Can one pay attention to a particular color?

In an array of elements whose colors vary can we selectively choose to process all the items of a particular color preferentially in relation to those of another color? We addressed this question by presenting subjects with arrays containing many elements, and recording reaction times to a luminance change of one of the elements. Half the elements had one color and the other half another color--the spatial distribution being random. In two tasks--a simple detection of this change or a choice reaction time to the polarity of the change--we found that reaction times were independent of the number of items in the array. Cuing the subjects as to the color of the target item had no significant influence on the detection task, but subjects were faster if cued for the discrimination task. A further experiment replicated these findings and examined possible costs and benefits. Our final experiment separated the roles of attentional guidance and postattentional processes by having subjects judge the orientation of the target element and varying the magnitude of the target flash that defined which element was the target. We found that this judgment was also affected by color cuing, and that the size of the effect interacted with the flash strength, suggesting that color cuing has its influence at the stage of attentional guidance. We conclude that subjects can selectively attend to items on the basis of color given the appropriate task and stimulus dynamics.     

Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data?

There is much interest currently in using functional neuroimaging techniques to understand better the nature of cognition. One particular practice that has become common is 'reverse inference', by which the engagement of a particular cognitive process is inferred from the activation of a particular brain region. Such inferences are not deductively valid, but can still provide some information. Using a Bayesian analysis of the BrainMap neuroimaging database, I characterize the amount of additional evidence in favor of the engagement of a cognitive process that can be offered by a reverse inference. Its usefulness is particularly limited by the selectivity of activation in the region of interest. I argue that cognitive neuroscientists should be circumspect in the use of reverse inference, particularly when selectivity of the region in question cannot be established or is known to be weak.     

Predicting World Cup results: Do goals seem more likely when they pay off?

Bar-Hillel and Budescu (1995) failed to find a desirability bias in probability estimation. The World Cup soccer tournament provided an opportunity to revisit the phenomenon in a context in which desirability biases are notoriously rampant. Participants estimated the probabilities of various teams’ winning their upcoming games. They were promised money if one team—randomly designated by the experimenter—won its upcoming game. Participants assigned a higher probability to a victory by their target team than did other participants, whose promised monetary reward was contingent on the victory of its opponent. Prima facie, this seems to be a desirability bias. However, in a follow-up study that made one team salient, without promising monetary rewards, participants also judged their target team to be more likely to win. On grounds of parsimony, we conclude that what appears to be a desirability bias may just be a salience/marking effect, and—although optimism is a robust and ubiquitous human phenomenon—that wishful thinking still remains elusive.     

Client or patient? Contrasts between medical and counselling models of confidentiality

Conflicts can arise within counseling in primary care settings over issues of client confidentiality as perceived from a therapeutic as opposed to medical perspective. ‘Ideal types’ of counseling confidentiality and medical confidentiality are compared, according to a proposed structural model of confidentiality. In contrast with a therapeutic concept of confidentiality as an interpersonal contract between client and counsellor, a structural model of confidentiality appropriate to medical and primary care settings would include reference to crucial aspects such as risk assessment, and the sharing of client information within a multi-disciplinary team. The client-centred counselling model of confidentiality is then explored with reference to the Derbyshire Inquiry Report on the mental health care provided for a client with psychiatric problems. The limitations of adopting an exclusive client-centred counselling approach towards confidentiality in primary care settings are noted, given the requirements of the Care Programme Approach for effective risk assessment and inter-professional liaison in the care of client and patients with psychiatric problems. The potential resultant issues of counsellor and general practitioner liability are identified in relation to complaints systems and the key legal concept of vicarious liability.     

Can Models of God Compete?

Though the very task of modeling God implies that the reality of God is to some degree unknowable, there are a variety of positions one may take concerning the degree to which one has epistemic access to God. If our models of God are too influenced by subjectivity, it makes no sense to test them against each other in rational competition. In this essay, I define four possible positions that may underlie the task of God-modeling: mysteriosophy, theopoetics, critical realism, and fallibilism. Of these four, I propose that fallibilism is the most appropriate method for constructing models of God. Fallibilism simultaneously assumes that our models are able to refer to a divine reality, and yet always with a tentative stance, as absolute confirmation or universal consensus concerning them will almost certainly never be obtained. Models of God can engage in rational competition, but a final decision will probably be delayed indefinitely. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

Can Persistence be a Matter of Convention?

This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence be able to account for such scenarios in terms of conventions of the first kind. Later parts of the article therefore investigate whether three of the currently most influential metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence—the endurance theory, the stage theory, and the perdurance theory—can do this. Fortunately, for them, it turns out that all can, though some philosophers have disputed this. However, when we ask how they account for a typical case of “conventional persistence” some problematic features of the theories—having to do with reference, persistence conditions, how they relate, and the epistemology of persistence—are revealed.     

Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing?

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - Wellbeing describes how good life is for the person living it. Wellbeing comes in degrees. Subjective theories of wellbeing maintain that for objects or states...     

Can One Be Cognitively Conscious of God?

How do humans ‘register’ God: attain knowledge or revelation of God? Analysis is familiar in terms of explanatory hypothesis, necessity, authority and commitment. However individuals speak also of ‘experience’ or ‘consciousness’ of God/Christ/grace – received widely, not just by an esoteric few. But may we properly hold that people can be cognitively aware of God? Undoubtedly such speech has problematic aspects. Not only do psychosis, self-deception, gullibility recur. Commentators are liable to enlist what may be termed the A-conceptual Lucidity picture, which critically fails. Various positions urged by thinkers rule out by definition the very possibility of cognitive awareness of God. Some analysts assert: a person’s experiencing x is constituted throughout by the person’s use of concepts in toto reached previously and independently. But, why adopt any a priori dismissiveness? We should favour a portrayal of people’s epistemic situation respecting God called the Consciousness Portrayal. Phrases therein include: ‘God’s gracious, guiding activity’; ‘a person’s access to God’; ‘attentive consciousness/conceptualization/knowledge of God’; ‘diverse levels or modes of consciousness’; ‘God’s guidance in a person’s creatively picking out concepts’; and ‘“cognition” which, as regards meaning, is not just a function of calculative reasoning’. Alertness to usage in non-religious contexts aids our finding the religious phrasing intelligible. The Portrayal is approachable from an internal and external angle. Opponents’ challenges to the Portrayal invoke some broad epistemological theses, often pronounced intrinsic to ‘rationality’. But we fittingly espouse certain contrasting epistemological views. And these prove to fortify the Consciousness Portrayal.     

Can the Paradox of Forgiveness Be Dissolved?

The “paradox of forgiveness” can be described as follows: Forgiving, unlike forgetting, is tied to reasons. It is a response to considerations that lead us to think that we ought to forgive. On the other hand, acts of forgiveness, unlike excuses, are responses to instances of culpable wrongdoing. If, however, the wrongdoing is culpable, there is (or seems to be) no reason to forgive it. So two mutually exclusive theses about forgiveness both seem to be equally warranted: Forgiveness is related to reasons, but there can be no reasons for forgiveness. In this paper, I attempt to dissolve this paradox. I argue that the paradox arises as a result of a too narrow conception of “reason” and that it can be dissolved if we acknowledge different kinds of reasons for forgiveness. More specifically, I examine three kinds of reasons for forgiving an act of wrongdoing: (1) Moral reasons that make forgiveness morally mandatory. (2) Prudential reasons for forgiveness. (3) Moral reasons that pertain to the character of the forgiver and that favor forgiveness without making it morally mandatory. I show that while the paradox of forgiveness arises when we consider reasons of the first kind, it can be dissolved with recourse to reasons of the second and third kind. The upshot of the argument is that we can be rational in deciding to overcome our feelings of resentment towards an act of unjustified and unexcused wrongdoing—and this is a strong point in favor of forgiveness.     

Did I turn off the gas? Reality monitoring of everyday actions

Failing to remember whether we performed, or merely imagined performing, an everyday action can occasionally be inconvenient, but in some circumstances it can have potentially dangerous consequences. In this fMRI study, we investigated the brain activity patterns, and objective and subjective behavioral measures, associated with recollecting such everyday actions. We used an ecologically valid “reality-monitoring” paradigm in which participants performed, or imagined performing, specified actions with real objects drawn from one of two boxes. Lateral brain areas, including prefrontal cortex, were active when participants recollected both the actions that had been associated with objects and the locations from which they had been drawn, consistent with a general role in source recollection. By contrast, medial prefrontal and motor regions made more specific contributions, with supplementary motor cortex activity being associated with recollection decisions about actions but not locations, and medial prefrontal cortex exhibiting greater activity when remembering performed rather than imagined actions. These results support a theoretical interpretation of reality monitoring that entails the fine-grained discrimination between multiple forms of internally and externally generated information.     

Can redescriptions of outcomes salvage the axioms of decision theory?

Philosophical Studies - The basic axioms or formal conditions of decision theory, especially the ordering condition put on preferences and the axioms underlying the expected utility (EU) formula,...     

Can We Make Sense of the Notion of Trustworthy Technology?

In this paper we raise the question whether technological artifacts can properly speaking be trusted or said to be trustworthy. First, we set out some prevalent accounts of trust and trustworthiness and explain how they compare with the engineer’s notion of reliability. We distinguish between pure rational-choice accounts of trust, which do not differ in principle from mere judgments of reliability, and what we call “motivation-attributing” accounts of trust, which attribute specific motivations to trustworthy entities. Then we consider some examples of technological entities that are, at first glance, best suited to serve as the objects of trust: intelligent systems that interact with users, and complex socio-technical systems. We conclude that the motivation-attributing concept of trustworthiness cannot be straightforwardly applied to these entities. Any applicable notion of trustworthy technology would have to depart significantly from the full-blown notion of trustworthiness associated with interpersonal trust.