The face‐mind link: Why we see minds behind faces,and how others' minds change how we see their face

Understanding others' minds has puzzled philosophers for centuries. Psychologists, too, have recently begun asking questions about what causes us to see another person as having complex or simple mental faculties. Here, we review recent evidence linking how we perceive others' faces with how we perceive others' minds—the face‐mind link. We first discuss research demonstrating a face‐to‐mind effect, showing that both certain facial features (e.g., eyes) and face perception processes (e.g., configural processing) can trigger the perception that a face has a mind. We then discuss recent evidence demonstrating a mind‐to‐face effect, showing that believing a person is inhumane (i.e., their mind) leads their face to be processed less like a face and more like an object. Finally, we consider both the consequences of this bidirectional face‐mind link, and what the next steps may be in understanding how and why we infer minds from faces, and how and why beliefs about others' minds affects how we see their face.     

Measurement‐Burst Designs for Social Health Research

Questions about variability and change in human behavior lie at the heart of much research in the behavioral sciences. This commentary examines the use of the measurement‐burst design ( Nesselroade, 1991 ) as an approach to study within‐person processes that transpire over very different temporal intervals. Consisting of repeated bursts of intensive (i.e., daily or momentary) assessments, the burst design can augment the type of information obtained from conventional daily diary and prospective longitudinal designs. We describe how the measurement‐burst approach can improve detection of long‐term intraindividual change, and how it can be used to study intraindividual variability and change in fine‐grained temporal relationships between daily experiences (e.g., hassles) and psychological states (e.g., mood). Some of the difficulties of implementing and analyzing data from measurement‐burst designs are discussed.     

On the influence of re-reading on mind wandering

Re-reading has been shown to have a minimal benefit on text comprehension, in comparison to reading only once or other types of study techniques (e.g., testing; self-explanation). In two experiments we examined the effect of re-reading on mind wandering. Participants read two texts, during which they responded to intermittent mind wandering probes. One text was read once and the other twice. Consistent with previous findings, there was no effect of re-reading on comprehension even though participants reported feeling more competent when they re-read the text. Critically, participants mind wandered more while re-reading. Furthermore, the effect of re-reading on mind wandering was specific to intentional forms of mind wandering rather than unintentional. The implications of these results for understanding mind wandering and the limited effectiveness of re-reading as a mnemonic are discussed.     

Tracking the train of thought from the laboratory into everyday life: An experience-sampling study of mind wandering across controlled and ecological contexts

In an experience-sampling study that bridged laboratory, ecological, and individual-differences approaches to mind-wandering research, 72 subjects completed an executive-control task with periodic thought probes (reported by McVay & Kane, 2009) and then carried PDAs for a week that signaled them eight times daily to report immediately whether their thoughts were off task. Subjects who reported more mind wandering during the laboratory task endorsed more mind-wandering experiences during everyday life (and were more likely to report worries as off-task thought content). We also conceptually replicated laboratory findings that mind wandering predicts task performance: Subjects rated their daily-life performance to be impaired when they reported off-task thoughts, with greatest impairment when subjects’ mind wandering lacked metaconsciousness. The propensity to mind wander appears to be a stable cognitive characteristic and seems to predict performance difficulties in daily life, just as it does in the laboratory     

Can reading time predict mind wandering in expository text?

Prior research has suggested that episodes of mind wandering not only negatively impact text comprehension but also are associated with fluctuations in reading behavior. However, these studies typically do not account for differences in the fundamental nature of the text itself, namely, whether it is narrative or expository in structure. As much research has supported the idea that these text genres are processed differently, it is of interest to determine whether similar changes in reading patterns are observed when mind wandering in an expository text. The present study examined whether fluctuations in sentence‐by‐sentence reading times were associated with periods of mindless reading during processing of an expository text. Results indicated that although mindless reading did negatively impact learning, probed reading time did not vary as a function of mind wandering. These results suggest that research aimed at studying mind wandering while reading may need to account for text genre.     

Episodic memory development: theory of mind is part of re‐experiencing experienced events

Two experiments with 3½‐ to 6½‐year‐old children showed that theory‐of‐mind development is associated with the growth of episodic memory. Episodic memory was assessed by manipulating informational conditions such that they permit or prevent the formation of episodic memories in terms of re‐experiencing the recalled event. Only experienced events, e.g. seeing how one puts a picture of a frog into a box, can be remembered by re‐experience. Events known through indirect information cannot be re‐experienced, e.g. putting pictures into the box when blindfolded and being later shown on video what was on these cards. Children were also tested on a battery of theory‐of‐mind tasks assessing their understanding of the origins of knowledge. There was a significant interaction in both experiments showing that recall of directly experienced items improved in relation to indirectly presented items the higher children's theory‐of‐mind scores. The discussion suggests that episodic memory development is specifically linked to the growing ability to introspect an ongoing experience and interpret it as representing an actual past event. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evil and Justice: An Experiential Personal Construct Approach

George Kelly (1955) made a philosophical assumption that the universe is integral or interconnected. This assumption, often overlooked by scholars, has profound implications for global issues facing the world today, including the perpetration of acts that can be considered evil. I first give an experiential personal construct psychology definition of evil (the perpetration of acts, out of our own woundedness, that harm another's central ways of being). I then discuss the ways that evil acts are manifested: objectifying others, denying connectedness, numbing of inner experiences, and a limited ability to introspect. Using these manifestations of evil, I illustrate the ways that evil acts are being perpetrated against others (e.g., travel bans, border walls) as well as the greater universe (e.g., ignoring climate change, exploiting the natural world). I conclude by discussing steps each person can take to minimize the perpetration of evil in the world today. Some of these actions are public (e.g., political, speaking up); others are more personal (e.g., maintaining an attitude of humility and reverence for the greater world). I advocate that people carefully and thoughtfully consider the implications of each action for all of our fellow humans as well as the entire planet.     

What would Batman do? Self‐distancing improves executive function in young children

This experimental research assessed the influence of graded levels of self‐distancing – psychological distancing from one's egocentric perspective – on executive function (EF) in young children. Three‐ (n = 48) and 5‐year‐old (n = 48) children were randomly assigned to one of four manipulations of distance from the self (from proximal to distal: self‐immersed, control, third person, and exemplar) on a comprehensive measure of EF. Performance increased as a function of self‐distancing across age groups. Follow‐up analyses indicated that 5‐year‐olds were driving this effect. They showed significant improvements in EF with increased distance from the self, outperforming controls both when taking a third person perspective on the self and when taking the perspective of an exemplar other (e.g., Batman) through role play. Three‐year‐olds, however, did not show increased EF performance as a function of greater distance from the self. Preliminary results suggest that developments in theory of mind might contribute to these age‐related differences in efficacy. These findings speak to the importance of psychological distancing in the expression of conscious control over thought and action from a young age and suggest a promising new avenue for early EF intervention.     

Big Picture,Bad Outcomes: When Visual Perspectives Harm Health Goal Pursuit

People often fail to achieve health goals, which compromises their well‐being. Prior research suggests that seeing events through an observer's eyes (i.e., adopting a third‐person perspective) should facilitate goal pursuit. However, we find that third‐person perspectives discourage goal‐consistent intentions and behavior for health goals when goal centrality is low (i.e., the goal is peripheral to one's self‐concept). In Experiment 1, people who adopted a third‐person perspective chose more sugary foods if they considered a healthy eating goal to be more peripheral to the self. Experiment 2 examines why a third‐person perspective can hinder goal pursuit; it encourages a breakdown in implemental thinking which, in turn, increases negative self‐conscious emotions. While high goal centrality buffers people from negative effects on goal intentions, low centrality does not. Experiment 3 demonstrates that this effect is robust when goal centrality is manipulated. We recommend that consumers pursuing health goals (and individuals who support them) exercise caution when employing perspective‐based strategies, as they may backfire for people at greatest risk of goal abandonment.     

Disclosure Experiences of Sexual Minority College Student Victims of Intimate Partner Violence

Although research on disclosure following intimate partner violence (IPV) victimization is burgeoning, sexual minority young adults’ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, questioning, etc.; LGBQ+) experiences have not received equal attention. The current study employed the minority stress framework to examine disclosure experiences of LGBQ+ college students across the United States reporting physical IPV victimization within their current relationship (n = 77). Participants completed measures assessing minority stress and IPV disclosure, and answered open‐ended questions regarding the most and least helpful persons/responses to disclosure or reasons for non‐disclosure. Results indicated that approximately one‐third (35 %) of victims disclosed to at least one person, with friends being the most common recipients. Thematic analyses indicated that talking or listening to the victim was considered the most helpful response and not understanding the situation least helpful. Reasons for non‐disclosure centered on themes of the victims’ perception that the IPV was not a big deal. Quantitative findings regarding physical IPV disclosure indicated that non‐disclosers experienced greater minority stress than disclosers. The current study suggests the presence of differences between sexual minority (i.e., LGBQ +persons) and non‐sexual minority persons, as well as between LGBQ+ young adults/college students and older adults and presents a theoretical structure (i.e., minority stress framework) through which these differences may be understood.     

Daily mental lapses and the subjective experience of true self-alienation

The current research drew upon cross-sectional evidence that feelings of being disconnected from one’s “true” self (true self-alienation) covary with tendencies to become mentally detached from present environmental stimuli (mind wandering). Two longitudinal studies tested the prospective associations between true self-alienation and mind wandering. Study 1 found evidence for a positive association between true self-alienation and mind wandering at the trait level only. Study 2, which employed a more optimal design, revealed reciprocal positive prospective associations between with-in person fluctuations in “true” self-alienation and mind wandering. Our results provide new evidence for the association between true self-alienation and mind wandering and suggest that basic aspects of conscious experience are prospectively linked to feelings of self-alienation.     

Can “you” make a difference? Investigating whether perspective‐taking improves performance on inconsistent mathematical word problems

Pronouns encouraging a second‐person perspective (e.g., “you/your”) affect peoples' mental representations constructed while reading and improve learning. The present study applied these insights to a domain in that such pronoun effects have yet been unexplored: mathematical word problem solving. Specifically, we encouraged a second‐person perspective (using “your”) in an attempt to reduce the consistency effect, that is, the finding that more errors are made on word problems containing a relational keyword inconsistent rather than consistent with the required arithmetic operation. Primary school children solved consistent and inconsistent word problems (containing the relational keywords “less than”) presented in third‐person (i.e., store name) or second‐person (“your store”) perspective. Results demonstrated the consistency effect, but the perspective manipulation did not produce significant differences between conditions, that is, a second‐person perspective did not reduce the consistency effect. These findings suggest that reducing the consistency effect may require a less subtle approach than using personalized pronouns.     

Perceptions of Credibility for a Memory Report of a Single Versus Repeated Event

Summary: When a person experiences an event that has multiple similar instances (i.e., a repeated event), memories for details that change across instances are challenging to recall. We expected that third parties would perceive memory reports of instances of repeated events as less credible than they would unique (i.e., single) events. Undergraduates participated in a single or repeated event, during which critical details were presented. Participants were asked to recall the session 2 days later, and memory reports were video recorded. New participants then viewed one video and evaluated the credibility of the speaker's memory report. Overall, repeated‐event reports were seen as less credible than were single‐event reports, despite the reports being equally accurate. Although credibility research in the context of repeated events has focused exclusively on child populations, a range of applications exists for adults (e.g., criminal and industrial eyewitnesses, and asylum seekers); we discussed our findings in these areas.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Embodied Simulations Are Modulated by Sentential Perspective

There is considerable evidence that language comprehenders derive lexical‐semantic meaning by mentally simulating perceptual and motor attributes of described events. However, the nature of these simulations—including the level of detail that is incorporated and contexts under which simulations occur—is not well understood. Here, we examine the effects of first‐ versus third‐person perspective on mental simulations during sentence comprehension. First‐person sentences describing physical transfer towards or away from the body (e.g., “You threw the microphone,” “You caught the microphone”) modulated response latencies when responses were made along a front‐back axis, consistent with the action‐sentence compatibility effect (ACE). This effect was not observed for third‐person sentences (“He threw the microphone,” “He caught the microphone”). The ACE was observed when making responses along a left‐right axis for third‐person, but not first‐person sentences. Abstract sentences (e.g., “He heard the message”) did not show an ACE along either axis. These results show that perspective is a detail that is simulated during action sentence comprehension, and that motoric activations are flexible and affected by the pronominal perspective used in the sentence.     

Drifting from slow to "D'oh!": working memory capacity and mind wandering predict extreme reaction times and executive control errors

A combined experimental, individual-differences, and thought-sampling study tested the predictions of executive attention (e.g., Engle & Kane, 2004) and coordinative binding (e.g., Oberauer, Süβ, Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007) theories of working memory capacity (WMC). We assessed 288 subjects' WMC and their performance and mind-wandering rates during a sustained-attention task; subjects completed either a go/no-go version requiring executive control over habit or a vigilance version that did not. We further combined the data with those from McVay and Kane (2009) to (1) gauge the contributions of WMC and attentional lapses to the worst performance rule and the tail, or τ parameter, of reaction time (RT) distributions; (2) assess which parameters from a quantitative evidence-accumulation RT model were predicted by WMC and mind-wandering reports; and (3) consider intrasubject RT patterns--particularly, speeding--as potential objective markers of mind wandering. We found that WMC predicted action and thought control in only some conditions, that attentional lapses (indicated by task-unrelated-thought reports and drift-rate variability in evidence accumulation) contributed to τ, performance accuracy, and WMC's association with them and that mind-wandering experiences were not predicted by trial-to-trial RT changes, and so they cannot always be inferred from objective performance measures.     

Everyday Attention: Variation in Mind Wandering and Memory in a Lecture

Understanding the factors underlying variation in attentional state is critical in a number of domains. Here, we investigate the relation between time on task and mind wandering (i.e., a state of decoupled attention) in the context of a lecture. Lectures are the primary means of knowledge transmission in post secondary education rendering an understanding of attentional variations in lectures a pressing practical concern. We report two experiments wherein participants watched a video recorded lecture either alone (Experiment 1) or in a classroom context (Experiment 2). Participants responded to mind wandering probes at various times in the lecture in an effort to track variations in mind wandering over time. In addition, following the lecture, memory for the lecture material was tested. Results demonstrate that in a lecture mind wandering increases with time on task and memory for the lecture material decreases. In addition, there was a significant relation between mind wandering and memory for lecture material. Theoretical and practical applications of the present results are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

自发走神和有意走神及其与元认知的关系

走神包括有意走神和自发走神两种类型,元认知对二者的影响可能不同。研究使用两维度走神量表和元认知-30量表,对国内部分高校学生的走神和元认知(元认知信念、元认知加工和认知自信判断)进行调查,结果显示:(1)走神可以划分为有意走神和自发走神;(2)失控和危险感既能预测自发走神也能预测有意走神,但认知自信只能预测自发走神,认知的自我意识只能预测有意走神。说明元认知对自发走神和有意走神的影响存在差异。     

The Impact of Modality on Mind Wandering during Comprehension

The executive resource hypothesis assumes a positive relationship between resource availability and mind wandering. Under the assumption that different modalities of information delivery differentially tax resources, we compared mind wandering across different modalities during the presentation of The Red Headed League (Experiment 1 and 2) and Walden (Experiment 3). An Audio only condition produced the most mind wandering. Two conditions that presumably consumed more executive resources than the Audio Only condition (i.e. Audio + Text and Self‐paced Reading) produced equivalent amounts of mind wandering during Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 3 the reading time of the Self‐paced readers moderated the effect of mind wandering in that the fast readers mind wandered more than those in the Audio + Text condition. Results are discussed in the context of the demands of different modes of information delivery methods and mind wandering as well as the potential effects of material type. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motivating meta-awareness of mind wandering: A way to catch the mind in flight?

Given the negative effects of mind wandering on performance, it may be profitable to be aware of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) as they occur. The present study investigated whether motivating people to catch TUTs increases meta-awareness. We offered incentives for increased self-catching during reading. To enhance the veracity of these self-reports, we used a “bogus-pipeline” procedure; we convinced participants that their mental states were being covertly monitored using physiological measures. In reality, mind wandering was assessed covertly by a secondary task (“gibberish detection”), and overtly by experience sampling. The results showed that incentives increased the number of self-catches without increasing overall mind wandering. Moreover, both the bogus pipeline and the opportunity for incentives increased the validity of self-reports, evidenced by significantly increased correlations between self-caught and behaviorally assessed mind wandering. We discuss the relevance of this methodological approach for research on mind wandering and research building on introspective reports more generally.     

Dreaming and waking: similarities and differences revisited

Dreaming is often characterized as lacking high-order cognitive (HOC) skills. In two studies, we test the alternative hypothesis that the dreaming mind is highly similar to the waking mind. Multiple experience samples were obtained from late-night REM sleep and waking, following a systematic protocol described in Kahan (2001). Results indicated that reported dreaming and waking experiences are surprisingly similar in their cognitive and sensory qualities. Concurrently, ratings of dreaming and waking experiences were markedly different on questions of general reality orientation and logical organization (e.g., the bizarreness or typicality of the events, actions, and locations). Consistent with other recent studies (e.g., [Bulkeley and Kahan, 2008] and [Kozmová and Wolman, 2006] ), experiences sampled from dreaming and waking were more similar with respect to their process features than with respect to their structural features.