Dividing Attention Between Tasks: Testing Whether Explicit Payoff Functions Elicit Optimal Dual‐Task Performance

We test people's ability to optimize performance across two concurrent tasks. Participants performed a number entry task while controlling a randomly moving cursor with a joystick. Participants received explicit feedback on their performance on these tasks in the form of a single combined score. This payoff function was varied between conditions to change the value of one task relative to the other. We found that participants adapted their strategy for interleaving the two tasks, by varying how long they spent on one task before switching to the other, in order to achieve the near maximum payoff available in each condition. In a second experiment, we show that this behavior is learned quickly (within 2–3 min over several discrete trials) and remained stable for as long as the payoff function did not change. The results of this work show that people are adaptive and flexible in how they prioritize and allocate attention in a dual‐task setting. However, it also demonstrates some of the limits regarding people's ability to optimize payoff functions.     

The effect of mood and pleasant versus unpleasant information feedback on performing a motor skill

The effect of negative, positive, or neutral feedback on a rotary pursuit task as a function of the subject's depressed or elated mood was ascertained. Specifically, the self-schema hypothesis was examined. Ninety female volunteers, ranging in age from 18 to 25 years, participated. They were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions based on depressed or elated mood states, elicited by Velten's (1968) mood induction procedure, and feedback. A control group received no feedback and was not subjected to a mood inducing treatment. Baseline measures and changes in mood were determined by the Multiple Adjective Affective Checklist (MAACL). Bogus feedback was offered after all but one of the trials. The subjects' mood changed significantly during the mood-inducing treatment. For motor performance, partial support was lent to self-schema. Elated and depressed subjects performed best under positive and negative feedback, respectively. The effects, however, were temporary.     

On being happy but fearing failure: The effects of mood on self-handicapping strategies

Does temporary mood influence people’s tendency to engage in self-handicapping behaviors? Based on past research on self-handicapping and recent work on affect and social behaviors, this experiment predicted and found that positive mood significantly increased the tendency to engage in two kinds of self-handicapping strategies. Participants (N = 94) first received contingent or non-contingent positive feedback about performance on a task of ‘cognitive abilities’, and then underwent a positive, neutral, or negative mood induction using video films. Self-handicapping was assessed in terms of their subsequent preference for (a) drinking a performance-enhancing, or performance-inhibiting herbal tea, and (b) engaging or not engaging in performance-enhancing cognitive practice. As predicted, happy mood and non-contingent feedback significantly increased self-handicapping on both measures. The implications of these results for everyday performance tasks, and for recent affect-cognition theories, are discussed.     

The Fears of Evaluation About Performance (FEAP) Task: Inducing Anxiety-Related Responses to Direct Exposure to Negative and Positive Evaluations

Fears of negative and positive evaluation (i.e., evaluative fears) manifest within performance-based situations (e.g., public speaking, group presentations), particularly among those experiencing social anxiety. Within these performance-based situations, individuals experiencing such evaluative fears frequently display a variety of impairments (e.g., avoidance, nervousness) that might manifest within and across various settings (e.g., employment, school). How do those who experience these fears react to in-the-moment feedback about their performance? We constructed the Fear of Evaluation About Performance (FEAP) task to examine ecologically valid experiences with anxiety when reacting to positive and negative feedback. During the task, participants gave a speech, and subsequent to this and in counterbalanced order, received positive and negative feedback about their speech, with continued assessment of anxiety-related arousal throughout the task. We tested the FEAP task among 127 adults, who provided self-reports of fears of positive and negative evaluation before completing the task. Fears of positive evaluation uniquely predicted arousal following receipt of positive feedback, whereas fears of negative evaluation uniquely predicted arousal following receipt of negative feedback. Relative to participants receiving positive feedback first, those receiving negative feedback first experienced elevated post-feedback arousal, followed by a steep decline in arousal post-positive feedback. Conversely, participants receiving positive feedback first experienced a buffer effect whereby arousal post-negative feedback remained low, relative to the arousal experienced post-negative feedback among those who received negative feedback first. We expect the FEAP task to inform basic science on fears of negative and positive evaluation, as well as treatment planning in applied clinical settings.     

THE INFLUENCE OF UPWARD FEEDBACK ON SELF- AND FOLLOWER RATINGS OF LEADERSHIP

The impact of upward feedback (followers' perceptions of leadership provided to leaders) on leaders' self-evaluations and followers' subsequent ratings of leadership was assessed in a field setting. Subjects were 978 student leaders and their 1,232 followers. Results indicated that overall, leaders' behaviors as rated by followers improved after feedback. Leaders' self-evaluations following feedback became more similar to the evaluations provided by followers. Interestingly, when leaders were grouped according to whether feedback was positive, neutral, or negative based on agreement between self- and follower ratings, differences between groups in post-feedback self-evaluations and follower ratings emerged. Self-evaluations for leaders receiving negative feedback (high self- relative to followers' ratings) went down, while self-evaluations for leaders receiving positive feedback (low self- relative to follower's ratings) went up. Follower ratings of leaders who received negative feedback improved following feedback to leaders, while there was no change in follower ratings for those receiving positive feedback. Implications for using upward feedback in organizations are discussed.     

The facilitative effects of heart-rate feedback in the emotional processing of claustrophobic fear

This study examines predictions derived from Foa and Kozak's theory of emotional processing. We hypothesized that the provision of heart-rate feedback would facilitate emotional processing through a fuller activation of the participant's fear structure, and by focusing participants' attention on information that is incompatible with the fear structure, i.e., the interoceptive pattern of habituation. Nonclinical students (N = 54) showing marked claustrophobic fear received 30 min of self-directed exposure to a claustrophobic chamber. Three exposure conditions (heart-rate feedback, paced-tone control, and exposure only control) were examined across six 5-min exposure trials. Participants receiving heart-rate feedback displayed greater between-trial habituation across treatment trials and lower levels of fear at post-treatment. Treatment process findings failed to support the fear activation hypothesis. Implications of the findings for theories of fear reduction are discussed.     

On bad mood and white bears: The effects of mood state on ability to suppress unwanted thoughts

Does temporary mood influence people's ability to engage in effective thought suppression? Based on past research on mental control and recent work on affective influences on social cognition, this experiment predicted and found that negative mood improved and positive mood impaired people's ability to suppress their thoughts when instructed not to think of a neutral concept, white bears. We also found clear evidence for ironic rebound effects: on a subsequent generative task, intrusions of the suppressed thought were greater in the negative than in the positive mood group. Participants received positive or negative feedback about performance on a supposed creativity task to induce positive or negative moods, and then engaged in two consecutive generative writing tasks, the first accompanied by instructions to suppress thoughts of white bears. Those in a negative group reported fewer “white bear” intrusions when attempting to suppress, but more “white bear” intrusions (an ironic rebound effect) in the subsequent task when the suppression instruction was lifted. The implications of these results for everyday tasks of mental control, and for recent affect–cognition theories are discussed.     

The Effect of Erroneous Knowledge of Results on Skill Acquisition when Augmented Information is Redundant

Even though it can be shown that verbal knowledge of results (KR) is redundant with sensory feedback for learning certain motor skills, such findings do not eliminate the possibility that when KR is available it influences underlying learning processes. In order to examine the function of KR more closely, two experiments were designed in which the subjects received conflicting information about their own sensory feedback and the KR presented by the experimenter. In Experiment 1, two erroneous-KR groups, a correct-KR group, and a no-KR group performed 150 practice trials on a simple anticipation timing task and then performed three no-KR retention tests of 30 trials each following intervals of 10 minutes, 1 week, and 1 month. The results supported previous findings that providing correct KR is redundant in anticipation tasks. However, learning was influenced by KR as subjects performed according to the erroneous KR information, thereby ignoring their sensory feedback even after a 1-month interval. In Experiment 2, subjects practised a more complex striking response for the anticipation task for 75 trials and then performed no-KR retention trials either immediately, or 1 day or 1 week later. One of the groups received erroneous KR after 50 practice trials with correct KR. The results confirmed and extended those from Experiment 1, as erroneous KR, even after initial practice with correct KR, influenced retention performance. These results indicate that although KR provides information that is not needed to learn anticipation timing skills, this augmented verbal information is a dominant source of information that influences underlying cognitive processes involved in learning motor skills.     

Further Tests of Schmidt’s Schema Theory

The present study investigated the generalizability of Schmidt’s (1975) schema theory to an open-skill (Poulton, 1957) situation. Subjects attempted to time a preferred-hand button press so that it was coincident with the lighting of the last of a series of runway lights whose apparent velocity was 4023 mm/sec. Prior to five trials of performance on the criterion task, subjects received 40 trials in which they either (a) watched (low response requirements) or (b) responded with the nonpreferred hand (high response requirements) to a stimulus moving at (a) a constant (2235, 3129, 4917, or 5812 mm/sec) velocity (low stimulus variability) or (b) different velocities (high stimulus variability) from trial to trial. Subjects receiving high stimulus variability and high response requirements during training had significantly lower absolute error on the criterion task than did those in the other conditions. The results were discussed in terms of the type of practice which facilitates development of a schema rule for coincident-timing situations.     

Further tests of Schmidt's schema theory: development of a schema rule for a coincident timing task

The present study investigated the generalizability of Schmidt's (1975) schema theory to an open-skill (Poulton, 1957) situation. Subjects attempted to time a preferred-hand button press so that it was coincident with the lighting of the last of a series of run way lights whose apparent velocity was 4023 mm/sec. Prior to five trials of performance on the criterion task, subjects received 40 trials in which they either (a) watched (low response requirements) or (b) responded with the nonpreferred hand (high response requirements) to a stimulus moving at (a) a constant (2235, 3129, 4917, or 5812 mm/sec) velocity (low stimulus variability) or (b) different velocities (high stimulus variability) from trial to trial. Subjects receiving high stimulus variability and high response requirements during training had significantly lower absolute error on the criterion task than did those in the other conditions. The results were discussed in terms of the type of practice which facilitates development of a schema rule for coincident-timing situations.     

Self-controlled practice: Autonomy protects perceptions of competence and enhances motor learning

ObjectiveIn previous self-controlled feedback studies, it was observed that participants who could control their own feedback schedules usually use a strategy of choosing feedback after successful trials, and present superior motor learning when compared with participants who were not allowed to choose. Yoked participants of these studies, however, were thwarted not only regarding autonomy but also, presumably, regarding perceived competence, as their feedback schedules were provided randomly, regarding good or bad trials. The purpose of the present study was to examine whether self-controlled feedback schedules would have differential effects on learning if yoked participants are provided with feedback after good trials at the same rate as their self-controlled counterparts.DesignExperimental study with two groups. Timing accuracy was assessed in two different experimental phases, supplemented by questionnaire data.MethodParticipants practiced a coincident-anticipation timing task with a self-controlled or yoked feedback schedule during practice. Participants of the self-controlled group were able to ask for feedback for two trials, after each of five 6-trial practice blocks. Yoked participants received a feedback schedule matching the self-control group schedule, according to accuracy.ResultsParticipants asked for (self-controlled group) and received (yoked group) feedback, mainly after relatively good trials. However, participants of the self-controlled group reported greater self-efficacy at the end of practice, and performed with greater accuracy one day later, on the retention test, than the yoked group.ConclusionsThe findings indicate that the autonomy provided by self-controlled feedback protocols can raise learners' perceptions of competence, with positive consequences on motor learning.     

The influence of performance feedback on goal-setting and mental effort regulation

Goal-setting and mental effort investment may be influenced by the perception of success or failure. The aim of the current study was to investigate the dynamics of motivational intensity model using false performance feedback. Forty participants performed a demanding cognitive task over five successive (5 min) blocks. Participants received performance feedback of either progressive success or progressive failure. A number of psychophysiological variables were used to index mental effort investment and emotion, including: HRV components, blood pressure, skin conductance level, EEG, and facial EMG. Subjective estimates of mood, workload and motivation were also collected alongside performance measures. The success group experienced positive affect and a less pronounced decline in subjective motivation in response to a perception of successful achievement. In contrast, feedback of failure led to adverse changes in mood/motivation, but did not lead to the absolute withdrawal of effort, although trends in the psychophysiological data suggest that participants in the failure group were on the verge of abandoning the task. The implications of these findings are discussed within the context of goal-setting and effort regulation models.     

Can expressions of anger enhance creativity? A test of the emotions as social information (EASI) model

We investigated whether expressions of anger can enhance creative performance. Building on the emotions as social information (EASI) model (Van Kleef, 2009), we predicted that the interpersonal effects of anger expressions on creativity depend on the target's epistemic motivation (EM)—the desire to develop an accurate understanding of the situation (Kruglanski, 1989). Participants worked on an idea generation task in the role of “generator.” Then they received standardized feedback and tips from an “evaluator” (a trained actor) via a video setup. The feedback was delivered in an angry way or in a neutral way (via facial expressions, vocal intonation, and bodily postures). Participants with high EM exhibited greater fluency, originality, and flexibility after receiving angry rather than neutral feedback, whereas those with low EM were less creative after receiving angry feedback. These effects were mediated by task engagement and motivation, which anger increased (decreased) among high (low) EM participants.     

Self-efficacy's influence on persistence on a physical task: Moderating effect of performance feedback ambiguity

ObjectivesThe present investigation was designed to test the predictions of a control theory based view of self-regulation on the complex effects of self-efficacy on persistence. Specifically, self-efficacy was predicted to have a positive effect on persistence given unambiguous feedback, but a weak, negative effect given ambiguous feedback. Moreover, the research was designed to replicate an influential set of studies on self-efficacy.DesignA 2 (self-efficacy: low, high) × 2 (feedback ambiguity: low, high) between-groups ANOVA was conducted to examine the interaction between self-efficacy and feedback ambiguity in two trials of an isometric hand-grip competitive endurance task.MethodParticipants (87 females and 67 males) competed on a hand-grip strength task against confederates who claimed to have overworked their hand (high manipulated self-efficacy) or to be tennis players (low manipulated self-efficacy). The competition occurred either in the presence (high feedback ambiguity) or absence (low feedback ambiguity) of a physical barrier between the individuals. Persistence was how long individuals could grip at 50% of their maximum voluntary contraction.ResultsThe interaction was significant and in the predicted direction. Self-efficacy was also found to negatively relate to self-reported effort regardless of condition.ConclusionsThe results from the current study confirm that self-efficacy can foster persistence when one is aware of one's current state of performance. However, consistent with a control theory view of self-regulation, self-efficacy was unrelated to persistence when feedback was ambiguous. The results have implications for understanding the role of self-efficacy in sports and highlight the importance of replications with extensions.     

The role of feedback and dot presentation format in younger and older adults’ number estimation

Numerosity estimation, the rapid assessment of the number of items in a visual scene, is historically inaccurate. We assessed whether providing feedback regarding the correct numerosity on either 0%, 50%, or 100% of the trials would affect younger and older adults’ estimation accuracy for randomized, clustered (i.e., groups of 3 or 7 dots), and stacked (i.e., column) dot formats. Participants provided estimates and confidence ratings in six blocks, each containing 48 trials (16 numerosities shown in each format). Feedback frequency was manipulated between participants during blocks 1–4; no feedback was provided during blocks 5 and 6, which contained old and new numerosities and previously estimated presentations rotated 90°. Estimation accuracy was age equivalent across blocks despite younger adults initially being more accurate than older adults. Feedback improved both age groups’ accuracy. Stacked presentations were most accurately estimated but were more likely to be over-estimated than clustered and randomized presentations. Older adults gave lower confidence ratings than younger adults despite both age groups showing increased confidence across blocks, for more structured presentation formats, and as feedback frequency increased. These results expand our understanding of the role of presentation format and feedback in producing age equivalence or age-related differences in numerosity estimation.     

Clearing the mind: a working memory model of distraction from negative mood

The present research examined whether and how loading working memory can attenuate negative mood. In three experiments, participants were exposed to neutral, weakly negative, or strongly negative pictures followed by a task and a mood scale. Working memory demands were varied by manipulating task presence (Study 1), complexity (Study 2), and predictability (Study 3). Participants in all three experiments reported less negative moods in negative trials with high compared to low working memory demand. Working memory demands did not affect mood in the neutral trials. When working memory demands were high, participants no longer reported more negative moods in response to strongly negative pictures than to weakly negative pictures. These findings suggest that loading working memory prevents mood-congruent processing, and thereby promotes distraction from negative moods.     

Brain oscillatory activity associated with task switching and feedback processing

In this study, we sought to dissociate event-related potentials (ERPs) and the oscillatory activity associated with signals indicating feedback about performance (outcome-based behavioral adjustment) and the signals indicating the need to change or maintain a task set (rule-based behavioral adjustment). With this purpose in mind, we noninvasively recorded electroencephalographic signals, using a modified version of the Wisconsin card sorting task, in which feedback processing and task switching could be studied separately. A similar late positive component was observed for the switch and correct feedback signals on the first trials of a series, but feedback-related negativity was observed only for incorrect feedback. Moreover, whereas theta power showed a significant increase after a switch cue and after the first positive feedback of a new series, a selective frontal beta–gamma increase was observed exclusively in the first positive feedback (i.e., after the selection of the new rule). Importantly, for the switch cue, beta–alpha activity was suppressed rather than increased. This clear dissociation between the cue and feedback stimuli in task switching emphasizes the need to accurately study brain oscillatory activity to disentangle the role of different cognitive control processes.     

“Not Thinking” Helps Reasoning

Despite previous research suggesting that participants’ negative and positive emotions can impair and facilitate reasoning performance, a recent study proposes that the emotional content of the mood induction materials may not be crucial in eliciting these phenomena—deontic selection task performance is as poor when these materials are neutral as when they are negative (Perham and Oaksford 2006). We extend this finding to syllogistic reasoning performance. Participants in the mood induction conditions (negative and neutral) verbally described their experiences in relation to twenty negative or neutral words whereas participants in the control condition received no such mood induction. Subsequent syllogistic reasoning performance was significantly poorer for both mood induction conditions yet only those in the negative mood induction condition showed a significant increase in anxiety. Results imply that the key mechanism involved in the impairment derives from the production of irrelevant thoughts and that these need not be linked to a positive or negative mood, thus “not thinking” may actually help the reasoning process.     

False external feedback modulates posterror slowing and the f-P300: implications for theories of posterror adjustment

People tend to slow down after mistakes. This posterror slowing (PES) has commonly been explained by a change to a more conservative response threshold to avoid future errors. Alternatively, the attention-orienting account posits that all infrequent, surprising events (including errors) elicit an orienting response followed by a time-consuming process of task reorientation, explaining PES without increased response caution. In the present study, we employed both behavioral and electrophysiological measures to compare the predictions of these accounts using a flanker paradigm in which accurate or false external response feedback was provided. Participants demonstrated typical posterror adjustments, responding more slowly and accurately in posterror than in postcorrect trials. This finding provides initial evidence suggesting that posterror adjustments are motivated by the avoidance of subsequent mistakes. Most importantly, PES and an event-related potential relating to the attentional processing of feedback, the feedback-related P300 (f-P300), were modulated by feedback type. More specifically, the f-P300 was larger after false than after accurate feedback, suggesting that participants oriented their attention toward (i.e., were surprised by) inaccurate feedback signals. Interestingly, false feedback differentially modulated reaction times: Participants were slower after correct responses when feedback falsely informed of an error rather than confirmed the correct response. In contrast, faster responses were made after errors when feedback falsely indicated correct rather than incorrect performance. When these patterns of results are regarded together, they are best explained by theories of cognitive control in which posterror adjustments in choice reaction time tasks are assumed to reflect control processes leading to more conservative performance after error signals.     

Reactions to objective self-awareness

In order to determine reactions to objective self-awareness, 96 female undergraduates received either positive or negative feedback on a “creativity” task prior to being given an opportunity to write a response to a visual cue. Half of the subjects were made objectively self-aware, via a mirror, during the visual cue task; half were not. In addition, half of the subjects were led to believe that the visual cue task was highly related to creativity, while half learned that the task was low in relevance. A “longer the response, the better” standard of correctness was established for all subjects. As predicted, the results indicated that when made objectively self-aware, subjects who received negative feedback wrote more in response to the visual cue than did those who received positive feedback, a difference which was not obtained for the subjectively self-aware subjects. The task relevance manipulation also produced a significant main effect. A similar pattern of results was obtained on a measure of the time spent on the task. The implications of the results for objective self-awareness theory are considered.