言语产生中双词素词的语音编码

采用同音判断和音节监控方法 ,考察言语产生中双词素词语音激活的特点。选用以偏正结构的双词素词为名称的图片和与双词素词中首尾两个词素同音的两组探测字作为实验材料 ,探测字在图片呈现后 5 0毫秒 (实验一 ) ,或图片呈现前 130 0毫秒 (实验二 )出现 ,要求被试判断出现的字是否与图片名称中任何一个词素同音。实验结果与绝大部分言语产生理论的预期相反 ,对图片名称第一词素的反应慢于第二词素。考虑到首尾两个词素对整词意义贡献的差别 ,作者把实验结果解释为词素意义对语音激活的作用 :第二词素的语义重要性决定了对应音节激活的快速性 ,双词素词中词素音位激活的速度和时间性受词义和词素意义激活程度的影响 ,而不完全取决于词素发音的序列性。实验不支持音位编码从左到右、序列进行的观点     

THE ASSIMILATION ARGUMENT AND THE ROLLBACK ARGUMENT

Seth Shabo has presented a new argument that attempts to codify familiar worries about indeterminism, luck, and control. His ‘Assimilation Argument’ contends that libertarians cannot distinguish overtly randomized outcomes from exercises of free will. Shabo claims that the argument possesses advantages over the Mind Argument and Rollback Argument, which also purport to establish that indeterminism is incompatible with free will. I argue first that the Assimilation Argument presents no new challenges over and above those presented by the Rollback Argument, and second that the Rollback Argument itself neither presents a deep challenge to, nor raises the cost of, accepting libertarianism.     

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND THE DEVIL

The 'parody objection' to the ontological argument for the existence of God advances parallel arguments apparently proving the existence of various absurd entities. I discuss recent versions of the parody objection concerning the existence of 'AntiGod' and the devil, as introduced by Peter Millican and Timothy Chambers. I argue that the parody objection always fails, because any parody is either (i) not structurally parallel to the ontological argument, or (ii) not dialectically parallel to the ontological argument. Moreover, once a parody argument is modified in such a way that it avoids (i) and (ii), it is, ironically, no longer a parody – it is the ontological argument itself.     

DEMONS AND THE ISOLATION ARGUMENT

Justifying a belief gives reason to think that the belief is true. So our concept of justification contains a 'truth connection'. I canvass a number of proposals for analysing this. In the end, two competing conceptions of the truth connection remain: the first, that justifying a belief makes the belief objectively probable, the second, that justifying a belief makes the belief probable in a world which would make true our other beliefs. I discuss reasons for embracing and rejecting these two versions of the truth connection. Ultimately, the two versions appear to represent distinct but equally plausible conceptions of justification. I conclude by rejecting the proposal that these truth connections respectively capture internalist and externalist conceptions of justification.     

DEFLATIONISM AND THE SUCCESS ARGUMENT

Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal–explanatory property. However, the now familiar 'success argument' attempts to show that truth plays an important causal–explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal–explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of causal explanations, the standard deflationist response is inconsistent, for on this account even logical properties can be causally explanatory. Therefore the deflationist should remain neutral as to whether truth is a causal–explanatory property, and focus instead on the claim that truth, if it is a property, is a merely logical one.     

THOUGHT,LANGUAGE, AND THE ARGUMENT FROM EXPLICITNESS

Abstract: This article deals with the relationship between language and thought, focusing on the question of whether language can be a vehicle of thought, as, for example, Peter Carruthers has claimed. We develop and examine a powerful argument—the “argument from explicitness”—against this cognitive role of language. The premises of the argument are just two: (1) the vehicle of thought has to be explicit, and (2) natural languages are not explicit. We explain what these simple premises mean and why we should believe they are true. Finally, we argue that even though the argument from explicitness shows that natural language cannot be a vehicle of thought, there is a cognitive function for language.     

汉语词汇产生中音、形、义三种信息激活的时间进程

采用图-词干扰范式和图片命名方法,探讨语音、语义、字形在汉语词汇产生中激活的时间进程与特点。选择与目标图片名称(如“羊”)具有同音(“阳”)、语义相联(“牛”)、字形相似(“丰”)或无关控制(“冷”)等四种关系的干扰字,依SOA条件呈现在将要被命名的图片上,发现图片命名时间受干扰字的影响：语义干扰效应存在于较早期的SOA(0ms)条件中,在较晚期SOA(150ms)时有很大的减弱;语音促进效应和字形促进效应同时强烈地存在于早期和晚期SOA。实验发现了词条选择(语义激活)和音位编码(语音提取)在激活时间上的重叠现象,与传统的独立两阶段模型的预期存在明显矛盾,倾向于支持交互作用理论的观点。     

SPEECH CONVERGENCE AND SPEECH EVALUATION IN FACT-FINDING INTERVIEWS

The purpose of this study was to examine speech convergence and speech evaluation in fact-finding interviews conducted in the field. Forty interviewers (ERs), undergraduates enrolled in a class on interviewing processes, conducted 20–30 minute interviews with selected interviewees (EEs), business persons and professionals in fields of interest to the ERs. Speech behaviors examined included response latency, speech rate, and turn duration; these were coded per one minute intervals of each interaction. Time series regression procedures indicated that both ERs and EEs converged speech rate and response latency toward their interlocutors' performances of these behaviors. Although turn duration convergence did not characterize the entire data set, male-male dyads did converge significantly and male (ER)-female (EE) dyads significantly diverged turn duration. Regarding speech evaluation, there was some evidence that greater response latency similarity, greater speech rate and response latency convergence, and faster ER speech and slower EE speech were positively related to the competence and social attractiveness judgments of participants. Limitations and implications are discussed.     

REPRESENTATIONALISM AND THE ARGUMENT FROM HALLUCINATION

Abstract: Representationalism is sometimes advertised as providing a novel response to the argument from hallucination, one that accepts the presence of a 'common factor' between veridical and hallucinatory experience without positing sensory intermediaries between the mind and the world. I argue that much of the attractiveness of representationalism stems from a failure in the literature to distinguish between two distinct possible versions of representationalism, what I call 'content-based representationalism' and 'vehicle-based representationalism'. Generically, representationalism appears to have a response to the argument from hallucination that avoids a commitment to qualia or sense-data. But once the distinction between content-based representationalism and vehicle-based representationalism is recognized, this response to the argument from hallucination fails.     

THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT AND HIGHER-ORDER PROPERTIES

The paper argues that Jackson's knowledge argument fails to undermine physicalist ontology. First, it is argued that, as this argument stands, it begs the question. Second, it is suggested that, by supplementing the argument (and taking one of its premises for granted), this flaw can be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against type‐physicalism; however, this flaw cannot be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against token‐physicalism. The argument cannot be supplemented so as to show that experiences have properties which are illegitimate from a physicalist perspective.     

THE WEAK ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT

Abstract. The design argument for God's existence was critically assessed when in the growth of modern science the cognitive value of ideological categories was called into question. In recent discussions dealing with anthropic principles there has appeared a new version of the design argument, in which cosmic design is described without the use of ideological terms. The weak anthropic principle (WAP), a most critical version of all these principles, describes the fine-tuning of physical parameters necessary lo the genesis of carbon-based life. It defines no physical mechanisms of the observed coordination between physical parameters. If in a future unified physical theory such mechanisms are discovered, the weak anthropic principle should be replaced by the strong anthropic principle, which asserts the physical necessity of fine-tuning. Neither of the versions can be regarded as physically trivial unless one accepts strong assumptions of the existence of parallel universes. Consequently, a new version of the philosophical design argument can be developed on the basis of the weak anthropic principle.     

汉语词汇产生中语义、语音层次之间的交互作用

采用3种方法考察汉语词汇产生中语义激活（词条选择）和音位编码这两个阶段之间的关系。实验一、二分别采用图片命名法和干扰字命名法,发现目标图片（“牛”）的语义相关词（“羊”）的语音信息得到了激活,说明汉语词汇产生中存在多重语音激活,音位编码在词条选择完成之前既已开始。实验三采用语义范畴判断法,考察语音信息的激活是否会向上反馈到词条和语义层次,发现目标图片（“羊”）的同音字（“阳”）不会促进对图片的语义判断。研究表明,多重语音激活与语音激活向词条和语义层次反馈是两个独立的,可以分割的问题。虽然实验一和二的结果符合相互作用理论,实验三的结果符合模块化观点,但就总体而言,本研究更加支持词汇产生中的模块化观点     

UNREFLECTIVE ACTION AND THE ARGUMENT FROM SPEED

Hubert Dreyfus has defended a novel view of agency, most notably in his debate with John McDowell. Dreyfus argues that expert actions are primarily unreflective and do not involve conceptual activity. In unreflective action, embodied know‐how plays the role reflection and conceptuality play in the actions of novices. Dreyfus employs two arguments to support his conclusion: the argument from speed and the phenomenological argument. I argue that Dreyfus's argumentative strategies are not successful, since he relies on a dubious assumption about concepts and reflection. I suggest that Dreyfus is committed to a minimal view of conceptuality in action.