Reenactment: an embodied cognition approach to meaning and linguistic content

A central finding in experimental research identified with embodied cognition (EC) is that understanding actions involves their embodied simulation, i.e., executing some processes involved in performing these actions. Extending these findings, I argue that reenactment??the overt embodied simulation of actions and practices, including especially communicative actions and practices, within utterances??makes it possible to forge an integrated EC-based account of linguistic meaning. In particular, I argue: (a) that remote entities can be referred to by reenacting actions performed with them; (b) that the use of grammatical constructions can be conceived of as the reenactment of linguistic action routines; (c) that complex enunciational structures (reported speech, irony, etc.) involve a separate level of reenactment, on which characters are presented as interacting with one another within the utterance; (d) that the segmentation of long utterances into shorter units involves the reenactment of brief audience interventions between units; and (e) that the overall meaning of an utterance can be stated in reenactment terms. The notion of reenactment provides a conceptual framework for accounting for aspects of language that are usually thought to be outside the reach of EC in an EC framework, thus supporting a view of meaning and linguistic content as thoroughly grounded in action and interaction.     

The Normativity of Meaning: Guidance and Justification

Abstract

The thesis that meaning is normative has come under much scrutiny of late. However, there are aspects of the view that have received comparatively little critical attention which centre on meaning’s capacity to guide and justify linguistic action. Call such a view ‘justification normativity’ (JN). I outline Zalabardo’s (1997) account of JN and his corresponding argument against reductive-naturalistic meaning-factualism and argue that the argument presents a genuine challenge to account for the guiding role of meaning in linguistic action. I then present a proposal regarding how this challenge may be met. This proposal is then compared to recent work by Ginsborg (2011; 2012), who has outlined an alternative view of the normativity of meaning that explicitly rejects the idea that meanings guide and justify linguistic use. I outline how Ginsborg utilises this notion of normativity in order to provide a positive account of what it is to mean something by an expression which is intended to serve as a response to Kripke’s semantic sceptic. Finally, I argue that Ginsborg’s response to the sceptic is unsatisfactory, and that, insofar as it is able to preserve our intuitive view of meaning’s capacity to guide linguistic action, my proposal is to be preferred.     

The exercise pill: should we replace exercise with pharmaceutical means?

New physiological and pharmacological research points to the possibility of a pill that produces the complete physiological effects of exercise. Is replacement of exercise with a pill a good idea? And if so, under what circumstances? To explore answers, I have examined three approaches to the understanding exercise. From a dualist point of view, exercise is explained mechanistically in terms of physiological cause and effect relationships. From this perspective, and in particular for reluctant exercisers, there seems to be no strong argument against the use of a pill. From a phenomenological point of view, exercise is understood from a first person perspective focusing on experiential qualities. It is argued that a pill can never replace the embodied, experiential values of exercising and their potential ethical significance. In other words, the use of a pill is rejected. From a critical social constructivist point of view, exercise is understood as an expression of sociocultural values. Exercise can be a source of both bodily alienation and embodied self-realization and meaning. It is argued that in settings of alienating exercise malpractice, an exercise pill can be a temporary lesser evil approach. It is pointed out, however, that the long-term solution to malpractice is not a pill but a change of practice. In a final section, the possibility of the exercise pill is contextualized in the larger, bio-ethical debate on human enhancement.     

Knowledge of Self,knowledge of others,error; and the place of consciousness

"Knowledge of self, knowledge of others, error and the place of consciousness" examines texts and problems from the phenomenological tradition to show that the other does not present her/himself as a consciousness enclosed in a merely material body. I discuss Merleau-Ponty's attempt to supplant this view with the view that the other is always seen as an "incarnate consciousness" - a unity of mind and body in activity. This view faces a difficulty in that it seems to collapse the distinction between one's own understanding of one's behavior and the understanding which another might have of this same behavior. In response to this objection, I study how the meaning of people's behaviors are settled in dialogue. I argue that the meanings that an actor gives to her or his behavior cannot rest entirely with that person, nor are they determined solely by the interpreter, but instead develop in the interaction between the actor and the interpreter.     

Bhartṛhari’s Verbal Holism: Some Hermeneutical Queries

One of the main problems regarding language which has bothered philosophers since antiquity is that it often misleads us. Linguistic understanding inevitably involves a subject who understands and the subject-matter or content of what she understands. Since the subject-matter of linguistic understanding is externally given to the subject as text or spoken word, linguistic understanding, therefore, is both subjective and objective at the same time and ineluctably involves interpretation on the part of the subject. But the moment we grant the subjective participation in understanding, the problem of universality of meaning would inevitably raise its head. This problem has been addressed in different ways by different thinkers across history and cultures. Even though some of the ancient Indian thinkers like Bhartṛhari mainly focus on understanding of the Vedic texts, they could probably have important clues for the problem of universality in understanding through language as it is posed by hermeneutic thinkers starting from St. Augustine in medieval period up to Gadamer and Habermas in more recent times. This paper attempts to explore and examine Bhartṛhari’s philosophy of verbal holism from the point of view of the problem of universality in hermeneutics.

     

Truth as an Epistemic Notion

What is the appropriate notion of truth for sentences whose meanings are understood in epistemic terms such as proof or ground for an assertion? It seems that the truth of such sentences has to be identified with the existence of proofs or grounds, and the main issue is whether this existence is to be understood in a temporal sense as meaning that we have actually found a proof or a ground, or if it could be taken in an abstract, tenseless sense. Would the latter alternative amount to realism with respect to proofs or grounds in a way that would be contrary to the supposedly anti-realistic standpoint underlying the epistemic understanding of linguistic expressions? Before discussing this question, I shall consider reasons for construing linguistic meaning epistemically and relations between such reasons and reasons for taking an anti-realist point of view towards the discourse in question.     

Making sense of the lived body <Emphasis Type="Italic">and</Emphasis> the lived world: meaning and presence in Husserl,Derrida and Noë

I argue that Husserl’s transcendental account of the role of the lived body in sense-making is a precursor to Alva Noë’s recent work on the enactive, embodied mind, specifically his notion of “sensorimotor knowledge” as a form of embodied sense-making that avoids representationalism and intellectualism. Derrida’s deconstructive account of meaning—developed largely through a critique of Husserl—relies on the claim that meaning is structured through the complication of the “interiority” of consciousness by an “outside,” and thus might be thought to lend itself to theories of mind such as Noë’s that emphasize the ways in which sense-making occurs outside the head. But while Derrida’s notion of “contamination” rightly points to an indeterminateness of meaning in an outside, extended, concrete lived world, he ultimately reduces meaning to a structure of signification. This casts indeterminateness in terms of absence, ignoring the presence of non-linguistic phenomena of embodied sense-making central to both the contemporary enactivist program and to the later Husserl, who is able to account for the indeterminateness of meaning in lived experience through his distinction between sense (Sinn) and more exact linguistic meaning (Bedeutung). Husserl’s transcendental theory of meaning also allows for a substantive contribution to sense-making from the side of the perceived object—an aspect missing from Noë’s account. Thus, in contrast to Derrida and to Noë, Husserl accounts for sense-making in terms of both the lived body and the lived world.     

Phenomenology of Bodily Integrity in Disfiguring Breast Cancer

In this paper, I explore the meaning of bodily integrity in disfiguring breast cancer. Bodily integrity is a normative principle precisely because it does not simply refer to actual physical or functional intactness. It rather indicates what should be regarded and respected as inviolable in vulnerable and damageable bodies. I will argue that this normative inviolability or wholeness can be based upon a person's embodied experience of wholeness. This phenomenological stance differs from the liberal view that identifies respect for integrity with respect for autonomy (resulting in an invalidation of bodily integrity's proper normative meaning), as well as from the view that bodily integrity is based upon ideologies of wholeness (which runs the risk of being disadvantageous to women). I propose that bodily integrity involves a process of identification between the experience of one's body as “Leib” and the experience of one's body as “Körper.” If identification fails or is not possible, one's integrity is threatened. This idea of bodily integrity can support breast cancer patients and survivors in making decisions about possible corrective interventions. To implement this idea in oncology care, empirical‐phenomenological research needs to establish how breast cancer patients express their embodied self‐experiences.     

Presence and place of main ideas and examples in study texts

Background: How indispensable are examples and main ideas in study texts? In research into comprehension of expository texts examples are sometimes considered as cognitive support, sometimes as seductive details. According to the cognitivist view, text comprehension is based on main ideas, whereas the constructivist view holds that examples are the basis of understanding. Aims: This study explored how text comprehension is influenced by main ideas and examples in study texts, in relation to Vermunt's (1992, 1998) ‘concrete elaboration’ learning style. In Experiment 1, concrete texts with many examples were compared with abstract texts with many main ideas. In Experiment 2, idea‐oriented texts, in which main ideas preceded examples, were compared with example‐oriented texts, in which examples preceded main ideas. Samples: In both experiments, undergraduate social sciences students studied various versions of an introductory text on educational psychology. Methods: The text contained sections with a varying number of relevant and irrelevant examples and with or without a main idea (Experiment 1), and sections with a main idea followed by examples, sections with a main idea without examples, or sections with examples followed by a main idea (Experiment 2). After studying the text, students completed a verbatim recognition test and an explanation test. Results: Best results were obtained after studying sections with a main idea and two or five examples. Irrelevant examples were detrimental to understanding. Students used examples to construct knowledge or to activate prior knowledge. Students with a strong habit of concrete elaboration used main ideas to recollect episodes of personal experience. This may interfere with understanding underlying concepts and principles by relating main ideas to examples in the text. Students with a low score on the concrete elaboration scale were sensitive to the presence of examples in the study text. Conclusion: In expository texts, examples are indispensable. The findings suggest that main ideas are useful, and, in order to prevent interference effects, the more so when they are put at the end of sections.     

Locke and the Primary Signification of Words: An Approach to Word Meaning

Locke's claim that the primary signification of (most) words is an idea, or complex of ideas, has received different interpretations. I support the majority view that Locke's notion of primary signification can be construed in terms of linguistic meaning. But this reading has been seen as making Locke's account vulnerable to various criticisms, of which I consider two. First, it appears to make the account vulnerable to the charge that an idea cannot play the role that a word meaning should play. I argue that the role Locke actually gives to signified ideas is not susceptible to this criticism. Second, it appears to make Locke guilty of at least some degree of semantic idealism. I argue that Locke is not guilty of this and that he makes a proper distinction between the non-referential relation that holds between a word and its primary signification and the referential relation that holds between a word and things the word is used to speak about.     

Grounding abstract object characteristics in embodied interactions

Recent studies in cognitive linguistics have demonstrated that objects are conceptualised in terms of the actions they afford, i.e., in terms of their spatial-functional meaning. Since our interactions are constrained by the structure of our body, these studies view conceptualisation as essentially embodied. In this paper we argue that an object's abstract/figurative meaning is also embodied in that it is grounded in patterns of recurrent interactions with our environment, referred to as image schemas. On the basis of the spatial, relational structure of three such image schemas, two everyday products, a jug and an alarm clock, were systematically varied on form dimensions. Experiment 1 showed that participants with a background in design relate abstract characteristics to the form changes in the way predicted. To rule out the possibility that the relations uncovered are due to learned associations, a replication of the experiment was conducted with nai ve participants (experiment 2), leading to highly similar results. In experiment 3, we tested the cross-cultural consistency of our findings by performing a second replication with Brazilian participants. The results of this experiment were only partly in line with our predictions, suggesting that cultural differences in interacting with the environment to some degree affect our understanding of the abstract meaning of objects.     

将分析哲学奠定在实用主义的基础上——布兰顿的语言实用主义述评

继奎因、罗蒂、普特南之后,当代实用主义进入了一个新的发展时期,布兰顿的语言实用主义①是新实用主义的最新代表:它用理性建构的方式,从一个不同的视角,将实用主义与分析哲学紧密结合在一起,以一种更加精确的哲学语言展示了实用主义的当代学术价值。本文旨在阐明布兰顿的语言     

Interactional expertise as a third kind of knowledge

Between formal propositional knowledge and embodied skill lies ‘interactional expertise’—the ability to converse expertly about a practical skill or expertise, but without being able to practice it, learned through linguistic socialisation among the practitioners. Interactional expertise is exhibited by sociologists of scientific knowledge, by scientists themselves and by a large range of other actors. Attention is drawn to the distinction between the social and the individual embodiment theses: a language does depend on the form of the bodies of its members but an individual within that community can learn the language without the body. The idea has significance for our understanding of colour-blindness, deafness and other abilities and disabilities. They say that love's a word, a word we've only heard the meaning of.     

Wittgenstein on Understanding and Interpretation (Comments on the work of Thomas Morawetz)

Wittgenstein's distinction between understanding and interpretation is fundamental to the account of meaning in Philosophical Investigations. In his discussion of rule‐following, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the idea that understanding or grasping a rule is a matter of interpretation. Wittgenstein explains meaning and rule‐following in terms of action, rejecting both realist and Cartesian accounts of the mental. I argue that in his effort to employ Wittgenstein's views on meaning and rule‐following, Professor Morawetz embraces the position Wittgenstein rejects. In the course of making his case for law as a “deliberative practice,” Professor Morawetz embraces interpretation as a fundamental element of human practices, thereby taking up precisely the view Wittgenstein rejects     

The development of children's understanding of "because" and "so"

Children's (5 years, 8 months to 8 years, 4 months) comprehension of "because" and "so" was assessed on both enactment and sentence completion tasks. The use of a within-subject design permitted performance on each task to be interpreted in terms of performance on the other. The pattern of results provided evidence against a componential model for the acquisition of causal connectives. This model holds that the two meaning components (cause, order) are acquired separately, with the order component being acquired several years later than the causal component. The results also were in accord with predictions derived from a contextual model of children's developing understanding of terms expressing logical relationships. This model posits that the understanding of relational terms is initially context dependent, such that children can understand relational terms when they express familiar relationships, but experience difficulty in forming representations of novel relationships solely on the basis of linguistic input. The lexical components of because and so are understood during the context-dependent stage, and the transition from context-dependent to context-independent understanding does not reflect further lexical development, but rather increasing facility in dealing with decontextualized linguistic input.     

The Well- and Unwell-Being of a Child

The concept of the ‘well-being of the child’ (like the ‘child’s welfare’ and ‘best interests of the child’) has remained underdetermined in legal and ethical texts on the needs and rights of children. As a hypothetical construct that draws attention to the child’s long-term welfare, the well-being of the child is a broader concept than autonomy and happiness. This paper clarifies some conceptual issues of the well-being of the child from a philosophical point of view. The main question is how well-being could in practice acquire a concrete meaning and content for a particular issue or situation. A phenomenological-hermeneutic research perspective will be outlined that allows the child’s well-being to be elucidated and specified as an anthropological and ethical idea. It is based on a contextual understanding of generative relationships, a combination of the theory and practice of making sense, here described as ‘generative insight’, which could provide ethical guidance for decision making in families, legal practice, medicine or biomedical research.     

The identification of metaphor

A number of philosophers, linguists and psychologists have made the dual claim that metaphor is cognitively significant and that metaphorical utterances have a meaning not reducible to literal paraphrase. Such a position requires support from an account of metaphorical meaning that can render metaphors cognitively meaningful without the reduction to literal statement. It therefore requires a theory of meaning that can integrate metaphor within its sematics, yet specify why it is not reducible to literal paraphrase. I introduce the idea of a “second-order meaning”, of which metaphor is but one instance, that is a function on literal-conventional, i.e., first-order meaning, and outline a linguistic framework designed to provide a representation of linguistic meaning for both. This framework is designed to represent linguistic units ranging from a single word to an entire text since I argue that the by-now familiar position that the sentence is the appropriate unit for metaphor has mislead us into asking the wrong questions about metaphorical meaning. With this apparatus, we can specify the conditions under which an utterance may transcend the constraints on first-order meaning (transgressions not always apparent on the sentential level), without thereby being “meaningless”. Conversely, we can specify the conditions that may render apparently odd utterances first-order meaningful rather than metaphorical. In this way we see how metaphorical language differs both from deviant language and from specialized language such as technical language, fanciful and fantastical language (in fairy tales, science fiction, etc.).     

Using Linguistic Corpora as a Philosophical Tool

The central aims of this paper are to show how linguistic corpora have been used and can be used in philosophy and to argue that linguistic corpora and corpus analysis should be added to the philosopher’s toolkit of ways to address philosophical questions. A linguistic corpus is a curated collection of texts representing language use that can be queried to answer research questions. Among many other uses, linguistic corpora can help answer questions about the meaning of words and the structure of discourse. Through a discussion of examples, the paper shows that there are many philosophical questions that can be addressed by using a linguistic corpus. However, linguistic corpora need not (and often cannot) replace traditional philosophical methods. Lastly, it argues that the special properties of linguistic corpora, including their independence and the current ease and cheapness of access, make them an indispensable resource for philosophers.     

Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation

Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others’ behaviours through representing their mental states. Research into the ‘social brain’ has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive observation of others’ behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain. In this paper, we present a concept of social understanding as an ongoing, dynamical process of participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation. This process may be described (1) from a dynamical agentive systems point of view as an interaction and coordination of two embodied agents; (2) from a phenomenological approach as a mutual incorporation, i.e. a process in which the lived bodies of both participants extend and form a common intercorporality. Intersubjectivity, it is argued, is not a solitary task of deciphering or simulating the movements of others but means entering a process of embodied interaction and generating common meaning through it. This approach will be further illustrated by an analysis of primary dyadic interaction in early childhood.