Culture in the context of intercultural negotiation.

This study explores culture's effect on behaviors and outcomes in intercultural negotiation and examines how those effects are moderated by role. Eighty U.S. and international students took part in a previously developed negotiation task (Pruitt, 1981) and completed Hui and Triandis's (1986) individualism‐collectivism (INDCOL) scale. Negotiation interactions were coded for information sharing, offers, and distributive tactics. Findings show that a negotiation dyad's collectivism is positively associated with higher joint profit. The effects of culture on both communication behaviors and joint outcomes, however, differ by role of the negotiator. In particular, seller collectivism has larger and more consistent effects on communication behavior and joint profit than buyer collectivism. Results support a ‘culture in context’ perspective of negotiation that takes into account negotiator qualities, contextual and structural features of the negotiation, and mediating processes in addition to cultural values.     

Expectancy Disconfirmation and Negotiator Reactions Across Negotiation Episodes

In the negotiation literature, relatively little attention has been paid to the impact of negotiator goals and expectancy disconfirmations on negotiator behaviors and affective outcomes. We found that negotiators with larger negative expectancy disconfirmations were less satisfied; set lower targets for a subsequent negotiation; and were more likely to settle with the other party in the second negotiation, rather than requiring third-party imposition of a settlement. Those negotiators who settled had more positive feelings and perceptions about the negotiation and set higher targets for a third negotiation. Further, negotiators who experienced repeated high levels of negative expectancy disconfirmation also experienced the greatest decrements in their feelings and perceptions across negotiation episodes. Implications of study findings for future research are discussed.     

MEDIUM OF COMMUNICATION,DIFFERENTIAL POWER,AND PHASING OF CONCESSIONS: NEGOTIATING SUCCESS AND ATTRIBUTIONS TO THE OPPONENT1

The effect of three variables thought to be important to the negotiation process was investigated via an attributional analysis. Three different communication modes (audio, audio/video, face-to-face), three levels of power (high, equal, low), and three prior concession-phasing strategies (alternating, increasingly cooperative, decreasingly cooperative) were combined in a factorial design to determine their effect on negotiation outcomes and negotiator attributions. The data indicated that the communication and power variables were the most potent, with the face-to-face communication mode producing the best joint outcomes, followed by the audio/video and audio-only conditions. The various “prior” concession strategies had little effect on subsequent negotiation outcomes. Several significant internal/external attributions of locus of causality were found, as were significantly different impression ratings according to conditions.     

Motivated by guilt and low felt trust: The impact of negotiators' anger expressions on the implementation of negotiated agreements

Prior research has identified benefits from certain emotion tactics in negotiation, particularly expressing anger to achieve short‐term gains. We demonstrate that such tactics can be strategically problematic due to their impact on an actor's emotions and felt trust. Through five studies, we find that negotiators' use of anger tactics during a negotiation increased their feelings of guilt and reduced the extent to which they felt trusted by their counterpart following the negotiation. We found this guilt to be the result of their aggressive tone and how they treated their counterpart. The guilt and diminished felt trust in turn motivated negotiators to engage in greater cooperative behaviors during the deal implementation process that benefited their counterpart, even if doing so was costly to the negotiator. Our results demonstrate that negotiator guilt and felt trust resulting from anger tactics influence the dynamic relationship between negotiators and their counterparts. This in turn has strategic implications for negotiators, who attempt to mitigate these negative feelings during the crucial implementation phase of a negotiated agreement.     

Threats,Bluffs, and Disclaimers in Negotiations

In a buyer-seller simulation within two negotiation periods, we examined the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of variations in the communication of threats. Specifically, we examined the consequences of receiving no threat or a threat stated with, versus without, a disclaimer. In addition, we examined changes in subjects′ evaluations of their partner and negotiation outcomes after some were led to believe their partner had stated a false threat (a "bluff"). As expected, we found that while negotiators who used threats were perceived as more powerful, they were also perceived as less cooperative and achieved less integrative agreements than those who did not use threats. In addition, when information (allegedly from a constituent) identified the threat as a bluff, we found that the disclaimer lessened the negativity of re-evaluations of the negotiation partner. Taken together, our findings suggest that current theory regarding the effect of threats and bluffs in negotiation needs to be qualified by how these tactics are stated. Theoretical and practical implications of our findings are discussed.     

The mind and heart (literally) of the negotiator: personality and contextual determinants of experiential reactions and economic outcomes in negotiation

The authors developed and tested a model proposing that negotiator personality interacts with the negotiation situation to influence negotiation processes and outcomes. In 2 studies, the authors found that negotiators high in agreeableness were best suited to integrative negotiations and that negotiators low in agreeableness were best suited to distributive negotiations. Consistent with this person-situation fit argument, in Study 1 the authors found that negotiators whose dispositions were a good fit to their negotiation context had higher levels of physiological (cardiac) arousal at the end of the negotiation compared with negotiators who were "misplaced" in situations inconsistent with their level of agreeableness, and this arousal was in turn related to increased economic outcomes. Study 2 replicated and extended the findings of Study 1, finding that person-situation fit was related to physiological (heart rate), psychological (positive affect), and behavioral activation (persistence) demonstrated during the negotiation, and these measures in turn were related to the economic outcomes achieved by participants.     

GENDER DIFFERENCES IN NEGOTIATION OUTCOME: A META-ANALYSIS

Studies reporting the objective settlements obtained by men and women in negotiations were reviewed. Differences in outcomes were expected due to differences in perceptions, behaviors, and contextual factors between men and women. In the sample of studies, men negotiated significantly better outcomes than women. Opponent sex, relative power of the negotiator, integrative potential of the task, mode of communication and year of the study were tested as moderators of the effect. Although the overall difference in outcomes between men and women was small, none of these hypothesized moderators or several exploratory moderators reversed or eliminated this effect. The organizational significance of the findings is discussed in terms of the glass ceiling, a gender-based earnings differential and women in negotiation positions. Directions for future research in the laboratory and the field are suggested.     

First offers as anchors: the role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus

Three experiments explored the role of first offers, perspective-taking, and negotiator self-focus in determining distributive outcomes in a negotiation. Across 3 experiments, whichever party, the buyer or seller, made the 1st offer obtained a better outcome. In addition, 1st offers were a strong predictor of final settlement prices. However, when the negotiator who did not make a 1st offer focused on information that was inconsistent with the implications of the opponent's 1st offer, the advantageous effect of making the 1st offer was eliminated: Thinking about one's opponent's alternatives to the negotiation (Experiment 1), one's opponent's reservation price (Experiment 2), or one's own target (Experiment 3) all negated the effect of 1st offers on outcomes. These effects occurred for both face-to-face negotiations and E-mail negotiations. Implications for negotiations and perspective-taking are discussed.     

Alternative Models of Price Behavior in Dyadic Negotiations: Market Prices, Reservation Prices, and Negotiator Aspirations

Three competing predictors of price are manipulated in a two-party distributive negotiation. These include prevailing market prices, negotiator reservation prices, and negotiator aspirations. We offer a cognitive interpretation of how each type of information is incorporated into the negotiator′s thought processes as an alternative cognitive reference point. In two studies varying the levels of these three factors, only reservation prices, not prevailing market prices or negotiator aspirations, account for significant variance in negotiated outcomes. Discussion is offered, suggesting that the negotiator as decision maker may experience a "dominant reference point" effect. When multiple pieces of relevant information are available, the negotiator may only be able to focus on one of them. Among the three predictors studied, the reservation price may be cognitively interpreted as the most absolute limit.     

My way: How strategic preferences vary by negotiator role and regulatory focus

Negotiators may use vigilant, loss-minimizing strategies or eager, gain-maximizing strategies. The present study provides evidence that preferences for these different strategies depend on negotiator role and personal orientation. In a price negotiation, buyers and prevention-focused individuals prefer vigilant strategies, whereas sellers and promotion-focused individuals prefer eager strategies. When there is a match between the strategy and the role (role–strategy fit) or between the strategy and the individual's regulatory focus orientation (focus–strategy fit), the negotiator experiences more fit and plans to be more demanding in the negotiation. By manipulating strategy in a real, binding negotiation, we reveal its importance in determining negotiators' subjective experiences and planned demand. Our results show that shared strategic preferences between different motivational orientations—negotiator role and personal regulatory focus—can create self-regulatory compatibility.     

The Impact of Alcohol on Negotiator Behavior: Experimental Evidence1

Business‐related drinking is an important organizational and managerial activity with particular relevance to the negotiation process. This paper investigates the influence of a moderate amount of alcohol on negotiator behavior and negotiated outcomes. We conducted 2 negotiation studies involving inebriated and sober participants, and found that inebriated negotiators used more aggressive tactics, made more mistakes, and reached less integrative agreements than did sober negotiators. Across both studies, we found that inebriated negotiators were unaware that alcohol had affected their negotiations.     

Negotiating over Time: Impediments to Integrative Solutions

Most negotiation relationships consist of interactions that occur across time. This paper explores the influence of two variables on the outcomes of such negotiations: the mobility of negotiators and the frame of the short-term sacrifice required to reach long-term gain. Specifically, we focus on the integrativeness of agreements both within a static negotiating period as well as across several negotiations. Subjects participated in an experiment that consisted of 10 similar negotiations across time, with two issues being addressed in each negotiation. The experiment was created to allow for the possibility of a moderately advantageous integrative agreement within each static negotiation, as well as a superior integrative agreement across negotiations. A higher level of negotiator mobility was predicted to decrease the integrativeness of outcomes across negotiations. This prediction was supported. The frame of the sacrifice required of subjects was predicted to affect integrativeness both within as well as across negotiations, such that subjects would be less likely to sacrifice on an issue, or issues, if it meant accepting a perceived loss rather than a reduced gain. This prediction was not supported. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for managerial negotiation and decision making.     

Tough guys finish last: the perils of a distributive reputation

Reputations are socially constructed labels that provide representations (or schema), which organize our images of another person. We look at how reputations influence negotiations by examining their impact on negotiator cognitions, behaviors, and subsequent outcomes. We randomly paired relative novices with relative experts to negotiate over email, telling half the novices that their counterparts were experts in distributive negotiation (i.e., the art of claiming value). Findings supported our predictions that novices whose counterparts had a distributive reputation judged these counterparts' intentions in a more negative light and used more distributive and fewer integrative tactics than the control group novices. This resulted in lower joint gains in the distributive reputation condition than in the control condition. Notably, the more experienced negotiators were able to extract more individual value from the deal, but not when they had a reputation for being distributive. In other words, the fictitious distributive reputation prevented participants from capitalizing on their real negotiation expertise advantage.     

"Inside Information" and Negotiator Decision Behavior

In negotiation, information about the other party may be a source of strength or weakness, depending on the context, the type of information, its availability and quality, and how a negotiator uses it. An empirical study examines the way negotiators use "inside" information specifically designed to increase bargaining strength. The scoop-privileged information about the other party′s deadline-does not inform negotiators about possible deals; rather, it suggests a process of negotiating agreement. Misuse of the scoop, therefore, poses potential costs that may diminish its possible advantages. In a two-party negotiation exercise, access to inside information affected negotiators′ thoughts and behaviors. It enhanced their feelings of success and shifted the criterion for success away from final price toward a relative, interpersonal standard. Furthermore, informed negotiators used the scoop appropriately to manage the negotiation process and enhance both joint and individual profits.     

The use of mental health professional consultants to police hostage negotiation teams

Three hundred law enforcement agencies in the United States that employ a negotiator in hostage incidents responded to a survey regarding the use of mental health professionals as consultants to the negotiation team. Thirty-nine percent of the agencies with a negotiator use a mental health professional consultant to the negotiation team. Police agencies that use a mental health professional as a consultant on negotiation techniques reported more hostage incidents ending by negotiated surrender and fewer hostage incidents ending by tactical team assault and arrest of the perpetrator. Also, police agencies that use a mental health professional as a consultant on the assessment of the perpetrator reported fewer hostage incidents resulting in the serious injury or death of a hostage. Although these results are only correlational, they raise the possibility that the use of mental health professionals as consultants to police hostage negotiation teams may decrease the risk of hostage injury and death.     

Can Nervous Nelly negotiate? How anxiety causes negotiators to make low first offers,exit early,and earn less profit

Negotiations trigger anxiety. Across four studies, we demonstrate that anxiety is harmful to negotiator performance. In our experiments, we induced either anxiety or neutral feelings and studied behavior in negotiation and continuous shrinking-pie tasks. Compared to negotiators experiencing neutral feelings, negotiators who feel anxious expect lower outcomes, make lower first offers, respond more quickly to offers, exit bargaining situations earlier, and ultimately obtain worse outcomes. The relationship between anxiety and negotiator behavior is moderated by negotiator self-efficacy; high self-efficacy mitigates the harmful effects of anxiety.     

Strategic Timing in Group Negotiations: The Implications of Forced Entry and Forced Exit for Negotiators with Unequal Power

This study used a three-person mixed-motive negotiation to (1) investigate the effects of asymmetrical caucusing (i.e., negotiations in which parties possess unequal opportunities to engage in discussion) on group negotiations and (2) assess potential explanations for these effects. Negotiators who were excluded from part of the discussion received a smaller share of rewards than those who remained throughout the discussion, and those who were excluded from the latter half of the discussion received a smaller share of rewards than those who were excluded from the beginning. In addition, groups that excluded the low power negotiator from part of the discussion achieved less integrative agreements than groups that excluded the high power negotiator and groups that retained all negotiators throughout the discussion. The results highlight the importance of negotiator participation for gaining a share of rewards and the critical role played by negotiators with low power for determining the quality of agreements reached.     

Judgment Accuracy and Outcomes in Negotiation: A Causal Modeling Analysis of Decision-Aiding Effects

This study examines how interaction structure (no formal structure versus modified Nominal Group Technique) and communication channels (face-to-face versus computer-mediated) affect negotiation performance by changing negotiation judgment accuracy. Participants assumed the role of a selling division manager or one of two buying division managers and completed an intra-organizational transfer pricing negotiation task in groups of three members each. In half of all groups, members interacted freely without any formal structure; in the other half, members interacted using a two-step, modified Nominal Group Technique. Within each of these two conditions, half the groups met directly and communicated face-to-face; in the other half, members were physically isolated and communicated with the aid of a simultaneous electronic-messaging facility. Results showed that unstructured groups and computer-mediated groups had lower judgment accuracy, obtained lower outcomes, and distributed resources more unequally than structured groups and face-to-face groups, respectively. Further analyses using causal modeling revealed that judgment accuracy played a significant role in determining negotiation outcomes. Specifically, negotiation structure caused increases in both individual and group profits and decreases in inequality of resource distribution by reducing fixed-sum error. Computer-mediated communication increased both fixed-sum error and incompatibility error and these increases explained the effects of communication medium on resource distribution. However, changes in fixed-sum error only partially explained the effects of communication medium on individual and group profits. Changes in incompatibility error did not explain any of the effects of communication medium on profits. These results are discussed in terms of implications for the design and implementation of decision aids for small group negotiation.     

The three faces of Eve: Strategic displays of positive,negative, and neutral emotions in negotiations

In a series of laboratory experiments, we tested the influence of strategically displaying positive, negative, and neutral emotions on negotiation outcomes. In Experiment 1, a face-to-face dispute simulation, negotiators who displayed positive emotion, in contrast to negative or neutral emotions, were more likely to incorporate a future business relationship in the negotiated contract. In Experiment 2, an ultimatum setting, managers strategically displaying positive emotion were more likely to close a deal. This effect was mediated by negotiators’ willingness to pay more to a negotiator strategically displaying positive versus negative emotions. In Experiment 3, display of positive emotion was a more effective strategy for gaining concessions from the other party in a distributive setting. Negotiators made more extreme demands when facing a negotiator strategically displaying negative, rather than positive or neutral, emotions. Implications for strategic display of emotion in negotiations are discussed.