Processing fluency affects subjective claims of recollection

Previous studies that have used the remember-know paradigm to investigate subjective awareness in memory have shown that fluency manipulations have an impact on "know" responses but not on "remember" responses (e.g., Rajaram, 1993), a finding typically accounted for by invoking inferential processing in judgments of familiarity but not of recollection. However, in light of several researchers' criticisms of this procedure, as well as findings documenting the influence of processing fluency on various subjective judgments, the present study was conducted in order to investigate whether judgments of recollection might also be subject to inferential processes and not solely the product of conscious retrieval. When the standard remember-know procedure was used (Experiment 1), manipulations of perceptual fluency increased "know" responses but had no effect on "remember" responses, replicating previous findings. However, when an independent ratings method was employed (Higham & Vokey, 2004), manipulations of perceptual fluency (Experiment 2) and conceptual fluency (Experiment 3) reliably increased claims of both familiarity and recollection, suggesting that the conclusion that fluency affects only "know" responses may be an artifact of the standard remember-know procedure.     

Familiarity is related to conceptual implicit memory: An examination of individual differences

Explicit memory is thought to be distinct from implicit memory. However, growing evidence has indicated that explicit familiarity-based recognition memory judgments rely on the same process that supports conceptual implicit memory. We tested this hypothesis by examining individual differences using a paradigm wherein we measured both familiarity and conceptual implicit memory within the same participants. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we examined recognition memory confidence ROCs and remember/know responses, respectively, to estimate recollection and familiarity, and used a free association task to measure conceptual implicit memory. The results demonstrated that, across participants, familiarity, but not recollection, was significantly correlated with conceptual priming. In contrast, in Experiment 2, utilizing a similar paradigm, a comparison of recognition memory ROCs and explicit associative cued-recall performance indicated that cued recall was related to both recollection and familiarity. These results are consistent with models assuming that familiarity-based recognition and conceptual implicit memory rely on similar underlying processes.     

Effects of exact and category repetition in true and false recognition memory

Two experiments used the distinction between remembering and knowing to investigate the effects of exact and category repetition in recognition memory. In Experiment 1, exact repetition enhanced remember responses but had no reliable effect on know responses. In Experiment 2, category repetition enhanced correct know responses but had no effect on correct remember responses. Category repetition also increased false positive remember and know responses. It is argued that exact repetition influences the recollection component of recognition memory via the creation of multiple episodic traces, each of which is potentially capable of supporting a remember response, whereas category repetition influences the familiarity component of recognition memory by enhancing the fluency with which test items are processed.     

Investigating the attentional demands of recognition memory: Manipulating depth of encoding at study and level of attention at test

Two experiments investigated the effects of divided attention at test after manipulating levels of processing at study. In Experiment 1 items were studied either intact or as anagrams. In Experiment 2 items were studied with either full or divided attention (DA). In both experiments participants carried out a recognition test with either full or divided attention. Analysis of remember and know responses revealed that DA at test had no effect on remember responses to anagrams or to items studied with full attention. In contrast, Know responses decreased with DA at test, and this occurred for items studied in both deep and shallow encoding conditions. The present study confirms recent findings (Knott & Dewhurst, 2007a) that knowing can rely on more controlled retrieval processes, whereas remembering can rely on more automatic retrieval processes. Differences in the controlled processes associated with recollection and familiarity and remember and know responses are discussed.     

Time course of melody recognition: a gating paradigm study

Recognizing a well-known melody (e.g., one's national anthem) is not an all-or-none process. Instead, recognition develops progressively while the melody unfolds over time. To examine which factors govern the time course of this recognition process, the gating paradigm, initially designed to study auditory word recognition, was adapted to music. Musicians and nonmusicians were presented with segments of increasing duration of familiar and unfamiliar melodies (i.e., the first note, then the first two notes, then the first three notes, and so forth). Recognition was assessed after each segment either by requiring participants to provide a familiarity judgment (Experiment 1) or by asking them to sing the melody that they thought had been presented (Experiment 2). In general, the more familiar the melody, the fewer the notes required for recognition. Musicians judged music's familiarity within fewer notes than did nonmusicians, whereas the reverse situation (i.e., musicians were slower than nonmusicians) occurred when a sung response was requested. However, both musicians and nonmusicians appeared to segment melodies into the same perceptual units (i.e., motives) in order to access the correct representation in memory. These results are interpreted in light of the cohort model (Marslen-Wilson, 1987), as applied to the music domain.     

The difference between implicit and explicit associative processes at study in creating false memory in the DRM paradigm

The effects of implicit and explicit associative processes for false recognition were examined by manipulating exposure duration of studied items; 20 ms or 2000 ms. Participants studied lists of words that were high associates to a nonpresented word (critical lure) in either condition. After learning each list, they took a recognition test and remember/know judgements immediately (Experiment 1) or 1 minute later (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, know responses for critical lures were more in the 20 ms than in the 2000 ms conditions, while remember responses for them were more in the 2000 ms condition. Implicit associative processes create familiarity of critical lures, and explicit associative processes create details of false memories. Comparing the results of Experiment 1 with those of Experiment 2, remember responses for critical lures were increased with the prolonged time only in the 20 ms condition. Characteristics of false memory made by implicit associative processes could be changed by prolonged time.     

The difference between implicit and explicit associative processes at study in creating false memory in the DRM paradigm

The effects of implicit and explicit associative processes for false recognition were examined by manipulating exposure duration of studied items; 20 ms or 2000 ms. Participants studied lists of words that were high associates to a nonpresented word (critical lure) in either condition. After learning each list, they took a recognition test and remember/know judgements immediately (Experiment 1) or 1 minute later (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, know responses for critical lures were more in the 20 ms than in the 2000 ms conditions, while remember responses for them were more in the 2000 ms condition. Implicit associative processes create familiarity of critical lures, and explicit associative processes create details of false memories. Comparing the results of Experiment 1 with those of Experiment 2, remember responses for critical lures were increased with the prolonged time only in the 20 ms condition. Characteristics of false memory made by implicit associative processes could be changed by prolonged time.     

Recognition memory and awareness: A large effect of study-test modalities on “know” responses following a highly perceptual orienting task

Abstract

Two experiments investigated the effects of varying the correspondence between presentation and test modes on states of conscious awareness in recognition memory. Experiment 1 used visual test items and showed that auditory and visual study modes differentially affected recollective experience and feelings of familiarity assessed by “remember” and “know” responses accompanying recognition: “know” responses were slightly enhanced following visual presentation, but this was largely offset by a similarly small increase in “remember” responses. Experiment 2 employed conditions designed to maximise any effect on “know” responses of the correspondence between presentation and test modes by using a highly perceptual orienting task at study. Under these conditions, there was a large mode correspondence effect on “know” responses. The results support the idea that “know” responses are particularly sensitive to perceptual factors.     

Forgetting in recognition memory with and without recollective experience

Retention interval was manipulated in two recognition-memory experiments in which subjects indicated when recognizing a word whether its recognition was accompanied by some recollective experience ("remember") or whether it was recognized on the basis of familiarity without any recollective experience ("know"). Experiment 1 showed that between 10 min and 1 week, "remember" responses declined sharply from an initially higher level, whereas "know" responses remained relatively unchanged. Experiment 2 showed that between 1 week and 6 months, both kinds of responses declined at a similar, gradual rate and that despite quite low levels of performance after 6 months, both kinds of responses still gave rise to accurate discrimination between target words and lures. These findings are discussed in relationship to current ideas about multiple memory systems and processing accounts of explicit and implicit measures of retention.     

Cognitive effort and recollective experience in recognition memory

The difficulty of the cognitive operations required to process study items was manipulated in two experiments investigating recollective experience. In subsequent recognition tests, subjects indicated whether their recognition judgements for items processed in these tasks were based on recollection ("remember" responses) or on familiarity ("know" responses). In Experiment 1 target items were presented in the context of a category decision task. It was found that remember responses increased with the difficulty of the category decision. For positive instances, remember responses were greater for items of low instance frequency than for items of high instance frequency, while for negative instances remember responses were greater for items from similar categories than for items from dissimilar categories. These effects were not present in know responses. In Experiment 2, remember responses were more frequent when study items had been presented in the form of anagrams to be solved than when they had been presented in the form of words to be read aloud. The incidence of know responses was not affected by the format in which study items were presented. Source judgements were also more accurate when recognition was based on recollection. It is argued that the type of conscious awareness experienced during recognition is determined by the knowledge activated by items presented in the recognition test, which in turn is determined by the nature of the operations engaged at encoding.     

Dissociating familiarity from recollection using rote rehearsal

Recollection-based recognition memory judgments benefit greatly from effortful elaborative encoding, whereas familiarity-based judgments are much less sensitive to such manipulations. In this study, we have examined whether rote rehearsal under divided attention might produce the opposite dissociation, benefiting familiarity more than recollection. Subjects rehearsed word pairs during the "distractor" phase of a working memory span task, and were then given a surprise memory test for the distractor items at the end of the experiment. Experiment 1 demonstrated that increasing rehearsal elevated the recognition rate for intact and rearranged pairs, but neither associative recognition accuracy nor implicit fragment completion benefited from rehearsal. The results suggest that rote rehearsal leads to a greater increase in familiarity than in recollection, and that the increase in observed familiarity cannot be attributed to effects of repetition priming. In Experiment 2, we tested item recognition with the remember/know procedure, and the results supported the conclusions of Experiment 1. Moreover, a signal detection model of remember/know performance systematically overpredicted rehearsal increases in remember rates, and this worsened when high-rehearsal items were assumed to be more variable in strength. The results suggest that rote rehearsal can dissociate familiarity from recollection at the time of encoding and that item recognition cannot be fully accommodated within a one-dimensional signal detection model.     

Do changes in the subjective experience of recognition over time suggest independent processes?

Two experiments examined the nature of recognition memory by asking how subjective reports of remembering change over time. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to report their experience of remembering using the well‐known remember–know–guess procedure. Estimates of recollection declined over a 14‐day period, but estimates of familiarity remained constant, suggesting that the processes are independent. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to report their confidence in their recognition decisions. Subjective reports of confidence were analysed via receiver operating characteristics and also indicated different rates of decline for recollection and familiarity. Superficially, the data appear to support a dual‐process account of recognition, but close inspection shows the data to be consistent with a simple signal detection model. The conclusion is that although the phenomenal experience of remembering changes over time this is most likely to be predicated on a single process.     

Recognition memory for pictorial material in subclinical depression

Depression has been associated with impaired recollection of episodic details in tests of recognition memory that use verbal material. In two experiments, the remember/know procedure was employed to investigate the effects of dysphoric mood on recognition memory for pictorial materials that may not be subject to the same processing limitations found for verbal materials in depression. In Experiment 1, where the recognition test took place two weeks after encoding, subclinically depressed participants reported fewer know judgements which were likely to be at least partly due to a remember-to-know shift. Although pictures were accompanied by negative or neutral captions at encoding, no effect of captions on recognition memory was observed. In Experiment 2, where the recognition test occurred soon after viewing the pictures, subclinically depressed participants reported fewer remember judgements. All participants reported more remember judgements for pictures of emotionally negative content than pictures of neutral content. Together, these findings demonstrate that recognition memory for pictorial stimuli is compromised in dysphoric individuals in a way that is consistent with a recollection deficit for episodic detail and also reminiscent of that previously reported for verbal materials. These findings contribute to our developing understanding of how mood and memory interact.     

Two effects of repetition: Support for a dual-process model of know judgments and exclusion errors

In three experiments, aremember/know recognition test (Experiments 1–2) and an exclusion test (Experiments 2–3) were used to examine effects of repeated study presentations. An effect of study repetition was obtained for remember but not know judgments, similar to results reported by Gardiner, Kaminska, Dixon, and Java (1996). Experiment 2 demonstrated the similarity between know responses and exclusion errors; neither was affected by repeated study presentations. In Experiment 3, a response deadline procedure was used to show that exclusion errors are the product of two opposing processes—recollection and familiarity—both of which are influenced by repetition. The interpretation of exclusion errors and know responses is shown to require a dual-process model that includes an assumption about the relationship between processes.     

Assessing text representations with recognition: The interaction of domain knowledge and text coherence

Readers construct at least 2 interrelated mental representations when they comprehend a text: a textbase and a situation model. Two experiments were conducted with recognition memory to examine how domain knowledge and text coherence influence readers' textbase and situation-model representations. In Experiment 1, participants made remember-know judgments to text ideas. Knowledge and coherence interacted to influence remember judgments differently than know judgments. In Experiment 2, the authors used the process-dissociation procedure to obtain recollection and familiarity estimates. Knowledge and coherence interacted to influence recollection estimates but not familiarity estimates. The authors claim that recollection and familiarity can be used as markers of the different processes involved in constructing a textbase and a situation model.     

Remembering parts and wholes: Configural processing in face recollection

In two experiments, we examined the role of configural processing on states of awareness in face recognition. Configural processing was manipulated by presenting upright and inverted faces during study and test. After studying facial photographs of humans (Experiment 1) and horses (Experiment 2), participants provided a remember/know judgement for each recognised test face. In both experiments, disrupted configural processing had selective effects on states of awareness, so that inversion reduced remember, but not know, responses. Experiment 2 revealed disproportionate inversion effects in that the difference in remember responses between upright and inverted items was significant for human faces but not horses. These findings suggest that configural processing facilitates explicit recollection by providing a distinctive combination of nonsalient event attributes.     

Familiarity and recollection in item and associative recognition

Recognition memory for item information (single words) and associative information (word pairs) was tested immediately and after retention intervals of 30 min and 1 day (Experiment 1) and 2 days and 7 days (Experiment 2) using Tulving's (1985) remember/know response procedure. Associative recognition decisions were accompanied by more "remember" responses and less "know" responses than item recognition decisions. Overall recognition performance and the proportion of remember responses declined at similar rates for item and associative information. The pattern of results for item recognition was consistent with Donaldson's (1996) single-factor signal detection model of remember/know responses, as comparisons based on A' between overall item recognition and remember item recognition showed no significant differences. For associative recognition, however, A' for remember responses was reliably greater than for overall recognition. The results show that recollection plays a significant role in associative recognition.     

Recognition memory performance as a function of reported subjective awareness

Three experiments introduced a recognition memory paradigm designed to investigate reported subjective awareness during retrieval. At study, in Experiments 1A and 2, words were either generated or read (generation), while modality of presentation (auditory versus visual) was manipulated in Experiment 1B. Word pairs (old/new or new/new) were presented during test trials, and participants indicated if they contained an old word by responding "remember", "know" or "new" in Experiments 1A and 1B, and by responding "strong no", "weak no", "weak yes", or "strong yes" in Experiment 2. Participants were then required to decide which of the 2 words was old. We demonstrated that the proportion measures used in the Remember Know paradigm substantially underestimated the influence of generation on familiarity resulting in an artificial dissociation between indices of knowing (familiarity) and remembering (recollection). We also found a qualitatively different pattern of forced-choice recognition performance as a function of claimed awareness.     

Gaze control and recollective experience in face recognition

In two experiments, we examined the relation between gaze control and recollective experience in the context of face recognition. In Experiment 1, participants studied a series of faces, while their eye movements were eliminated either during study or test, or both. Subsequently, they made remember/know judgements for each recognized test face. The preclusion of eye movements impaired explicit recollection without affecting familiarity-based recognition. In Experiment 2, participants examined unfamiliar faces under two study conditions (similarity vs. difference judgements), while their eye movements were registered. Similarity vs. difference judgements produced the opposite effects on remember/know responses, with no systematic effects on eye movements. However, face recollection was related to eye movements, so that remember responses were associated with more frequent refixations than know responses. These findings suggest that saccadic eye movements mediate the nature of recollective experience, and that explicit recollection reflects a greater consistency between study and test fixations than familiarity-based face recognition.     

The mere exposure effect and recognition memory

This investigation explores the relationship between liking ratings and recognition performance for obscure classical and Russian music melodies. Past studies have explored if awareness of stimulus presentation affects the mere exposure effect (MEE) (Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992). We investigate if the type of awareness (i.e., "remembering" an actual occurrence of hearing the melody vs. "knowing" that one is familiar with the melody in a more general, less contextualised sense; Tulving, 1985) affects the MEE. In Experiment 1, we administered the liking test and the recognition test within the same test block and found that liking ratings for "remembered" melodies were on average higher than those for melodies that were merely "known". Although the recognition data replicate the findings of Gardiner, Kaminska, Dixon, and Java (1996) whereby remember and know responses to a given stimulus react differently to repetition from one to three trials, liking data did not vary with the degree of exposure. In addition, our adoption of the recognition category "guess" resulted in a pattern of results that is not only different from previous studies but illustrates the importance of judged, instead of true, old/new status in determining liking. The basic findings of Experiment 1 were replicated in Experiment 2 in which the liking test was conducted prior to the recognition test. Implications of these findings for theories of MEE are discussed.