public scrutiny” of the nudge. This paper offers the first of its kind experimental evidence that tests whether nudges are, in fact, compatible with “careful public scrutiny”. Using three sets of experiments, the paper argues that, even when entirely visible, nudges attract less scrutiny than their “hard law” counterparts.     

Nudges and Cultural Variance: a Note on Selinger and Whyte

Selinger and Whyte argue that Thaler and Sunstein are insufficiently sensitive to cultural variance in Nudge. I construct a taxonomy of the various roles that cultural variance may play in nudges. First, biases that are exploited in nudging may interact with features that are culturally specific. Second, cultures may be more or less susceptible to certain biases. Third, cultures may resolve conflicting biases in different ways. And finally, nudge may be enlisted for different aims in different cultures.     

The Relative Contribution of Emotional Competence and Cognitive Ability to Individual and Team Performance

The relative contributions of emotional competence and cognitive ability to individual and team performance, team-member attitudes, and leadership perceptions were examined. Focusing on emotional competencies, we predicted that, although both cognitive ability and emotional competence would predict performance, cognitive ability would account for more variance on individual tasks, whereas emotional competence would account for more variance in team performance and attitudes. We also predicted that emotional competence would be positively related to team attitudes and to both leader emergence and effectiveness. Using a sample of undergraduate business majors who completed tasks alone and as members of teams, our results generally supported the hypotheses. Implications for the reach and impact of work relating emotional competencies to performance are offered.     

Intention, interpretation and the computational structure of language

I show how a conversational process that takes simple, intuitively meaningful steps may be understood as a sophisticated computation that derives the richly detailed, complex representations implicit in our knowledge of language. To develop the account, I argue that natural language is structured in a way that lets us formalize grammatical knowledge precisely in terms of rich primitives of interpretation. Primitives of interpretation can be correctly viewed intentionally, as explanations of our choices of linguistic actions; the model therefore fits our intuitions about meaning in conversation. Nevertheless, interpretations for complex utterances can be built from these primitives by simple operations of grammatical derivation. In bridging analyses of meaning at semantic and symbol-processing levels, this account underscores the fundamental place for computation in the cognitive science of language use.     

Informational nudges as an effective approach in raising awareness among young adults about the risk of future disability

As many consumers have neither sufficient time nor the cognitive and motivational resources to deal with complex insurance decisions, the mere provision of information might not be enough to influence consumer perception and choice. The way such information is presented might also affect any decision made. This paper focuses on the risk of becoming unable to continue in a profession as a result of illness or an accident. In collaboration with an insurance company, we examined the effectiveness of ‘informational nudging’ (i.e. providing information which acts as a nudge) in sensitizing young adults to the potential risk of disability. In a pre‐study, an online survey (n = 1003) was conducted to assess the main barriers preventing young Swiss adults from participating in private provision. Based on the results of the pre‐study, we developed four ‘informational nudges’ and tested their effects on risk awareness and insurance choices among young adults using an online experiment (n = 240). We found that by presenting information on a company website in such a way that heuristics such as availability or loss aversion were exploited, enhanced risk awareness and a corresponding increase in insurance preferences were observed to some degree. However, the informational nudges did not motivate the participants to investigate the issues any further. Indeed, the results suggested that informational nudging could be an effective tool in raising participant awareness, but that future research is needed to understand better the interplay between automatic and deliberate processes activated by the informational nudges. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Ethics of Organ Donor Registration Policies: Nudges and Respect for Autonomy

Governments must determine the legal procedures by which their residents are registered, or can register, as organ donors. Provided that governments recognize that people have a right to determine what happens to their organs after they die, there are four feasible options to choose from: opt-in, opt-out, mandated active choice, and voluntary active choice. We investigate the ethics of these policies' use of nudges to affect organ donor registration rates. We argue that the use of nudges in this context is morally problematic. It is disrespectful of people's autonomy to take advantage of their cognitive biases since doing so involves bypassing, not engaging, their rational capacities. We conclude that while mandated active choice policies are not problem free—they are coercive, after all—voluntary active choice, opt-in, and opt-out policies are potentially less respectful of people's autonomy since their use of nudges could significantly affect people's decision making.     

A Reason‐Based Theory of Rational Choice *

There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with the formal models of decision problems used by social scientists. To bridge this gap, we propose a new, reason‐based theory of rational choice. At its core is an account of preference formation, according to which an agent’s preferences are determined by his or her motivating reasons, together with a ‘weighing relation’ between different combinations of reasons. By explaining how someone’s preferences may vary with changes in his or her motivating reasons, our theory illuminates the relationship between deliberation about reasons and rational choices. Although primarily positive, the theory can also help us think about how those preferences and choices ought to respond to normative reasons.     

Applying the choice/no‐choice methodology: the case of children’s strategy use in spelling

The present study illustrates the usefulness of the choice/no‐choice method to investigate age‐related changes in children’s strategies. This method enables independent assessments of strategy use and execution. It is applied in children’s spelling strategies. Third‐ and fifth‐grade children were asked to write down words using a dictionary or not (choice condition). Then, they were successively required to spell words using each strategy (no‐choice condition). Performance showed that (a) strategy choices and accuracy differed in younger and older children, (b) strategy effectiveness was the strongest predictor of children’s strategy use, and (c) having the choice resulted in higher level of spelling accuracy (especially in older children) than having no choice. We discuss the implications of these results on how the choice/no‐choice method can be useful for understanding and investigating children’s strategy choices in spelling and other cognitive domains.     

Dorsal anterior cingulate and ventromedial prefrontal cortex have inverse roles in both foraging and economic choice

Recent research has highlighted a distinction between sequential foraging choices and traditional economic choices between simultaneously presented options. This was partly motivated by observations in Kolling, Behrens, Mars, and Rushworth, Science, 336(6077), 95–98 (2012) (hereafter, KBMR) that these choice types are subserved by different circuits, with dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC) preferentially involved in foraging and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) preferentially involved in economic choice. To support this account, KBMR used fMRI to scan human subjects making either a foraging choice (between exploiting a current offer or swapping for potentially better rewards) or an economic choice (between two reward-probability pairs). This study found that dACC better tracked values pertaining to foraging, whereas vmPFC better tracked values pertaining to economic choice. We recently showed that dACC’s role in these foraging choices is better described by the difficulty of choosing than by foraging value, when correcting for choice biases and testing a sufficiently broad set of foraging values (Shenhav, Straccia, Cohen, & Botvinick Nature Neuroscience, 17(9), 1249–1254, 2014). Here, we extend these findings in 3 ways. First, we replicate our original finding with a larger sample and a task modified to address remaining methodological gaps between our previous experiments and that of KBMR. Second, we show that dACC activity is best accounted for by choice difficulty alone (rather than in combination with foraging value) during both foraging and economic choices. Third, we show that patterns of vmPFC activity, inverted relative to dACC, also suggest a common function across both choice types. Overall, we conclude that both regions are similarly engaged by foraging-like and economic choice.     

Mixing virtue and vice: combining the immediacy effect and the diversification heuristic

Many of the most significant choices that people make are between vices, which exchange small immediate rewards for large delayed costs, and virtues, which exchange small immediate costs for large delayed rewards. We investigate the consequences of making a series of such choices either simultaneously or sequentially. We made two predictions. First, because many alternatives chosen under simultaneous choice will only be experienced following a delay, and because hyperbolic time discounting predicts that people will prefer delayed virtues but immediate vices, we predicted that people would choose more virtues in simultaneous than sequential choice. Second, due to the tendency to diversify portfolios of choices, we predicted a greater mix of virtues and vices in simultaneous than sequential choice. These predictions were confirmed in two experiments involving real choices; one between ‘highbrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ movies, and the other between ‘instant‐win’ and ‘prize‐draw’ lottery tickets. We conclude by posing the question of whether simultaneous or sequential choice results in decisions that more closely approximate what people ‘really’ want. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nudge to Health: Harnessing Decision Research to Promote Health Behavior

We review selected literature that examines how biases in decision making can be utilized to encourage individual health behavior, such as vaccination, and promote policy decisions, such as resource allocation. These studies use simple interventions to nudge people towards more optimal health decisions without restricting decision‐makers’ freedom of choice. Examples include framing effects, defaults, implementation intentions, position effects, social norm, incentives, and emotions. We suggest that nudges are an effective way to promote healthy behavior.     

基于期望值最大化的理论何时失效：风险决策中为自己-为所有人决策差异的眼动研究

主流的风险决策理论专家发展了一系列基于期望值最大化(expectation-maximization)的理论, 以期捕获所有人的风险决策行为。然而大量证据表明, 这些基于期望值最大化的理论并不能如同描述性理论那样理想地描述单一个体的决策行为。本研究采用眼动追踪技术, 系统考察了个体在为所有人决策与为自己决策时的风险决策行为及信息加工过程的差异。本研究发现, 基于期望值最大化的理论可捕获为所有人决策或为自己多次决策时的情况, 却不能很好捕获个体为自己进行单次决策时的情况。本研究结果有助于理解基于期望值最大化的理论与启发式/非基于期望值最大化的理论的边界, 为风险决策理论的划分和发展提供实证参考。     

Anticipated Emotions as Guides to Choice

When making decisions, people often anticipate the emotions they might experience as a result of the outcomes of their choices. In the process, they simulate what life would be like with one outcome or another. We examine the anticipated and actual pleasure of outcomes and their relation to choices people make in laboratory studies and real-world studies. We offer a theory of anticipated pleasure that explains why the same outcome can lead to a wide range of emotional experiences. Finally, we show how anticipated pleasure relates to risky choice within the framework of subjective expected pleasure theory.     

Decision-making competence in everyday life: The roles of general cognitive styles,decision-making styles and personality

Research indicates that decision-making competence in everyday life is associated with certain decision-making styles. The aims of this article are to extend this research by examining (a) the extent to which general cognitive styles explain variance in decision-making competence over and above decision-making styles, and (b) the extent to which personality explains variance in decision-making competence over and above both types of style variable. Participants (N = 355) completed measures of everyday decision-making competence (Decision Outcomes Inventory), decision styles (Decision Style Questionnaire; Maximization Inventory), cognitive styles (the Cognitive Styles Inventory; Rational-Experience Inventory), and the Big Five personality variables (IPIP Big-Five factor scales). The results indicate that cognitive styles offer no incremental validity over decision-making styles in predicting decision-making competence, but that personality does offer substantial incremental validity over general cognitive styles and decision-making styles. Jointly decision-making styles and personality account for a substantial amount of variance in everyday decision-making competence.     

Semantic diversity: A measure of semantic ambiguity based on variability in the contextual usage of words

Semantic ambiguity is typically measured by summing the number of senses or dictionary definitions that a word has. Such measures are somewhat subjective and may not adequately capture the full extent of variation in word meaning, particularly for polysemous words that can be used in many different ways, with subtle shifts in meaning. Here, we describe an alternative, computationally derived measure of ambiguity based on the proposal that the meanings of words vary continuously as a function of their contexts. On this view, words that appear in a wide range of contexts on diverse topics are more variable in meaning than those that appear in a restricted set of similar contexts. To quantify this variation, we performed latent semantic analysis on a large text corpus to estimate the semantic similarities of different linguistic contexts. From these estimates, we calculated the degree to which the different contexts associated with a given word vary in their meanings. We term this quantity a word’s semantic diversity (SemD). We suggest that this approach provides an objective way of quantifying the subtle, context-dependent variations in word meaning that are often present in language. We demonstrate that SemD is correlated with other measures of ambiguity and contextual variability, as well as with frequency and imageability. We also show that SemD is a strong predictor of performance in semantic judgments in healthy individuals and in patients with semantic deficits, accounting for unique variance beyond that of other predictors. SemD values for over 30,000 English words are provided as supplementary materials.     

Analysis of word comprehension in a case of pure word deafness

A case of pure word deafness due to a left temporal infarct is reported. The results of dichotic tests suggest that auditory verbal material may be processed in the right hemisphere. The inability to repeat nonsense words, the frequent semantic paraphasias in real-word repetition tasks, and the capacity to give a partial account of the meaning of a word that the patient cannot repeat show that despite the impairment of the phonological analysis, lexical semantic processing is possible. An attempt is made to demonstrate that the patient resorts to this semantic processing and that this reflects the linguistic competence of the right hemisphere.     

Meaning in the lives of humans and other animals

This paper argues that contemporary philosophical literature on meaning in life has important implications for the debate about our obligations to non-human animals. If animal lives can be meaningful, then practices including factory farming and animal research might be morally worse than ethicists have thought. We argue for two theses about meaning in life: (1) that the best account of meaningful lives must take intentional action to be necessary for meaning—an individual’s life has meaning if and only if the individual acts intentionally in ways that contribute to finally valuable states of affairs; and (2) that this first thesis does not entail that only human lives are meaningful. Because non-human animals can be intentional agents of a certain sort, our account yields the verdict that many animals’ lives can be meaningful. We conclude by considering the moral implications of these theses for common practices involving animals.