Julian of Norwich: Problems of Evil and the Seriousness of Sin

Julian of Norwich emphasizes God’s eternal and unchanging love for humankind. Her visions show how God is not angry with our sins and so has no need to forgive us. God does not shame or blame us but excuses us and plans how to reward and compensate us for sin. In relation to Mother Jesus, we remain dear lovely children who need help, correction, and education. Although these remarks suggest to some that Julian must be “soft” on sin, that she has no adequate appreciation of the worthiness of God or the dignity of human nature, I argue that this is far from the case. On the contrary, she makes Divine worthiness axiomatic and urges readers to live into it. She relocates human dignity not in its intrinsic value but in our centrality to God’s plan. She measures the seriousness of sin in terms of the “real hard work” it takes to rear us up out of it: crucifixion for Christ, the hell of being a sinner and the crucifixion of life-long penance for us. Nevertheless, the brightness of her visions dominates with her assurance that despite the sin-produced sufferings of this present life, all will be well.     

"Where Theologians Fear to Tread"

This essay appeals to the practice of Baroque musical ornamentation as an analogy to the place of reflection on angels and demons in Christian theology. In ways left to the discretion of the performer, this reflection functions to enhance the main theological melody of God, Christ, human salvation, and, in particular, eschatology. Jonathan Edwards and Karl Barth are the text cases for this thesis. While Edwards' treatment of angels and Satan mutes his eschatology of glory by drawing attention to the humility and suffering of Christ, Barth's treatment underscores the sovereignty of God and Christ's victory over sin.     

THE ART OF DYING: IN LUTHER'S SERMON ON PREPARING TO DIE

Luther counseled those preparing to die to ponder the three ‘glowing pictures’ of Christ –‘life, grace, and heaven’, as well as the affective ‘sign’ of the sacrament – to drive out the three counterpictures produced by the devil –‘death, sin, and hell’. The proper timing of contemplation before death and the proper orientation of clinging to Christ and his merciful acts on the cross will empower the sufferer to face death with confidence. Before the saving image of Christ, the trilogy produced by evil vanishes of itself without opposition, a psychological phenomenon which incites faith in us and praise of God at this last hour. The annihilating knowledge of the negative images may be useful, therefore, if it drives us into the arms of Christ.     

Is penal substitution unjust?

Penal substitution in a theological context is the doctrine that God inflicted upon Christ the suffering which we deserved as the punishment for our sins, as a result of which we no longer deserve punishment. Ever since the time of Faustus Socinus, the doctrine has faced formidable, and some would say insuperable, philosophical challenges. Critics of penal substitution frequently assert that God’s punishing Christ in our place would be an injustice on God’s part. For it is an axiom of retributive justice that it is unjust to punish an innocent person. But Christ was an innocent person. Since God is perfectly just, He cannot therefore have punished Christ. Virtually every premiss in this argument is challengeable. Not all penal substitution theories affirm that Christ was punished for our sins. The argument makes unwarranted assumptions about the ontological foundations of moral duty independent of God’s commands. It presupposes without warrant that God is by nature an unqualified negative retributivist. It overlooks the possibility that the prima facie demands of negative retributive justice might be overridden in Christ’s case by weightier moral considerations. And it takes it for granted that Christ was legally innocent, which is denied by the classic doctrine of imputation. It thus fails to show any injustice in God’s punishing Christ in our place.     

The resurrection as near-death experience

I suggest in this paper that Jesus Christ was not clinically dead but in a deep coma when he was taken down from the cross. He was revided by Joseph of Arimathea, who was permitted to take Jesus's body into his care. By Pentecost, seven weeks later, Jesus had finally recovered from his wounds, and his reappearance convinced his followers that he was the Son of God. I suggest that the Resurrection was not a physical happening, but a near-death experience. As such, it was totally real to Christ himself, and it also confirmed his belief that he could, by proxy, discharge humanity's sins.Roger B. Cook, M.A., was until 1991 a lecturer at the Open University, Milton Keynes, England.     

Luther's Heidelberg Disputation and identity formation

Luther's famous Ninety‐five Theses overshadowed his twenty‐eight theses of the Heidelberg Disputation. This is regrettable insofar as Luther broke in Heidelberg with the traditional scholastic method and introduced for the first time publicly his influential theology of the cross. Luther's existential emphasis in this Disputation is particularly significant, because he answers here the big questions for us: Who am I really in the sight of God? What is my true identity in Christ? Luther radically exposes our self‐centeredness and calls us to look at the world, God, and ourselves through “suffering and the cross,” as only in this way will we be able to perceive clearly and “say what a thing is.” He encourages us to become theologians of the cross who have given up on themselves and discovered that “everything is already done.” Luther's passionate plea to put the cross of Christ at the center of our lives is a welcome reminder for us today, even five hundred years later, as we seek to find out who we are, who God is, and what God is accomplishing in and through us. Rescuing Luther's Heidelberg Disputation from oblivion is vital for the health of both church and academia today.     

Beyond Existentialism: Kierkegaard on the Human Relationship with the God Who is Wholly Other

Recent scholarship argues that, for Kierkegaard, God's absolute alterity is a consequence of sin that is overcome by the redemptive activity of Jesus Christ. On such a reading, the work of Christ delivers individuals to lives of faith that are not infinitely qualitatively different from God. This fails to recognize that the absolute otherness of God is overcome not simply by the redemptive work of Christ but in and through the person of Christ. The failure to grasp this has tied Kierkegaard to an anthropocentric theology that prioritizes Christ's contribution to existential human development. This article challenges this perception by establishing Kierkegaard's emphasis that God would remain infinitely removed from humanity were it not for the continuing mediation of Jesus Christ.     

Communal Reconciliation: Corporate Responsibility and Opposition to Systemic Sin

Recent events have given rise to considerations of systemic sin and how the church should respond to it. This article looks at passages in the Hebrew Bible which demonstrate the communal character of sin and atonement. God holds the whole nation responsible despite righteous individuals, often for the sins of individuals. Paul develops this relation between individuals and groups in his ecclesiology. I argue from this development that responsibility for sins, individual or systemic, is placed on the whole community. Thus, there is for the church a corporate responsibility for reconciliation, demanding group agency in rectifying systemic sins like racism.     

Suffering, meaning, and bioethics.

Suffering evokes moral and metaphysical reflection, the bioethics of suffering concerns the proper ethos of living with suffering. Because empirical and philosophical explorations of suffering are imprisoned in the world of immanent experience, they cannot reach to a transcendent meaning. Even if religious and other narratives concerning the meaning of suffering have no transcendent import, they can have aesthetic and moral significance. This understanding of narratives of suffering and of their custodians has substantial ecumenical implications: chaplains can function as general custodians of narratives and sustainers of a generic religious meaning. This understanding is contrary to traditional Christianity, which discloses a transcendent significance of human suffering found in a very particular history involving particular persons: Christ as the second Adam through the submission of the second Eve has taken on our nature so that we can be united with God. Human suffering is tied to human sin, not simply as a punishment for sin, much less as an opportunity to discharge a supposed temporal punishment due to sin. Human suffering is the result of our rebellious free choices. It provides an opportunity for humility and submission, so that, united to the cross of Christ, sin can be forgiven and suffering set aside in the Resurrection. Knowledge of this framing context for all human suffering is accessible not through rational argument. It is a knowledge garnered through repentance, purification of the heart, illumination by God's grace, and unification with God. Christian bioethics is embedded in the narrative of suffering, which is part of the history of salvation and which encompasses and places all of medicine in its terms.     

Barth and Anselm: God,Christ and the Atonement

This article considers God, Christ and the atonement in the work of Anselm and Barth. It identifies key points of agreement regarding God's self‐assigned identity and the importance of dyothelitism; it discerns a marked divergence of opinion with respect to the atonement. Anselm construes the atonement in terms of a gift that Christ offers on behalf of sinful humankind. Barth, on the other hand, presents a view of atonement that builds on his revolutionary doctrine of election. He describes the cross as an event in which sin is ‘burned up’, cancelled and overcome within the time and space of God's being.     

Non-Penal Substitution

Abstract:  McLeod Campbell is synonymous with the doctrine of atonement known as vicarious penitence, according to which Christ atones for human sin by repenting on behalf of fallen human beings. This understanding of Christ's work has been very influential, but not always clearly understood. In this article I set out a version of this doctrine, called non-penal substitution, drawing on the work of Jonathan Edwards, the original inspiration for Campbell's work. This version of non-penal substitution is able to overcome several difficulties for the Campbellian version of the doctrine and offers an intriguing and original way of conceiving the work of Christ that, unlike Campbell's account, does not require revisions to the doctrine of God.     

Luther on Ubiquity and a Theology of the Public

Abstract:  In this article, I contest Milbank's critiques of Luther by underscoring the participatory theme in his treatment of faith. After considering faith's relation to the presence of Christ, I explore Luther's treatment of real presence in his theology of the Lord's Supper. His appeal to ubiquity in this regard functions doxologically to counter the possibility of the orchestration of Christ's presence. The promised nature of that presence, however, emphasizes that God graciously elicits a faith which apprehends absence as a profound mode of presence and so grounds a theology of the public in which the church, by theosis , shares Christ's definitive, rather than ubiquitous, presence.     

Punishing and atoning: a new critique of penal substitution

The doctrine of penal substitution claims that it was good (or required) for God to punish in response to human sin, and that Christ received this punishment in our stead. I argue that this doctrine’s central factual claim—that Christ was punished by God—is mistaken. In order to punish someone, one must at least believe the recipient is responsible for an offense. But God surely did not believe the innocent Christ was responsible for an offense, let alone the offense of human sin. So, the central factual claim is mistaken. In the final section, I show that this critique of penal substitution does not apply to the closely-related Anselmian satisfaction theory.     

The two strangers

Therefore remember that at one time you were Gentiles in the flesh, called the uncircumcision by what is called the circumcision, which is made in the flesh by hands—remember that you were at that time separated from Christ, alienated from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the covenants of promise, having no hope and without God in the world. But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near in the blood of Christ. For he is our peace, who has made us both one, and has broken down the dividing wall of hostility, by abolishing in his flesh that law of commandments and ordinances, that he might create in himself one new man in place of the two, so making peace, and might reconcile us both to God in one body through the cross, thereby bringing the hostility to an end. And he came and preached peace to you who were far off and peace to those who were near; for through him we both have access in one Spirit to the Father. So then you are no longer strangers and sojourners, but you are fellow citizens with the saints and members of the household of God, built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus himself being the chief cornerstone, in whom the whole structure is joined together and grows into a holy temple in the Lord; in whom you are also built into it for a dwelling place of God in the Spirit. Ephesians 2:11–22     

EUTHYPHRO AND THE GOODNESS OF GOD INCARNATE

A familiar problem is here viewed from an unfamiliar angle. The familiar problem is the Euthyphro dilemma: if God wills something because it is good, then goodness is independent of God, so God becomes, morally speaking, de trop. On the other hand, if something is good because God wills it, then, given the absence of constraint on what God may will, moral truths are – counterintuitively – contingent. An examination of the kinds of necessity and possibility at work in this conundrum leads us to the most promising solution: there is a metaphysical connection between God and goodness. What he wills is an expression of his nature. But (and this is the unfamiliar angle), that solution now poses an acute problem for an understanding of the Incarnation. For if God is constitutive of goodness, and Christ is God incarnate, then Christ is constitutive of goodness. But Christ, as a human, is subject to external moral evaluation and obligation, which entails that he is not constitutive of goodness. This metaethical difficulty is not easily met by the usual strategies by which Christ is understood to have two natures. Reflection on our moral relations to our past selves, however, suggests a way forward.     

Taking Sin Seriously

Contemporary Roman Catholic ethics endeavors to take sin seriously by offering theologies of sin that emphasize it as a force and as a basic, personal orientation. Such efforts rightly counter the Catholic tradition's earlier reduction of sin to sins, and sins to external acts and moral culpability. But perhaps they go too far in this regard. By engaging Charles Curran, this study argues that inattention to sins undermines the theological referent of sin as a discourse that concerns more than moral culpability, obscures God as the source of freedom and value, and neglects the way in which acts express and sustain sin and fashion a personal orientation. Drawing on the work of Jean Porter, the essay shows that attention to sins highlights the historicity, particularity, and provisionality of human acts because of the theological referent and analogical character of sin and sins.     

Illness theodicies in the New Testament

The New Testament writers advocate or at least mention six different religious explanations for the origin of sickness. First, Satan may thus victimize the innocent. Second, God may send sickness as a punishment for the sufferer's sins. Third, God may send sickness to punish one's parents' sins. Fourth, God may so punish one's own sins committed in a previous life. Fifth, God may inflict illness in order to show his power by subsequent healing. Sixth, God may inflict illness in order to show his power by sustaining the sufferer through the illness instead of healing it.     

The noetic effects of sin: a dispositional framework

One of the well-known theses of Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology of religious belief is his claim about the noetic effects of sin. But Plantinga does not clearly spell out how sin functions to undermine or weaken the believer’s natural knowledge of God. In this paper, I want to suggest a dispositional gloss on his account of religious epistemology that properly identifies the epistemic role of sin and other factors that may undermine knowledge of God. It will be further argued that the dispositional framework provides us with a principled basis for deriving some of the main contours of Plantinga’s general epistemology.

     

Sin and the Limits of Theology: A Reflection in Conversation with Julian of Norwich and Martin Luther

While the confession of divine transcendence entails that all theological speech faces intrinsic limits, the problem of sin brings theology’s limits into focus in a very particular way. For while Christians confess that God has been uniquely and unsurpassably revealed in Jesus Christ, insofar as they do not claim that even this revelation explains the place of sin in the divine economy, the ongoing mystery of sin and evil presents the theologian with a stark alternative. On the one hand, if the grace of God revealed in Christ is emphasized, less attention will be given to the mystery of sin that remains hidden in God; on the other, if theologians emphasize what is hidden, the light of Christ will be obscured. This article explores the tension between these two alternatives with reference to the Showings of Julian of Norwich and Martin Luther’s Bondage of the Will.     

Christ’s faith,doubt, and the cry of dereliction

According to accounts of the Passion, Christ cries out from the cross, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” The cry, I argue, manifests that Christ lacks a belief that God is with him. Given the standard view of faith—belief that p is required for faith that p—it would follow that Christ lost his faith that God is with him just before he died. In this paper, I challenge the standard view by looking at the cognitive requirement of faith. Although faith that p requires some positive cognitive orientation toward p, that orientation need not be belief. I show that reliance is an alternative stance that fulfills the cognitive requirement of faith. Reliance aims at providing sensible guidance for action that is in accord with one’s values/ends. Thinking of the cognitive component of Christ’s faith in terms of reliance makes sense of the doubt manifested in his cry.