What we can do

Philosophical Studies - Plural first-person pronouns have often been ignored in the literature on indexicals and pronouns. The assumption seems to be that we is just the plural of I. So, we can...     

Psychology and social justice: why we do what we do

Much of psychological science and knowledge is significantly relevant to social justice, defined here as the goal to decrease human suffering and to promote human values of equality and justice. A commitment to social justice has evolved as a more important value in the last few decades for psychology, including for the American Psychological Association (APA). The mission, vision, goals, Ethics Code, and strategic plan of APA all provide a rationale for psychologists' involvement in systematic and visible ways of applying our knowledge to social issues. Although psychology has not been immune to the application of psychological knowledge in destructive ways, overall, psychology, many psychologists, and APA have demonstrated a commitment to social justice. This article provides a brief review of the key proponents, debates, and controversies involved in applying psychological science and knowledge to complex societal problems. Psychologists often find themselves in conflict and honest disagreement when the association addresses complex and controversial issues. An important goal is that we continue to find ways to agree or disagree in a respectful manner regardless of where each of us stands on the various positions that APA takes.     

What mediation analysis can (not) do

The present article is concerned with a common misunderstanding in the interpretation of statistical mediation analyses. These procedures can be sensibly used to examine the degree to which a third variable (Z) accounts for the influence of an independent (X) on a dependent variable (Y) conditional on the assumption that Z actually is a mediator. However, conversely, a significant mediation analysis result does not prove that Z is a mediator. This obvious but often neglected insight is substantiated in a simulation study. Using different causal models for generating Z (genuine mediator, spurious mediator, correlate of the dependent measure, manipulation check) it is shown that significant mediation tests do not allow researchers to identify unique mediators, or to distinguish between alternative causal models. This basic insight, although well understood by experts in statistics, is persistently ignored in the empirical literature and in the reviewing process of even the most selective journals.     

What we regret most... and why

Which domains in life produce the greatest potential for regret, and what features of those life domains explain why? Using archival and laboratory evidence, the authors show that greater perceived opportunity within life domains evokes more intense regret. This pattern is consistent with previous publications demonstrating greater regret stemming from high rather than low opportunity or choice. A meta-analysis of 11 regret ranking studies revealed that the top six biggest regrets in life center on (in descending order) education, career, romance, parenting, the self, and leisure. Study Set 2 provided new laboratory evidence that directly linked the regret ranking to perceived opportunity. Study Set 3 ruled out an alternative interpretation involving framing effects. Overall, these findings show that people's biggest regrets are a reflection of where in life they see their largest opportunities; that is, where they see tangible prospects for change, growth, and renewal.     

What neuroimaging and brain localization can do, cannot do and should not do for social psychology

Interest in bridging social psychology and neuroscience has seen a significant upsurge. Much of this interest has centered on brain localization--the attempt to relate psychological events to locations of brain events. Although many articles have sought to localize brain activity that supports social behavior, scant attention has been paid to the specific methods to be used in integrating brain localization data into psychological theory. The authors describe 4 strategies psychologists can use to integrate brain localization data and psychological theory, and they consider whether social psychology presents special considerations in the use of these strategies. They conclude that brain localization offers a useful tool for some but not all problems in social psychology, and they discuss the types of problems for which it may and may not prove useful.     

What we know and what to do

This paper discusses an important puzzle about the semantics of indicative conditionals and deontic necessity modals (should, ought, etc.): the Miner Puzzle (Parfit, ms; Kolodny and MacFarlane, J Philos 107:115–143, 2010). Rejecting modus ponens for the indicative conditional, as others have proposed, seems to solve a version of the puzzle, but is actually orthogonal to the puzzle itself. In fact, I prove that the puzzle arises for a variety of sophisticated analyses of the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals. A comprehensive solution requires rethinking the relationship between relevant information (what we know) and practical rankings of possibilities and actions (what to do). I argue that (i) relevant information determines whether considerations of value may be treated as reasons for actions that realize them and against actions that don’t, (ii) incorporating this normative fact requires a revision of the standard ordering semantics for weak (but not for strong) deontic necessity modals, and (iii) an off-the-shelf semantics for weak deontic necessity modals, due to von Fintel and Iatridou, which distinguishes “basic” and “higher-order” ordering sources, and interprets weak deontic necessity modals relative to both, is well-suited to this task. The prominence of normative considerations in our proposal suggests a more general methodological lesson: formal semantic analysis of natural language modals expressing normative concepts demands that close attention be paid to the nature of the underlying normative phenomena.     

What we look at when we read

The entire surface phrase structure hierarchy of sentences influences visual scanning patterns in reading familiar material. A general eye-fixation rule predicts the pattern of adults’ eye-fixations in a study of reading predictable sentences: “fixate on the first half of phrase structure constituents.” This rule applies cumulatively at all levels of the surface phrase structure.     

Toward a comprehensive model of face impressions: What we know,what we do not,and paths forward

A person's impression of another depends upon three sources of variance. The characteristics of the target, the characteristics of the perceiver, and the interplay between the two. Researchers have dedicated different amounts of study to these three sources of variance, and therefore they differ in how well they are understood. The present work will first review the portions of the face impression process that are understood well, then identify and discuss portions of the process less well understood. We will then question to what extent the current state of knowledge will generalize to novel targets and populations. Finally, we will review several modeling approaches that can accommodate relatively unexamined yet important sources of variance in impression formation, suggesting a clear path forward toward a comprehensive understanding of face impressions.