The distinctive feeling theory of pleasure

In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by showing how it can answer two important objections that have been made to it. First, the famous worry that there is no felt similarity to all pleasant (or unpleasant) experiences (sometimes called ‘the heterogeneity objection’). Second, what I call ‘Findlay’s objection’, the claim that it cannot explain the nature of our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain.     

‘Defrosting’ music chills with naltrexone: The role of endogenous opioids for the intensity of musical pleasure

The endogenous opioid system has been implicated during experiences of pleasure (i.e., from food or sex). Music can elicit intense emotional and bodily sensations of pleasure, called ‘Chills’. We investigated the effects of an opioid antagonist (50 mg naltrexone) or placebo (40 μg d3-vitamin) while listening to self-selected music or other ‘control’ music selected by another participant. We used a novel technique of continuous measurement of pleasantness with an eye tracker system, where participants shifted their eyes along a visual analogue scale, in the semblance of a thermometer so that, as the music unfolded, gaze positions indicated the self-reported hedonic experience. Simultaneously, we obtained pupil diameters. Self-reported pleasure remained unchanged by naltrexone, which – however – selectively decreased pupillary diameters during ‘Chills’. Hence, the endogenous μ-opioid signaling is not necessary for subjective enjoyment of music but an opioid blockade dampens pupil responses to peak pleasure, consistent with decreased arousal to the music.     

Why ‘Nonexistent People’ Do Not Have Zero Wellbeing but No Wellbeing at All

Some believe that the harm or benefit of existence is assessed by comparing a person's actual state of wellbeing with the level of wellbeing they would have had had they never existed. This approach relies on ascribing a state or level of wellbeing to ‘nonexistent people’, which seems a peculiar practice: how can we attribute wellbeing to a ‘nonexistent person'? To explain away this oddity, some have argued that because no properties of wellbeing can be attributed to ‘nonexistent people’ such people may be ascribed a neutral or zero level of wellbeing, setting the baseline for comparatively assessing the harm or benefit of coming into existence. However, this line of argumentation conflates the category of having zero wellbeing with the category of having no wellbeing. No Φ, unlike a zero level of Φ, is not comparable to levels of Φ — neutral, positive, or negative. Considering the nature of wellbeing and the fact that ‘nonexistent people’ cannot (metaphysically or conceptually) have wellbeing determinative properties, it follows that ‘nonexistent people’ have no wellbeing rather than zero wellbeing.     

Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism

Hedonism and the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare (“desire satisfactionism”) are typically seen as archrivals in the contest over identifying what makes one’s life go best. It is surprising, then, that the most plausible form of hedonism just is the most plausible form of desire satisfactionism. How can a single theory of welfare be a version of both hedonism and desire satisfactionism? The answer lies in what pleasure is: pleasure is, in my view, the subjective satisfaction of desire. This thesis about pleasure is clarified and defended only after we proceed through the dialectics that get us to the most plausible forms of hedonism and desire satisfactionism.     

The portrait of a hedonist: The personality and ethics behind the value and maladaptive pursuit of pleasure

Hedonism is the prioritizing of pleasure over other life values and is theorized to be independent of well-being. However, popular culture depicts hedonists as unhappy, as well as selfishly unconcerned with others’ well-being. Because the current literature has not differentiated between people’s value of pleasure and their maladaptive pursuit of it, we examined if these related, but not equivalent, dispositions had different personality and morality profiles. We found that value-based hedonists have a distinct moral profile (i.e., they are less likely to endorse moral foundations associated with social conservatism) and, yet, they differ little from others in regard to personality traits. We also found that people’s maladaptive hedonism (i.e., excessive pleasure-seeking) was best predicted by their personality traits (i.e., being less agreeable, less conscientious, and more neurotic) rather than by their conceptions of right and wrong. We discuss how these results contribute to our understanding of hedonism and why some people pursue their value of pleasure into over-indulgence.     

The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism

What makes a life go well for the one who lives it? Hedonists hold that pleasure enhances the value of a life; pain diminishes it. Hedonism has been subjected to a number of objections. Some are (a) based on the claim that hedonism is a form of “mental statism”. Others are (b) based on the claim that some pleasures are base or degrading. Yet others are (c) based on the claim that when a bad person enjoys a pleasure, his receipt of that pleasure seem not to make the world better. It is important to keep in mind that hedonism is a theory about the value of a person's life for the person who lives it, and not for the world or for others. It is also important to distinguish between sensory hedonism and attitudinal hedonism. “Desert Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism” appears to be immune to objections (a) and (b). A variant appears to be immune to all of them. Perhaps it is the answer to the question about the value of a life.     

Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure

On phenomenological theories of pleasure, what makes an experience a pleasure is the way it feels. On attitudinal theories, what makes an experience a pleasure is its relationship to the favorable attitudes of the subject who is having it. I advance the debate between these theories in two ways. First, I argue that the main objection to phenomenological theories, the heterogeneity problem, is not compelling. While others have argued for this before, I identify an especially serious version of this problem that resists existing solutions, and I explain why even this version of the problem does not undermine phenomenological theories. Second, I argue that a grand reconciliation can be effected between the two types of theory: it can be true both that pleasures are pleasures in virtue of the way they feel and that they are pleasures in virtue of how they are related to their subjects' favorable attitudes, so long as the attitudes that are constitutively related to pleasures are ones that feel a certain way. Hybrid views of this sort have significant advantages over pure attitudinal or phenomenological views.     

The feels good theory of pleasure

Most philosophers since Sidgwick have thought that the various forms of pleasure differ so radically that one cannot find a common, distinctive feeling among them. This is known as the heterogeneity problem. To get around this problem, the motivational theory of pleasure suggests that what makes an experience one of pleasure is our reaction to it, not something internal to the experience. I argue that the motivational theory is wrong, and not only wrong, but backwards. The heterogeneity problem is the principal source of motivation for this, otherwise, highly counterintuitive theory. I intend to show that the heterogeneity problem is not a genuine problem and that a more straightforward theory of pleasure is forthcoming. I argue that the various experiences that we call “pleasures” all feel good.     

Fiction,Pleasurable Tragedy,and the HOT Theory of Consciousness

Abstract

The ‘feeling fiction problem’ asks: is it rational to be moved by what happens to fictional characters? The so-called ‘paradox of tragedy’ is embodied in the question: Why or how is it that we take pleasure in artworks which are clearly designed to cause in us such feelings as sadness and fear? My focus in this paper is to examine these problems from the point of view of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory of consciousness’ (HOT theory) which says that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought that one is in that state. I examine the feeling fiction problem in light of the HOT theory and through a critique of Colin Radford's view. For example, I argue that Radford equivocates in his use of the term ‘aware’ in his response to some of the proposed solutions to the feeling fiction problem. Finally, I show how Susan Feagin's approach to the paradox of tragedy can be analysed and supported by the HOT theory.     

Colour and emotion: children also associate red with negative valence

The association of colour with emotion constitutes a growing field of research, as it can affect how humans process their environment. Although there has been increasing interest in the association of red with negative valence in adults, little is known about how it develops. We therefore tested the red–negative association in children for the first time. Children aged 5–10 years performed a face categorization task in the form of a card‐sorting task. They had to judge whether ambiguous faces shown against three different colour backgrounds (red, grey, green) seemed to ‘feel good’ or ‘feel bad’. Results of logistic mixed models showed that – as previously demonstrated in adults – children across the age range provided significantly more ‘feel bad’ responses when the faces were given a red background. This finding is discussed in relation to colour–emotion association theories.     

The Anomalous Wellbeing of Disabled People: A Response

Disabled people frequently find themselves in situations where their quality of life and wellbeing is being measured or judged by others, whether in decisions about health care provision or assessments for social supports. Recent debates about wellbeing and how it might be assessed (through subjective and/or objective measures) have prompted a renewed focus on disabled people’s wellbeing because of its seemingly ‘anomalous’ nature; that is, whilst to external (objective) observers the wellbeing of disabled people appears poor, based on subjective assessments, people with disabilities report a good quality of life. In this paper, I examine an article by the philosopher Dan Moller in which he seeks to explain this ‘disability paradox’. Despite agreeing with his analysis that there is more to what people value than happiness, his explanation reflects some of the difficulties presented in philosophical accounts which seek to understand the lives of disabled people: this includes an analysis which fails to problematise definitions of wellbeing and who has the ‘voice’ to do the defining; which negates the multiple identities and subject positions that disabled people occupy; and which lacks recognition of the social contexts which mediate disabled people’s lives. I suggest that there is a need to incorporate disabled people’s voices into research which deepens our empirical knowledge about the relationship between impairment and wellbeing, including the social circumstances that shape disabled people’s agency.     

Epicurean Hedonism as Qualitative Hedonism

Epicurus’ theory of what is good for a person is hedonistic: only pleasure has intrinsic value. Critics object that Epicurus is committed to advocating sensualist excess, since hedonism seems both to imply that more pleasure is always of some good for you, and to recommend even debauched, sensual kinds of pleasure. However, Epicurus can respond to this objection much like J. S. Mill responds to the objection that hedonism is a “doctrine worthy only of swine”. I argue that Epicurus’ hedonism is a version of qualitative hedonism on which static pleasure is intrinsically superior to other kinds of pleasure. I also argue that Epicurus conceives of pleasure as a phenomenal or felt quality of experience, and that this is compatible with his troublesome claim that there is an upper limit to pleasure and wellbeing.     

Radicalization in leadership from over-positioning to trans-positioning

This article explores how the term radicalization might be applied to leaders in a professional and business environment, and is based on three concepts: radicalization, over-positioning, and trans-positioning. Hermans refers to the phenomenon of radicalization as ‘over-positioning’ in terms of dialogical self theory (DST): one I-position dominating the entire system of self. From a theoretical perspective of DST ‘trans-positioning’ is introduced by Van Loon as metaphorically transposing one aspect of a position repertoire to another. The argument is elaborated that trans-positioning can be used in the service of deradicalization for the purpose of opening the system and improving wellbeing.     

On the difficulty interpreting He Yan’s ‘emotionless sage’

This paper examines the debate surrounding He Shao’s account that ‘He Yan thinks the sage is without pleasure, anger, sorrow and grief.’ The point of controversy surrounds squaring a perspective on the sage as emotionless with a thinker who otherwise largely expounds values and political views found in the Lunyu and the Laozi. Since proper management of emotions is important in both texts, it is difficult to imagine how He Yan could hold such a radical view. Dealing with this difficulty scholars have either simply found He Yan ‘unreasonable’ and ‘contradictory’ or otherwise sought to explain away his emotionless sage through complex ontological or political arguments. When He Yan’s work is contextualized in terms of philosophical religious views at the time, we find additional problems with how He Yan’s work has been interpreted. This paper considers a new way to view He Yan, one that respects his multifarious views.     

On the use of the uncanny in ritual

In ‘The Future of an Illusion’, Freud suggested that religion allows a person to ‘feel at home in the uncanny’ – that unsettling interplay of suppression and memory that arises from living subject to fears and anxieties in an unpredictable world. Here, the author examines a ritual called the ‘Wild Hunt’ that occurred during her ethnographic research among contemporary Pagans to explore how uncanny encounters within religious rituals can help participants come to terms with fears and anxieties, transforming inchoate emotions stemming from trauma or dislocation. Following Otto, the author suggests that such a sense of the uncanny can be central to the power of religious ritual. These uncanny elements within religious ritual provide an illustration of how religious experiences can help participants to feel ‘at home in the uncanny’, thereby bringing together the seemingly disparate accounts of Otto and Freud on the relationship between religion and uncanny experience.     

Hedonism and Happiness

Hedonism is a way of life, characterised by openness to pleasurable experience. There are many qualms about hedonism. It is rejected on moral grounds and said to be detrimental to long-term happiness. Several mechanisms for this 'paradox of hedonism' have been suggested and telling examples of pleasure seekers ending up in despair have been given. But is that the rule? If so, how much pleasure is too much? An overview of the available knowledge is given in this paper. The relation between hedonism and happiness has been studied at two levels: that of the nation and the individual. At the national level average happiness is correlated with moral acceptance of pleasure and with active leisure. At the individual level it is similarly linked with hedonistic attitudes and also correlated with hedonistic behaviours such as frequent sex and use of stimulants. In most cases the pattern is linearly positive. The relation between happiness and consumption of stimulants follows an inverted U-curve, spoilsports and guzzlers are less happy than modest consumers. Yet, these data cannot settle the issue, since the observed relations may be spurious or due to the effects of happiness on hedonism rather than the reverse. Even if we can prove a positive effect of (mild) hedonism on happiness, there is still the question of how that gains balances against a possible loss of health. A solution is to assess the effect of hedonistic living on the number of years lived happily.     

Kant and the Pleasure of “Mere Reflection”

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant refers to the pleasure that we feel when judging that an object is beautiful as the pleasure of “mere reflection”. Yet Kant never makes explicit what exactly is the relationship between the activity of “mere reflection” and the feeling of pleasure. I discuss several contemporary accounts of the pleasure of taste and argue that none of them is fully accurate, since, in each case, they leave open the possibility that one can reflect without having a feeling of pleasure, and hence allow a possible skepticism of taste. I then present my own account, which can better explain why Kant thinks that when one reflects one must also have a feeling of pleasure. My view, which emphasizes the role of attention in Kant, depicts well what we do when we judge something to be beautiful. It can also suggest a way to explain the relation between judgments of taste and moral feeling, and begin to show how the faculty of feeling fills a gap in the system of our cognitive faculties.     

Beyond Components of Wellbeing: The Effects of Relational and Situated Assemblage

Despite multiple axes of variation in defining wellbeing, the paper argues for the dominance of a ‘components approach’ in current research and practice. This approach builds on a well-established tradition within the social sciences of attending to categories whether for their identification, their value or their meanings and political resonance. The paper critiques the components approach and explores how to move beyond it towards conceptually integrating the various categories and dimensions through a relational and situated account of wellbeing. Drawing on more fluid social sciences, wellbeing is framed as an effect, dependent on the mobilisation of resources from everyday encounters with complex assemblages of people, things and places. Through such a framing, wellbeing can be conceived of as stable and amenable to change, as individual and collective and as subjective and objective. Policy interventions then need to attend to the relationalities of particular social and spatial contexts.     

Quality of life - three competing views

The aim of the present paper is to describe three different attempts, which have been made by philosophers, to define what quality of life is; and to spell out some of the difficulties that faces each definition. One, Perfectionism, focuses on the capacities that human beings possess: capacities for friendship, knowledge and creative activity, for instance. It says that the good life consists in the development and use of these capacities. Another account, the Preference Theory, urges that satisfying one's preferences, or desires, is what improves one's quality of life. And a third account, Hedonism, sees life-quality as consisting in the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The paper describes and evaluates objections to each of these views, thereby displaying their weaknesses and strengths. Since no view comes out as the right one there is a choice to be made. At the end of the paper it is being discussed how well each of the views cohere with different methodologies used in quality of life research. Also it is suggested that considerations about what the research is to be used for are relevant.     

Young people's perceptions and experiences of leaving high school early: an exploration

Research suggests it is important for students to feel a sense of belonging to their school. Students who do not belong at school often attempt to satisfy this need through membership in antisocial groups, or they drop out from school altogether. The current study explored the perceptions and experiences of the school context held by young people who have left school early. Twelve young people aged 16–19 years were interviewed on their experiences of school and their wellbeing as a result of leaving school early. Constructionist grounded theory methodology formed the basis of the data analysis. The early leaving process was identified as having three phases; exclusion from school, the transition into workforce and the ‘now’ phase. The results identified factors in the school context that contributed to early student withdrawal. Furthermore, the research has implications for creating a ‘normative narrative’ (Rappaport, 2000 ) in relation to early school leavers. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.