Discursive Psychology and its Empirical Programme. Reviewed by Wendy Drewery. A reply by the author,Derek Edwards

Derek Edwards is Professor of Psychology at Loughborough University. His main interests are in the analysis of discourse and conversation and discursive psychology. His other books include: Discourse and Cognition (1997, Sage), Common Knowledge (with Neil Mercer, 1987, Routledge), Ideological Dilemmas (with Michael Billig and others, 1988, Sage), Discursive Psychology (with Jonathan Potter, 1992, Sage). Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What is (Dis)Agreement?

When do we agree? The answer might once have seemed simple and obvious; we agree that p when we each believe that p. But from a formal epistemological perspective, where degrees of belief are more fundamental than beliefs, this answer is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, there is reason to suppose that it is false; degrees of belief about p might differ when beliefs simpliciter on p do not. On the other hand, even if it is true, it is too vague; for what it is to believe simpliciter ought to be explained in terms of degrees of belief. This paper presents several possible notions of agreement, and corresponding notions of disagreement. It indicates how the findings are fruitful for the epistemology of disagreement, with special reference to the notion of epistemic peerhood.     

Inconsistency as an interactional problem: a lesson from political rhetoric

The classical theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that when two related cognitions are mutually inconsistent, one of them will change to restore consistency. However, Billig suggests that inconsistency is primarily an interactional problem between subjects and not a cognitive problem within a subject. In the current paper, we adopt Billig's rhetorical approach to inconsistency and study inconsistency as an interactional problem in the context of political rhetoric. More specifically, we use Action-Implicative Discourse Analysis to identify the discursive strategies the former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, used to cope with the inconsistency between his national ideology and his contradictory behavior during his short term in office.     

British Citizenship and the ‘Other’: An Analysis of the Earned Citizenship Discourse

This paper presents an analysis of interviews conducted with citizenship officers in London, working within the field of British naturalisation. We draw from a rhetorical psychology perspective to study the dilemmatic tensions that exist in the participants' discourse about naturalisation applicants who are constructed as ‘good’ and ‘bad’, as both ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ of British citizenship. In line with a rhetorical approach, we argue that these different constructions of the migrant are strategic and are associated with different constructions of Britain as humanitarian and tolerant, on the one hand, and as being under threat by the influx of immigration, on the other hand. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of this ambivalence for processes of inclusion and exclusion. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rhetorical theory and family therapy practice

The study found that a connection exists between rhetoric and therapy because both fields are interested in using language as a tool for generating change. Persuasion is viewed as inherent in human communication, even though people do not necessarily intentionally attempt to persuade others. Following a brief (but detailed) explanation of the theoretical stance which informs the implementation of rhetorical techniques in therapy, three pragmatic exemplars are offered to demonstrate the employment of two classical rhetorical concepts, the parastasis catalogue and syncrisis.The authors are grateful to Sandra Kodner, MS for her participation in the development of this project.     

Everyday rhetoric: Argument and persuasion in everyday life

While the study of rhetoric in the humanities has an impressive pedigree, rhetorical analysis in organization studies is rather less developed. In this article, I want to provide an introduction to rhetorical analysis, drawing particularly on the work of Billig (1996) and Potter (1996), and illustrate its application to organizational issues through a case example concerning technological change in a public sector organization. In doing this, I demonstrate how alternative approaches to traditional positivism may augment the explanatory power of research in work and organizational psychology. In particular, I want to argue that an awareness of the everyday rhetoric of organizational talk can be illuminating in explaining how the work of an organization is accomplished.     

Similarity, feature discovery, and the size principle

In this paper we consider the “size principle” for featural similarity, which states that rare features should be weighted more heavily than common features in people’s evaluations of the similarity between two entities. Specifically, it predicts that if a feature is possessed by n objects, the expected weight scales according to a 1/n law. One justification of the size principle emerges from a Bayesian analysis of simple induction problems ( [Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001a] and [Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001b]), and is closely related to work by Shepard (1987) proposing universal laws for inductive generalization. In this article, we (1) show that the size principle can be more generally derived as an expression of a form of representational optimality, and (2) present analyses suggesting that across 11 different data sets in the domains of animals and artifacts, human judgments are in agreement with this law. A number of implications are discussed.     

Phenomenology,Realism and Logic

One never gets beyond time. Husserl, says only that there are many ways of living time. On the one hand, there is the passive way, in which one is inside time and submits to it—being in time [Innerzeitigkeit], On the other hand, one can take over this time and live it through for oneself. But in either case one is temporal and never gets beyond time.¹     

Tableaux for Łukasiewicz Infinite-valued Logic

In this work we propose a labelled tableau method for ukasiewicz infinite-valued logic L . The method is based on the Kripke semantics of this logic developed by Urquhart [25] and Scott [24]. On the one hand, our method falls under the general paradigm of labelled deduction [8] and it is rather close to the tableau systems for sub-structural logics proposed in [4]. On the other hand, it provides a CoNP decision procedure for L validity by reducing the check of branch closure to linear programming     

Difference and Repetition in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Both Sitting Duet</Emphasis>

In this paper I identify and explore resonances between a contemporary dance piece – Jonathan Burrowss and Matteo Fargions Both Sitting Duet (2003) – and some theories from Gilles Deleuzes Difference and Repetition (1994). The duet consists of rhythmic, repetitive patterns of mainly hand movements performed by two men, for the most part, sitting on chairs. My argument, with Deleuze, is that the repetitions in the dance are productive rather than reductive. They are never repetitions of the same. The ways in which the hand patterns are played with constitute the multiple differences and repetitions we witness. I discuss these in relation to Deleuzes theories of repetition, specifically the ways in which repetition differs from resemblance avoiding the limitations of notions of origin and representation. I argue that, because of these differences which are bound up in the affective qualities of the duet that characterise the distinctive relationship between the two performers, the work, like Deleuzes theories, is transgressive with potential for change. I demonstrate this through its resonances with Deleuzes notions of simulacra and importantly his discussion of the Other. In the process, I aim to show how dance and philosophy can open up something of each other and, in this instance, suggest ways of thinking encounters otherwise. My aim is to foreground the transgressive potential of the extended repetition of the dance for making differences that matter between self and other.     

Convergence to the Truth Without Countable Additivity

Must probabilities be countably additive? On the one hand, arguably, requiring countable additivity is too restrictive. As de Finetti pointed out, there are situations in which it is reasonable to use merely finitely additive probabilities. On the other hand, countable additivity is fruitful. It can be used to prove deep mathematical theorems that do not follow from finite additivity alone. One of the most philosophically important examples of such a result is the Bayesian convergence to the truth theorem, which says that conditional probabilities converge to 1 for true hypotheses and to 0 for false hypotheses. In view of the long-standing debate about countable additivity, it is natural to ask in what circumstances finitely additive theories deliver the same results as the countably additive theory. This paper addresses that question and initiates a systematic study of convergence to the truth in a finitely additive setting. There is also some discussion of how the formal results can be applied to ongoing debates in epistemology and the philosophy of science.

     

Précis of The Situated Self

The riddle posed by the double nature of the ego certainly lies beyond [the limits of science]. On the one hand, I am a real individual man, born by a mother and destined to carrying out real and psychical acts (far too many, I may think, if boarding a subway during an hour). On the other hand, I am “vision” open to reason, a self‐penetrating light, immanent sense‐giving consciousness, or how ever you may call it, and as such unique. (Weyl, Address, 3)     

Évaluation de l'efficacité d'un entraînement mnésique chez des personnes très âgées dépressives institutionnalisées

The focus of this work is to study the influence of “memory's training” on a group of 27 depressed elderly residents (age's mean = 84.77; GDS's mean = 17.7) and 28 non-depressed elderly residents (age's mean = 84.96; GDS's mean = 3.5) with self-reported memory loss. The training's task was a free recall using mmemonic method of Loci with each person. Results showed that depressed residents increase their performances during the training's sessions like non-depressed residents but not to the post-test. Consequently, the memory complaint is an indicator to propose to elderly person memory's training if the prevalence of depression is establish, so it is to be hoped that further or additional interventions be proposed.     

Rhetoric and Dialectic from the Standpoint of Normative Pragmatics

Normative pragmatics can bridge the differences between dialectical and rhetorical theories in a way that saves the central insights of both. Normative pragmatics calls attention to how the manifest strategic design of a message produces interpretive effects and interactional consequences. Argumentative analysis of messages should begin with the manifest persuasive rationale they communicate. But not all persuasive inducements should be treated as arguments. Arguments express with a special pragmatic force propositions where those propositions stand in particular inferential relations to one another. Normative pragmatics provides a framework within which varieties of propositional inference and pragmatic force may be kept straight. Normative pragmatics conceptualizes argumentative effectiveness in a way that integrates notions of rhetorical strategy and rhetorical situation with dialectical norms and procedures for reasonable deliberation. Strategic effectiveness should be seen in terms of maximizing the chances that claims and arguments will be reasonably evaluated, whether or not they are accepted. Procedural rationality should be seen in terms of adjustment to the demands of concrete circumstances. Two types of adjustment are illustrated: rhetorical strategies for framing the conditions for dialectical deliberation and rhetorical strategies for making do with limitations to dialectical deliberation.     

The gifts of culture and of eloquence: An open letter to Michael J. Mahoney in reply to his article, "Scientific psychology and radical behaviorism"

In what seems to be a response to a paper by Skinner (1987), Mahoney (1989) provides evidence of unfamiliarity with and intellectual intolerance toward radical behaviorism by presenting a critique of it that includes a variety of improper and counterfactual attributions. For example, he argues that radical behaviorism is Cartesian rather than Baconian when the historical record shows the opposite, that it is fundamentally associationist when in fact it is selectionist, and that its philosophy of science is essentially that of operationalism and logical positivism when instead it moved on to other criteria decades ago. The details of Mahoney's history are sometimes flawed and sometimes unsubstantiated, as when he provides a distorted account of the origins of the Association for Behavior Analysis or when he makes undocumented claims about the banning of books. On examination, many of his arguments are couched in stylistic terms that share their rhetorical features with racial, ethnic, and religious stereotyping.     

Admissions of racism in discourse on migration in Greece: Beyond the norm against prejudice?

The turn to language in social psychology is closely related to the study of prejudice as racist discourse has been the subject matter of some of the ground‐breaking discourse analytic work. A widely accepted argument was that there seems to be a norm against prejudice informing Western societies: people commonly engage in denials of prejudice when they make negative comments about minorities. Recent work has argued that, due to ideological shifts in the wider societal context or because denying prejudice may not be people's only rhetorical concern, it is possible to find people admitting prejudice. We examine how people in Greece, Greek majority and immigrants, formulate admissions of racism in interviews on migration and citizenship in Greece. Drawing on Ideological Dilemmas and Critical Discursive Social Psychology, we argue that these admissions ironically operate within the norm against prejudice and discuss our findings in relation to the wider socio‐political Greek context.     

La localisation cérébrale des facultés mentales

Although the word faculty has been criticized by « scientific » psychologists, Fodor used it more recently in his famous book on modularity of mind (1983). During second half of the xixth, the cerebral localization of faculties or mental functions by phrenologists and physiologists interested most researchers which have continued in the same way but with others technologies like functional cerebral imagery. We underlined in the paper the difficulties associated with the discovery of the precise localization of the mental functions and the necessity of reinforcing the dialogue between neurosciences, psychology and philosophy.     

In Defense of the Notion of Truthlikeness

The notion of truthlikeness (verisimilitude, approximate truth), coined by Karl Popper, has very much fallen into oblivion, but the paper defends it. It can be regarded in two different ways. Either as a notion that is meaningful only if some formal measure of degree of truthlikeness can be constructed; or as a merely non-formal comparative notion that nonetheless has important functions to fulfill. It is the latter notion that is defended; it is claimed that such a notion is needed for both a reasonable backward-looking and a reasonable forward-looking view of science. On the one hand, it is needed in order to make sense of the history of science as containing a development; on the other, it is needed in order to understand present-day sciences as containing knowledge-seeking activities. The defense of truthlikeness requires also a defense of two other notions: quasi-comparisons and regulative ideas, which is supplied in this paper as well.     

Analyzing Argumentative Discourse from a Rhetorical Perspective: Defining `Person' and `Human Life' in Constitutional Disputes Over Abortion

In this paper, a case study is presented of constitutional debates about abortion. An analysis is given of arguments from the Roe v. Wade case for definitions concerning the key notions of `person' and `human life'. The paper illustrates how the Court has gradually taken a more pragmatic or rhetorical position on definitional matters crucial to the purpose of regulating abortion.