Voice recognition and the ontological status of self-deception

Douglas and Gibbins (1983) recently argued that our demonstration that errors in self-other recognition are often instances of self-deception was inadequate. In their study, they found that both self-other and acquaintance-other recognition errors met two of the four criteria we had offered as necessary and sufficient for ascribing self-deception. They presented no evidence that either type of recognition error was not an instance of self-deception. Here we describe the original basis of our demonstration and point out the logical fallacy in Douglas and Gibbins' argument.     

The self-deception of the self-destructive

317 college students as respondents were measured for suicide proneness and self-destructive behaviors and were also asked questions about self-attitudes, value for life, beliefs about suicide and self-destruction, religiosity and dogmatism. Those who score high on suicide proneness and self-destructiveness do not tend to be the same people, and they differ from one another. Correlations and factor analyses suggest the Suicide Prone are aware of their tendencies and are influenced by their value for life and beliefs about suicide and self-destruction. The Self-destructive are tied to negative self-evaluations, are less aware of their self-destructive tendencies, and score significantly higher than the Suicide Prone on dogmatism. Belief structure of the highly dogmatic person may allow those who are self-destructive to deny negative self-attitudes and to be unaware of self-destructive behaviors which are inconsistent with their beliefs.     

Robust,unconscious self-deception: Strategic and flexible

In recent years deflationary accounts of self-deception, under the banner of motivationalism, have proven popular. On these views the deception at work is simply a motivated bias. In contrast, we argue for an account of self-deception that involves more robustly deceptive unconscious processes. These processes are strategic, flexible, and demand some retention of the truth. We offer substantial empirical support for unconscious deceptive processes that run counter to certain philosophical and psychological claims that the unconscious is rigid, ballistic, and of limited cognitive sophistication.     

The evolution and psychology of self-deception

In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-deception.     

God,guilt, and logic: The psychological basis of the ontological argument

The most eminent exponents of the ontological argument for the existence of God have been characterized as well by a common emotional ingredient — a concern with individual guilt. Anselm, Josiah Royce, Karl Barth, and Norman Malcolm in their respective ways have made the experience of guilt a central one in their metaphysical standpoints. The hypothesis is therefore advanced that the validity which such thinkers have found in the ontological argument is the expression of a frame of mind which we can call ‘logical masochism'; under the influence of such emotions, the ontologian bows his logical powers submissively before an entity the existence of which he cannot question because of the guilt that such questioning would arouse. Under such social circumstances, on the other hand, as during the eighteenth century, when the psychology of individual guilt subsided, the appeal of the ontological argument likewise declines.     

Theater of lies: The letter to D'Alembert and the tragedy of self-deception

Though Rousseau is recognized to have treated the problem of self-knowledge with great sensitivity, very little is known about a centrally important aspect of that treatment—his understanding of self-deception. I reconstruct this conception, emphasizing the importance of purposive but sub-intentional processes that work to enhance agents' self-esteem. I go on to argue that Rousseau's fundamental concern about the theater is its capacity to manipulate these processes in ways that make spectators both complicit in their own falsification and vulnerable to elite domination. This argument, with its focus on the pervasive and often subconscious character of self-deception, not only problematizes an influential reading of Rousseau which emphasizes the epistemic availability of the “true” or “sincere” self, but also highlights the ongoing civic and moral threat posed by self-deceptive mental states.     

Self-awareness and self-deception: a Sartrean perspective

In spite of the fact that many find Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of la mauvaise foi puzzling, unclear and troublesome, he remains a recurring figure in the debate about self-deception. Indeed, Sartre’s exposition of self-deception is as puzzling as it is original. The primary task of my paper will be to expose why this is the case and to thereby correct a recurrent misunderstanding of Sartre’s theory of consciousness. In the end, will we see that Sartre offers the following theory: self-deception is to be accounted for by assuming that there are intrinsically self-deceptive epistemic states. The latter are self-deceptive in so far as they claim certainty while nevertheless being accompanied by an inbuilt and incorruptible awareness of being unwarranted. For Sartre, developing this rather peculiar account of self-deception, is, as we will see, not primarily intended as an end in itself. Rather, Sartre thereby hopes to illuminate the nature of self-awareness as (i.) epistemically super-secure, (ii.) pre-reflexive, (iii.) non-positional and “embryonic” knowledge that (iv.) does not necessitate but can still ground epistemically super-secure reflexive knowledge, and (v.) that can replace Freud’s notion of unconscious knowledge. As an account of self-deception, Sartre’s suggestion, however, comes at a high price. Apart from the presuppositions Sartre makes in the theory of consciousness and intentionality, his account is deflationist with regard to local cases of self-deception.     

反馈对自我欺骗的影响：来自ERP的证据

本研究主要探讨反馈类型和反馈效价对自我欺骗的影响。实验1采用前瞻范式探究不同效价的模糊反馈对自我欺骗的影响, 结果发现, 相比于无答案提示组, 有答案提示组的被试在积极模糊反馈的条件下显著地提高测试2第二阶段的预测分数(自我欺骗的程度加重)。实验2探究不同效价的精确反馈对自我欺骗的影响, 结果发现, 相对于无答案提示组, 有答案提示组的被试在消极精确反馈条件下显著地降低测试2第二阶段的预测分数。实验3采用ERP技术探究反馈类型和反馈效价影响自我欺骗的内在机制, 结果发现, 模糊反馈条件下的自我欺骗诱发较大的P2成分、诱发较小的N1和N400成分; 以及发现自我欺骗在额区的效应较大。总之, 这些研究结果表明可能积极反馈促进个体的自我欺骗产生, 消极反馈削弱个体自我欺骗的产生; 积极模糊反馈能够进一步促进了个体自我欺骗的产生。这些研究结果还表明自我欺骗产生的背后机制可能是自我膨胀。     

Ultimate, provisional, and personal meaning of life: differences and common ground

Building on Viktor Frankl's clinical approach of Logotherapy and the works of subsequent theoreticians, three types of meaning of life were theoretically derived and empirically investigated, Ultimate, Provisional, and Personal meaning. These types were characterized, first, by the amount of agreement of subjects, second, by sources of Life Meaning, which were assessed by content analyses, third, by correlations, and fourth by prediction with ratings of important life concepts from the domains of Well-being, Religiosity, and Prosocial Behavior. 192 German adults, 45 men and 147 women, whose M age was 31.6 yr. (SD = 11.9), participated. Analysis indicated different sources for the Ultimate meaning compared with the other meaning types, which seem to display more similarities with each other. Other important life concepts, such as Belief, Harmony, Happiness, and Human Goodness were related to the investigated types of meaning of life. Some implications for clinical applications, research perspectives, and Positive Psychology are discussed.     

Creative writing for life design: Reflexivity,metaphor and change processes through narrative

To survive and thrive on the labor market of the 21st century, individuals must construct their identities in a process of meaning making, where identity is co-constructed in the form of a narrative. In order to better understand the nature and elements involved in this career-identity change process the Interpersonal Process Recall interview (IPR) method was used to examine the results of a two-day Career Writing (Lengelle, 2014) intervention. The exploration regarding what prompted changes and how reflexivity was developed, was done by having each of two participants bring in pieces written during the course and having the interviewer ask what thoughts and feelings were remembered at the time of writing. The IPR process revealed that Career Writing enables participants to first enter into feelings, then make sense of those by finding the ‘right’ words to describe them, and experience (by thinking and feeling) that their ‘new story’ makes sense on a gut level and provides meaning. This process is made possible by an internal and an external dialogue where various I-positions (voices within the self) speak and where metaphors and analogies concretely facilitate meaning making.     

The ontological character of anxiety

Conclusion We conclude from our analysis of Tillichian and Rogerian anthropology that anxiety is ontological in character. It is ontological because it is the necessary concomitant condition of the fact and structures of existence. Man is faced with one basic threat—the possibility of non-being. In an absolute form, he is threatened with the total extinction of being. In an absolute form, he is threatened with the total extinction of being. In a relative form, he is threatened with personal death and with the failure of personal fullillment—with the loss of being and becoming. Ontological anxiety has to do with the absolute threat of extinction and ontic anxiety with the relative threat to self-preservation and self-enhancement. From this condition there is no escape. Refusal to accept the inescapable results in neurotic anxiety, a nonessential concomitant of being which, therefore, can be removed. These distinctions are revealed by an ontological and phenomenological analysis of human existence that brings ontology and psychology into a complementary relationship.