The Making of the Reliably Religious Boy

In Men, Religion, and Melancholia: James, Otto, Jung, and Erikson (D. Capps, 1997) and Men and Their Religion: Honor, Hope, and Humor (D. Capps, 2002), I argued that men are no less religious than women, but their religiousness is different from that of women because it has its psychological origins in the emotional separation between a boy and his mother around the ages of three to five. Employing Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” (S. Freud, 1917/1963) essay, I suggested that their religiousness is rooted in an ontological state of melancholy (which is different from the psychological state of depression). In Men and Their Religion I identified the religions of honor and of hope as the primary forms of male melancholic religion, and suggested that humor is a third form that may come to one’s assistance when one experiences the limitations of the other two religions. In this article, I focus on my own early adolescent years (age 11–14) and explain how one boy became reliably religious, that is, how he embraced or internalized the religions of honor and of hope. In the companion article, I will explain how these two religions were relativized—and thereby preserved—by the religion of humor.     

Moore’s Paradox and Moral Motivation

Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’). I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory. 2. This paradoxicality can be traced to a form of epistemic self-defeat that also explains the paradoxicality of ordinary Moore-paradoxical statements. 3. Although a simple form of internalism about moral judgment and motivation can explain the paradoxicality of these moral equivalents, a more plausible explanation can be provided that does not rely on this simple form of internalism. 4. The paradoxicality of such statements suggests a more credible understanding of the thesis that those who are not motivated by their moral judgments are irrational.     

Richard Pryor: Melancholy and the Religion of Tragicomedy

Drawing on Donald Capps’ discussion in Men and Their Religion (2000) on the development of the melancholy self in early childhood and the emergence of three religious impulses as a consequence of its development (the religions of honor, hope, and humor), this article focuses on the early childhood experience of Richard Pryor and the role that the religion of humor plays in helping him cope with these experiences. Particular attention is given to his grandmother’s paradoxical role in his life and his identification of her as his spiritual mother.     

My <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ishvara</Emphasis> is Dead: Spiritual Care on the Fringes

Human suffering speaks differently to different lived contexts. In this paper, I have taken a metaphoric representation of suffering, Ishvara, from the lived context of a Hindu immigrant woman to show that suffering is experienced and expressed within one’s lived context. Further, a dominant narrative from her world is presented to show that the same lived context can be a resource for spiritual care that could reconstruct her world that has fallen apart with a suffering experience. Having argued that suffering is experienced and expressed within one’s lived context, and that lived context could be a resource, in this paper I present that spiritual care is an intervention into the predicaments of human suffering and its mandate is to facilitate certain direction and a meaningful order through which experiences and expectations are rejoined. Finally, I observe that spiritual care is an engagement between the lived context where suffering is experienced and the spiritual experience and orientation of the caregiver.     

The Assessment of Argumentation from Expert Opinion

In this contribution, I will develop a comprehensive tool for the reconstruction and evaluation of argumentation from expert opinion. This is done by analyzing and then combining two dialectical accounts of this type of argumentation. Walton’s account of the ‘appeal to expert opinion’ provides a number of useful, but fairly unsystematic suggestions for critical questions pertaining to argumentation from expert opinion. The pragma-dialectical account of ‘argumentation from authority’ offers a clear and systematic, but fairly general framework for the reconstruction and evaluation of this type of argumentation. The tool is developed by incorporating Walton’s critical questions into a pragma-dialectical framework.     

Engineering responsibilities in lesser-developed nations: The welfare requirement

Increasing numbers of engineers from developed countries are employed during some part of their careers in lesser-developed nations (LDN’s), or they may design products for use in LDN’s. Yet determining the implications of professional engineering codes for engineers’ conduct in such settings can be difficult. Conditions are often substantially different from those in developed countries, where the codes were formulated. In this paper I explore the implications of what I call the “welfare requirement” in engineering codes for professional engineering conduct in LDN’s. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Engineering Foundation Conference on “Ethics for Science and Engineering Based International Industries”, Durham, NC, USA, 14–17 September 1997.     

‘Minimal Religion’ and Mikhail Epstein’s Interpretation of Religion in Late-Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia

This is an examination of two essays on minimal religion by Mikhail Epstein (1982 and 1999), assessing the usefulness of the term ‘minimal religion’ for the analysis of religion in contemporary Russia. An adapted version of a paper delivered at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), University of London, on 8 December, 2003. Note regarding Mikhail Epstein’s use of the words ‘religion’, ‘religiosity’ and ‘spirituality’: Epstein uses the word ‘religion’ to signify ‘mainstream’, church-based manifestations of religion and also the institutional, hierarchical structures related to those. Although in English usage the word ‘religiosity’ has negative connotations – signifying either a superficially felt religious sentiment or a somehow false and insincere expression of religious feeling, intended for outward show – Epstein appears to use the term entirely neutrally. For him it simply serves as a synonym for the word ‘spirituality’. In the two essays examined in the present article the word ‘spirituality’ signifies the whole inner spiritual life and aspirations of the individual and her/his reflection on an ethical way of living, whether the person concerned is a committed, church-going believer, or someone engaged in a personal spiritual or philosophical quest for meaning, or else someone who has experienced what Epstein refers to as ‘the wilderness’ of the Soviet years and has learnt of a spiritual dimension to life through that formative experience.     

Aesthetic Concepts,Perceptual Learning,and Linguistic Enculturation: Considerations from Wittgenstein,Language, and Music

Aesthetic non-cognitivists deny that aesthetic statements express genuinely aesthetic beliefs and instead hold that they work primarily to express something non-cognitive, such as attitudes of approval or disapproval, or desire. Non-cognitivists deny that aesthetic statements express aesthetic beliefs because they deny that there are aesthetic features in the world for aesthetic beliefs to represent. Their assumption, shared by scientists and theorists of mind alike, was that language-users possess cognitive mechanisms with which to objectively grasp abstract rules fixed independently of human responses, and that cognizers are thereby capable of grasping rules for the correct application of aesthetic concepts without relying on evaluation or enculturation. However, in this article I use Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to argue that psychological theories grounded upon this so-called objective model of rule-following fail to adequately account for concept acquisition and mastery. I argue that this is because linguistic enculturation, and the perceptual learning that’s often involved, influences and enables the mastery of aesthetic concepts. I argue that part of what’s involved in speaking aesthetically is to belong to a cultural practice of making sense of things aesthetically, and that it’s within a socio-linguistic community, and that community’s practices, that such aesthetic sense can be made intelligible.     

The Impact of a Breast Cancer Diagnosis on Religious/Spiritual Beliefs and Practices in the UK

The use of religious/spiritual resources may increase when dealing with the stress of a cancer diagnosis. However, there has been very little research conducted into changes in religious/spiritual beliefs and practices as a result of a cancer diagnosis outside the USA. The aim of this study was to examine the impact of a breast cancer diagnosis on patients’ religious/spiritual beliefs and practices in the UK where religious practice is different. The study used two methods. One compared the religious/spiritual beliefs and practices of 202 patients newly diagnosed with breast cancer with those of a control group of healthy women (n = 110). The other examined patients’ perceived change in religious/spiritual beliefs and practices at the time of surgery with those in the year prior to surgery. The aspects of religiousness/spirituality assessed were: levels of religiosity/spirituality, strength of faith, belief in God as well as private and public practices. Patient’s perceived their belief in God, strength of faith and private religious/spiritual practices to have significantly increased shortly after surgery compared with the year prior to surgery. However, there were no significant differences in religious/spiritual beliefs and practices between patients and healthy participants. Change scores demonstrated both a reduction and an increase in religious/spiritual beliefs and practices. Although belief in God, strength of faith and private religious/spiritual practices were perceived by patients to be significantly higher after their cancer diagnosis, no significant differences in religious/spiritual beliefs and practices were found between the cancer group at the time of surgery and the control group. Different methodologies appear to produce different results and may explain contradictions in past US studies. Limitations of this study are discussed and suggestions for future research are made.     

Humor and the Rebellious Spirit of the Early Adolescent Boy

In my companion article on the making of the reliably religious boy (D. Capps, 2006c) I presented my argument that, whereas the younger boy of three to five is becoming religious as a result of his emotional separation from his mother, the early adolescent boy (age 11–14) has become reliably religious in that he has developed a religious habit of mind, a habit reflected in his embrace of the religions of honor and hope. I presented myself as a case study in this regard. I noted, however, that there is a third form of religion, that of humor, and that it relativizes—and thereby preserves—the religions of honor and hope. I also noted that religion and spirituality are capable of being differentiated. I suggested that my own spirituality took the form of rebellion and that this spirit of rebellion fueled and was fueled by the religion of humor. Employing Freud’s writings on humor, I explain in this article how this works.     

Autonomy Within Subservient Careers

While there is much literature on autonomy and the conditions for its attainment, there is less on how those conditions reflect on agents’ ordinary careers. Most people’s careers involve a great deal of subservient activity that would prevent the kind of control over agents’ actions that autonomy would seem to require. Yet, it would seem strange to deny autonomy to every agent who regularly follows orders at work—to do so would make autonomy a futile ideal. Most contemporary autonomy accounts provide purely theoretical analysis without reference to any practical goal that autonomy could serve. These accounts are likely to resolve this issue in one direction: either almost entirely including or excluding subservient workers from autonomy. Either solution would fail to distinguish agents who sufficiently control their lives, in spite of limited subservience, according to their own standards, from agents for whom subservience precludes a fulfilling life. I suggest the solution lies in a return to goal-oriented autonomy accounts, which can use the goal to distinguish when subservience overwhelms autonomy from when subservience and autonomy can coexist. I present an account that anchors autonomy in the happiness that it provides for agents who sufficiently control their lives as determined by their more important prudential standards. On this account, agents in subservient careers can be autonomous if they determine how to make their careers consistent with their happiness.     

Dicing with Saul Kripke

Everyone knows what David Lewis’ possible worlds are, what role they play in his account of possibility and necessity, and Saul Kripke’s criticisms. But what, instead, are Kripke’s possible worlds, and what role do they play in his account of possibility and necessity? The answers are not so obvious. Recently, it has even been claimed that, contrary to what is standardly assumed, Kripke’s approach to modality has not always been consistently metaphysical. In particular, an interpretation of the famous passage in the preface to Naming and Necessity with Kripke’s discussion of the dice example has been put forward, according to which he purports there to clarify the modal notions in terms of that of possible world, model-theoretically construed, in a way which is reminiscent of Carnap’s. In this paper, I shall point out some internal difficulties of this interpretation, and offer a different one, according to which in the dice passage Kripke is trying, consistently with his metaphysical approach, to legitimize the technically useful notion of possible world starting from modal notions, to be accounted for in another way (arguably, in an essentialistic framework). My final goal, however, will be philosophical elucidation rather than mere exegesis. Indeed, I am interested in shedding some light on what possible worlds might possibly be, if something like Kripke’s metaphysical approach is on the right track.     

Field-ground reversal in Islamic art as a model for confronting indeterminancy in theology

Field-ground reversal underlies Islamic art's use of repeating geometric patterns or tessellations. Encounter with field-ground reversal suggests the notion of ‘oscillationism’ to mean willingness to oscillate between two equally plausible opposites rather than to affirm one or the other of them. This article explores oscillationism as a move for confronting theories of evil and for assessing the merits of foundationalism without succumbing to cognitive dissonance. The article goes on to examine F.D.E. Schleiermacher's suggestion of 1799 that the infinitude of God calls for more, not fewer religions. His reversal of Christian and Muslim assumptions puts contemporary debate in the theology of religions into a postmodernist perspective. Without supplying fresh answers, the spiritual practice of oscillationism provides a fresh way to frame some of the weightiest questions.     

A Type Hierarchy of Selection Processes for the Evaluation of Evolutionary Analogies

In this paper I propose a type-hierarchy approach to provide an intersubjective framework for the evaluation of evolutionary analogies. This approach develops David Hull’s and others’ attempts to provide full generalisation for selection processes, in order to show that sociocultural development and, particularly, scientific change can be considered as an instance of Darwinian selection. I argue that the recent work by Eileen Cornell Way on type hierarchies can offer the kind of generalisation needed to solve the main problems that still affect Hull’s theory and to show that the evolutionary analogy is, after all, only a particular way of grouping phenomena together. If Hull’s main objective is a unified theory of selection, which supports the idea that science selection and natural selection obey the same laws, I also argue that the type hierarchy approach to models shows that this objective is unsustainable as it stands, and is in need of further development. I will firstly introduce the general outline of the type hierarchy approach to models. Then, after a brief recapitulation of Hull’s main points and difficulties, I will try and construct a hierarchy for a general abstraction of selection processes. Finally I will introduce the main criticisms that Hull’s work has faced from philosophers and scientists, and show how they compare with my proposal.     

Discovery,theory change and structural realism

In this paper I consider two accounts of scientific discovery, Robert Hudson’s and Peter Achinstein’s. I assess their relative success and I show that while both approaches are similar in promising ways, and address experimental discoveries well, they could address the concerns of the discovery sceptic more explicitly than they do. I also explore the implications of their inability to address purely theoretical discoveries, such as those often made in mathematical physics. I do so by showing that extending Hudson’s or Achinstein’s account to such cases can sometimes provide a misleading analysis about who ought to be credited as a discoverer. In the final sections of the paper I work out some revisions to the Hudson/Achinstein account by drawing from a so-called structural realist view of theory change. Finally, I show how such a modified account of discovery can answer sceptical critics such as Musgrave or Woolgar without producing misleading analyses about who ought to receive credit as a discoverer in cases from the mathematical sciences. I illustrate the usefulness of this approach by providing an analysis of the case of the discovery of the Casimir effect.     

Justice in grades allocation: teachers’ perspective

In this investigation I explore teachers’ perspectives on just grade allocation. The study was carried out among language, math and science teachers in a national sample of Israeli high schools, where teachers were required to weigh a set of considerations that are used in the decision on grade allocation. Findings suggest that (a) a teacher’s decision is based on a weighted combination of multi-principles of allocation, (b) equity by output (students proved academic success) is the ruling consideration, and (c) the weight given to the various considerations differ by teachers’ subject matter expertise. The appeared difference placed science teachers vis-à-vis math and language teachers, unlike the expected humanities (language)—sciences (math and science) dichotomy. Comparison of grading considerations by student capacity suggests that about half of the teachers consider differential grading considerations for “weak” and “strong” students as just, attributing greater weight to academic input (effort) and need for encouragement when grading their “weak” students.     

Confucius and Aristotle on the Goods of Friendship

This essay discusses the goods of friendship as they are articulated by Confucius, Mencius, and Aristotle. It is argued that since Confucius and Mencius tend to conceive personal relationships in hierarchical terms, they do not directly address the goods of symmetrical friendships. Using Aristotle’s account of friendship, I argue that friendship is necessary for the cultivation of virtue outside the family. This is supported by discussing the virtues of generosity, trust, and wisdom as they develop within family life and then are refined in friendships. Lastly, as Confucius, Mencius, and Aristotle agree that the good friendship is necessarily a virtuous one, I consider what value aesthetic friendships have.     

Can QOL Researchers Learn Anything “Scientifically” Meaningful from Popular Cultural Icons Who Speak on Happiness and Well-Being?

This is review of two books written by “gurus” who address the topic of happiness and well-being from a spiritual perspective. One book is Matthieu Ricard’s Happiness: A Guide to Developing Life’s Most Important Skill (published by Little, Brown and Company, 2003). The other book is Eckhart Tolle’s A New Earth: Awakening to Your Life’s Purpose (published by A Plume Book, 2005). The books are thought provoking and interesting reading for the layperson. From a scientific perspective, they should not be treated with any credibility. They advocate an image of the human condition and well-being that is not based on a good and scientific understanding of human nature.     

A Psychology of Religious Plurality: From Intra-Religious Dialogue to Intra-Psychic Reality

Panikkar’s (The intra-religious dialogue, 1978) classic, re-issued by Paulist Press in 1999, grapples with the theological challenges in the disciplines of comparative theology and the theology of religions through what he terms, “intra-religious dialogue.” In this psychology of religious plurality, I use works from a variety of disciplines to highlight the achievements of Panikkar’s intra-religious dialogue, as well as to critique his work in the hope of finding categories of understanding that can be profitably used to face the inter-personal crises of the contemporary world, namely religious terrorism.