Animal Pain: What It is and Why It Matters

The basis of having a direct moral obligation to an entity is that what we do to that entity matters to it. The ability to experience pain is a sufficient condition for a being to be morally considerable. But the ability to feel pain is not a necessary condition for moral considerability. Organisms could have possibly evolved so as to be motivated to flee danger or injury or to eat or drink not by pain, but by “pangs of pleasure” that increase as one fills the relevant need or escapes the harm. In such a world, “mattering” would be positive, not negative, but would still be based in sentience and awareness. In our world, however, the “mattering” necessary to survival is negative—injuries and unfulfilled needs ramify in pain. But physical pain is by no means the only morally relevant mattering—fear, anxiety, loneliness, grief, certainly do not equate to varieties of physical pain, but are surely forms of “mattering.” An adequate morality towards animals would include a full range of possible matterings unique to each kind of animal, what I, following Aristotle, call “telos”. Sometimes not meeting other aspects of animal nature matter more to the animal than does physical pain. “Negative mattering” means all actions or events that harm animals—from frightening an animal to removing its young unnaturally early, to keeping it so it is unable to move or socialize. Physical pain is perhaps the paradigmatic case of “negative mattering”, but only constitutes a small part of what the concept covers. “Positive mattering” would of course encompass all states that are positive for the animal. An adequate ethic for animals takes cognizance of both kinds. The question arises as to how animals value death as compared with pain. Human cognition is such that it can value long-term future goals and endure short-run negative experiences for the sake of achieving them. In the case of animals, however, there is no evidence, either empirical or conceptual, that they have the capability to weigh future benefits or possibilities against current misery. We have no reason to believe that an animal can grasp the notion of extended life, let alone choose to trade current suffering for it. Pain may well be worse for animals than for humans, as they cannot rationalize its acceptance by appeal to future life without pain. How can we know that animals experience all or any of the negative or positive states we have enumerated above? The notion that we needed to be agnostic or downright atheistic about animal mentation, including pain, because we could not verify it through experience, became a mainstay of what I have called “scientific ideology”, the uncriticized dogma taught to young scientists through most of the 20th century despite its patent ignoring of Darwinian phylogenetic continuity. Together with the equally pernicious notion that science is “value-free”, and thus has no truck with ethics, this provided the complete justification for hurting animals in science without providing any pain control. This ideology could only be overthrown by federal law. Ordinary common sense throughout history, in contradistinction to scientific ideology, never denied that animals felt pain. Where, then, does the denial of pain and other forms of mattering come from if it is inimical to common sense? It came from the creation of philosophical systems hostile to common sense and salubrious to a scientific, non-commonsensical world view. Reasons for rejecting this philosophical position are detailed. In the end, then, there are no sound reasons for rejecting knowledge of animal pain and other forms of both negative and positive mattering in animals. Once that hurdle is cleared, science must work assiduously to classify, understand, and mitigate all instances of negative mattering occasioned in animals by human use, as well as to understand and maximize all modes of positive mattering.     

What Sort of Collective Afterlife Matters and How

In Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler argues that the assumption of a “collective afterlife” (i.e., the assumption that the human race and humanity lives on after our own individual deaths) plays an essential role in us valuing much of what we do. If a collective afterlife did not exist, our value structures would be radically different according to Scheffler. We would cease to value much of what we do. In Part I of the paper, I argue that there is something to Scheffler’s afterlife conjecture, but that Scheffler has misplaced the mattering of a collective afterlife. Its significance lies not in the realm of axiology but more importantly in coming to terms with the fact of death and in viewing our lives as having meaning. In Part II of the paper, I outline three views on the sort of collective afterlife that matters and argue in favor of the view that it must involve creatures that recognize our existence, reasons, values, and contributions (“The Recognition Thesis”) and the view that it must involve creatures that value similar things to us (“The Valuers Like Us Thesis”)—but argue against the view that it necessarily be a human collective afterlife (“The Human Form Thesis”).     

The Ties That Bind

In this paper, I define a psychoanalytic object broadly, as an object that “matters” to an individual. My focus is on how someone becomes a psychoanalytic object and how our ideas about this process lead us to a particular conception of an analyst’s mutative role. Further, I examine the function of a psychoanalytic object in one’s inner world. One view of the object leads to a “dynamic” emphasis, examining the object’s role in a system of unconscious conflict and compromise, whereas a second, overlapping line of thought leads to a “structural” focus, emphasizing the object’s role in developing, stabilizing, and often maintaining compromised internal psychic capacities. These capacities are developmental achievements that form the context of conflict and compromise. Dynamic and structural emphases lead to different clinical stances. In considering the object and evolving conceptions of the object within Freudian psychoanalysis (my focus), we simultaneously review the evolution of Freudian psychoanalysis itself.     

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY,ETHICS, AND LOVE: TOWARD A NEW RELIGION AND SCIENCE DIALOGUE

Religion and science dialogues that orbit around rational method, knowledge, and truth are often, though not always, contentious. In this article, I suggest a different cluster of gravitational points around which religion and science dialogues might usefully travel: philosophical anthropology, ethics, and love. I propose seeing morality as a natural outgrowth of the human desire to establish and maintain social bonds so as not to experience the condition of being alone. Humans, of all animals, need to feel loved—defined as a compassionate present‐with in dynamic dyadic relation such that one experiences the sense of mattering—but that need has an equally natural tendency to be met by creating biased us‐and‐them distinctions. A “critical” natural ethics, then, is one in which we become aware of and work to undermine our tendency to reify in‐group distinctions between “us” and “them.” Religious communities that work intentionally on this can be seen, to some extent, as laboratories of love—or as sites for co‐creating knowledge in perilous times.     

Neo Homo Economicus and the End of the Subject

Neo-liberalism is now a dominant ideology and sociopolitical-economic organizing principle. Following Nancy Hollander’s (this issue) illuminating foray into its psychological demi-monde, and in full agreement with the understanding that the subject contains and reflects the social, my commentary aims to elaborate on neo-liberalism’s subjective and intersubjecrive correlates. I also raise some more general questions about the relations between the subjective and the social, and our ways of thinking about them. I begin in exploring the value attached to caregiving and attachment. Attachment as goods exchanged and as investment. I follow by highlighting the slippage between ethical and economic meanings in terms such as “value,” “debt,” “guilt,” and “redemption,” a slippage that points to the the probable co-emergence of ethics and markets. Leaning on Foucault’s notion of homo economicus and on the psychoanalytic concept of libidinal economy, I outline some questions about the psychology of the homo economicus of neo-liberalism. I question what seems to me a nostalgic sentiment that runs through neo-liberalism as well as recent psychoanalytic theories, suggesting that this similarity demonstrates how psychoanalytic thinking itself reflects the current order of things. Finally, I wonder whether, under this ideology, we are encountering not only a new kind of subjectivity but also the end of subjectivity as a fundament of human life.     

Sleeping Dogs: Psychoanalysis and the Socio-Political

Psychoanalysis deals with what unconsciously mediates our relationship to reality. Our “ordinary clinical terms” (Holmes, this issue) include the press of drives and its fantasy derivatives, the history of early attachment and object relations, lifetime and intergenerational legacies; these are the elements that we assume shape psychic reality. As a discipline we are less likely to interrogate the profound and ongoing ways in which we are spellbound by ideology and are less likely to address racism, homophobia, misogyny, and privilege as central. What I hope to address in this discussion is why considering the socio-political is actually quite complicated for psychoanalysis.     

The Invisible and the Secret: Of a Phenomenology of the Inapparent

I consider in this article Heidegger’s late characterization of phenomenology as a “phenomenology of the inapparent.” Phenomenology is traditionally considered to be a thought of presence, assigned to a phenomenon that is identified with the present being, or with an object for consciousness. The phenomenon would be synonymous with presence itself, with what manifests itself in a presence. However, I will suggest in the following pages that phenomenology is haunted by the presence of a certain unappearing dimension, a claim that was made by Heidegger in his last seminar in 1973, when he characterized the most proper sense of phenomenology as a “phenomenology of the inapparent.” I attempt to show in what sense for Heidegger the “inapparent” plays in phenomenality and in phenomenology, and to then consider (drawing from Levinas and Derrida) its ethical import.     

＂I Effaced Myself＂ and ＂The Disappearance of the Subject＂： A Comparison between Zhuangzi and Jean Baudrillard＇s Anti-Subjectivism

In the chapter ＂The Adjustment of Controversies＂ in his eponymous work, Zhuangzi has the character Nanguo Ziqi declare ＂I effaced myself,＂ thereby holding that one can return to the state of naturalness only after breaking with the ＂self＂ that is in opposition to ＂objects,＂ abandoning his subject-object standpoint and entering a state of ＂effacement＂ wherein one fuses with the Dao. Coincidently, the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard also repeatedly stresses the ＂disappearance of the subject＂ in his later philosophy, trying to dissolve subject-centrism by means of a counterattack by the object wherein its logic would entrap the subject. Although they lived in different times, both Zhuangzi and Baudrillard note the same human predicament--the situation wherein the ＂I as subject＂ constantly obscures the ＂real I.＂ Their resolutions of the predicament are similar： both put their hopes in the dissolution of the ＂I＂ or self in subject-object relations, with Zhuangzi declaring ＂I effaced myself＇ and Baudrillard mooting the ＂disappearance of the subject.＂ They differ, however, on how to dissolve the ＂I＂ （myself）. Briefly, Zhuangzi advocates ＂effacing myself through the Dao,＂ that is, quitting one＇s ＂fixed mindset＂ and ＂egoism＂ and returning to the Dao by means of ＂forgetting＂ or ＂effacing＂; Baudrillard, on the other hand, proposes to ＂efface oneself through the object,＂ i.e., replace the supremacy of the subject with that of the object. Baudrillard＇s theory has often been criticized as pataphysics because of its nihilism without transcendence; in contrast, Zhuangzi＇s view, which construes the whole world as the unfolding of the Dao, seems more thought-provoking.     

Mistakes and Mental Disturbances: Pleasants, Wittgenstein, and Basic Moral Certainty

In his article, “Wittgenstein and Basic Moral Certainty,” Nigel Pleasants argues that killing an innocent, non-threatening person is wrong. It is, he argues, “a basic moral certainty.” He believes our basic moral certainties play the “same kind of foundational role as [our] basic empirical certaint[ies] do.” I believe this is mistaken. There is not “simply one kind of foundational role” that certainty plays. While I think Pleasants is right to affiliate his proposition with a Wittgensteinian form of certainty, he exposes himself to a tension that exists in On Certainty regarding how we acquire it: is certainty natural, is it social? In this paper, I present two ways in which we come to possess certainty: a bottom-up approach, where certainty is part of our instinctual predisposition, and a top-down approach, where certainty is acquired through positive reinforcement by family and culture.     

What is the “front” of a simple geometric form?

A total of 670 undergraduate Ss were tested in three studies conducted in an attempt to define a set of cues that minimally specify perceived “frontness” and “backness” of objects. In Experiment I, Ss were instructed to identify the “front” and “back” of printed squares to which no, one, or two circles were attached. In Experiment II, different Ss made the same kind of judgment to a wider range of geometric forms. In Experiment III, different Ss judged the direction of “imagined” movement of forms from Experiment I. The results indicated that the “front” and “back” are asymmetric opposite sides, with “front” the side most different from the rest and the side toward which the form is imagined to be moving.     

INTERPERSONAL EPISTEMIC ENTITLEMENTS

In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief‐forming processes—perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others—is not restricted to one's own belief‐forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others’ processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are “interpersonal.” I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non‐standard version of anti‐reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, and a more “extended” epistemology—one that calls into question the epistemic significance that has traditionally been ascribed to the boundaries separating individual subjects.     

Possession attachment: Individual differences in the endowment effect

The endowment effect suggests that people become attached to objects that are in their possession, and they demand a higher price to sell an object they own than they would be willing to pay to buy the same object. The results of four experiments support the suggestion that “possession attachment” is related to adult attachment styles in close relationships. Measures of attachment style in close relationships significantly predicted both actual and hypothetical selling prices moderating the endowment effect (Study 1), and significantly correlate with ratings of possession attachment (Study 2). Specifically, attachment anxiety is positively correlated with the selling prices of objects, while attachment avoidance shows no significant relation with object evaluation. The third and fourth experimental studies further demonstrated that attachment anxiety enhances possession evaluation and inhibits trades. The studies used real commodities and real money, and therefore, they have implications for everyday decisions as well as for the development of theories to better understand decisions about trades, negotiations, and choice of goods. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hypnotic experience and the autism spectrum disorder. A phenomenological investigation

In recent decades, the focus in autism research progressively expanded. It presently offers extensive material on sensorimotor disturbances as well as on perceptive-cognitive preferences of people with autism. The present article proposes not only a critical interpretation of the common theoretical framework in autism research but also focuses on certain experiences common to some people with autism and which can be appropriately understood by phenomenology. What I will call “hypnotic experiences” in autism are moments in which some individuals withdraw into intense sensorial and perceptive experiences. Following their examples, I use the term “hypnosis” primarily to describe a trance state in which the individuals become highly alert to and awake for an experience of a totally new kind. Through a close analysis of autobiographical writings from people with autism I defend the idea that the particularity of hypnotic experiences in autism consists in a certain qualitative shift within experience itself: what changes, in the hypnotic moments, is the way a person with autism relates to his/her own bodily experiences. If this qualitative shift is indeed difficult to account for within a reifying and intellectualist research perspective, phenomenology offers a large conceptual framework for understanding it. Phenomenology, and precisely, phenomenological psychopathology, will thus emerge as a major device in accounting for such “hypnotic experiences”. The argument mainly draws on the twofold structure of experience which is traditionally used in phenomenological research: it claims that in hypnotic experience people with autism are inclined to focus on non-reified “sensings”, “perceivings” and “movings”, and thus leave aside the object itself and any intentional reification of it. Finally, I will claim that this restriction to mere non-reified sensings might lead to a completely new conception of self and world. In the hypnotic experiences of autism, neither the subject nor the object come to a full-blown and independent existence. A thorough phenomenological analysis of hypnotic experience in autism therefore also has to face the question of a corresponding ontology of these experiences.     

Buddhism and bell hooks: Liberatory Aesthetics and the Radical Subjectivity of No‐Self

This article engages bell hooks's concept of “radical black subjectivity” through the lens of the Buddhist doctrine of no‐self. Relying on the Zen theorist Dōgen and on resources from Japanese aesthetics, I argue that non‐attachment to the self clarifies hooks's claim that radical subjectivity unites our capacity for critical resistance with our capacity to appreciate beauty. I frame this argument in terms of hooks's concern that postmodernist identity critiques dismiss the identity claims of disempowered peoples. On the one hand, identity critique has an emotional component, as it involves questioning the self and possibly letting go of aspects of that self in which a person has inevitably made emotional investments. On the other hand, it has an aesthetic component, as it opens a space for the creative crafting and recrafting of identity. Japanese aesthetics emphasizes that all aesthetic appreciation is accompanied by feelings of mournfulness, for the object of aesthetic appreciation is transient. Linking hooks's liberatory aesthetics with the resources of the Japanese tradition suggests that mournfulness in the face of self‐loss necessarily accompanies all instances of critical resistance. Thus non‐attachment becomes a useful framework in which to understand both the emotional and aesthetic components of empowered identity critique.     

Attachment and mental and physical health: self-compassion and mattering as mediators

Research shows a strong link between adult attachment and mental and physical health, but little is known about the mechanisms that underlie these relationships. The present study examined self-compassion and mattering, two constructs from positive psychology literature, as potential mediators. Using survey data from a sample of 208 college students, relationships among attachment, self-compassion, mattering, and functional health were explored. Correlational analyses indicated that attachment anxiety and avoidance were strongly related to the mental health component of functional health. Mediation analyses indicated that mattering and self-compassion mediated the relationships between attachment orientation (i.e., levels of avoidance and anxiety) and mental health. These findings suggest that individuals' abilities to be kind toward themselves and their sense of belonging and being important to others are pathways through which attachment orientation relates to mental health.     

What's Formal about Formal Indication? Heidegger's Method in Sein und Zeit 1

Against the background of a recent exchange between Cristina Lafont and Hubert Dreyfus, I argue that Heidegger's method of “formal indication” is at the heart of his attempt in Sein und Zeit to answer “the ontological question of the being of the ‘sum’” (SZ, p. 46). This method works reflexively, by picking out certain essential features of one's first-person singular being at the outset of its investigation that are implicit in the question “what is it to be the entity I am?” On the basis of these features, various further a priori, ontological structures (care and temporality) that constitute one as a first-person singular entity then become accessible. Formal indication is thus formal in two senses: it officially designates or signals certain first-person singular phenomena as the topic of investigation, and it picks out features which define the ontological form of the entity in question. It is thereby the method by which a legitimately transcendental account of our being may be begun to be generated by each of us from out of our factical, immanent existence.     

On Fundamental Differences between Dependent and Independent Meanings

In “Function and Concept” and “On Concept and Object”, Frege argued that certain differences between dependent and independent meanings were inviolable and “founded deep in the nature of things” but, in those articles, he was not explicit about the actual consequences of violating such differences. However, since by creating a law that permitted one to pass from a concept to its extension, he himself mixed dependent and independent meanings, we are in a position to study some of the actual consequences of his having done so. To make certain of Frege’s ideas about the inviolability of logical form more tangible, I describe a string of very interrelated consequences that his attempt to transform dependent meanings into independent meanings actually brought in its wake.     

From analytic pragmatism to historical materialism: Frankfurt school critical theory and the Quine-Duhem thesis

My aim in this paper is to explore an affinity between early critical theory and analytical philosophy. The affinity is in a fairly unexpected area: philosophy of science. I argue that early critical theory embraces a view of science which is a natural if somewhat unfamiliar extension of the pragmatist one defended by Quine. In particular, I argue that Horkheimer has a version of the Quine-Duhem thesis (“underdetermination of theory choice by the evidence”). How do the Frankfurt and analytical versions of the underdetermination thesis differ? Quine and others have taken the thesis to motivate a form of pragmatism. What this means is that it is certain interests that ultimately determine the choice of theory: chief among them, an interest in simplicity of our theories. However, the Critical Theorists offer us a distinctly historical materialist version of the underdetermination thesis, in which it is the imperatives of the prevailing mode of production, for example, capitalism, which are decisive. The result is an unfamiliar Marxist version of an otherwise familiar thesis from the analytic tradition.     

Practical Reason,Sympathy and Reactive Attitudes

This paper has three aims. First, I defend, in its most radical form, Hume's scepticism about practical reason, as it applies to purely self‐regarding matters. It's not always irrational to discount the future, to be inconstant in one's preferences, to have incompatible desires, to not pursue the means to one's ends, or to fail to maximize one's own good. Second, I explain how our response to the “irrational” agent should be understood as an expression of frustrated sympathy, in Adam Smith's sense of sympathy, rather than a genuine judgement about Reason. We judge these people because we cannot imaginatively identify with their desires and attitudes, and this is frustrating. Third, compared to the standard cognitive view, my account better explains the nature of our criticism of the “irrational,” and, by portraying “irrationality” as a cause of upset to other people, provides a better normative basis for being “rational.”