Do priming effects in perceptual identification and word judgment reflect different underlying mechanisms?

We examined priming of orthographically illegal nonwords in a perceptual identification task and a word judgment task in undergraduate participants. In perceptual identification, priming was significant and equivalent after structural or phonological encoding. In word judgment, priming was significant after phonological encoding but not structural encoding. In a follow-up experiment in older control participants and amnesic participants, priming in word judgment was not significant. Older control participants found the stimuli more difficult to pronounce than did undergraduate participants, and word judgment priming in undergaduate participants was significant only for the stimuli that were judged easy to pronounce. These findings demonstrate that priming in perceptual identification and word judgment extends to novel stimuli that are not linked to preexisting lexical or sublexical representations but that priming occurs at different levels in the two tasks: at a featural or orthographic level in perceptual identification and at a phonological level in word judgment.     

What is primed in priming from imagery?

Priming from imagery is typically weaker than that from perception. This has been interpreted as resulting from weaker activation of perceptual processes. However, for imagery and perception, commonality is only half the story: Each is also characterized by specific processes. If priming can be due to both unshared and shared components of imagery and perception, then it should be possible to observe greater priming from imagery than from perception. Two new priming experiments were designed to test this hypothesis, while controlling incidental task differences. In both experiments, participants studied objects by counting their parts (from a mental image or a picture). Experiment 1 used a word-picture matching test task, which was hypothesized to depend on stimulus processing specific to perception, and Experiment 2 a size judgment test task, which was hypothesized to depend on retrieval and generation processes specific to imagery. As predicted, priming for perceived objects was greater than priming for imagined objects in the word-picture matching task. Conversely, in the size judgment task, more priming from imagery than from perception was observed. These results support the conclusions that (a) imagery and perception have substantial unshared processes, and (b) these processes contribute to priming.     

Perceptual priming is not a necessary consequence of semantic classification of pictures

Four experiments investigated how repetition priming of object recognition is affected by the task performed in the prime and test phases. In Experiment 1 object recognition was tested using both vocal naming and two different semantic decision tasks (whether or not objects were manufactured, and whether or not they would be found inside the house). Some aspects of the data were inconsistent with contemporary models of object recognition. Specifically, object priming was eliminated with some combinations of prime and test tasks, and there was no evidence of perceptual (as opposed to conceptual or response) priming in either semantic classification task, even though perceptual identification of the objects is required for at least one of these tasks. Experiment 2 showed that even when perceptual demands were increased by brief presentation, the inside task showed no perceptual priming. Experiment 3 showed that the inside task did not appear to be based on conceptual priming either, as it was not primed significantly when the prime decisions were made to object labels. Experiment 4 showed that visual sensitivity could be restored to the inside task following practice on the task, supporting the suggestion that a critical factor is whether the semantic category is preformed or must be computed. The results show that the visual representational processes revealed by object priming depend crucially on the task chosen.     

基于客体工作记忆内容的保持对时间判断的影响

本研究通过操作工作记忆内容的有效性,探讨了记忆内容的保持对时间判断的影响。采用不规则的客体作为实验材料,使时间任务中的刺激与工作记忆内容匹配或不匹配。实验1采用工作记忆和时间判断的双任务范式,要求被试首先记忆一个客体,然后在每个试次的最后判断测试刺激是否与记忆项相同。在延迟阶段,被试判断连续出现的两个刺激的时距哪个更长（或更短）。实验2中,要求被试忽略第一个刺激,仅完成时间判断任务。结果发现,相比单任务的计时,双任务条件下,工作记忆内容的保持延长了时间判断的时间。而且,在记忆匹配和知觉匹配条件下,匹配刺激呈现的时间越长,正确率越低,反应时越长。这说明记忆内容的保持增加了决策的难度,工作记忆内容对时间判断的可能是由记忆内容引起的注意定向造成的。     

实物形状的知觉相似性对视觉隐喻加工的影响

视觉隐喻是众多研究者比较关注的领域, 当前多以物体简笔画、漫画及广告等方面的研究为主, 但对与生活密切相关的实物的视觉隐喻研究甚少。因此研究采用掩蔽启动范式、李克特9点量表及语音生成等研究方法, 在物体概念类型(概念相同、概念相异)及形状类型(形状相似、形状相异)条件下, 针对实物图片的形状知觉相似性是否对视觉隐喻加工产生影响进行探讨。结果发现无论物体概念是否相同, 形状相似性对个体的物体识别具有“促进”作用, 并有利于视觉隐喻加工; 在物体识别中, 当两个物体概念不同时, 个体会试图建立一个特设类别来对形状相似的物体进行归类, 从而实现了视觉隐喻的加工。因此研究进一步证明了实物形状的知觉相似性有利于视觉隐喻的加工。     

The role of attention and study time in explicit and implicit memory for unfamiliar visual stimuli

The effects of limited attentional resources and study time on explicit and implicit memory were studied using Schacter and Cooper’s possible and impossible objects in their recognition and object decision paradigm. In one experiment, when attention at study was limited by a flanking digits procedure, object recognition was diminished but object decision priming for possible objects was unaffected; in another experiment, limiting attention plus reducing stimulus study time impaired object recognition and eliminated object priming. Recognition memory and perceptual priming for previously unfamiliar visual stimuli were both influenced by attention, although to different degrees. The intervening variable of study time determined the degree to which priming was affected by attentional resources. These results support a limited capacity attentional model for both recognition and perceptual priming of unfamiliar visual stimuli, and they highlight the need for assessing the interaction of attentional resources and study time in explicit and implicit memory tasks.     

Repetition priming and the haptic recognition of familiar and unfamiliar objects

In four experiments, we examined the haptic recognition of 3-D objects. In Experiment 1, blindfolded participants named everyday objects presented haptically in two blocks. There was significant priming of naming, but no cost of an object changing orientation between blocks. However, typical orientations of objects were recognized more quickly than nonstandard orientations. In Experiment 2, participants accurately performed an unannounced test of memory for orientation. The lack of orientation-specific priming in Experiment 1, therefore, was not because participants could not remember the orientation at which they had first felt an object. In Experiment 3, we examined haptic naming of objects that were primed either haptically or visually. Haptic priming was greater than visual priming, although significant cross-modal priming was also observed. In Experiment 4, we tested recognition memory for familiar and unfamiliar objects using an old-new recognition task. Objects were recognized best when they were presented in the same orientation in both blocks, suggesting that haptic object recognition is orientation sensitive. Photographs of the unfamiliar objects may be downloaded from www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

Visual saliency and semantic incongruency influence eye movements when inspecting pictures

Models of low-level saliency predict that when we first look at a photograph our first few eye movements should be made towards visually conspicuous objects. Two experiments investigated this prediction by recording eye fixations while viewers inspected pictures of room interiors that contained objects with known saliency characteristics. Highly salient objects did attract fixations earlier than less conspicuous objects, but only in a task requiring general encoding of the whole picture. When participants were required to detect the presence of a small target, then the visual saliency of nontarget objects did not influence fixations. These results support modifications of the model that take the cognitive override of saliency into account by allowing task demands to reduce the saliency weights of task-irrelevant objects.

The pictures sometimes contained incongruent objects that were taken from other rooms. These objects were used to test the hypothesis that previous reports of the early fixation of congruent objects have not been consistent because the effect depends upon the visual conspicuity of the incongruent object. There was an effect of incongruency in both experiments, with earlier fixation of objects that violated the gist of the scene, but the effect was only apparent for inconspicuous objects, which argues against the hypothesis.     

Visual saliency and semantic incongruency influence eye movements when inspecting pictures

Models of low-level saliency predict that when we first look at a photograph our first few eye movements should be made towards visually conspicuous objects. Two experiments investigated this prediction by recording eye fixations while viewers inspected pictures of room interiors that contained objects with known saliency characteristics. Highly salient objects did attract fixations earlier than less conspicuous objects, but only in a task requiring general encoding of the whole picture. When participants were required to detect the presence of a small target, then the visual saliency of nontarget objects did not influence fixations. These results support modifications of the model that take the cognitive override of saliency into account by allowing task demands to reduce the saliency weights of task-irrelevant objects.

The pictures sometimes contained incongruent objects that were taken from other rooms. These objects were used to test the hypothesis that previous reports of the early fixation of congruent objects have not been consistent because the effect depends upon the visual conspicuity of the incongruent object. There was an effect of incongruency in both experiments, with earlier fixation of objects that violated the gist of the scene, but the effect was only apparent for inconspicuous objects, which argues against the hypothesis.     

Orientation priming of grasping decision for drawings of objects and blocks,and words

This study tested the influence of orientation priming on grasping decisions. Two groups of 20 healthy participants had to select a preferred grasping orientation (horizontal, vertical) based on drawings of everyday objects, geometric blocks or object names. Three priming conditions were used: congruent, incongruent and neutral. The facilitating effects of priming were observed in the grasping decision task for drawings of objects and blocks but not object names. The visual information about congruent orientation in the prime quickened participants’ responses but had no effect on response accuracy. The results are discussed in the context of the hypothesis that an object automatically potentiates grasping associated with it, and that the on-line visual information is necessary for grasping potentiation to occur. The possibility that the most frequent orientation of familiar objects might be included in object-action representation is also discussed.     

知觉信息先期呈现下两可图的命名和相似判断

在实物图片或轮廓图先期呈现的条件下研究了6岁、9岁、12岁及成人被试对两可图形的命名或相似判断。结果表明：（1）命名项目或相似判断与线索项目有关时,各年龄被试对判断项的命名或相似判断均表现出与线索项目一致的倾向。（2）轮廓图作为线索项目时．命名或相似判断反应时较长;实物作为线索项目时,命名或相似判断反应时较短。无关项目作为为线索项目时．被试命名或相似判断的反应时居中;命名项目或相似判断项目均与线索项目一致时反应时较短;命名项目或相似判断项目均与线索项目不一致时反应时延长。（3）被试命名或相似判断的反应时随其年龄的增长而下降,6岁和9岁儿童的反应时较长;12岁儿童的反应时较短;成人的反应时最短。     

The role of colour in implicit and explicit memory performance

We present two experiments that examine the effects of colour transformation between study and test (from black and white to colour and vice versa, or from incorrectly coloured to correctly coloured and vice versa) on implicit and explicit measures of memory for diagnostically coloured natural objects (e.g., yellow banana). For naming and coloured-object decision (i.e., deciding whether an object is correctly coloured), there were shorter response times to correctly coloured-objects than to black-and-white and incorrectly coloured-objects. Repetition priming was equivalent for the different stimulus types. Colour transformation did not influence priming of picture naming, but for coloured-object decision priming was evident only for objects remaining the same from study to test. This was the case for both naming and coloured-object decision as study tasks. When participants were asked to consciously recognize objects that they had named or made coloured-object decisions to previously, whilst ignoring their colour, colour transformation reduced recognition efficiency. We discuss these results in terms of the flexibility of object representations that mediate priming and recognition.