Temporal Anaphora with Spanish <Emphasis Type="BoldItalic">Imperfecto</Emphasis>

This paper argues against the assumption that Spanish—and more generally Romance—imperfective past (IMP) is an intrinsically anaphoric tense. It is a widely accepted view that IMP requires a temporal discourse antecedent to be licensed. My aim is to show that such requirement is not actually in force when IMP combines with a stative/atelic predicate. In fact, with stative/atelic predicates, IMP (a) is acceptable in isolated sentences with no suitable antecedent available, (b) is able to access implicit assumptions that are not available with telic predicates—but do not behave as real antecedents, and (c) does not trigger certain perspectivisation effects that depend on the existence of a temporal antecedent. As a result, an asymmetry arises between continuous and habitual interpretations of IMP, which do not require retrieving a temporal antecedent, and progressive and narrative interpretations, which do need an accessible antecedent. Thus, the relevance of a discourse antecedent varies according to the lexical aspect of the predicate and the corresponding interpretations, and the alleged anaphoric nature of IMP cannot be a feature of its semantics: it is rather pragmatically derived from imperfectivity.     

Combinations of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Stit</Emphasis> with <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ought</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Know</Emphasis>

This paper presents a short survey of recent developments in stit theories, with an emphasis on combinations of stit and deontic logic, and those of stit and epistemic logic.     

The Power of Belnap: Sequent Systems for <Emphasis Type="BoldItalic">SIXTEEN</Emphasis><Subscript><Emphasis Type="Bold">3</Emphasis></Subscript>

The trilattice SIXTEEN₃\textit{SIXTEEN}_3 is a natural generalization of the well-known bilattice FOUR₂\textit{FOUR}_2. Cut-free, sound and complete sequent calculi for truth entailment and falsity entailment in SIXTEEN₃\textit{SIXTEEN}_3 are presented.     

Precis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Philosophy and Neuroscience</Emphasis>: <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Ruthlessly Reductive Account</Emphasis>

This book precis describes the motives behind my recent attempt to bring to bear “ruthlessly reductive” results from cellular and molecular neuroscience onto issues in the philosophy of mind. Since readers of this journal will probably be most interested in results addressing features of conscious experience, I highlight these most prominently. My main challenge is that philosophers (even scientifically-inspired ones) are missing the nature and scope of reductionism in contemporary neuroscience by focusing exclusively on higher-level cognitive neuroscience, and ignoring the discipline's cell-physiological and molecular-biological core.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ziran</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Wuwei</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Daodejing</Emphasis>: An Ethical Assessment

In Daoist philosophy, the self is understood as an individual interdependent with others, and situated within a broader environment. Within this framework, the concept ziran is frequently understood in terms of naturalness or nature while wuwei is explained in terms of non-oppressive government. In many existing accounts, little is done to connect these two key Daoist concepts. Here, I suggest that wuwei and ziran are correlated, ethical, concepts. Together, they provide a unifying ethical framework for understanding the philosophy of the Daodejing. I explore the meaning of ziran as self-so-ness or, in human terms, as pertaining to an individual’s spontaneity. The appropriate response to the spontaneity of individuals is to avoid, insofar as possible, imposing or using restrictive norms and methods, that is, wuwei. According to this view, ziran and wuwei offer an account of ethics that attends to core notions of interdependent selfhood, including mutuality, relationality, interdependence, symbiosis, and responsiveness.