The dialectics of sketching

The generation of architectural form is by definition a creative activity. As a rule, architects engage in intensive, fast, freehand sketching when they first tackle a design task. This study investigated the process of sketching and revealed that by sketching, the designer does not represent images held in the mind, as is often the case in lay sketching, but creates visual displays which help induce images of the entity that is being designed. Sketching partakes in design reasoning and it does so through a special kind of visual imagery. A pattern of pictorial reasoning is revealed which displays regular shifts between two modalities of arguments, pertaining to both figural and nonfigural aspects of candidate forms at the time they are being generated, as part of the design search. The dialectics of sketching is the oscillation of arguments which brings about gradual transformation of images, ending when the designer judges that sufficient coherence has been achieved.     

Marx,Engels, and dialectics

Studies in East European Thought -     

Psychoanalysis and theology: Two dialectics

In the vocabulary of psychoanalysis, health means something roughly correlative to salvation in the vocabulary of theology. Both health and salvation assume some manner of change from a previous pathological or doomed state. Against this background this paper seeks to delineate two different possible models of change: One in which realityper se is changed as opposed to one in which theperception of reality is changed. In theology, the former can be represented by Paul and the latter by John. In psychoanalysis, Freud represented each point of view in his structural and topographical paradigms respectively. In contemporary psychoanalytical therapy, Otto Kernberg represents the former and Jacques Lacan the latter.He maintains a private practice of psychotherapy at the Parkwood mental Health Center. This paper is based on a presentation to the Faculty Reseacrh Forum of Candler School of Theology. For their editorial assistance, the author is grateful to jean E. Levenson, M.Div., and David M. Moss, Ph.D.     

Modern dialectics in social psychology: A reappraisal

The current status of dialectic theory in social psychology is critically examined. Its basic and interdependent assumptions are discussed and recent misconceptions analyzed. An attempt is made to clarify major confusions and misinterpretations of dialectics regarding such issues as dialectics as a conceptual versus a methodological tool, dialectics as a form of cognitive process, dialectics as a firm of interactionism, and dialectical contradictions as semantic opposites. To illustrate the relevance of dialectic theory to current issues a major dualism in social psychology is examined, namely that of individual versus social theorizing. Drawing liberally from Marxist social theory it is shown how the traditional dualism is resolved through dialectics. Finally, a response is firmed to criticisms addressed to the current status of social psychology. It is shown that dialectics not only incorporates most of the demands raised by these criticisms, but also enhances the field by pointing toward new perspectives and directions.     

The dialectics of scepticism: Comments on Gallois

In 'Axiological Actualism' Josh Parsons argues that 'axiological actualism', which is 'the doctrine that ethical theory should refrain from assigning levels of welfare, or preference orderings, or anything of the sort to merely possible people', lends plausibility to 'the converse intuition'. This is the proposition that 'the welfare a person would have, were they actual, can give us a reason not to bring that person into existence'. I show that Parsons's argument delivers less than he promises. It could be convincing only to actualists who hold certain views about normative ethics, and could at most convince them to heed the converse intuition only under certain circumstances.     

Bodies and other visual objects: the dialectics of reaching toward objects

Participants viewed video clips of a left or right-handed reach toward an object that was orientated with a handle to the left or right. They were required to classify the object by making a left or right-handed key-press and ignore the reach. These responses were, never-the-less, affected by the observed reach in ways which largely reflected the opportunities for complementary actions in the viewed scenes, given the simultaneous constraints of the object orientation combined with the direction and hand of reach. These influences are claimed to reflect the interdependency of the action possibilities that arise from a set of objects and agents in three-dimensional space that together determine behaviour.     

Ambiguity and contradiction: the outlines of Jung’s dialectics

This essay explores Jung’s thinking strategies, argumentation patterns, and concept formation processes, and reveals how they distinguish his work from normal present‐day science. Jung doesn’t much appreciate the law of noncontradiction, which is a cornerstone of classical logic, and he doesn’t refrain from using openly ambiguous theoretical terms. It will be pointed out that not only specific archetypes, but the notion of archetype itself, as well as other of Jung’s theoretical notions (energy, including libidinal energy, polarity, integration, wholeness, instinct, symbol, and so on), are consciously ambiguous and thus potentially contradictory. It is shown that this kind of dialectic research strategy and related contradiction‐tolerant and ambiguity‐tolerant methods connect his work to Post‐Kantian German Idealism, Schelling’s and Schopenhauer’s philosophy in particular. However, it was Hegel who, in his Science of Logic, presented a systematic overview of such dialectic principles of reasoning, which were, in the 19^th century, widely applied by German philosophers, theologians, and other scholars. Unfortunately, Jung decided not to study Hegel, but, instead, wrote derogatorily of his work. It will be argued that a Jungian who wants to be conscious of her own argumentation strategies and methods of concept formation should study Hegel’s complex and sophisticated dialectical logic. In addition, it is suggested that Jungian depth psychology might help us to amend the phenomenological deficits of Hegel’s system by providing it with a primal experiential source. This is needed because Hegel’s Geist, due to its intellectual emphasis, is a self‐conscious conceptual totality which advances progressively from stage to stage by guiding itself with the help of dialectical reason (Vernunft). It will be shown that if enriched with a proper kind of experiential givenness, which includes the Jungian unconsciousness (with libidinal energy, instincts, and archetypes), Hegelian metaphysics would be able to embrace a seriously aconceptual or preconceptual dimension. Aconceptual experience, which is, for Jung, mainly the instinctual layer of archetypes, remains essentially inaccessible, not only for normal scientific concepts, but for the concepts of any form of dialectics as well.     

The dialectics of infinitism and coherentism: inferential justification versus holism and coherence

This paper formally explores the common ground between mild versions of epistemological coherentism and infinitism; it proposes—and argues for—a hybrid, coherentist–infinitist account of epistemic justification. First, the epistemological regress argument and its relation to the classical taxonomy regarding epistemic justification—of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism—is reviewed. We then recall recent results proving that an influential argument against infinite regresses of justification, which alleges their incoherence on account of probabilistic inconsistency, cannot be maintained. Furthermore, we prove that the Principle of Inferential Justification has rather unwelcome consequences—formally resembling the Sorites paradox—as soon as it is iterated and combined with a natural Bayesian perspective on probabilistic inferences. We conclude that strong versions of foundationalism and infinitism should be abandoned. Positively, we provide a rough sketch for a graded formal coherence notion, according to which infinite regresses of epistemic justification will often have more than a minimal degree of coherence.     

The disclosure of a metaphysical horizon,or how to escape dialectics

Abstract

In a footnote to The Inoperative Community French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy wonders how to escape Hegelian dialectics. Because Nancy in his later work often returns to this attempt of a ‘disclosure of our metaphysical horizon’, we not only consider this note as a crucial one in his attempt to ‘disclose’ our metaphysical horizon; on top of that, we think this note is really worthwhile considering for our philosophical era in general: how to think after the so called ‘end of metaphysics’? Nancy’s work is an explicit confrontation with this horizon. Therefore, in this paper we prefer to reconstruct his line of thought in this, from the influence of Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot, over Friedrich Hegel up to Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida. We focus on the way attempts for the disclosure of our metaphysical horizon out from the problem of community, one of the central topics in his work. We conclude with a discussion why Nancy’s ontological framework has the potential to break up the metaphysical horizon of our philosophical era.