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Slobodanka Vladiv-Glover 《Studies in East European Thought》2006,58(3):205-238
Mamardašvili’s ‘classical’ paradigm of knowledge is seen to be minimally based on extrapolations from Descartes’ classical
philosophy to which Mamardašvili attributes features that rather anticipate his own post-classical ontology. The latter is
oriented towards the primacy of perception as a subjective process, in which the self-conscious subject constructs the world,
not as illusion, but as a ‘picture’ or ‘model’ (Wittgenstein’s Bild). By examining Mamardašvili’s definition of the ‘phenomenon’ against the␣background of Husserl’s ‘reduction’, Wittgenstein’s
‘object’ and the Freudian and post-structuralist psychoanalytic model of subjectivity, the paper arrives at the inference
that Mamardašvili is essentially a post-Structuralist thinker who appropriates concepts from various critical and philosophical
disciplines to construct his own multi-disciplinary theory of consciousness and perception. 相似文献
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In an information state where various agents have both factual knowledge and knowledge about each other, announcements can
be made that change the state of information. Such informative announcements can have the curious property that they become
false because they are announced. The most typical example of that is ‘fact p is true and you don’t know that’, after which you know that p, which entails the negation of the announcement formula. The announcement of such a formula in a given information state
is called an unsuccessful update. A successful formula is a formula that always becomes common knowledge after being announced.
Analysis of information systems and ‘philosophical puzzles’ reveals a growing number of dynamic phenomena that can be described
or explained by unsuccessful updates. This increases our understanding of such philosophical problems. We also investigate
the syntactic characterization of the successful formulas.
An erratum to this article is available at . 相似文献
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Jesús P. Bonilla 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2002,33(2):349-368
Some peculiarities of the evaluation of theories within scientific research programmes (SRPs) and of the assessing of rival
SRPs are described assuming that scientists try to maximise an ‘epistemic utility function’ under economic and institutional
constraints. Special attention is given to Lakatos' concepts of ‘empirical progress’ and ‘theoretical progress’. A notion
of ‘empirical verisimilitude’ is defended as an appropriate utility function. The neologism ‘methodonomics’ is applied to
this kind of studies.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Eugen Fischer 《Synthese》2008,162(1):53-84
The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical
problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical
questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of
debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are
motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result from misinterpretation, driven by ‘urges to misunderstand’.
The present paper clarifies this neglected concept and analyses how such ‘urges’ give rise to pseudo-problems of one particular,
hitherto little understood, kind. This will reveal ‘therapeutic’ aims reasonable and ‘non-theoretical’ methods necessary,
in one clearly delineated and important part of philosophy. I.e.: By developing a novel account of nature and genesis of one
important class of philosophical problems, the paper explains and vindicates a revolutionary reorientation of philosophical
work, at the level of both aims and methods. 相似文献
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Markus Schmitz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2001,32(2):271-305
The epistomology of the definition of number and the philosophical foundation of arithmetic based on a comparison between
Gottlob Frege's logicism and Platonic philosophy (Syrianus, Theo Smyrnaeus, and others). The intention of this article is to provide arithmetic with a logically and methodologically valid definition of number for
construing a consistent philosophical foundation of arithmetic. The – surely astonishing – main thesis is that instead of
the modern and contemporary attempts, especially in Gottlob Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic, such a definition is found in the arithmetic in Euclid's Elements. To draw this conclusion a profound reflection on the role of epistemology for the foundation of mathematics, especially
for the method of definition of number, is indispensable; a reflection not to be found in the contemporary debate (the predominate
‘pragmaticformalism’ in current mathematics just shirks from trying to solve the epistemological problems raised by the debate
between logicism, intuitionism, and formalism). Frege's definition of number, ‘The number of the concept F is the extension
of the concept ‘numerically equal to the concept F”, which is still substantial for contemporary mathematics, does not fulfil
the requirements of logical and methodological correctness because the definiens in a double way (in the concepts ‘extension
of a concept’ and ‘numerically equal’) implicitly presupposes the definiendum, i.e. number itself. Number itself, on the contrary,
is defined adequately by Euclid as ‘multitude composed of units’, a definition which is even, though never mentioned, an implicit
presupposition of the modern concept ofset. But Frege rejects this definition and construes his own - for epistemological
reasons: Frege's definition exactly fits the needs of modern epistemology, namely that for to know something like the number
of a concept one must become conscious of a multitude of acts of producing units of ‘given’ representations under the condition
of a 1:1 relationship to obtain between the acts of counting and the counted ‘objects’. According to this view, which has
existed at least since the Renaissance stoicism and is maintained not only by Frege but also by Descartes, Kant, Husserl,
Dummett, and others, there is no such thing as a number of pure units itself because the intellect or pure reason, by itself
empty, must become conscious of different units of representation in order to know a multitude, a condition not fulfilled by Euclid's conception. As this is Frege's
main reason to reject Euclid's definition of number (others are discussed in detail), the paper shows that the epistemological
reflection in Neoplatonic mathematical philosophy, which agrees with Euclid's definition of number, provides a consistent
basement for it. Therefore it is not progress in the history of science which hasled to the a poretic contemporary state of
affairs but an arbitrary change of epistemology in early modern times, which is of great influence even today.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Alberto Peruzzi 《Axiomathes》2006,16(4):424-459
Among the main concerns of 20th century philosophy was that of the foundations of mathematics. But usually not recognized
is the relevance of the choice of a foundational approach to the other main problems of 20th century philosophy, i.e., the logical structure of language, the nature of scientific theories, and the architecture of the mind. The tools used
to deal with the difficulties inherent in such problems have largely relied on set theory and its “received view”. There are
specific issues, in philosophy of language, epistemology and philosophy of mind, where this dependence turns out to be misleading.
The same issues suggest the gain in understanding coming from category theory, which is, therefore, more than just the source
of a “non-standard” approach to the foundations of mathematics. But, even so conceived, it is the very notion of what a foundation
has to be that is called into question. The philosophical meaning of mathematics is no longer confined to which first principles
are assumed and which “ontological” interpretation is given to them in terms of some possibly updated version of logicism,
formalism or intuitionism. What is central to any foundational project proper is the role of universal constructions that
serve to unify the different branches of mathematics, as already made clear in 1969 by Lawvere. Such universal constructions
are best expressed by means of adjoint functors and representability up to isomorphism. In this lies the relevance of a category-theoretic
perspective, which leads to wide-ranging consequences. One such is the presence of functorial constraints on the syntax–semantics
relationships; another is an intrinsic view of (constructive) logic, as arises in topoi and, subsequently, in more general
fibrations. But as soon as theories and their models are described accordingly, a new look at the main problems of 20th century’s
philosophy becomes possible. The lack of any satisfactory solution to these problems in a purely logical and set-theoretic
setting is the result of too circumscribed an approach, such as a static and punctiform view of objects and their elements,
and a misconception of geometry and its historical changes before, during, and after the foundational “crisis”, as if algebraic
geometry and synthetic differential geometry – not to mention algebraic topology – were secondary sources for what concerns
foundational issues. The objectivity of basic geometrical intuitions also acts against the recent version of structuralism
proposed as ‘the’ philosophy of category theory. On the other hand, the need for a consistent and adequate conceptual framework
in facing the difficulties met by pre-categorical theories of language and scientific knowledge not only provides the basic
concepts of category theory with specific applications but also suggests further directions for their development (e.g., in
approaching the foundations of physics or the mathematical models in the cognitive sciences). This ‘virtuous’ circle is by
now largely admitted in theoretical computer science; the time is ripe to realise that the same holds for classical topics
of philosophy.
Text of a talk given at the Workshop and Symposium on the Ramifications of Category Theory, Florence, November 18–22, 2003. For further documentation on the conference, see 相似文献
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Daniel Cohnitz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2006,37(2):373-392
Summary In their paper, ‘When are thought experiments poor ones?’ (Peijnenburg and David Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322.), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are “poor”
ones with “disastrous consequences” and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought
experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg
and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy
and that instead of concocting more “recherché” thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical. In this comment
I will argue that Peijnenburg’s and Atkinson’s view on thought experiments is based on a misleading characterization of both,
the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion
in contemporary philosophy is about, we will arrive at a considerably different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments.
For I am convinced that we now find ourselves at an altogether decisive turning point in philosophy, and that we are objectively justified in considering that an end has come to the fruitless conflict of systems. We are already at the present time, in my opinion, in possession of methods which make any such conflict in principle unnecessary. What is now required is their resolute application. (Schlick, ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy’, 1930/1959, p. 54).相似文献
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Willy Pfändtner 《Sophia》2010,49(1):65-94
This article presents current philosophical reflections on religious diversity and concomitant attitudes towards the interreligious
situation. The motive behind this presentation is to show that in order to deal more efficiently with the phenomenon of religious
plurality, there is a need for a development of the philosophy of religion, where new perspectives are opened up and explored.
The very concept of religion as a belief system is put into question, since it has caused philosophical reflections on religious
diversity to be confined to certain metaphysical and epistemological concerns. Instead of focusing on the noun ‘religion’,
the article suggests a way to understand the adjective ‘religious’ and view religious plurality as a plurality of ways of
being religious. This opens up a certain context of interreligious relations and interreligious dialogue, where this very
dialogue itself can contribute to the development of philosophical tools, concepts and categories for dealing with the fact
of plurality. I call this context constructive dialogical pluralism. 相似文献
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Andrew B. Irvine 《Sophia》2011,50(4):603-624
Enrique Dussel has developed a sweeping philosophical critique of the eurocentricity of Western habits of thought and action,
with the aim of articulating an ‘ethics of liberation’ that takes the part distinctively of ‘the victims’ of the world system.
The heart of Dussel’s effort is an ostensibly new method, ‘analectic’ or ‘anadialectic,’ which comes about through the ‘revelation’
of the other, and goes beyond the self-enclosure that, Dussel asserts, typifies dialectic in Western ontology. Thus, he takes
his position to have gone beyond ontology: it is a trans-ontology, a genuine meta-physics. I question whether analectic does
go beyond Western thinking of being, and propose an ontological critique that is classically Western or, as I would prefer
to say, historically Western yet (along with its analogues in other philosophical traditions) classically relevant even in
our ‘age of globalization and exclusion.’ 相似文献
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John Forge 《Science and engineering ethics》2010,16(1):111-118
While there has been much interest in this topic, no generally accepted definition of dual use has been forthcoming. As a
contribution to this issue, it is maintained that three related kinds of things comprise the category of dual use: research,
technologies and artefacts. In regard to all three kinds, difficulties are identified in making clear distinctions between
those that are and are not dual use. It is suggested that our classification should take account of actual capacities and
willingness to make use of these objects for ‘bad ends’ and not the mere possibility that this could be done, and here three
‘contextual factors’ are identified. A (provisional) definition is proposed that takes account of threats and risks. 相似文献
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Kristian Köchy 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(1):59-85
Between Physics of Organism and Organismic Physics: Object and Method of Biology. In the history of biological theory one
can observe an oscillation between two tendencies of thinking, namely the biologistic and the physicalistic point of view.
Both aim at a general or unified theory of nature that is relevant for scientific research as well as for philosophical reflection.
In terms of a pluralistic approach these two ways of theory-formation must be rejected. Biology e.g. as a specific natural
science, characterized by its mid-position between ‘nomothetic’ and ‘idiographic’ thinking (Windelband), is much more than
a subordinate branch of physical knowledge. This very autonomy of biology does not only result from a special methodology
or from a specific theoretical framework. On the contrary, the methodological and functional autonomy of biology is due to
the very features of the phenomena investigated. These features include multitude, individuality and wholeness.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Matthew Ratcliffe 《Synthese》2011,178(1):121-130
This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen’s claim that empiricism is a ‘stance’. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds
of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ‘finding oneself in a world’. At least some of van Fraassen’s
claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ‘empirical stance’, he assumes the stance of
the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This
latter stance does not incorporate the attitude that van Fraassen takes to be characteristic of empiricism. Thus its possibility
serves to illustrate that empiricism as an all-encompassing philosophical orientation is untenable. I conclude by discussing the part played by feelings in philosophical stances and
propose that they contribute to philosophical conviction, commitment and critique. 相似文献
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Bruce R. Reichenbach 《Sophia》2012,51(1):1-16
William Alston proposed an understanding of religious experience modeled after the triadic structure of sense perception.
However, a perceptual model falters because of the unobservability of God as the object of religious experience. To reshape
Alston’s model of religious experience as an observational practice we utilize Dudley Shapere’s distinction between the philosophical
use of ‘observe’ in terms of sensory perception and scientists’ epistemic use of ‘observe’ as being evidential by providing
information or justification leading to knowledge. This distinction helps us to understand how religious experience of an
unobservable God can be an epistemic practice that satisfies our epistemic obligations and justifies religious belief. 相似文献
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Henk van den Belt 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2003,34(2):201-219
A central question in constructivist studies of science is how the analyst should deal with the material objects handled by
scientific practitioners in laboratories. Representatives of ‘radical constructivism’ such as Knorr-Cetina and Latour have
gone furthest in exploring the role of these ‘non-humans’ but have also maneuvered themselves in untenable positions due to
a fatal conflation of different meanings of the term ‘construction’. The epistemological and ontological commitments of ‘moderate
constructivism’ especially of the Strong Program defended by Barnes and Bloor, are more suitable for dealing with the task
at hand. While radical constructivists treat the domains of nature and human society as largely coterminous, an alternative
ontology stresses that natural reality is never fully absorbed into the world of culture but only interacts with the latter
at localizable interfaces such as practices and artifacts. This perspective promises a more relaxed relationship with current
forms of scientific realism.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Alessandro Ferrara 《Res Publica》2011,17(4):377-383
This paper engages with Ferrajoli’s contribution to the philosophical debate on constitutional democracy and in particular
his conception of ‘structural entrenchment’, or the basis upon which one can defend the normativity of the Constitution as
‘higher law’, which can trump or limit legislation, without infringing democratic principles. Ferrajoli’s own understanding
of ‘structural entrenchment’ is compared to Rawls’s and Dworkin’s arguments in support of it. Ferrajoli’s position is neither
grounded on a philosophy of history, as in Rawls, nor on a version of moral realism, as for Dworkin, but on a formal understanding
of the nature of fundamental rights, and in a conception of democratic sovereignty as ‘joint ownership.’ 相似文献
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Eberhard Herrmann 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,64(2):63-73
The starting-point is the distinction between concept and conception. Our conceptions of gold, for instance, are the different
understandings we get when we hear the word ‘gold’ whereas the concept of gold consists in the scientific determination of
what gold is. It depends on the context whether it is more reasonable to claim a concept or to look for fitting conceptions.
By arguing against metaphysical realism and for non-metaphysical realism, I will elaborate on some philosophical reasons for
dealing with conceptions instead of concepts of God, and secondly, I will discuss how such conceptions should be critically
assessed.
This article is an amended and enlarged version of a paper delivered at the conference on The Concept of God, arranged by
the British Society for the Philosophy of Religion in Oxford, Great Britain, September 11–13, 2007. 相似文献
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B. Brogaard 《Synthese》2006,152(1):47-79
Russell’s new theory of denoting phrases introduced in “On Denoting” in Mind 1905 is now a paradigm of analytic philosophy. The main argument for Russell’s new theory is the so-called ‘Gray’s Elegy’
argument, which purports to show that the theory of denoting concepts (analogous to Frege’s theory of senses) promoted by
Russell in the 1903 Principles of Mathematics is incoherent. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument rests on the premise that if a denoting concept occurs in a proposition, then
the proposition is not about the concept. I argue that the premise is false. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument does not exhaust
Russell’s ammunition against the theory of denoting concepts. Another reason Russell rejects the theory is, as he says, that
it cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts. In the last section of the paper, I argue that even
though Russell was right in thinking that the theory of denoting concepts cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely
denoting concepts, Russell’s new theory does not succeed in eliminating the occurrence of all denoting concepts, as it requires
a commitment to the existence of variables that indirectly denote their values. However, the view that variables are denoting
concepts is unproblematic once the ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument is blocked. 相似文献