Psychology and social justice: why we do what we do

Much of psychological science and knowledge is significantly relevant to social justice, defined here as the goal to decrease human suffering and to promote human values of equality and justice. A commitment to social justice has evolved as a more important value in the last few decades for psychology, including for the American Psychological Association (APA). The mission, vision, goals, Ethics Code, and strategic plan of APA all provide a rationale for psychologists' involvement in systematic and visible ways of applying our knowledge to social issues. Although psychology has not been immune to the application of psychological knowledge in destructive ways, overall, psychology, many psychologists, and APA have demonstrated a commitment to social justice. This article provides a brief review of the key proponents, debates, and controversies involved in applying psychological science and knowledge to complex societal problems. Psychologists often find themselves in conflict and honest disagreement when the association addresses complex and controversial issues. An important goal is that we continue to find ways to agree or disagree in a respectful manner regardless of where each of us stands on the various positions that APA takes.     

What we regret most... and why

Which domains in life produce the greatest potential for regret, and what features of those life domains explain why? Using archival and laboratory evidence, the authors show that greater perceived opportunity within life domains evokes more intense regret. This pattern is consistent with previous publications demonstrating greater regret stemming from high rather than low opportunity or choice. A meta-analysis of 11 regret ranking studies revealed that the top six biggest regrets in life center on (in descending order) education, career, romance, parenting, the self, and leisure. Study Set 2 provided new laboratory evidence that directly linked the regret ranking to perceived opportunity. Study Set 3 ruled out an alternative interpretation involving framing effects. Overall, these findings show that people's biggest regrets are a reflection of where in life they see their largest opportunities; that is, where they see tangible prospects for change, growth, and renewal.     

When and why Conventions cannot Be Social Institutions

Philosophia - The paper focuses on the issue of compatibility of social institution and convention. At first, it introduces the modest account of conventionality building on five distinctive...     

Autonomy and moral deference

The idea that a person might have a duty to defer to the moral judgments of others is typically something that arouses our suspicion, in ways that other kinds of deference do not. One explanation for this is the value of autonomy. According to this explanation, people have a duty to be autonomous, and any act of deferring to another person’s moral judgement is not an autonomous action. Call this “the Autonomy Argument” against moral deference. In this article, I criticise the Autonomy Argument. I argue that, even if we accept that an act of moral deference can never be autonomous, those who believe that people have a duty to be autonomous must accept that acts of moral deference are morally necessary. This is because some people are incapable of becoming autonomous by themselves, and deferring to a moral expert is the only way they might ever become autonomous.     

Projected fantasies and the political process: toward understanding why Hillary lost

The author explores the events involved in the Democratic Party primary campaign of 2007-2008. Well before the campaign began, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton was seen as the odds-on favorite to capture the nomination. But, that did not happen. Not only did she trail a relatively politically unknown, but she lost favor with many of those who would normally have supported her, such as advocates of gender progressivism, including many women. The author attempts to explain what happened by examining voter behavior, large group identity and its corollary of political identity, and the relation of large groups to leaders. Noting the effect of the sexual scandals during the Presidency of her husband, the author postulates that particular scenarios that have been repetitive throughout history, in art and literature, and reflected in mythology were graphed onto the perception of the Clintons. These narratives, much like Jung's archetypes, have evocative potential. Freud's early formulation of oedipal betrayal is used to explain the dynamics of infidelity and how that weakened Senator Clinton in the eyes of the public.     

Beliefs in moral luck: When and why blame hinges on luck

Belief in moral luck is represented in judgements that offenders should be held accountable for intent to cause harm as well as whether or not harm occurred. Scores on a measure of moral luck beliefs predicted judgements of offenders who varied in intent and the outcomes of their actions, although judgements overall were not consistent with abstract beliefs in moral luck. Prompting participants to consider alternative outcomes, particularly worse outcomes, reduced moral luck beliefs. Findings suggest that some people believe that offenders should be punished based on the outcome of their actions. Furthermore, prompting counterfactuals decreased judgements consistent with moral luck beliefs. The results have implications for theories of moral judgement as well as legal decision making.     

Depth of processing: When the principle of congruity fails

Two factors, level of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and congruity (Schulman, 1974), known to have large effects on the recall of experimenter-provided responses to questions, were examined in a series of five incidental learning experiments using subject-generated responses. The data show that manipulation of level of processing has the same effect on recall of subjectgenerated responses as it does on experimenter-provided responses. However, the effect of congruity is reversed for subject-generated responses. The data suggest that the difficulty of generating unrelated responses (“incongruous“ items) may account, at least in part, for the failure of the “principle of congruity“ with subject-generated responses.     

Second-personal reasons: why we need something like them,but why there are actually no such things

Abstract

Stephen Darwall, in his book The Second-Person Standpoint (2006), has argued for an account of morality grounded in what he calls second-personal reasons. My first aim in this paper is to demonstrate the value of an account like Darwall’s; as I read it, it responds to the need for an account of morality as ‘intrinsic’ to the person. However, I go on to argue, as my second aim in this paper, that Darwall’s account is ultimately unsuccessful. I hope to achieve these aims by contrasting Darwall’s second-personal account with two other accounts, Hobbes’ and the neo-Kantians’. In the first case, I aim to show that Darwall’s account meets a need that the other accounts don’t in virtue of its differences from the other accounts; and in the second case, I aim to show that Darwall’s account ultimately fails in virtue of its residual similarities to at least one of them.     

When and why hierarchy steepness is related to team performance

This study develops and tests a contingency theory on the functions of status hierarchy steepness in teams. Findings from a field study among 438 employees working in 72 work teams across diverse business settings demonstrate that task complexity moderates the relationships between status hierarchy steepness, different types of team conflict, and team performance. Steeper status hierarchies were negatively related to both process and task conflict, and hence increased team performance in teams working on tasks with lower complexity but did not yield such clear conflict and performance effects in teams working on more complex tasks. By showing that various levels of task complexity determine whether status hierarchy steepness has a conflict-regulating function that drives team performance, this research generates valuable insights about the context dependency of team responses to status hierarchy steepness.     

Daydreaming to navigate the social world: What we know,what we don't know,and why it matters

A substantial portion of daily life is spent daydreaming—that is, engaged in thought independent of, and unrelated to, goals in the external environment. We argue that this naturally occurring, unconstrained cognition is a vital, but currently underappreciated, form of social cognition that enables navigation of the social world. First, we present the results of a meta‐analysis of neuroimaging studies which illustrate the shared neural basis of daydreaming and social cognition (including regions of the anterior temporal lobes and the posterior cingulate cortex). Second, we review evidence regarding the frequency, correlates, and adaptive outcomes of social daydreaming, cumulative findings that point to the adaptive value of imaging others during this offline state. We end by encouraging cross‐fertilization between daydreaming research and domains of social psychology (goal pursuit, social interactions, and close relationships), which we hope will foster mutually beneficial directions for understanding the role that unconstrained thinking plays in social life.     

Overconfidence and underconfidence: When and why people underestimate (and overestimate) the competition

It is commonly held that people believe themselves to be better than others, especially for outcomes under their control. However, such overconfidence is not universal. This paper presents evidence showing that people believe that they are below average on skill-based tasks that are difficult. A simple Bayesian explanation can account for these effects and for their robustness: On skill-based tasks, people generally have better information about themselves than about others, so their beliefs about others’ performances tend to be more regressive (thus less extreme) than their beliefs about their own performances. This explanation is tested in two experiments that examine these effects’ robustness to experience, feedback, and market forces. The discussion explores the implications for strategic planning in general and entrepreneurial entry in particular.     

When we hurt the ones we love: Predicting violence against women from men's mate retention

Mate retention behaviors are designed to solve several adaptive problems such as deterring a partner's infidelity and preventing defection from the mating relationship. Although many mate retention behaviors appear to be innocuous romantic gestures (e.g., displaying resources, giving flowers), some may be harbingers of violence. We investigated the associations between male mate retention and violence against women in romantic relationships. In Study 1, 461 men reported their use of mate retention behaviors and separately completed instruments designed to assess violence in their relationships. Study 2 assessed 560 women's reports of their partners’ mate retention behaviors and the degree to which their partners used violence against them. As predicted, and across both studies, men's use of particular mate retention behaviors was related positively to female‐directed violence. Study 3 secured 2 separate data sources—husbands’ reports of their mate retention and wives’ reports of their husbands’ violence in a sample of 214 individuals forming 107 couples. The results corroborated those of Studies 1 and 2, with particular male mate retention behaviors predicting violence against romantic partners. The general discussion outlines future directions for research that are likely to result in a more comprehensive understanding of partner violence against women.     

致读者:我们为什么要出"临床决策论坛版"

我们趁<医学与哲学>改出半月刊的机会,将刊物原有的内容一分为二:一谓"人文社会医学",一谓"临床决策论坛".     

When the strong punish: why net costs of punishment are often negligible

In small-scale societies, punishment of adults is infrequent and employed when the anticipated cost-to-benefit ratio is low, such as when punishment is collectively justified and administered. In addition, benefits may exceed costs when punishers have relatively greater physical and social capital and gain more from cooperation. We provide examples from the Tsimane horticulturalists of Bolivia to support our claims.