The Growing Evidence for Demonic Possession: What Should Psychiatry’s Response be?

Evidence of evil spirits is voluminous and comes from many cultures, both ancient and modern. Cases from China, India, and the United States are examined and evaluated. The actual experience of spirit victims, the universality of spirit oppression, the superhuman phenomena associated with possession, and the comparative success of deliverance and exorcism vs. psychiatry are considered. Potential arguments against the spirit hypothesis center on the antecedent improbability of spirits, multiple personality disorder, and the effectiveness of medication; but these can be countered. Psychiatrists should question their materialist assumption that mental illness is strictly a matter of an aberrant brain, carefully examine the literature of possession, experiment to determine why exorcists and deliverance ministers often succeed where psychiatry fails, and develop a more complete inventory of techniques for healing the complete person.     

The Priest’s Husband

Clergy self-concepts provide an important resource for research into the psychosocial pressures that often breed domestic tension and marital discord in ministerial families. More than 30 years ago the Journal of Religion and Health published (15:3, 1976) Platt and Moss’s initial study of clergy families, research focused on the self-perceptions of the wives of Episcopal priests. That investigation explored some of the intrapsychic ingredients and interpersonal concerns of these women. Oden now concentrates on clergy spouses from a different vantage—the historically recent phenomenon of the Episcopal priest’s husband. This article grows out of the first formal study of such a growing parochial reality. Husbands of priests present novel issues because there has never been anyone like them before. They are men who will inevitably find themselves confronted by congregational expectations that can modify their self-concepts and retailer their marriages, “for better or for worse”.     

The Presentist’s Dilemma

This paper defends three theses: (i) that presentism is either trivial or untenable; (ii) that the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time is not about the status of presentism; and (iii) that there is no temporal analogue of the modal thesis of actualism.     

Visual imagery: The past and future as seen by patients with Alzheimer’s disease

We investigated visual imagery for past and future thinking in Alzheimer’s Disease (AD). We invited AD patients and controls to retrieve past events and to imagine future events. Participants also provided a “Field” response if they see the event through their own eyes, or an “Observer” response if they see themselves in the scene as a spectator would. Less “Field” and more “Observer” responses were observed in AD participants than in controls during past and future thinking, suggesting a diminished ability to mentally visualize past and future events in AD. Results also demonstrated significant positive correlations between the production of “Field” responses and specificity during past and future thinking, suggesting a relationship between the ability to mentally visualize past and future events and autobiographical overgenerality in AD.     

On Li Zhi’s Theory of Growing up in Spirit

The theory of growing up in spirit is the core of Li Zhi’s thought. The theory attempts to get rid of the limit of the rigid ethical doctrine of Confucianism and to encourage growth in a helpful person for the benefit of the country, which demands both a free environment of society and enough courage and insight of the individual. At the same time, the criterion of growing up in spirit indicates the limitation of Li Zhi’s thought. His free exploration, however, provides various revelations for us. Translated from Journal of Wuhan University, 2005:4 by Yang Xu     

Roots of the Pavlovian Society’s missions of the past and present: The Pavlov dimension

This paper offers an interpretation of the relation between Pavlov’s life and work and the missions of the Pavlovian Society, both past (“observation and observation”) and present (“interdisciplinary research on the integrated organism”). I begin with an acount of Pavlov's life and his influence on contemporary thought. I then indicate the relation of some of Pavlov's attitudes (e.g., his motto, his epistemological stance) to the Society's past mission. In the concluding and most controversial section, I argue for six guiding principles derived from Pavlov, to be applied to the Society’s mission. These are: (a) a confident methodological behaviorism; (b) a significant role assigned to both physiological and psychological factors in the prediction and control of the integrated organism; (c) approximately equal taxonomic precision of physiological and psychological explanatory concepts; (d) distrust of toleological explanatory concepts; (e) rejection of psychology’s instrumentalist “cognitive paradigm shift”; and (f) rejection of the representational theory of knowledge.     

The Political Egalitarian’s Dilemma

Political egalitarianism is at the core of most normative conceptions of democratic legitimacy. It finds its minimal expression in the “one person one vote” formula. In the literature on deliberative democracy, political equality is typically interpreted in a more demanding sense, but different interpretations of what political equality requires can be identified. In this paper I shall argue that the attempt to specify political equality in deliberative democracy is affected by a dilemma. I shall illustrate the political egalitarian’s dilemma by a hypothetical choice between two informational bases for political equality: Rawlsian primary goods and Amartya Sen’s capability approach. The political egalitarian’s dilemma reveals a clash between the requirement of ensuring equal possibilities to participate in the democratic process and the requirement of subjecting substantive judgments to deliberative evaluation. As such, the dilemma is a variant of the procedure vs. substance dilemma that is well-known in democratic theory. While it has sometimes been argued that deliberative democracy solves the tension between procedure and substance, the political egalitarian’s dilemma shows that this tension continues within deliberative democracy.

The Moral Oracle’s Test

When presented with a situation involving an agent’s choice between alternative actions, a moral oracle says what the agent is allowed to do. The oracle bases her advice on some moral theory, but the nature of that theory is not known by us. The moral oracle’s test consists in determining whether a series of questions to the oracle can be so constructed that her answers will reveal which of two given types of theories she adheres to. The test can be applied to moral theories in order to determine if they differ in their recommendations for action. Based on this test, a terminology is developed to specify different forms and degrees of distinguishability between moral theories, or types of theories, in terms of their recommendations for action. In conclusion, the test is applied to consequentialism and utilitarianism.     

The imprecise impermissivist’s dilemma

Synthese - Impermissivists hold that an agent with a given body of evidence has at most one rationally permitted attitude that she should adopt towards any particular proposition. Permissivists...     

The Devil’s Lying Wonders

That demonic agents can work wonders is a staple of much Judeo-Christian theology. Believers have proposed various means by which the Devil's work can be distinguished from the miracles wrought by God, primarily so that no one is led astray by the Devil's ‘lying wonders.’ I consider the likelihood of our using the suggested criteria with any success. Given certain claims about the demonic nature and certain facts about the way theists often handle the problem of inscrutable evil, it seems unlikely that any of the criteria I examine can be relied upon.

The Fictionalist’s Attitude Problem

According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that Mackie’s approach can be vindicated by a fictionalist account of moral discourse. And Mark Kalderon has argued that moral fictionalism is attractive quite independently of Mackie’s error-theory. Kalderon argues that the Frege–Geach problem shows that we need moral propositions, but that a fictionalist can and should embrace propositional content together with a non-cognitivist account of acceptance of a moral proposition. Indeed, it is clear that any fictionalist is going to have to postulate more than one kind of acceptance attitude. We argue that this double-approach to acceptance generates a new problem – a descendent of Frege–Geach – which we call the acceptance–transfer problem. Although we develop the problem in the context of Kalderon’s version of non-cognitivist fictionalism, we show that it is not the non-cognitivist aspect of Kalderon’s account that generates the problem. A closely related problem surfaces for the more typical variants of fictionalism according to which accepting a moral proposition is believing some closely related non-moral proposition. Fictionalists of both stripes thus have an attitude problem.

The Choice Architect’s Trilemma

Critics have long dismissed paternalistic choice architecture as conceptually muddled at best and oxymoronic at worst. In this article, I argue that this criticism remains true despite recent replies to the contrary. Further, I suggest that a similar conceptual criticism also applies to non-paternalistic choice architecture. This is due to a three-way tension between the effectiveness, avoidability, and distinctiveness of each nudge. To illustrate this tension, I provide a novel explanation of the mechanics of nudging and a taxonomy of these interventions. I then argue that choice architects who defend the distinctiveness of nudging according to how it guides our behaviour via our unreflective intuitive reasoning encounter a trilemma because the distinctiveness of nudging hinges on interventions being both avoidable and effective. Choice architects cannot achieve this aim without harnessing both our automatic and reflective systems of thought in tandem. However, this diminishes the distinctive character of nudging by bringing it closer to other traditional policy interventions. This establishes the choice architect’s trilemma: a nudge is likely to be either ineffective, effective via some morally unacceptable means, or effective in a manner that is conceptually indistinct from other evidence-based policy interventions.     

The Music of Dan’s Life

ABSTRACT

In a persistent quest for understanding of what animates life and produces human experience, Daniel Stern was able to put the unspeakable into words. Impregnated with the world of childhood, he described the Forms of Vitality, rendering as never before the ubiquity of the music of life that animates and underlies the unfolding of movement and action. This concept opens new horizons for many disciplines.

Examples will describe advances in neuroscience or for the diagnosis of autism, as well as the essential function of human relationships in early development.     

The lesson of Newcomb’s paradox

In Newcomb’s paradox you can choose to receive either the contents of a particular closed box, or the contents of both that closed box and another one. Before you choose though, an antagonist uses a prediction algorithm to accurately deduce your choice, and uses that deduction to fill the two boxes. The way they do this guarantees that you made the wrong choice. Newcomb’s paradox is that game theory’s expected utility and dominance principles appear to provide conflicting recommendations for what you should choose. Here we show that the conflicting recommendations assume different probabilistic structures relating your choice and the algorithm’s prediction. This resolves the paradox: the reason there appears to be two conflicting recommendations is that the probabilistic structure relating the problem’s random variables is open to two, conflicting interpretations. We then show that the accuracy of the prediction algorithm in Newcomb’s paradox, the focus of much previous work, is irrelevant. We end by showing that Newcomb’s paradox is time-reversal invariant; both the paradox and its resolution are unchanged if the algorithm makes its ‘prediction’ after you make your choice rather than before.     

Forgiveness: The Victim’s Prerogative

Abstract

This article explores and offers a qualified defence of the claim that the entitlement to forgive a wrongdoer belongs to the victim of the wrong. A summary account of forgiveness is given, followed by arguments in favor of the victim’s prerogative to forgive. Primary, or direct victims are then distinguished from secondary and tertiary ones, which point to a plurality of prerogatives to forgive. In cases of conflicts between these prerogatives it is emphasized that special care should be taken to protect the primary victim’s entitlement, without giving an absolute and exclusive status to the latter prerogative. Grounds for limiting the primary victim’s prerogative regarding forgiveness include (a) cases where harm to secondary and/or tertiary victims are greater than the harm resulting from the original wrong committed against the primary victim, (b) the social dimensions of the elements of forgiveness, and (c) the need for self-forgiveness when a repentant wrongdoer is not forgiven by any of the victims. The practical significance of these arguments are illustrated by considering the criticism that the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission have forgiven perpetrators in ways that inappropriately pre-empted the primary victims’ entitlement to forgive.     

The engineer’s responsibility for quality

This paper offers a definition of quality for products, explains why engineers are morally responsible for quality, and outlines how engineers can fulfill this responsibility. This paper was presented at the Engineering Foundation Conference on “Ethics for Science and Engineering Based International Industries”, Durham, NC, USA, 14–17 September 1997.