Do People Use Their Implicit Theories of Creativity as General Theories?

This study examines whether people use the general implicit theories of creativity or not when applying them to themselves and others. On the basis of the actor–observer asymmetry theory, the authors propose that conception of creativity would be differently constructed depending on the targets of attention: general, self, and other. Three studies attempted to examine this hypothesis. In the preliminary study, a measure was developed to assess the characteristics that describe general creativity. In Study 1, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses found the conceptual factors of general creativity. In Study 2, the common and specific factors of general, self, and others’ creativity concepts were compared through invariance tests. As a result, it was revealed that the invariance test failed, which means that the general conception of creativity may not be applicable to monitor self and others’ creativity in a consistent way. Implications and limitations of this study are discussed at the end of the study.     

Two Theories of Supposition?

In a recent paper Paul Vincent Spade suggests that, although the medieval doctrine of the modes of personal supposition originally had something to do with the rest of the theory of supposition, it became, by the 14th century, an unrelated theory with no question to answer. By contrast, I argue that the theory of the modes of personal supposition was meant to provide a way of making understandable the idea that a general term in a categorical proposition can be used to refer to the individual things that fall under it. Once that idea had been made acceptable, truth conditons for the various forms of categorical proposition could be given without any specific appeal to the ideas of descent and ascent in terms of which the modes had been defined.     

Turing–Taylor Expansions for Arithmetic Theories

Turing progressions have been often used to measure the proof-theoretic strength of mathematical theories: iterate adding consistency of some weak base theory until you “hit” the target theory. Turing progressions based on n-consistency give rise to a \({\Pi_{n+1}}\) proof-theoretic ordinal \({|U|_{\Pi^0_{n+1}}}\) also denoted \({|U|_n}\). As such, to each theory U we can assign the sequence of corresponding \({\Pi_{n+1}}\) ordinals \({\langle |U|_n\rangle_{n > 0}}\). We call this sequence a Turing-Taylor expansion or spectrum of a theory. In this paper, we relate Turing-Taylor expansions of sub-theories of Peano Arithmetic to Ignatiev’s universal model for the closed fragment of the polymodal provability logic \({\mathsf{GLP}_\omega}\). In particular, we observe that each point in the Ignatiev model can be seen as Turing-Taylor expansions of formal mathematical theories. Moreover, each sub-theory of Peano Arithmetic that allows for a Turing-Taylor expansion will define a unique point in Ignatiev’s model.     

Against No-Ātman Theories of Anattā

Suppose we were to randomly pick out a book on Buddhism or Eastern Philosophy and turn to the section on 'no-self' (anattā). On this central teaching, we would most likely learn that the Buddha rejected the Upanisadic notion of Self (ātman), maintaining that a person is no more than a bundle of impermanent, conditioned psycho-physical aggregates (khandhas). The rejection of ātman is seen by many to separate the metaphysically 'extravagant' claims of Hinduism from the austere tenets of Buddhism. The status quo has not, however, gone unchallenged. I shall join forces against this pernicious view, integrating some recent contributions into a sustained, two-pronged argument against no-ātman theories of anattā. At the end it shall be suggested, in line with Thanissaro Bhikkhu, that anattā is best understood as a practical strategy rather than as a metaphysical doctrine.     

Can Alternative Scientific Theories Challenge Scientific Rationality?

Axiomathes - One of the reasons for relativistic attitudes toward science is the impossibility of justifying scientists’ decisions in the face of alternative theories. According to this...     

Educational Science Students’ Implicit Theories of Creativity

This article presents the results of research into the implicit theories of creativity of Educational Science students preparing for the role of educational counsellors. Educational Science students will soon be working in educational institutions where they are expected to support creativity. Prospective (pre)school counsellors were asked about how they perceive and how they experience creativity in their own schooling by means of a questionnaire and focus group interview. Participants’ answers were analyzed using quantitative and qualitative content analyses. The data obtained from the questionnaire showed that the students mainly defined creativity as the characteristic of a person or process. They saw the major possibility for developing creativity during university studies in stimulating teaching activities and a supportive educational climate. The data from the focus group expanded the students’ definition of creativity through the domain of the expression and the valuation of creativity. In the discussion about the development of creativity during university studies, the role of the study program and the students’ individual characteristics were highlighted. The aspects of Educational Science education that need to be changed to increase the quality of the preparation of future educational counsellors are also considered.     

Are Mathematical Theories Reducible to Non-analytic Foundations?

In this article I intend to show that certain aspects of the axiomatical structure of mathematical theories can be, by a phenomenologically motivated approach, reduced to two distinct types of idealization, the first-level idealization associated with the concrete intuition of the objects of mathematical theories as discrete, finite sign-configurations and the second-level idealization associated with the intuition of infinite mathematical objects as extensions over constituted temporality. This is the main standpoint from which I review Cantor’s conception of infinite cardinalities and also the metatheoretical content of some later well-known theorems of mathematical foundations. These are, the Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem which, except for its importance as such, it is also chosen for an interpretation of the associated metatheoretical paradox (Skolem Paradox), and Gödel’s (first) incompleteness result which, notwithstanding its obvious influence in the mathematical foundations, is still open to philosophical inquiry. On the phenomenological level, first-level and second-level idealizations, as above, are associated respectively with intentional acts carried out in actual present and with certain modes of a temporal constitution process.     

Career Development Theories: What Help for Older Persons?

Career development theory, although most highly developed for persons in the first two or three decades of life, can help counselors plan ways to work with older persons. The career development theories of Super, Tiedeman, Holland, Blau and other sociologists, Ginzberg, and Krumboltz, as well as the developmental theories of Levinson, Gould, and Neugarten are briefly reviewed to support this assertion. Although applications should be made with caution, concepts from these theories seem to have potential for enhancing the effectiveness of counseling of older persons. There seems, however, to be an increase in research and theory-building on the career development of this age group; more helpful guidelines can be expected in the future.     

Freud’s Legacy and Modern Theories of Ineffable Trauma

Notions of ineffability, what cannot be put into words, vary depending on the historical and cultural context and, in particular, on shifting linguistic ideologies about the capabilities and limits of language. In recent decades psychoanalysts have embraced a modern notion of ineffability centered around traumatic bodily experiences that are thought to be inexpressible. However, these ideas break with Freudian ideas about language and, most importantly, with his understanding of the processes of interpretation that give meaning to both psychic pain and attempts to heal it. Contra Freud, current theories of ineffable trauma re-inscribe a dominance of the body over the psyche and over-simplify Freud’s ideas about the retro-determination of trauma.

     

Theories and inter‐theory relations in Bošković

During 1745–1755 Bo?kovi? explicitly used the concept of scientific theory in three cases: the theory of forces existing in nature, the theory of transformations of geometric loci, and the theory of infinitesimals. The theory first mentioned became the famous theory of natural philosophy in 1758, the second was published in the third volume of his mathematical textbook Elementorum Universae Matheseos (1754), and the third theory was never completed, though Bo?kovi? repeatedly announced it from 1741 on. The treatment of continuity and infinity in natural philosophy, geometry and infinitesimal analysis brought about inter‐theory relations in Bo?kovi?'s work during his Roman period. The two constructed theories of Bo?kovi?, the theory of forces and the theory of geometric transformations, directly influenced the idea for the construction of his third theory. These written theories refer to understanding and effective application of continuity and infinity in natural philosophy and geometry, and this task, according to Bo?kovi?, requires methodological support from the theory of infinitesimals.     

Georges Dumézil: Theories,Critiques and Theoretical Extensions

Georges Dumézil, best known as the deviser of the theory of a tripartite patterning impulse in the cultures making up the Indo-European (I-E) linguistic group, spent sixty years refining this concept, and adding other themes such as the bifurcation of his fonctions and the concept of Interfunctional War. Before his death, his ideas were used to explain I-E patterns in cultural areas such as the Celtic, the Norse-Scandinavian and the Western medieval; since his death, his theorised structures have served as a base for such extensions as a ‘fourth’ function, a feminine potency to the formula and age-set-divisions as a part of the patterning impulse. Critics have concentrated on philological points, though some have denied the existence of the I-E tripartite division tout court. Just before Dumézil's death a variation on the ‘revisionist’ line began to accuse him of suspect personal–political opinions, and these accusations continue. The ultimate usefulness of Dumézil is the flexibility of his system and the extraordinary range of materials one can draw into his theories; his value is as a ‘medium’ for further research and theoretical structuring.     

Theories of Truth without Standard Models and Yablo’s Sequences

The aim of this paper is to show that it’s not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but ω-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: Yablo’s Paradox. In theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. Firstly, I exhibit some conceptual problems that follow from so introducing it. Secondly, I show that in second order theories with standard semantics the same procedure yields a theory that doesn’t have models. So, while having an ω- inconsistent theory is a bad thing, having an unsatisfiable theory of truth is actually worse. This casts doubts on whether the predicate in question is, after all, a truthpredicate for that language. Finally, I present some alternatives to prove an inconsistency adding plausible principles to certain theories of truth.     

A Comparative Study on Confucius’ and Chrysippus’ Cosmopolitan Theories

A large number of papers and books on cosmopolitanism have been published since 1990, marking a renewed interest in the field among Western scholars. When we try to locate the original source of cosmopolitan ideas in human civilization, we find Chrysippus’ thought in western philosophy, and Confucius’ as its eastern counterpart. In this paper, I offer a comparative analysis of Confucius’ and Chrysippus’ cosmopolitan theories from the following three perspectives. I begin with the theoretical origins of the two thinkers on cosmopolitanism, which mainly center on the relationship between human beings and nature in their respective natural philosophies, and on the question of how to be a good person from their moral philosophies. Then, I explain the concrete schemes they posit for a cosmopolitan society. Finally, I compare their differing concerns regarding one’s attitude to family members or fellow citizens, which constitutes the main source of disagreement between them. In conclusion, I propose that both of their ideas can be located within a continuum of “moral cosmopolitanism.” The difference being that Confucius holds to a moderate cosmopolitan idea, while Chrysippus prefers a stricter version of cosmopolitanism.     

Ability Theories of Practice and Turner’s Criticism of Bourdieu

The aim of this paper is to provide a characterization of ability theories of practice and, in this process, to defend Pierre Bourdieu’s ability theory against Stephen Turner’s objections. In part I, I outline ability theorists’ conception of practices together with their objections to claims about rule following and rule explanations. In part II, I turn to the question of what ability theorists take to be the alternative to rule following and rule explanations. Ability theorists have offered, and been ascribed, somewhat different answers to this question, just as their replies, or positive accounts, have been heavily criticized by Turner. Due to this state of the debate, I focus on the positive account advanced by a single—and highly famous—ability theorist of practice, Pierre Bourdieu. Moreover, I show that despite Turner’s claims to the contrary, his arguments do not refute Bourdieu’s positive account.     

The Relationist and Substantivalist Theories of Time: Foes or Friends?

Abstract: There are two traditionally rival views about the nature of time: substantivalism that takes time to be a substance that exists independently of events located in it, and relationism that takes time to be constructed out of events. In this paper, first, I want to make some progress with respect to the debate between these two views, and I do this mainly by examining the strategies they use to face the possibilities of ‘empty time’ and ‘time without change’. As we shall see, the two allegedly very different rival views are much less different than has been thought: their structure is extremely similar, their strategies are extremely similar, and they can both face the possibilities of ‘empty time’ and ‘time without change’ in the same way. Thus, I argue in favour of a certain kind of equivalence between the two views; I discuss a Strong and a Weak version of this claim; and I provide reasons for endorsing the former. I also discuss the parallel between this pair of views about the nature of time and another analogous pair of views: the bundle theory and the substratum theory about the nature of material objects, with respect to the problem with Identity of Indiscernibles.     

War Crimes and Expressive Theories of Punishment: Communication or Denunciation?

In a paper published in 2006, I argued that the best way of defending something like our current practices of punishing war criminals would be to base the justification of this practice on an expressive theory of punishment. I considered two forms that such a justification could take—a ‘denunciatory’ account, on which the purpose of punishment is supposed to communicate a commitment to certain kinds of standard to individuals other than the criminal and a ‘communicative’ account, on which the purpose of the punishment is to communicate with the perpetrator, and argued for a denunciatory account which I developed at some length. In this paper I would like to reconsider the plausibility of a communicative account. One difficulty that such accounts face is that the punishment of war criminals often involves the inflicting of harsh treatment on them by individuals who are members of states other than their own. On a communicative account this is problematic: on such an account—or at least on the version of it proposed by Duff (2000)—it is essential that those who are punish and those who punish them belong to a single community. When this requirement is not satisfied harsh treatment does not constitute punishment. Duff has argued that the problem can be solved by regarding all human beings as members of a single moral community: here I argue that this suggestion is unsatisfactory and propose an alternative. One consequence of my account is that if it is correct there may limitations on the range of kinds of war criminal that can legitimately be punished by international tribunals.     

Should the Changing Character of War Affect Our Theories of War?

War has changed so much that it barely resembles the paradigmatic cases of armed conflict that just war theories and international humanitarian law seemed to have had in mind even a few decades ago. The changing character of war includes not only the use of new technology such as drones, but probably more problematically the changing temporal and spatial scope of war and the changing character of actors in war. These changes give rise to worries about what counts as war and thus what norms to use in evaluating a particular conflict. In this paper, I develop an argument that the changing character of war gives us reasons to take reductionist revisions of just war theory seriously. By reductionist theories of war I mean those revisions within the just war tradition that suggest that we can use ordinary peacetime interpersonal analyses of moral responsibility and liability to harm to decide what justice requires in times of war.     

Is There a Simple Argument for Higher-Order Representation Theories of Awareness Consciousness?

William Lycan has articulated “a simple argument” for higher-order representation (HOR) theories of a variety of consciousness sometimes labeled ‘awareness consciousness’ (Lycan, Analysis 61.1, January 3–4, 2001). The purpose of this article is to critically assess the influential argument-strategy of the simple argument. I argue that, as stated, the simple argument fails since it is invalid. Moreover, I argue that an obvious “quick fix” would beg the question against competing same-order representation (SOR) theories of awareness consciousness. I then provide a reconstruction of the argument and argue that although the reconstructed argument deserves consideration, it is also too simple as stated. In particular, it raises several controversial questions about the nature of mental representation. These questions must be addressed before a verdict as to the cogency of the HOR argument-strategy can be reached. But since the questions are controversial, a cogent argument for HOR theories of awareness consciousness is unlikely to be simple.

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