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1.
Johannes Persson 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(1):135-149
Accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as to provide an understanding of mechanism and of causation. Ontic
accounts differ quite radically in their ontologies, and one of the latest additions to this tradition proposed by Peter Machamer,
Lindley Darden and Carl Craver reintroduces the concept of activity. In this paper I ask whether this influential and activity-based
account of mechanisms is viable as an ontic account. I focus on polygenic scenarios—scenarios in which the causal truths depend
on more than one cause. The importance of polygenic causation was noticed early on by Mill (1893). It has since been shown to be a problem for both causal-law approaches to causation (Cartwright 1983) and accounts of causation cast in terms of capacities (Dupré 1993; Glennan 1997, pp. 605–626). However, whereas mechanistic accounts seem to be attractive precisely because they promise to handle complicated
causal scenarios, polygenic causation needs to be examined more thoroughly in the emerging literature on activity-based mechanisms.
The activity-based account proposed in Machamer et al. (2000, pp. 1–25) is problematic as an ontic account, I will argue. It seems necessary to ask, of any ontic account, how well it
performs in causal situations where—at the explanandum level of mechanism—no activity occurs. In addition, it should be asked how well the activity-based account performs in situations where there are
too few activities around to match the polygenic causal origin of the explanandum. The first situation presents an explanandum-problem
and the second situation presents an explanans-problem—I will argue—both of which threaten activity-based frameworks. 相似文献
2.
Donald Capps 《Pastoral Psychology》2007,55(3):253-270
In Men, Religion, and Melancholia: James, Otto, Jung, and Erikson (D. Capps, 1997) and Men and Their Religion: Honor, Hope, and Humor (D. Capps, 2002), I argued that men are no less religious than women, but their religiousness is different from that of women because it
has its psychological origins in the emotional separation between a boy and his mother around the ages of three to five. Employing
Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” (S. Freud, 1917/1963) essay, I suggested that their religiousness is rooted in an ontological state of melancholy (which
is different from the psychological state of depression). In Men and Their Religion I identified the religions of honor and of hope as the primary forms of male melancholic religion, and suggested that humor
is a third form that may come to one’s assistance when one experiences the limitations of the other two religions. In this
article, I focus on my own early adolescent years (age 11–14) and explain how one boy became reliably religious, that is, how he embraced or internalized the religions of honor and of hope. In the companion article, I will
explain how these two religions were relativized—and thereby preserved—by the religion of humor. 相似文献
3.
4.
In 2009 we distributed a questionnaire on the deadly sins. It combined two research instruments—The Life Attitudes Inventory constructed by Capps (Pastoral Psychology 37:229–253, 1989) and the Deadly Sins Scale developed by Nauta and Derckx (Pastoral Psychology 56:177–188, 2007). In a previous article (Capps and Haupt 2011) we reported on findings from the Life Attitudes Inventory. In this article we report on findings from the Deadly Sins Scale and then discuss the fact that an unusually high percentage of the respondents identified positively with the item “I achieve
my goals in life.” We suggest that their identification with this item is a reflection of the fact that humans are hopeful
by nature. 相似文献
5.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(1):45-60
Recently, Ernest Sosa (2007) has proposed two novel solutions to the problem of dream skepticism. In the present paper, I argue that Sosa’s first solution
falls prey to what I will refer to as the conditionality problem, i.e., the problem of only establishing a conditional—in
this case, “if x, then I am awake,” x being a placeholder for a condition incompatible with dreaming—in a context where it also needs to be established that we
can know that the antecedent holds, and as such can infer the consequent, i.e., “I am awake.” Sosa’s second solution, in terms
of so-called reflective knowledge, is shown to land him in the dilemma of either facing yet another conditionality problem,
or violating an internalist constraint that he explicitly grants the skeptic with respect to what kind of factors can be legitimately
invoked in our account of how we may know the relevant antecedent. For these reasons, I conclude that Sosa has not solved
the problem of dream skepticism. 相似文献
6.
Donald Capps 《Pastoral Psychology》2011,60(5):619-631
In a previous article (Capps 2011) I discussed a short story and essay I wrote in high school and showed that themes that had figured prominently in my later
writings were prefigured in these earlier writings. Invoking John Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress (1957) I concluded that the high school boy who lives inside of me has been my faithful companion throughout the years. In this
article I focus on a sermon I preached in my senior year of high school and on several poems I wrote that year. The sermon
and poems reflect my interest at the time in the harmful effects of silence on human relationships. An article that focused
on the son of Saint Augustine (Capps 1990b) signaled my return to the issue of silence after a thirty-year hiatus. My subsequent reading of Alice Miller’s Breaking Down the Wall of Silence (1991) and The Truth Shall Set You Free (2001) helped me to understand why silence had been a personal issue for me. It also encouraged me to listen to the fledgling poet
who lives within me and to appreciate his insights concerning silence and love. 相似文献
7.
Ian Underwood 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(2):265-283
Baxter (Australas J Philos 79:449–464, 2001) proposes an ingenious solution to the problem of instantiation based on his theory of cross-count identity. His idea is
that where a particular instantiates a universal it shares an aspect with that universal. Both the particular and the universal
are numerically identical with the shared aspect in different counts. Although Baxter does not say exactly what a count is,
it appears that he takes ways of counting as mysterious primitives against which different numerical identities are defined. In contrast, I defend the idea—suggested,
though not quite endorsed, by Baxter himself—that counts are independent dimensions of numerical identity. Different ways
of counting are explained by the existence of these different sorts of identity (i.e., counts). For the instantiation of a
universal by a particular, I propose one dimension concerned with the individuation of particulars (the p-count) and another
dimension concerned with the individuation of universals (the u-count). On that basis, I give a clear definition of cross-count
identity that explains its asymmetrical nature (i.e., the fact that particulars instantiate universals, but not vice versa).
I extend the theory to a third dimension—that of time, or the t-count—and thereby defend Baxter’s ideas on change, and the
contingency of instantiation. Baxter (Mind 97(388):575–582, 1988; Australas J Philos 79:449–464, 2001) proposes the related idea of composition as (cross-count) identity. Parts are individually cross-count identical with the
wholes that they constitute, and they collectively share all aspects across counts with those wholes. I propose an innovation
by which totality is shared distinctness across counts. The theory applies to both the totality of particulars that instantiate any given universal, and the totality
of parts that constitute any given whole. I argue that this has several advantages over Armstrong’s view, which is based on
a dubious external totalling relation. I also argue that Armstrong’s theory of numbers (or quantities) as internal relations ought to be rejected in favour of
an account based on identity and distinctness. The paper concludes with a careful analysis of external relations in Baxter’s
framework. I argue that we must recognise one further dimension of identity in order to differentiate between, e.g., the aspects
of Abelard insofar as he loves Heloise and Abelard insofar as he loves Isobel. Each of these aspects is identical with Abelard
and identical with loving-by, yet they must be in some way distinct. I therefore propose the r-count, in which multiple distinct relational properties
are the very same relation (-part). The existence of these four independent dimensions explains the fact that particulars,
universals, relations, and times are fundamentally different sorts of things in the ontology. Each is individuated with respect
to a different dimension of identity. 相似文献
8.
Joseph Adam Carter 《Philosophia》2010,38(3):517-532
Anti-luck epistemology is an approach to analyzing knowledge that takes as a starting point the widely-held assumption that knowledge must exclude
luck. Call this the anti-luck platitude. As Duncan Pritchard (2005) has suggested, there are three stages constituent of anti-luck epistemology, each which specifies a different philosophical requirement: these stages call for us to first give an account of luck; second,
specify the sense in which knowledge is incompatible with luck; and finally, show what conditions must be satisfied in order
to block the kind of luck with which knowledge was argued to be incompatible. What I’ll show here is that the modal account of luck offers a plausible story at the first stage and leads naturally to equally plausible lines to take at the second and third
stages, at which a safety condition on knowledge is squarely motivated. There are, however, recent challenges—advanced by Jonathan Kvanvig (Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 77: 272–281, 2008); Kelly Becker (2007); and Jennifer Lackey (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(2):255–267, 2008), among others—to the plausibility of the safety-based anti-luck project I’ve sketched here at each of its three stages of
development. Once I’ve made precise the challenges, I’ll show why none implies that we abandon the commitments of the safety-based
anti-luck project at any of its stages. What we should conclude, then, is that a safety-condition on knowledge is motivated
by independently defensible accounts of (1) what luck is; and (2) just how knowledge should be thought incompatible with it. 相似文献
9.
Komarine Romdenh-Romluc 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(3):369-376
We assume that we can act—in at least some cases—by consciously intending to do so. Wegner (2002) appeals to empirical research carried out by Libet et al. (1983) to challenge this assumption. I argue that his conclusion presupposes a particular view of conscious intention. But there
is an alternative model available, which has been developed by various writers in the phenomenological tradition, and most
recently defended by Moran (2001). If we adopt this alternative account of conscious intention, Wegner’s argument no longer goes through, and we can retain
the claim that our conscious intentions can give rise to action. 相似文献
10.
Agustín Vicente 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(2):293-312
In a recent paper, Bird (in: Groff (ed.) Revitalizing causality: Realism about causality in philosophy and social science,
2007) has argued that some higher-order properties—which he calls “evolved emergent properties”—can be considered causally efficacious
in spite of exclusion arguments. I have previously argued in favour of a similar position. The basic argument is that selection
processes do not take physical categorical properties into account. Rather, selection mechanisms are only tuned to what such
properties can do, i.e., to their causal powers. This picture seems ultimately untenable in the light of further exclusion
problems; but at the same time, it meets our explanatory demands. My purpose is therefore to show that there is a real antinomy
with regard to evolved emergent properties. I develop a physicalist exclusion argument and then I go on to consider an argument
that seems to establish that evolved emergent properties are causally efficacious, and propose a compatibilist solution. Finally, I very briefly consider what the proposed model may
imply for the issue of mental causation. 相似文献
11.
Matthew C. Haug 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(3):313-330
Several philosophers (e.g., Ehring (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 30:461–480, 1996); Funkhouser (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 40:548–569, 2006); Walter (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37:217–244, 2007) have argued that there are metaphysical differences between the determinable-determinate relation and the realization relation
between mental and physical properties. Others have challenged this claim (e.g., Wilson (Philosophical Studies, 2009). In this paper, I argue that there are indeed such differences and propose a “mechanistic” account of realization that elucidates
why these differences hold. This account of realization incorporates two distinct roles that mechanisms play in the realization
of mental (and other special science) properties which are implicit, but undeveloped, in the literature—what I call “constitutive”
and “integrative” mechanisms. I then use these two notions of mechanism to clarify some debates about the relations between
realization, multiple realizability, and irreducibility. 相似文献
12.
Mark Graves 《Pastoral Psychology》2011,60(6):907-920
Religion and cognitive science contribute complementary understandings of the human person, and an integrated perspective
can bridge clinical, spiritual, and philosophical resources to facilitate healing and growth. Drawing upon cognitive science
and systems theory, I respond to Richard Payne, Mary Walsh, and Doug Oman’s comments on my Mind, Brain, and the Elusive Soul (Graves 2008; Oman 2011; Payne 2011; Walsh 2011). 相似文献
13.
Susan A. J. Stuart 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2010,9(1):37-51
A great deal of effort has been, and continues to be, devoted to developing consciousness artificially (A small selection
of the many authors writing in this area includes: Cotterill (J Conscious Stud 2:290–311, 1995, 1998), Haikonen (2003), Aleksander and Dunmall (J Conscious Stud 10:7–18, 2003), Sloman (2004, 2005), Aleksander (2005), Holland and Knight (2006), and Chella and Manzotti (2007)), and yet a similar amount of effort has gone in to demonstrating the infeasibility of the whole enterprise (Most notably:
Dreyfus (1972/1979, 1992, 1998), Searle (1980), Harnad (J Conscious Stud 10:67–75, 2003), and Sternberg (2007), but there are a great many others). My concern in this paper is to steer some navigable channel between the two positions,
laying out the necessary pre-conditions for consciousness in an artificial system, and concentrating on what needs to hold
for the system to perform as a human being or other phenomenally conscious agent in an intersubjectively-demanding social
and moral environment. By adopting a thick notion of embodiment—one that is bound up with the concepts of the lived body and
autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela et al. 2003; and Ziemke 2003, 2007a, J Conscious Stud 14(7):167–179, 2007b)—I will argue that machine phenomenology is only possible within an embodied distributed system that possesses a richly affective
musculature and a nervous system such that it can, through action and repetition, develop its tactile-kinaesthetic memory,
individual kinaesthetic melodies pertaining to habitual practices, and an anticipatory enactive kinaesthetic imagination.
Without these capacities the system would remain unconscious, unaware of itself embodied within a world. Finally, and following
on from Damasio’s (1991, 1994, 1999, 2003) claims for the necessity of pre-reflective conscious, emotional, bodily responses for the development of an organism’s core
and extended consciousness, I will argue that without these capacities any agent would be incapable of developing the sorts
of somatic markers or saliency tags that enable affective reactions, and which are indispensable for effective decision-making
and subsequent survival. My position, as presented here, remains agnostic about whether or not the creation of artificial
consciousness is an attainable goal. 相似文献
14.
This article is an examination of how the intersection of sport and race plays out in the sexualization of the sporting role
of African American male athletes. Further, the article is an examination of the multiple roles the media, sport, and race
play as these impact the public persona of African American male athletes in high-profile sports. The article concludes with
a number of recommendations for ending the negative images of African American male athletes.
To the white public, we are athletes, rappers, preachers, singers—and precious little else. We are also robberts, rapists,
mentally deficient and sexually well endowed. —Ellis Cose, The Envy of the World: On Being a Black Man in America (2002; New York: Washington Square Press, 3–4)
First of all, let me say good after ... good late afternoon. Because of the HIV virus I have attained, I will have to announce
my retirement from the Lakers today. I just want to make clear, first of all, that I do not have the AIDS disease, because
I know a lot of you want to know that, but the HIV virus. My wife is fine, she’s negative, so no problem with her. I plan
on going on, living for a long time, bugging you guys like I always have. So you’ll see me around. I plan on being with the
Lakers and the league—hopefully [Commissioner] David [Stern] will have me for a while—and going on with my life. I guess now
I get to enjoy some of the other sides of living—that [were missed] because of the season and the long practices and so on.
I just want to say that I’m going to miss playing. And I will now become a spokesman for the HIV virus because I want people,
young people, to realize they can practice safe sex. And, you know, sometimes you’re a little naive about it and you think
it could never happen to you. You only thought it could happen to, you know, other people and so on and on. And it has happened.
—Magic Johnson—Press Conference at L.A. Lakers Compound Washington Post, November 9, 1991 相似文献
15.
16.
Donald Capps 《Pastoral Psychology》2007,55(4):411-430
In my companion article on the making of the reliably religious boy (D. Capps, 2006c) I presented my argument that, whereas
the younger boy of three to five is becoming religious as a result of his emotional separation from his mother, the early
adolescent boy (age 11–14) has become reliably religious in that he has developed a religious habit of mind, a habit reflected in his embrace of the religions of honor
and hope. I presented myself as a case study in this regard. I noted, however, that there is a third form of religion, that
of humor, and that it relativizes—and thereby preserves—the religions of honor and hope. I also noted that religion and spirituality
are capable of being differentiated. I suggested that my own spirituality took the form of rebellion and that this spirit
of rebellion fueled and was fueled by the religion of humor. Employing Freud’s writings on humor, I explain in this article
how this works. 相似文献
17.
Ken Daley 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(3):349-372
Jerry Fodor (Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) famously argued that lexical concepts are unstructured. After examining the advantages and disadvantages of both the classical
approach to concepts and Fodor’s conceptual atomism, I argue that some lexical concepts are, in fact, structured. Roughly
stated, I argue that structured lexical concepts bear a necessary biconditional entailment relation to their structural constituents. I develop this account of the structure of lexical concepts within the framework
of Pavel Tichy’s (The foundations of Frege’s logic. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 1988) theory of constructions. I argue that concepts are constructions which can be combined by way of Tichy’s construction-forming
operations of composition and closure and an additional operation, simplification, which I propose in section 6. The last of these construction-forming operations plays a central role in my account of lexical
concept structure. Stated generally, structured lexical concepts are a result of simplifying their structural constituents. 相似文献
18.
Maurice A. Finocchiaro 《Argumentation》2007,21(3):253-268
Krabbe (2003, in F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 641–644) defined a metadialogue as a dialogue about one or more dialogues, and a ground-level dialogue
as a dialogue that is not a metadialogue. Similarly, I define a meta-argument as an argument about one or more arguments,
and a ground-level argument as one which is not a meta-argument. Krabbe (1995, in F.H van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 333–344) showed that formal-fallacy criticism (and more generally, fallacy criticism) consists of
metadialogues, and that such metadialogues can be profiled in ways that lead to their proper termination or resolution. I
reconstruct Krabbe’s metadialogical account into monolectical, meta-argumentative terminology by describing three-types of
meta-arguments corresponding to the three ways of proving formal invalidity he studied: the trivial logic-indifferent method;
the method of counterexample situation; and the method of formal paraphrase. A fourth type of meta-argument corresponds to
what Oliver (1967, Mind
76, 463–478), Govier (1985, Informal Logic
7, 27–33), and Copi (1986) call refutation by logical analogy. A fifth type of meta-argument represents my reconstruction of
arguments by parity of reasoning studied by Woods and Hudak (1989, Informal Logic
11, 125–139). Other particular meta-arguments deserving future study are Hume’s critique of the argument from design in the
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and Mill’s initial argument in The Subjection of Women about the importance of established custom and general feeling vis-à-vis argumentation. 相似文献
19.
Martin Lembke 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2013,74(1):131-143
The Anselmian claim that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought in virtue of being ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ may be accused of incoherence or even unintelligibility. By proposing a non-relative but apparently meaningful analysis thereof, I attempt to defend it against such criticism. In particular, I argue that ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ can be plausibly interpreted so as to imply very many attributes traditionally predicated of that than which a greater cannot be thought. Central to this line of reasoning is the assumption that whatever is an actual moral being is greater, simpliciter, than whatever is not an actual moral being. 相似文献
20.
Wesley D. Cray 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(2):147-153
At first glance, the properties being omniscient and being worthy of worship might appear to be perfectly co-instantiable. (To say that some properties are co-instantiable is just to say that it is possible that some object instantiate all of them simultaneously. Being entirely red and being a ball are co-instantiable; being entirely red and being entirely blue are not). But there are reasons to be worried about this co-instantiability, as it turns out that, depending on our commitments
with respect to certain kinds of knowledge and notions of personhood, it might be the case that no being—God included—could
instantiate both. In this paper, I lay out and motivate this claim before going on to consider a variety of responses—some
more plausible than others—that may be offered by the theist. 相似文献