Comparison of Privacy Consciousness Between Younger and Older Adults

The degree of being conscious about privacy for the self and others is known as privacy consciousness. This study aimed to compare privacy consciousness between younger and older adults. Japanese younger (n = 166) and older (n = 145) adults were requested to rate all items in the Privacy Consciousness Scale, which assessed their degree of consciousness about privacy for the self and others and behaviors for maintaining privacy based on this consciousness. Results indicated that older adults scored lower on Consciousness Regarding Privacy of Others and higher on Behaviors Regarding Privacy of Others than younger adults. However, no significant difference was found in Consciousness and Behaviors Regarding Privacy of the Self between younger and older adults.     

How could phenomenal consciousness be involved in mental function?

In a phylogenetic perspective, the phenomenal and the functional aspects of consciousness cannot be separated because consciousness, as a phenomenal experience, must be causally effective. The hypothesis I propose is that the fundamental property of consciousness consists of a self-organizing process: the differentiation of a content. The differentiation of a content occurs on the basis of the relations internal to a representational whole, which behaves like a field and tends towards a condition of equilibrium. This hypothesis can be somehow considered an extension of Gestalt visual perceptual theory. Unlike neurocomputational processes, which are non-conscious and extrinsic to the representation, conscious processes are intrinsic to the representational whole. Consciousness, as an intrinsically self-organizing process interwoven with its phenomenal aspects, can be more than epiphenomenal and it can be involved in mental function. The paper then discusses the implications of this hypothesis for subjectivity and the explanatory gap.     

Facets of private and public self‐consciousness: construct and discriminant validity

The construct and discriminant validity of proposed facets of private self‐consciousness (Self‐Reflectiveness and Internal State Awareness) and public self‐consciousness (Style Consciousness and Appearance Consciousness) was examined in two studies. In study 1 an exploratory factor analysis of 367 subjects' responses to a translated version of the Self‐Consciousness Scale (SCS) of Fenigstein, Scheir, and Buss confirmed the existence of two factors of private and public self‐consciousness. Confirmatory factor analysis of 199 university students' responses to the SCS confirmed the results from study 1. A two‐dimensional model of private and public self‐consciousness respectively represented a significant improvement in fit to data over single‐factor models. Further, the two facets of private and public self‐consciousness were related differently to measures representing different aspects of adjustment/maladjustment. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consciousness and working memory: Current trends and research perspectives

Working memory has long been thought to be closely related to consciousness. However, recent empirical studies show that unconscious content may be maintained within working memory and that complex cognitive computations may be performed on-line. This promotes research on the exact relationships between consciousness and working memory. Current evidence for working memory being a conscious as well as an unconscious process is reviewed. Consciousness is shown to be considered a subset of working memory by major current theories of working memory. Evidence for unconscious elements in working memory is shown to come from visual masking and attentional blink paradigms, and from the studies of implicit working memory. It is concluded that more research is needed to explicate the relationship between consciousness and working memory. Future research directions regarding the relationship between consciousness and working memory are discussed.     

Phenomenological Views on Intersubjectivity: Towards a Reinterpretation of Consciousness

Intersubjectivity and consciousness are reinterpreted according to the dynamic and relational coordinates of lived experience. Consciousness is not just another property of the subject, but rather the condition itself of his/her own being-in-the-world. The different aspects of consciousness are the moments and movements which constitute its intentional structure. These structures lead us to reinterpret material embodiment, temporality, and intersubjectivity as the “complex” steps taken by consciousness, which in its movements does not turn inward, on itself like a transcendental, reasoning, and self-centred consciousness, but, on the contrary, as an embodied consciousness immersed in others and in the world.

Consciousness about own and others' affects: a study of the validity of a revised version of the Affect Consciousness Interview

This study presents a modified version of the affect consciousness interview ( Monsen, Eilertsen, Melgård & Ödegård, 1996 ), intended to capture the individual's affective consciousness. The aim of the modified version – The Affect Consciousness Interview – Revised (ACI‐R) – is to measure consciousness about own and others’ affects. Three groups of patients (with eating disorder, relational and social problems or stress‐related problems), and one non‐clinical group were included in the study (N= 95). The results indicated that it was possible to achieve adequate interrater reliability, that the scores correlated meaningfully with other measures of mental functioning, and that the interview discriminated between different clinical groups and non‐clinical participants. In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that the ACI‐R is a promising instrument and that it should be explored further in order to study the organization of self‐experiences and the ability to be emotionally present in interactions with others.     

Two theories of consciousness: Semantic pointer competition vs. information integration

Consciousness results from three mechanisms: representation by firing patterns in neural populations, binding of representations into more complex representations called semantic pointers, and competition among semantic pointers to capture the most important aspects of an organism’s current state. We contrast the semantic pointer competition (SPC) theory of consciousness with the hypothesis that consciousness is the capacity of a system to integrate information (IIT). We describe computer simulations to show that SPC surpasses IIT in providing better explanations of key aspects of consciousness: qualitative features, onset and cessation, shifts in experiences, differences in kinds across different organisms, unity and diversity, and storage and retrieval.     

Same old, same old: the same-order representation theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor

The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them–the theory ‘divides the phenomenal labor’ in an illicit fashion. This ‘failure of intimacy’ is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy. A version of this paper was presented at the ‘Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness’ conference, Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona, March 18th–20th, 2005.     

A presentation of Attentional Semantics

The paper presents the two main assumptions of Attentional Semantics—(A) and (B), and its main aim (C). (A) Conscious experience is determined by attention: there cannot be consciousness without attention. Consciousness is explained as the product of attentional activity. Attentional activity can be performed thanks to a special kind of energy: nervous energy. This energy is supplied by the organ of attention. When we perform attentional activity, we use our nervous energy. This activity directly affects the organ of attention, causing a variation in the state of the nervous energy. This variation constitutes the phenomenal aspect of consciousness. (B) Words are tools to pilot attention. The meanings of words isolate, de-contextualize, “freeze” and classify in an articulated system the ever-changing and multiform stream of our conscious experiences. Each meaning is composed of the sequence of invariable elements that, independently of any individual occurrence of a given conscious experience, are responsible for the production of any instance of that conscious experience. The elements composing the meanings of words are attentional operations: each word conveys the condensed instructions on the attentional operations one has to perform if one wants to consciously experience what is expressed through and by it. (C) Attentional Semantics aims at finding the attentional instruction conveyed by the meanings of words. To achieve this goal, it tries: (1) to identify the sequence of the elementary conscious experiences that invariably accompany, and are prompted by, the use of the word being analyzed; (2) to describe these conscious experiences in terms of the attentional operations that are responsible for their production; and (3) to identify the unconscious and non-conscious operations that, directly or indirectly, serve either as the support that makes it possible for the attentional operations to take place, be completed, and occur in a certain way, or as the necessary complement that makes it possible to execute and implement the activities determined and triggered by the conscious experiences. The origins of Attentional Semantics are also presented, and the methodological problems researchers encounter when analyzing meanings in attentional terms are discussed. Finally, a brief comparison with the other kinds of semantics is made.     

Mental Attention, Consciousness, and the Progressive Emergence of Wisdom

I discuss the mental–attentional mechanisms of consciousness, meditation, and the emergence of wisdom. A developmental (neoPiagetian), dynamic flash-light model of mental attention is used. I model the initial stages of consciousness in infancy, showing that the growth of consciousness is influenced by the number of schemes that attention can coordinate. I discuss ordinary consciousness in adults and the stages/levels of adult development in consciousness. Wisdom is defined as an expectable but often missed outcome of adult development. To accelerate access to wisdom, two complementary paths are mentioned: a natural life-experience path and a meditation path. Maturational organismic factors and the role of mental attentional mechanisms in these two paths are discussed, and a constructivist neuropsychological model of what happens in the brain during meditation, and in higher consciousness, is sketched. Processes involved in higher stages of consciousness are then examined from this perspective.     

Missing piece of the puzzle in the science of consciousness: Resting state and endogenous correlates of consciousness

Consciousness still stands as one of the most interesting and the most elusive problems of neuroscience. Finding its correlates is the first step toward its satisfactory explanation. Several theories have proposed its correlates but none of them seem to be generally accepted even though most of them share some very similar elements. These elements are the activity of the thalamus, which is considered by some as the central region for consciousness, and gamma synchronization, which should be the general principal for the emergence of conscious experience. However, all of these proposed theories share one characteristic and that is that they do not take into consideration the recently discovered endogenous activity of the brain, which is generally associated with the default mode network. Although the activity of this large scale brain network is in correlation with various levels of consciousness it is still missing in discussions of consciousness. This review recognizes the importance of endogenous activity and points out the important discoveries of endogenous activity that could be an important step toward a satisfactory explanation of consciousness.     

The Continuity of Consciousness

Abstract: In this paper I discuss two puzzles that concern the sense in which consciousness can be described as ‘continuous’. The first puzzle arises out of recent work by Dainton and Tye, both of whom appear to oscillate between ascribing the property of ‘continuity’ to the stream of experience, and ascribing it to the objects of experience. The second puzzle concerns the notion that the stream of consciousness could be in some sense unreal or illusory—a puzzle stemming from the thought that some of the brain processes underlying consciousness do not exhibit continuity. I argue that these problems can be solved by distinguishing between three possible bearers of the property of ‘continuity’—(1) the State of Consciousness, (2) the Stream of Experience, and (3) what is represented by experience—and two different senses of ‘continuity’—‘strict’ and ‘extreme’ continuity. I conclude by providing a positive account of the continuity of consciousness, according to which the State of Consciousness exhibits ‘strict’ continuity, and the Stream of Experience exhibits ‘extreme’ continuity.     

Conditioning,sensations, and the ergotropic-trophotropic balance

Analysis of Pschonik’s work on conditioning and sensation, in the light of Gellhorn’s studies on the tuning of the central nervous system through changes in the ergotropic-trophotropic balance, leads to the following results. Vasomotor and sensory reactions (VSR) induced by stimulation of cutaneous warmth and pain receptors (US), or by the conditional stimulus (CS) reinforced by the US, show parallel changes in a variety of circumstances: 1) anesthesia of the skin abolishes the effect of the US but not that of the CS; 2) various procedures lead to a reversal of VSR in the conditioned state in response to the US; 3) in a near-neurotic state VSR may be abolished while the plethysmogram gives evidence that ergotropic and trophotropic discharges occur at the same time. Changes in the ergotropic-trophotropic balance at the hypothalamic level alter VSR quantitatively and qualitatively. In an ergotropicallytuned state not only ergotropically-acting stimuli, but also trophotropically-acting stimuli lead to vasoconstriction and pain. Thus, stimulation of pain receptors, as well as stimulation of warmth receptors, produces vasoconstriction and pain. Similarly, these stimuli effect vasodilatation and warmth in the trophotropically-tuned state. It is concluded that the ergotropic-trophotropic balance has a profound influence on sensations and perceptions. It is of clinical significance that this balance can be altered through a conditional reflex mechanism,i.e., on the basis of individual experience.     

The electrophysiological correlates of stimulus visibility and metacontrast masking

There are conflicting views concerning the electrophysiological correlates of visual consciousness. Whereas one view considers a relatively late positive deflection (LP) as a primary correlate of consciousness, another model links consciousness with earlier negativity (VAN). The present experiment utilized metacontrast masking in investigating the electrophysiological correlates of visual consciousness. The participants were presented with target-mask sequences in three stimulus onset asynchronies. The target stimuli were followed by either a metacontrast mask or a similar-looking, but ineffective pseudomask. The results showed that the first deflection that correlated with target visibility was VAN which was followed by LP. We argue that the VAN is the primary correlate target visibility, while the LP reflects later, postperceptual processing stages.     

Gradations of awareness in a modified sequence learning task

We argue performance in the serial reaction time (SRT) task is associated with gradations of awareness that provide examples of fringe consciousness [Mangan, B. (1993b). Taking phenomenology seriously: the “fringe” and its implications for cognitive research. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 89–108, Mangan, B. (2003). The conscious “fringe”: Bringing William James up to date. In B. J. Baars, W. P. Banks & J. B. Newman (Eds.), Essential sources in the scientific study of consciousness (pp. 741–759). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.], and address limitations of the traditional SRT procedure, including criticism of exclusion generation tasks. Two experiments are conducted with a modified SRT procedure where irrelevant stimulus attributes obscure the sequence rule. Our modified paradigm, which includes a novel exclusion task, makes it easier to demonstrate a previously controversial influence of response stimulus interval (RSI) on awareness. It also allows identification of participants showing fringe consciousness rather than explicit sequence knowledge, as reflected by dissociations between different awareness measures. The NEO-PI-R variable Openness to Feelings influenced the diversity of subjective feelings reported during two awareness measures, but not the degree of learning and awareness as previously found with traditional SRT tasks [Norman, E., Price, M. C., & Duff, S. C. (2006). Fringe consciousness in sequence learning: the influence of individual differences. Consciousness and Cognition, 15(4), 723–760.]. This suggests possible distinctions between two components of fringe consciousness.     

Dispositional implementation solves the superfluous structure problem

Consciousness supervenes on activity; computation supervenes on structure. Because of this, some argue, conscious states cannot supervene on computational ones. If true, this would present serious difficulties for computationalist analyses of consciousness (or, indeed, of any domain with properties that supervene on actual activity). I argue that the computationalist can avoid the Superfluous Structure Problem (SSP) by moving to a dispositional theory of implementation. On a dispositional theory, the activity of computation depends entirely on changes in the intrinsic properties of implementing material. As extraneous structure is not required for computation, a system can implement a program running on some but not all possible inputs. Dispositional computationalism thus permits episodes of computational activity that correspond to potential episodes of conscious awareness. The SSP cannot be motivated against this account, and so computationalism may be preserved.     

Consciousness: a neurological perspective

Consciousness is a state so essentially entwined with human experience, yet so difficult to conceptually define and measure. In this article, we explore how a bidimensional model of consciousness involving both level of arousal and subjective awareness of the contents of consciousness can be used to differentiate a range of healthy and altered conscious states. These include the different sleep stages of healthy individuals and the altered states of consciousness associated with neurological conditions such as epilepsy, vegetative state and coma. In particular, we discuss how arousal and awareness are positively correlated in normal physiological states with the exception of REM sleep, while a disturbance in this relationship is characteristic of vegetative state, minimally conscious state, complex partial seizures and sleepwalking.     

Dyadically Expanded States of Consciousness and Therapeutic Change in the Interaction Between Analyst and Adult Patient

This paper presents a discussion of the mutual regulation model and the dyadic expansion of consciousness model as a way to better understand the interaction between the analysand and analyst and the process of therapeutic change. We argue that by examining matching, mismatching, and in particular reparation of therapeutic exchanges at the micro-level as well as the macro-level of the therapeutic exchange, including whole sessions or even over multiple sessions provides insight in the establishment of the therapeutic relationship and the formation of Dyadic States of Consciousness. Clinical examples are presented.     

Dynamics of mental activity

Motivated by neuronal modeling, our development of the mathematical foundations of consciousness in [W. Miranker, G. Zuckerman, Mathematical Foundations of Consciousness, J. Appl. Logic (2009)] (M-Z) was characterized by an axiomatic theory for consciousness operators that acted on the collection of all sets. Consciousness itself was modeled as emanating from the action of such operators on the labeled decoration of a graph, the latter set theoretic construct given the characterization of experience. Since mental activity (conscious and unconscious) is a time dependent process, we herein develop a discrete time dependent version of the theory. Specification of the relevant mental dynamics illuminates and expands the development of the mathematical framework in (M-Z) upon which our study of consciousness rests. This framework is an abstraction of neural net modeling.We review the Aczel theory for decorating labeled graphs, in particular that theory's application to the (M-Z) foundations. The relevant neuronal modeling concepts and terminology are also reviewed. A number of examples are presented. Then an extension of our considerations from graphs to multigraphs is made, since the latter represent a more accurate model of neuronal circuit connectivity. The dynamics are crafted for non-well-founded constructs by development of a hierarchy of systems, starting with the McCulloch–Pitts neuronal voltage input–output relations and building to a dynamics for the cognitive notions of memes and themata; these latter corresponding to aspects of decorations of labeled graphs associated with neural networks. We conclude with a summary and discussion of the semantics of the cognitive features of our development: memes, themata, qualia, consciousness operators, awareness field.