What's the problem? A response to "secular humanism and scientific psychiatry"

Natural philosophy once spanned the fields of philosophy, science, and medicine. Scientific disciplines and medical specialties have rapidly achieved independence, and the availability of the internet and open-access publishing promises a further expansion of knowledge. Nevertheless, a consideration of the grounding concepts and ethical principles that underlie health care remains paramount. It is timely, therefore, to contribute to the global conversation on health care with an open-access journal that focuses on addressing the conceptual basis of medicine and related disciplines, considering the ethical aspects of clinical practice, and exploring its intersection with the humanities (including history of medicine).     

Cochlear implants and the claims of culture? A response to Lane and Grodin

Because I reject the notion that physical characteristics constitute cultural membership, I argue that, even if the claim were persuasive that deafness is a culture rather than a disability, there is no reason to fault hearing parents who choose cochlear implants for their deaf children.     

What,why, and whence logic? A response to the commentators

This article presents our response to the four commentators. Specifically, the article aims to further justify the method we employed to show the logical autonomy of the various thought domains described by our theory, to explain the role of logic in cognitive development and to elaborate on the factors affecting its development.     

Infant imitation and the self—A response to Welsh

Talia Welsh (2006 Welsh, T. 2006. Do neonates display innate self-awareness? Why neonatal imitation fails to provide sufficient grounds for innate self and other awareness. Philosophical Psychology, 19: 221–238. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) argues that Shaun Gallagher and Andrew Meltzoff's (1996) application of neonatal imitation research is insufficient grounds for their claim that neonates are born with a primitive body image and thus an innate self-awareness. Drawing upon an understanding of the self that is founded upon a “theory of mind,” Welsh challenges the notion that neonates have the capacity for self-awareness and charges the supposition with an essentialism which threatens to disrupt more social constructionist understandings of the self. In this paper, I initially defend Gallagher and Meltzoff's (1996) application of infant imitation to understandings of neonatal self-awareness by explaining how body image schemas can be understood as non-representational embodied cognitive phenomena that challenge “theory of mind” theory. I then further develop the claim that neonates are born self-aware with reference to my own work in fetal development. I conclude that Welsh's political concerns are unfounded by showing how the conclusion that a neonate is self-aware does not signal a return to an essentialist understanding of self-awareness, but rather introduces into philosophical and psychological discourse possible alternate understandings of an embodied sense of self that are embedded within intersubjective contexts.     

How context-independent is the outgroup homogeneity effect? A response to Bartsch and Judd

Bartsch and Judd (1993) argue that outgroup homogeneity effects occur independently of any tendency for members of minority groups to see their ingroup as more homogeneous than the majority outgroup. This argument is based on evidence of an underlying outgroup homogeneity effect in a study which purports to unconfound the roles of judged group size and ingroup–outgroup judgement by presenting subjects first with a small or large ingroup (or outgroup) and then a small comparison outgroup (or ingroup). However, from the perspective of self-categorization theory (SCT), such a procedure actually introduces a confound as SCT predicts that when an ingroup is judged first it should be perceived as relatively heterogeneous due to the intragroup nature of this judgemental context. Close examination of Bartsch and Judd's data bears this point out: the tendency to see the ingroup as less homogeneous than the outgroup when the ingroup was judged first was extinguished when the ingroup was judged second even when the judged groups were of equal size. Consistent with SCT, this re-analysis suggests that manifestations of outgroup homogeneity are not independent of contextual factors which determine the relative appropriateness of category-based perception of ingroup and outgroup.     

What of the clients-eye view? A response to the millennium review

The BJGC 's (2000) symposium on guidance, psychotherapy and counselling reviewed the developments of these activities in the United Kingdom in the past and present, and then looked to the future at the turn of this millennium.The picture emerged of professionally dominated enterprises in which the client's point-of-view is obscure. This article explores why this is the case and how the client's perspective can reinforce the political as well as the therapeutic value of counselling, psychotherapy and guidance.     

A secular age? Reflections on Taylor and Panikkar

During the last few years two major volumes have been published, both greatly revised versions of earlier Gifford Lectures: Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007) and Raimon Panikkar’s The Rhythm of Being (2010). The two volumes are similar in some respects and very dissimilar in others. Both thinkers complain about the glaring blemishes of the modern, especially the contemporary age; both deplore above all a certain deficit of religiosity. The two authors differ, however, both in the details of their diagnosis and in their proposed remedies. Taylor views the modern age—styled as “secular age”—as marked by a slide into secular agnosticism, into “exclusive humanism”, and above all into an “immanent frame” excluding theistic “transcendence”. Although sharing the concern about “loss of meaning”, Panikkar does not find its source in the abandonment of (mono)theistic transcendence; on the contrary, both radical transcendence and agnostic immanence are responsible for the deficit of genuine faith. For him, recovery of faith requires an acknowledgment of our being in the world, as part of the “rhythm of being” happening in a holistic or “cosmotheandric” mode. In classical Indian terminology, while Taylor’s emphasis on the transcendence-immanence tension reflects ultimately a dualistic perspective (dvaita), Panikkar’s holistic notion of the rhythm of being captures the core of Advaita Vendanta.     

Clinically significant but impractical? A response to Hageman and Arrindell

Hageman, and Arrindell [Hageman, W.J., & Arrindell, W.A. (in press). Establishing clinically significant change: increment of precision and the distinction between individual and group level of analysis. Behavior Research and Therapy.] suggest adaptations to the traditional clinical significance model originally developed by Jacobson, Follette, and Revenstorf [Jacobson, N.S., Follette, W.C., & Revenstorf, D. (1984). Toward a standard definition of clinically significant change. Behavior Therapy, 17, 308-311.]. They observe that one must distinguish between analysis at the individual and group level and based upon an alternative decision-making strategy have formulated different procedures for assessing clinically significant change that incorporate the unreliability inherent in testing measures. A comparison of the traditional method with Hageman and Arrindell's suggested approach is conducted utilizing data originally presented by Jacobson and Truax [Jacobson, N.S., & Truax, P., Clinical significance: a statistical approach to defining meaningful change in psychotherapy research. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 59, 12-19.] and implications of this comparison for the method developed by Hageman and Arrindell's method are discussed. Although this revised method has much to recommend it, it seems to yield results at the individual level that are quite similar to those derived from the traditional method. Given the complexity of the revised method, the traditional model developed by Jacobson, Follette, and Revenstorf (1984) still seems to be preferable.     

Measuring aggressiveness and anger,but not aggression? A response to the CAAS critique

ObjectivesThe Competitive Aggressiveness and Anger Scale (CAAS) was developed to measure antecedents of aggression in sport. The critique attacks the CAAS on three points: (1) the definition of aggression in sport adopted, (2) the “one size fits all” element in the thinking behind the scale's development, (3) the nature of the CAAS Anger and Aggressiveness items. The objectives of this response is to address misunderstandings in the critique.MethodsWe identified a number of false assumptions that undermine the validity of the critique and attempt to clarify our position with respect to the criticisms made.Results(1) The CAAS is being criticised for a definition that it did not use. (2) We accepted that the CAAS may not be suitable for everyone in our limitations section and fully accept the limitations of any scale. We have since undertaken a large research project to establish whether the scale is valid across and within specific sports. (3) The fundamental misunderstanding inherent throughout the critique is that the CAAS was designed as a measure of aggression, rather than anger and aggressiveness, rendering the critique of its items redundant.ConclusionsThe critique misrepresents the authors of the CAAS and fails to present a coherent argument against its use. We hope to clarify our position here. The evidence to date suggests that the CAAS is a valid measure of anger and aggressiveness in many sports and that these concepts reliably differentiate players who admit unsanctioned aggression from those who do not.     

Qeauty and the books: a response to Lewis’s quantum sleeping beauty problem

In his 2007 paper “Quantum Sleeping Beauty”, Peter Lewis poses a problem for the supporters’ of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics appeal to subjective probability. Lewis’s argument hinges on parallels between the traditional “sleeping beauty” problem in epistemology and a quantum variant. These two cases, Lewis argues, advocate different treatments of credences even though they share important epistemic similarities, leading to a tension between the traditional solution to the sleeping beauty problem (typically called the “thirder” solution) and Everettian quantum mechanics. In this paper I examine the metaphysical and epistemological differences between Lewis’s two cases, and, in particular, I show how diachronic Dutch book arguments support both the thirder solution in the traditional case and the Everettian’s solution in the variant case. These Dutch books, I argue, reveal an important disanalogy between Lewis’s two cases such that Lewis’s argument does not reveal an inconsistency in either the Everettian’s or the thirder’s assignment of credences.     

Will the "secular priests" of bioethics work among the sinners?

In this paper I explore briefly the "secular priesthood" metaphor often applied to bioethicists. I next ask: if, despite our discomfort with the metaphor, we were to embrace the best aspects of the priesthood(s)--which I identify as the missionaries' willingness to work among sinners and lepers, at their own peril--would we be able to live up to that standard of bravery? I then draw a parallel with the fears of contagion currently be voiced (by Carl Elliott and others), with regard to bioethicists working in or near coporate settings. I argue that such fears may themselves have a number of deleterious effects, and I suggest several possible positive steps in response to that fear.     

Stereotypes and stereotyping: What's the brain got to do with it?

Influential social-psychological models suggest that perceivers frequently use information-processing strategies that result in the stereotype-based construal and treatment of other people. To elucidate in greater detail when, why, and how social encounters elicit stereotyping, researchers have begun to incorporate neuroscientific tools into their repertoire of investigative methods. The current article reviews these studies and considers their significance in light of existing theories of person perception, knowledge representation, and impression formation. Finally, using the concrete example of stereotyping, benefits and pitfalls of adopting a social neuroscience approach are discussed.     

What's the Story?: Spirituality and Writing

What is spirituality? As in other papers (Gearon, 1995, cf Wright, 1996; Gearon, 1996, 1997), I maintain here that spirituality may be defined as our relationship with ultimate reality. Spirituality is thus inevitably, by this definition, always metaphysical (Gearon, 1995, again, cf. Wright, 1996, but also Wright, 1997). I want to develop this theme here by contending that such notions of ultimate reality are determined, themselves defined, by texts, that spirituality today, in literate societies, is defined by writing.

Developing this intentionally provocative idea of spirituality's ultimate definition and determination by writing, particularly through notions of narrative and text, this paper provides a critical examination of the place of the literary form in contemporary debate on spirituality in education. Marking out the contentious territory of various interdisciplinary boundaries – some more disputed than others – an attempt is made to parallel the problems centring on our understanding of spirituality with problems associated with the interpretation of texts. By way of an open conclusion, designed as with the main body of the paper to stimulate debate, these albeit brief considerations will be set within the more specific concerns of ‘Engaging the Curriculum – A Theological Programme’, (Thatcher, 1995; Markham, 1996, 1997, 1997a; Gearon, 1997a, 1997b, and, forthcoming, 1998, 1998a), a major project to promote an interdisciplinary awareness of spiritual and theological issues in the curriculum in a genuinely international context. (The bulletin and now journal of the project is, beyond the UK, circulated in Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, the Philippines, the United States, amongst other countries.)