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1.
The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Adam Rieger 《Erkenntnis》2001,54(2):195-203
A view often expressed is that to classify the liar sentence as neither true nor false is satisfactory for the simple liar but not for the strengthened liar. I argue that in fact it is equally unsatisfactory for both liars. I go on to discuss whether, nevertheless, Kripke's theory of truth represents an advance on that of Tarski. 相似文献
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Journal of Philosophical Logic - 相似文献
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Greg Ray 《Philosophical Studies》2003,115(1):55-80
I offer an interpretation of a familiar, but poorly understood portion of Tarskis work on truth – bringing to light a number of unnoticed aspects of Tarskis work. A serious misreading of this part of Tarski to be found in Scott Soames Understanding Truth is treated in detail. Soamesreading vies with the textual evidence, and would make Tarskis position inconsistent in an unsubtle way. I show that Soames does not finally have a coherent interpretation of Tarski. This is unfortunate, since Soames ultimately arrogates to himself a key position that he has denied to Tarski and which is rightfully Tarskis own. 相似文献
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Keith Simmons 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》1990,19(3):277-303
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Stephen Read 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(3):363-375
In recent years, speech-act theory has mooted the possibility that one utterance can signify a number of different things.
This pluralist conception of signification lies at the heart of Thomas Bradwardine’s solution to the insolubles, logical puzzles
such as the semantic paradoxes, presented in Oxford in the early 1320s. His leading assumption was that signification is closed
under consequence, that is, that a proposition signifies everything which follows from what it signifies. Then any proposition
signifying its own falsity, he showed, also signifies its own truth and so, since it signifies things which cannot both obtain,
it is simply false. Bradwardine himself, and his contemporaries, did not elaborate this pluralist theory, or say much in its
defence. It can be shown to accord closely, however, with the prevailing conception of logical consequence in England in the
fourteenth century. Recent pluralist theories of signification, such as Grice’s, also endorse Bradwardine’s closure postulate
as a plausible constraint on signification, and so his analysis of the semantic paradoxes is seen to be both well-grounded
and plausible.
相似文献
Stephen ReadEmail: Email: |
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Aristotle on the Liar 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Topoi - The only passage from Aristotle's works that seemsto discuss the paradox of the liar is within chapter 25 of Sophistici Elenchi (180a34–b7). This passage raises several questions:... 相似文献
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Emil Badici 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(4):583-596
In Beyond the Limits of Thought [2002], Graham Priest argues that logical and semantic paradoxes have the same underlying structure (which he calls the Inclosure Schema). He also argues that, in conjunction with the Principle of Uniform Solution (same kind of paradox, same kind of solution), this is sufficient to ‘sink virtually all orthodox solutions to the paradoxes’, because the orthodox solutions to the paradoxes are not uniform. I argue that Priest fails to provide a non-question-begging method to ‘sink virtually all orthodox solutions’, and that the Inclosure Schema cannot be the structure that underlies the Liar paradox. Moreover, Ramsey was right in thinking that logical and semantic paradoxes are paradoxes of different kinds. 相似文献
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Graham Priest 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(2):359-366
Badici [2008] criticizes views of Priest [2002] concerning the Inclosure Schema and the paradoxes of self-reference. This article explains why his criticisms are to be rejected. 相似文献
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Zeno's paradoxes of motion and the semantic paradoxes of the Liar have long been thought to have metaphorical affinities. There are, in fact, isomorphisms between variations of Zeno's paradoxes and variations of the Liar paradox in infinite-valued logic. Representing these paradoxes in dynamical systems theory reveals fractal images and provides other geometric ways of visualizing and conceptualizing the paradoxes. 相似文献
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Bradley Armour-Garb 《Synthese》2004,139(3):491-512
In defense of the minimalist conception of truth, Paul Horwich(2001) has recently argued that our acceptance of the instances of the schema,`the proposition that p is true if and only if p', suffices to explain our acceptanceof truth generalizations, that is, of general claims formulated using the truth predicate.In this paper, I consider the strategy Horwich develops for explaining our acceptance of truth generalizations. As I show, while perhaps workable on its own, the strategy is in conflictwith his response to the liar paradox. Something must give. I consider and reject variousalternatives and emendations to the strategy. In order to resolve the conflict,I propose an alternative approach to the liar, one that supports Horwich's strategywhile leaving minimalism maximally uncompromised. 相似文献
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First, language and axioms of Church's paper 'Comparison of Russell's Resolution of the Semantical Antinomies with that of
Tarski' are slightly modified and a version of the Liar paradox tentatively reconstructed. An obvious natural solution of
the paradox leads to a hierarchy of truth predicates which is of a different kind from the one defined by Church: it depends
on the enlargement of the semantical vocabulary and its levels do not differ in the ramified-type-theoretical sense. Second,
two attempts are made in order to justify the Russellian, and perhaps Churchian, idea that language should not be fragmented
beyond what is required by type distinctions. After all, because of reducibility, which seems to allow a semantics without
propositions, this comes out to be possible only at the cost of resorting to two disputable theses.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Yann Benétreau-Dupin 《逻辑史和逻辑哲学》2013,34(1):18-28
Jean Buridan has offered a solution to the Liar Paradox, i.e. to the problem of assigning a truth-value to the sentence ‘What I am saying is false’. It has been argued that either (1) this solution is ad hoc since it would only apply to self-referencing sentences [Read, S. 2002. ‘The Liar Paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine’, Vivarium, 40 (2), 189–218] or else (2) it weakens his theory of truth, making his ‘a logic without truth’ [Klima, G. 2008. ‘Logic without truth: Buridan on the Liar’, in S. Rahman, T. Tulenheimo and E. Genot, Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox, Berlin: Springer, 87–112 (Chapter 5); Dutilh Novaes, C. 2011. ‘Lessons on truth from mediaeval solutions to the Liar Paradox’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 61 (242), 58–78]. Against (1), I will argue that Buridan's solution by means of truth by supposition does not involve new principles. Self-referential sentences force us to handle supposition more carefully, which does not warrant the accusation of adhoccery. I will also argue, against (2), that it is exaggerated to assert that this solution leads to a ‘weakened’ theory of truth, since it is consistent with other passages of the Sophismata, which only gives necessary conditions for the truth of affirmative propositions, but sufficient conditions for falsity. 相似文献
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Stamatios Gerogiorgakis 《逻辑史和逻辑哲学》2013,34(4):313-330
An eleventh-century Greek text, in which a fourth-century patristic text is discussed, gives an outline of a solution to the Liar Paradox. The eleventh-century text is probably the first medieval treatment of the Liar. Long passages from both texts are translated in this article. The solution to the Liar Paradox, which they entail, is analysed and compared with the results of modern scholarship on several Latin solutions to this paradox. It is found to be a solution, which bears some analogies to contemporary game semantics. Further, an overview of other Byzantine scholia on the Liar Paradox is provided. The findings and the originality of the discussed solution to the Liar Paradox suggest a change in the way in which Byzantine Logic is traditionally regarded in contemporary scholarship. 相似文献
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Athanassios Tzouvaras 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》1998,27(1):85-108
We extend the ordinary logic of knowledge based on the operator K and the system of axioms S5 by adding a new operator U, standing for the agent utters , and certain axioms and a rule for U, forming thus a new system KU. The main advantage of KU is that we can express in it intentions of the speaker concerning the truth or falsehood of the claims he utters and analyze them logically. Specifically we can express in the new language various notions of lying, as well as of telling the truth. Consequently, as long as lying or telling the truth about a fact is an intentional mode of the speaker, we can resolve the Liar paradox, or at least some of its variants, turning it into an ordinary (false or true) sentence. Also, using Kripke structures analogous to those employed by S. Kraus and D. Lehmann in [3] for modelling the logic of knowledge and belief, we offer a sound and complete semantics for KU. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - 相似文献