"Company motivates the miserable": the impact of consensus information on help seeking for psychological problems

Based on an attribution theory analysis, it was predicted that normal individuals (people who do not evidence a particular target problem) would be least motivated to seek help for a psychological problem when they believe that the problem is actuarially common (i.e., high consensus). Based on an analysis of how target problem people evaluate their psychological problem, however, it was predicted that such individuals (unlike normal individuals) should be maximally motivated to seek help when they believe that the problem is common. To test these predictions, target problem and normal individuals (high vs. average test anxious females) were given feedback that they possessed a problem (test anxiety). Individuals were then told that their problem was either common, uncommon, or given no consensus information. As predicted, the higher consensus information led to the least help-seeking behavior for the normal individuals and to the most help-seeking behavior for the target problem individuals.     

Sinning Saints and Saintly Sinners: The Paradox of Moral Self-Regulation

ABSTRACT— The question of why people are motivated to act altruistically has been an important one for centuries, and across various disciplines. Drawing on previous research on moral regulation, we propose a framework suggesting that moral (or immoral) behavior can result from an internal balancing of moral self-worth and the cost inherent in altruistic behavior. In Experiment 1 , participants were asked to write a self-relevant story containing words referring to either positive or negative traits. Participants who wrote a story referring to the positive traits donated one fifth as much as those who wrote a story referring to the negative traits. In Experiment 2 , we showed that this effect was due specifically to a change in the self-concept. In Experiment 3 , we replicated these findings and extended them to cooperative behavior in environmental decision making. We suggest that affirming a moral identity leads people to feel licensed to act immorally. However, when moral identity is threatened, moral behavior is a means to regain some lost self-worth.     

The “Paradox of Self‐Constitution” and Korsgaard's Two Conceptions of Maxims for Action

This article argues that Christine Korsgaard gives two accounts of maxims, the identity‐priority account and the form‐priority account. There is a tension between the accounts because (1) Korsgaard's form‐priority maxims account cannot function apart from the identity of a well‐formed agent that precedes and tests maxims to determine if they should count as reasons or laws, and (2) Korsgaard's identity‐priority maxims account needs the form of the maxim to precede, bind, and constitute the well‐formed agent. This tension mirrors the two sides of what Korsgaard has called the “paradox of self‐constitution.” The article concludes that Korsgaard's paradox of self‐constitution leads to an arbitrariness that undermines the formation of moral laws.     

Need for closure effect on collective action intentions and behavior toward immigrants in Italy: The mediation of binding foundations and political conservatism

Why are people (de)motivated to mobilize in favor of immigrants? Addressing this question, we investigated the role of individuals' epistemic motivation (i.e., need for closure) in influencing the process of becoming motivated to participate in collective action in favor of immigrants in Italy. Specifically, the mediational role of binding moral foundations and political conservatism in explaining the relationship between need for closure and collective action in favor of immigrants was examined in three studies. It was hypothesized that a heightened need for closure would be indirectly and negatively associated with collective action in favor of immigrants, sequentially mediated first through binding moral foundations and then political conservatism. We found support for this prediction when either dispositional measure (Study 1 and Study 2) or an experimental induction (Study 3) of need for closure were used, and when both collective action intentions (Study 1 and Study 3) and behavior (Study 2) were assessed. The results suggest that need for closure constitutes a powerful motivational force that leads individuals to engage in uncertainty‐reducing evaluations and actions. We discuss these results regarding how they are related with previous work and their implications for research and practice.     

Social justifications for moral emotions: when reasons for disgust are less elaborated than for anger

In the present research, we tested the unreasoning disgust hypothesis: moral disgust, in particular in response to a violation of a bodily norm, is less likely than moral anger to be justified with cognitively elaborated reasons. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to explain why they felt anger and disgust toward pedophiles. Participants were more likely to invoke elaborated reasons, versus merely evaluative responses, when explaining their anger, versus disgust. Experiment 2 used a between-participants design; participants explained why they felt either anger or disgust toward seven groups that either violated a sexual or nonsexual norm. Again, elaborated reasons were less prevalent when explaining their disgust versus anger and, in particular, when explaining disgust toward a group that violated a sexual norm. Experiment 3 further established that these findings are due to a lower accessibility of elaborated reasons for bodily disgust, rather than inhibition in using them when provided. From these findings, it can be concluded that communicating external reasons for moral disgust at bodily violations is made more difficult due to the unavailability of those reasons to people.     

An attributional analysis of excuse giving: studies of a naive theory of emotion

We conducted four studies that pertained to excuses given for a broken social contract. In an initial field investigation, participants recalled occasions in which they had given true and false reasons for not fulfilling a social obligation. Communicated reasons tended to be external to the person, uncontrollable, and unintentional (e.g., "My car broke down"), whereas withheld reasons tended to be internal, controllable, and either intentional (e.g., "I did not want to go") or unintentional (e.g., "I forgot"). The external uncontrollable excuses were anticipated to lessen the anger of the wronged party. In a subsequent simulation study, excuses based on the categories detected in Experiment 1 were manipulated and related to anger ratings. The same pattern of results was displayed, with intent and negligence provoking the highest anger ratings. The final two studies involved laboratory manipulation of a communicated reason for coming late to an experiment. In Experiment 3, a confederate conveyed either an internal controllable, an external uncontrollable, or no reason for making a subject wait, whereas in Experiment 4, subjects were detained and created their own good, bad, any, or no excuse for being tardy, which was communicated to a second, waiting subject. A consistent pattern of good excuse/external uncontrollable reason and bad excuse/internal controllable reason was displayed; offering no excuse resulted in the same judgments as giving a poor excuse. Relative to the external uncontrollable reasons, internal controllable excuses for being late augmented aversive emotional reactions, increased negative personality ratings, and resulted in a desire for no further social contact.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

Motivated comprehension regulation: Vigilant versus eager metacognitive control

The more accurately people assess their comprehension, the more likely they are to engage in study behaviors that precisely target gaps in their learning. However, comprehension regulation involves more than knowing when to implement a new study strategy; it also involves deciding which strategy will most effectively resolve one’s confusion. In two experiments, we explored how people’s motivational orientations influence which study strategies they select to regulate their comprehension. In Experiment 1, people who were motivated to vigilantly protect against potential mistakes (i.e., prevention-focused individuals) were more likely to adopt a rereading strategy than people who were motivated to eagerly pursue new learning opportunities (i.e., promotion-focused individuals). In Experiment 2, this difference in strategy use emerged specifically in response to confusing sentences that had been inserted into the text. Furthermore, by using rereading strategies to resolve their confusion, prevention-focused individuals performed better than promotion-focused individuals on a comprehension test and a transfer task.     

A depleted mind feels inefficacious: Ego‐depletion reduces self‐efficacy to exert further self‐control

Recent research has found that ego‐depletion undermines self‐control by motivating cognition that justifies conservation of mental resource. One potential cognitive mechanism is reduction of self‐efficacy. Specifically, we propose that ego‐depletion might demotivate self‐control by making people believe that they are inefficacious in exerting self‐control in subsequent tasks. Three experiments support the proposal. First, we demonstrated that (a) ego‐depletion can reduce self‐efficacy to exert further control (Experiments 1 to 3) and (b) the temporary reduction of self‐efficacy mediates the effect of depletion on self‐control performance (Experiment 2). Finally, we found that (c) these effects are only observed among participants who endorse a limited (versus non‐limited) theory of willpower and are, hence, more motivated to conserve mental resources (Experiment 3). Taken together, the present findings show that decrease in self‐efficacy to exert further self‐control is an important cognitive process that explains how ego‐depletion demotivates self‐control. This research also contributes to the recent discussion of the psychological processes underlying ego‐depletion.     

A study of the foundations of ethical decision-making of nurses

A study of nurses and nursing students was conducted to determine the various philosophical positions they hold with respect to ethical decision-making in nursing and their relationship to the subjective-objective controversy in value theory. The study revealed that most nurses and nursing students tend to be subjectivists in value theory, i.e., believe that value judgments are purely personal, private expressions of one's own opinion or inner-feelings and not believe that value judgments are knowledge claims capable of being true or false and therefore not expressions of moral requirements and normative imperatives emanating from an external value structure or moral order in the world. In addition, the study revealed that most nurses and nursing students are inconsistent in the philosophical foundations of their ethical decision-making, i.e., in decision-making regarding values they tend to hold beliefs which are incompatible with other beliefs they hold about values.     

The emotional cost of charitable donations

Donations in support of a charitable cause can create a conflict between moral intuitions (e.g., fulfilling moral obligations and helping as many individuals in need as possible) and the cost entailed by following one's moral intuitions (e.g., spending money). The present paper investigates this conflict by putting people in a situation in which they must choose whether to help three women by giving more money or help one woman by giving less. In addition, the paper uses the attraction effect paradigm to counteract the single victim effect and reduce the conflict. Experiment 1 demonstrates that in a two-alternative context the majority of participants choose to help one woman by giving €150 instead of helping three women by giving €450. Experiment 2 replicates this finding and highlights the role of emotion regulation strategies in the management of the emotional conflict arising in the two-alternative condition. In both studies, the introduction of a third, dominated alternative reduces the conflict and makes it easier to choose the programme asking for a higher donation and helping three women. Implications for charitable donations and the role of the conflict between moral intuitions and economic costs are discussed.     

SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON “SELF-STIMULATORY” BEHAVIOR: ANALYSIS AND TREATMENT APPLICATION

We tested the hypothesis that the “self-stimulatory” behaviors exhibited by some individuals may be socially mediated. Four developmentally disabled children who exhibited hand flapping and body rocking participated in a series of three experiments conducted to assess the influence of social variables on stereotyped behavior and to develop a treatment based on the assessment. Experiment 1 used an assessment procedure to determine the relative influences of social attention and task demands on stereotyped behavior. For all four children, hand flapping and body rocking increased when difficult academic tasks were introduced. Experiment 2 involved the use of a procedural time-out and demonstrated that removing task demands contingent on stereotyped behavior resulted in increased rates of hand flapping and body rocking. In Experiment 3, these results were used to develop a communication treatment that consisted of teaching the children to request assistance on the difficult tasks. This treatment resulted in significant reductions in self-stimulatory behavior. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that some forms of repetitive stereotyped behavior may come to serve social functions (e.g., escape from aversive situations). Teaching a functionally equivalent communicative alternative to escape-motivated stereotyped behavior can be an effective form of intervention for this problem.     

“No More” leads to “Want More,” but “No Less” leads to “Want Less”: Consumers' counterfactual thinking when faced with quantity restriction discounts

The current research examines the impact of point‐of‐purchase (POP) discounts on consumers' counterfactual thinking (CFT). Study 1 reveals that consumers tend to engage in upward CFT (what might have been better) rather than downward CFT (what might have been worse) in response to POP discounts. Study 2 shows that upward CFT depends on how the discount information is framed. A discount with a lower‐quantity restriction (e.g., “X % off if you buy at least Y items”) leads consumers to counterfactually wish to buy more, but a discount with an upper‐quantity restriction (“X % off – limit Y items per customer”) leads consumers to wish to buy less. Study participants in both conditions report they would buy the same POP‐suggested amount, but for completely opposite reasons. In Study 3, this convergence effect in purchase quantity disappears when the maximum and minimum restrictions are lifted, suggesting that quantity restrictions in POP discounts guide quantity decisions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An evolutionary perspective on Kohlberg’s theory of moral development

The purpose of this research was to test the proposition that moral development and social evolution have progressed together, each enabling the other. Stage 1 and Stage 2 reasons for behaving morally are to avoid punishment and achieve rewards. Since moral behavior at these stages is externally determined they do not form a basis for cooperative living. Stage 3 morality involves the reasoning that people are obligated to care for their family and friends; this would appear to be the morality of hunter and gatherer societies. Stage 4 morality involves the reasoning that people must obey authority in the form of traditional norms, written laws, and the legal system; this would appear to be the morality of nation states. Stage 5 morality involves the reasoning that people should obey democratically created rules which presumably create the greatest good for the greatest number and Stage 6 morality involves the reasoning that people should follow universal ethical principles like justice. These moralities would appear to be the morality of international social organizations. To test the hypothesis that moral development and social evolution progressed together, the Measures of Moral Reasoning Scale was created, consisting of six scales measuring Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning. As a measure of social evolution (i.e., inclusion), participants were asked how many of their resources they intended to invest in the following targets over their lifetimes: self, biological children, mate, biological parents, biological siblings, friends (but not relatives), American strangers, and non-American strangers. Supporting the hypothesis, Stage 1 and 2 measures correlated with the intent to invest in the self but not others; the Stage 3 measure correlated with the intent to invest in the participant’s children, mate, parents, siblings, and friends (a hunter-gatherer social organization); the Stage 4 measure correlated with investment in all of the above targets except self and non-American strangers (a nationalistic social organization); the Stage 5 measure correlated with investment in children, mate, parents, and American strangers (a nationalistic social organization), and the Stage 6 measure correlated with investment in all of the targets except self (a global social organization).

     

The role of cultural orientation in bargaining under incomplete information: Differences in causal attributions

This research examines how differences in cultural orientation influence causal attributions and thus the behavioral outcomes in an incomplete information bargaining situation. Using ultimatum bargaining, three experiments demonstrate that acceptance rates differ across Western and East Asian cultures because of the differences in implicit theories of behavior. The results of Experiment 1 shows that East Asians are more sensitive to both external constraints and group influences but only when there is information about the opponent’s situation to discount personality traits. Experiment 2 shows that reasons for an opponent’s behavior mediate the influence of cultural orientation on bargaining outcomes when situational constraints are made salient. Experiment 3 shows that reasons for an opponent’s behavior based on the saliency of a group context mediate the influence of cultural orientation on behavior. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings and suggesting directions for future research.     

Projecting Lower Competence to Maintain Moral Warmth in the Avoidance of Prosocial Requests

When faced with prosocial requests, consumers face a difficult decision between taking on the request's burden or appearing unwarm (unkind, uncaring). We propose that the desire to refuse such requests while protecting a morally warm image leads consumers to under‐represent their competence. Although consumers care strongly about being viewed as competent, five studies showed that they downplayed their competence to sidestep a prosocial request. This effect occurred across both self‐reported and behavioral displays of competence. Further, the downplaying competence effect only occurred when facing an undesirable prosocial request, not a similarly undesirable proself request. The final studies showed that people specifically downplayed competence and not warmth. We further distinguished between social warmth (e.g., humor) and moral warmth (e.g., kindness), showing that when competence, social warmth, and moral warmth were all requisite skills for a prosocial task, people downplayed competence and social warmth more than moral warmth. These findings underscore that although people care strongly about being viewed as competent, they willingly trade off competence evaluations if evaluations of warmth—particularly moral warmth—are at risk.     

The value of believing in free will: encouraging a belief in determinism increases cheating

Does moral behavior draw on a belief in free will? Two experiments examined whether inducing participants to believe that human behavior is predetermined would encourage cheating. In Experiment 1, participants read either text that encouraged a belief in determinism (i.e., that portrayed behavior as the consequence of environmental and genetic factors) or neutral text. Exposure to the deterministic message increased cheating on a task in which participants could passively allow a flawed computer program to reveal answers to mathematical problems that they had been instructed to solve themselves. Moreover, increased cheating behavior was mediated by decreased belief in free will. In Experiment 2, participants who read deterministic statements cheated by overpaying themselves for performance on a cognitive task; participants who read statements endorsing free will did not. These findings suggest that the debate over free will has societal, as well as scientific and theoretical, implications.     

Big Picture,Bad Outcomes: When Visual Perspectives Harm Health Goal Pursuit

People often fail to achieve health goals, which compromises their well‐being. Prior research suggests that seeing events through an observer's eyes (i.e., adopting a third‐person perspective) should facilitate goal pursuit. However, we find that third‐person perspectives discourage goal‐consistent intentions and behavior for health goals when goal centrality is low (i.e., the goal is peripheral to one's self‐concept). In Experiment 1, people who adopted a third‐person perspective chose more sugary foods if they considered a healthy eating goal to be more peripheral to the self. Experiment 2 examines why a third‐person perspective can hinder goal pursuit; it encourages a breakdown in implemental thinking which, in turn, increases negative self‐conscious emotions. While high goal centrality buffers people from negative effects on goal intentions, low centrality does not. Experiment 3 demonstrates that this effect is robust when goal centrality is manipulated. We recommend that consumers pursuing health goals (and individuals who support them) exercise caution when employing perspective‐based strategies, as they may backfire for people at greatest risk of goal abandonment.     

Judging near and distant virtue and vice

We propose that people judge immoral acts as more offensive and moral acts as more virtuous when the acts are psychologically distant than near. This is because people construe more distant situations in terms of moral principles, rather than attenuating situation-specific considerations. Results of four studies support these predictions. Study 1 shows that more temporally distant transgressions (e.g., eating one’s dead dog) are construed in terms of moral principles rather than contextual information. Studies 2 and 3 further show that morally offensive actions are judged more severely when imagined from a more distant temporal (Study 2) or social (Study 3) perspective. Finally, Study 4 shows that moral acts (e.g., adopting a disabled child) are judged more positively from temporal distance. The findings suggest that people more readily apply their moral principles to distant rather than proximal behaviors.     

The emotional cost of charitable donations

Donations in support of a charitable cause can create a conflict between moral intuitions (e.g., fulfilling moral obligations and helping as many individuals in need as possible) and the cost entailed by following one's moral intuitions (e.g., spending money). The present paper investigates this conflict by putting people in a situation in which they must choose whether to help three women by giving more money or help one woman by giving less. In addition, the paper uses the attraction effect paradigm to counteract the single victim effect and reduce the conflict. Experiment 1 demonstrates that in a two-alternative context the majority of participants choose to help one woman by giving €150 instead of helping three women by giving €450. Experiment 2 replicates this finding and highlights the role of emotion regulation strategies in the management of the emotional conflict arising in the two-alternative condition. In both studies, the introduction of a third, dominated alternative reduces the conflict and makes it easier to choose the programme asking for a higher donation and helping three women. Implications for charitable donations and the role of the conflict between moral intuitions and economic costs are discussed.