Political Liberalism and the Interests of Children: A Reply to Timothy Michael Fowler

Timothy Michael Fowler has argued that, as a consequence of their commitment to neutrality in regard to comprehensive doctrines, political liberals face a dilemma. In essence, the dilemma for political liberals is that either they have to give up their commitment to neutrality (which is an indispensible part of their view), or they have to allow harm to children. Fowler??s case for this dilemma depends on ascribing to political liberals a view which grants parents a great degree of freedom in deciding on the education of their children. I show that ascribing this view to political liberals rests upon a misinterpretation of political liberalism. Since political liberals have access to reasons based upon the interests of children, they need not yield to parent??s wishes about the education of their children. A correct understanding of political liberalism thus shows that political liberals do not face the dilemma envisaged by Fowler.     

Mental Illness, Motivation and Moral Commitment

I present a dilemma which depressive behavioural pathology poses for both Humean and non-Humean theories of motivation and value. Although the dilemma shows that neither theory can be considered adequate in its standard form, I argue that if the Humean theory is modified so as to embrace a richer notion of satisfaction than it currently does, it can solve the problem which depression poses for it, and thus the dilemma can be avoided. Embracing a richer notion of satisfaction not only solves this problem, it also extends the scope of the Humean theory in a potentially dramatic way, by extending the explanatory reach of moral psychology to issues often thought to fall outside its scope, namely, issues in moral psychopathology.     

The principle of alternate possibilities and a defeated dilemma

Famed so-called ‘Frankfurt-type examples’ have been invoked to cast doubt on the principle that a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Many who disagree that the examples are successful in this respect argue that these examples succumb to a deadly dilemma. I uncover and assess libertarian assumptions upon which the ‘dilemma objection’ is based. On exposing these assumptions, it becomes clear that various sorts of libertarian are no longer entitled to one or the other horns of the dilemma.     

Termination as Necessary Madness

The author offers an intensive clinical study, in which the paradox of termination is illuminated. For this patient, termination repeats the schizoid problem for which he arrived in treatment. The fear of closeness is confirmed by the knowledge that closeness will inevitably lead to loneliness and loss. This treatment dilemma opens up an inquiry into the original formulation of the analytic situation. The author proposes that the structure of psychoanalysis—intimacy entwined with the severing of intimacy—may conceal a need-fear dilemma which lies at the heart of our practice. I propose that this dilemma has always been gendered. Resistance to termination has been “feminized,” and a willingness to terminate has been “masculinized.”     

The Group-Based Binding Pledge as a Solution to Public Goods Problems

A social dilemma is a situation in which members of a group are faced with a conflict between two choices: maximizing personal interests (defection) or maximizing collective interests (cooperation). It is generally more profitable to defect, but if all do so, all are worse off than if all choose to cooperate. A public goods dilemma is a special case of a social dilemma in which people must contribute resources to provide a public good. Communication, especially face-to-face discussion, has been shown to be effective in facilitating cooperation in such situations, including asking members to make a pledge to contribute (cooperate). The purpose of this study was to evaluate some explanations for the effectiveness of a pledge in enhancing cooperation. Two hundred and fifty-six undergraduate students (in groups of four subjects) were asked to make choices in a public goods dilemma. The results suggest that a pledge is effective in enhancing cooperation because it induces group identity and the perception of criticality. It is suggested that when face-to-face discussion is not feasible, a pledge system may be effective in solving real life social dilemmas.     

Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas

Do cultural values influence the manner in which people cooperate with one another? This study assessed cultural characteristics of individuals and then related these characteristics to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Participants were assessed for their degree of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism, cultural values identified by Triandis (1995). They made choices in either a single-group or an intergroup social dilemma. The single-group dilemma entailed a three-person dilemma; the intergroup dilemma was identical but added subgroup competition, i.e., an opposing three-person group. The results indicated an interaction between cultural characteristics and type of dilemma for cooperation. The single-group versus intergroup effect reported by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated, but only for vertical individualists. The vertical individualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma-where cooperation with the group maximized personal outcomes. The vertical collectivists were most cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were less cooperative in the intergroup dilemma- where group defection resulted in maximum group outcomes. The horizontal individualists and collectivists exhibited an intermediate level of cooperation, with no differences in cooperation between the single-group and intergroup dilemmas. Taken together, the results suggest that the relationship between cultural values and cooperation, in particular with reference to vertical and horizontal components of individualism and collectivism, is more complex than has been suggested in past research. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.     

Das homosexuelle Dilemma

This paper intends to support the idea of homosexuality as an independent development. It shifts the attention to a complex which is described as the homosexual dilemma. It emerges regularly with the regression in homosexual men. In their analysis it forms the basis of the transference and is the core complex which is regarded to be an organizer of the usual male homosexual development: The mismatching between outlines representing the parental thought about the male baby and his actual identity. It is a specific dilemma within the reflexive identity processes in the basic homosexual development. It continues in later interactions and dominates a major part of the homosexual life. The way how this dilemma is solved determines the further development. If this is done successfully, the child will have the chance for a healthy homosexual life. If it turns out to fail, the final result will be a homosexual disturbance of identity, i.e. a pathological homosexuality. Reporting clinical examples it is shown how the homosexual dilemma finds its expression in the transference. The analyst is mainly used as a narcissistic self object. Mostly, he doesn’t become an object of sexual desire but a companion who promotes the stabilization of the homosexual identity by recognition.     

Empathy‐induced altruism in a prisoner's dilemma II: what if the target of empathy has defected?

What if participants in a one‐trial prisoner's dilemma know before making their decision that the other person has already defected? From the perspective of classic game theory, a dilemma no longer exists. It is clearly in their best interest to defect too. The empathy‐altruism hypothesis predicts, however, that if they feel empathy for the other, then a dilemma remains: self‐interest counsels defection; empathy‐induced altruism counsels not. This motivational conflict should lead at least some empathically aroused individuals not to defect. To test this prediction, we placed 60 undergraduate women in a one‐trial prisoner's dilemma in which they knew the other had already defected. Among those not induced to feel empathy, very few (0.05) did not defect in return. Among those induced to feel empathy for the other, almost half (0.45) did not defect. These results underscore the power of empathy‐induced altruism to affect responses in a prisoner's dilemma. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Beautiful Mind

It is often difficult to discern the line between creativity and madness. This presents a particular hazard for the analyst, whose failure to recognize real potential can result in undermining the individual's developmental strivings. This dilemma is explored through a case illustration of a woman whose creativity was undermined by a lack of recognition. To vivify the dilemma, the author invites the reader to look through her eyes into the lens offered by the film A Beautiful Mind, which portrays the struggles of Nobel Prize-winning mathematician John Nash to maintain his sanity while also testing the limits of his mind and imagination. These illustrations encourage us to consider the dilemma of the gifted individual when excessive tension arises between absorption in one's medium versus needs for recognition.     

资源两难问题的研究及其新进展

作为多人社会两难问题的基本范式之一,近年来资源两难问题引起了包括社会学家、经济学家和心理学家在内诸多领域研究者越来越多的关注。文章介绍了资源两难问题的定义、特点、研究意义并总结了以往的研究成果,着重介绍了Samuelson和Messick于1994年提出的资源两难决策模型。在此基础上进一步指出以往研究存在的一些不足,如忽视了对不确定性的研究等。文章最后指出了近年来有关资源两难问题的研究在心理学界的发展,并提出了对以后研究的一些建议。     

False Dilemma: A Systematic Exposition

False dilemma is a specific form of reasoning: despite the fact that it is based on a deductively valid argument form, it is rightly depicted as fallacy. A systematic exposition of false dilemma is missing in theoretical approaches to fallacies. This article formulates six criteria for a well-grounded exposition of a fallacy, suggesting also a systematic exposition of false dilemma. These criteria can be used to both explain, and categorise, the various false dilemma fallacies. The article introduces distinction between four types of false dilemma (and the respective subtypes): (1) False quandary, (2) Defeasible sound quandary, (3) False obstruction and (4) Defeasible sound obstruction. The types of criticism appropriate for each variant of false dilemma are suggested. Being able to discover false dilemma in situations when it is important to make good and free choices is a significant dimension of critical thinking. It may liberate us from accepting the consequences that necessarily follow from prearranged alternatives, when these are not the only alternatives possible. It may also liberate us from refraining from actions on the basis of obstructive disjunctive statements. In that respect, the faculty of critical thinking directed at uncovering reasoning based on false dilemma may also initiate the discovery of new alternatives, or discover the ways of unifying seemingly opposing alternatives. Thus, a well-developed ability to understand the tricky argumentative moves of false dilemma may be a good step towards initiating some features of creative thinking.     

公共资源两难管理的社会学习过程和动机释放机制

公共资源两难的根本问题是个人经济利益与社会整体利益的矛盾。一些人为了追逐个人利益最大,过度获取公共资源,走向＂公共的悲剧＂,或不愿为公共资源作出贡献,＂搭便车＂现象流行。传统的研究从理性经济人的角度探讨公共资源两难博弈行为的机制,用＂贪婪＂来解释＂搭便车＂现象,并根据强化理论以奖励和惩罚作为主要对策。但是,这种理性经济人观点忽视了人的社会动机。实际上,公共资源两难博弈是一个社会互动的过程,人的社会心理因素在其中起了很重要的作用,因此在方法论上有必要从社会人（Homo socius）的人性观来进行分析。本文在当前的相关研究文献基础上,分析了公共资源两难博弈行为的动机模式,从社会学习理论出发,提出了公共资源两难管理的社会学习过程和动机释放机制。     

INTRODUCING VARIABLE-RATE RULE-UTILITARIANISM

The basic idea of rule-utilitarianism is that right action should be defined in terms of what would be required by rules which would maximize either actual or expected utility if those rules gained general acceptance, or perhaps general compliance. Rule-utilitarians face a dilemma. They must characterize 'general acceptance' either as 100% acceptance, or as something less. On the first horn of the dilemma, rule-utilitarianism is vulnerable to the charge of utopianism; on the second, it is open to the charge of arbitrariness and lack of philosophical depth. I press this objection, and develop and defend an alternative version of rule-utilitarianism which can evade the dilemma. I call this new version 'variable-rate rule-utilitarianism'.     

PRIVILEGED ACCESS REVISITED

Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.     

Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual-use Dilemma in the Biological Sciences

The dual-use dilemma arises in the context of research in the biological and other sciences as a consequence of the fact that one and the same piece of scientific research sometimes has the potential to be used for bad as well as good purposes. It is an ethical dilemma since it is about promoting good in the context of the potential for also causing harm, e.g., the promotion of health in the context of providing the wherewithal for the killing of innocents. It is an ethical dilemma for the researcher because of the potential actions of others, e.g., malevolent non-researchers who might steal dangerous biological agents, or make use of the original researcher's work. And it is a dilemma for governments concerned with the security of their citizens, as well as their health. In this article we construct a taxonomy of types of "experiments of concern" in the biological sciences, and thereby map the terrain of ethical risk. We then provide a series of analyses of the ethical problems and considerations at issue in the dual-use dilemma, including the impermissibility of certain kinds of research and possible restrictions on dissemination of research results given the risks to health and security. Finally, we explore the main available institutional responses to some of the specific ethical problems posed by the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences.     

社会困境下政治信任对公众态度和合作行为的影响

现代社会面临的重要问题是如何有效地促进人们之间的相互合作,达到社会公共利益的最大化。因此,有关社会困境(social dilemma)的研究成为社会心理学领域的热点。随着群体理论的发展,研究者的研究视角逐渐从个体(individual)转向群体(collective),关注层级结构的群体(hierarchical groups)中,管理者或管理机构(权威)的特征和行为对个体合作行为的影响。其中,权威信任(trust in authority)和公正感(fairness)是影响个体态度和合作行为的重要变量。政治信任(political trust)也可以看作权威信任的一种,即在社会背景下,公众对社会管理权威(政府机构)的信任。未来研究应尝试在实验室里对政治信任的作用和机制进行探究,并进一步探究公正感在政治信任对态度及合作行为关系中的中介作用。     

A New Set of Moral Dilemmas: Norms for Moral Acceptability,Decision Times,and Emotional Salience

At the present time, the growing interest in the topic of moral judgment highlights the widespread need for a standardized set of experimental stimuli. We provide normative data for a sample of 120 undergraduate students using a new set of 60 moral dilemmas that might be employed in future studies according to specific research needs. Thirty dilemmas were structured to be similar to the Footbridge dilemma (“instrumental” dilemmas, in which the death of one person is a means to save more people), and thirty dilemmas were designed to be similar to the Trolley dilemma (“incidental” dilemmas, in which the death of one person is a foreseen but unintended consequence of the action aimed at saving more people). Besides type of dilemma, risk‐involvement was also manipulated: the main character's life was at risk in half of the instrumental dilemmas and in half of the incidental dilemmas. We provide normative values for the following variables: (i) rates of participants' responses (yes/no) to the proposed resolution; (ii) decision times; (iii) ratings of moral acceptability; and (iv) ratings of emotional valence (pleasantness/unpleasantness) and arousal (activation/calm) experienced during decision making. For most of the dependent variables investigated, we observed significant main effects of type of dilemma and risk‐involvement in both subject and item analyses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Debate: A Strategic Technique

This paper describes the work of a strategic team that came out from behind the one-way mirror. A debate among the team is enacted before the family as a strategy for change. The case of a family that refused to provide information illustrates an application of this method. The debate among the therapists represents a dilemma that is a strategically constructed isomorph of the family situation. From this position, therapists have the option of changing levels between themselves and the family, asking the family to help solve the therapists' dilemma so that they in turn can be free to help the family. The combination of the debate and the change of levels between the therapists and the family creates a therapeutic neutrality for the family. From their meta position, they observe the therapists' struggle to solve the family's problem, which is re-presented as a problem among the therapists. This perspective offers the family the choice of more adaptive solutions to their own dilemma.     

Deterministic Frankfurt cases

According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), people are morally responsible for what they do only if they could have done otherwise. Over the last few decades, this principle has dominated discussions of free will and moral responsibility. One important strand of this discussion concerns the Frankfurt-type cases or Frankfurt cases, originally developed by Frankfurt (J Philos 66:829–839, 1969), which are alleged counterexamples to PAP. One way in which proponents of PAP have responded to these purported counterexamples is by arguing that they fall prey to a dilemma, both horns of which undermine their cogency. Recently, Fischer (Philos Rev 119: 315–336, 2010) has defended the Frankfurt cases against one horn of this dilemma. In this essay, I criticize Fischer’s defense of the Frankfurt cases and argue that he does not successfully show how the cases can avoid this horn of the dilemma. If I am right, then, despite Fischer’s claims to the contrary, the original dilemma plaguing the cases still stands.     

论自然律与因果知识的知觉经验基础

<正>一、引论自休谟以来,特别是在科学哲学的演进中,自然律理论与因果理论从来是不可分离的。相比而言,自然律理论具有某种优先地位。因为按照休谟的广为接受的论证,人类的知觉经验并不能直接辩