The Logic of Dominance Reasoning

The logic of dominance arguments is analyzed using two different kinds of conditionals: indicative (epistemic) and subjunctive (counter‐factual). It is shown that on the indicative interpretation an assumtion of independence is needed for a dominance argument to go through. It is also shown that on the subjunctive interpretation no assumption of independence is needed once the standard premises of the dominance argument are true, but that independence plays an important role in arguing for the truth of the premises of the dominance argument. A key feature of the analysis is the interpretation of the doubly conditional comparative "I will get a better outcome if A than if B" which is taken to have the structure "(the outcome if A) is better than (the outcome if B)".     

The Logic of Team Reasoning

Abstract

Orthodox decision theory presupposes that agency is invested in individuals. An opposing literature allows team agency to be invested in teams whose members use distinctive modes of team reasoning. This paper offers a new conceptual framework, inspired by David Lewis's analysis of common reasons for belief, within which team reasoning can be represented. It shows how individuals can independently endorse a principle of team reasoning which prescribes acting as a team member conditional on assurance that others have endorsed the same principle. It argues that there can be such assurance even when no individual has an obligation to act on team reasoning.     

The Logic of Plausible Reasoning: A Core Theory

The paper presents a core theory of human plausible reasoning based on analysis of people's answers to everyday questions about the world. The theory consists of three parts:

• 1 a formal representation of plausible inference patterns; such as deductions, inductions, and analogies, that are frequently employed in answering everyday questions;
• 2 a set of parameters, such as conditional likelihood, typicality, and similarity, that affect the certainty of people's answers to such questions; and
• 3 a system relating the different plausible inference patterns and the different certainty parameters.

This is one of the first attempts to construct a formal theory that addresses both the semantic and parametric aspects of the kind of everyday reasoning that pervades. all of human discourse.     

Judgements of Deontic Relevance in Reasoning: A Reply to Jackson and Griggs

Facilitation on abstract versions of the selection task can be produced by deontic content. Jackson and Griggs (1990) claimed that this finding depends on the presence of an explicit negative on the not-q card. We hypothesized that the removal of the explicit negative from this card made its deontic status ambiguous. Experiment 1 demonstrated that a not-q card presenting implicit negative is not selected, and most subjects select the only card that appears to be relevant from a deontic point of view (i.e. the p card). Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the presence of the explicit negative on the not-q card is not necessary for producing facilitation, provided that the form of this card makes it clear that the not-q individual is a potential violator. Experiment 4 showed that a high success rate can be obtained even with a not-q card presenting an implicit negative. The results are discussed in terms of the specificity of reasoning in the deontic domain.     

The Modal Logic of Bayesian Belief Revision

In Bayesian belief revision a Bayesian agent revises his prior belief by conditionalizing the prior on some evidence using Bayes’ rule. We define a hierarchy of modal logics that capture the logical features of Bayesian belief revision. Elements in the hierarchy are distinguished by the cardinality of the set of elementary propositions on which the agent’s prior is defined. Inclusions among the modal logics in the hierarchy are determined. By linking the modal logics in the hierarchy to the strongest modal companion of Medvedev’s logic of finite problems it is shown that the modal logic of belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable.

     

Paraconsistency in Categories: Case of Relevance Logic

Categorical-theoretic semantics for the relevance logic is proposed which is based on the construction of the topos of functors from a relevant algebra (considered as a preorder category endowed with the special endofunctors) in the category of sets Set. The completeness of the relevant system R of entailment is proved in respect to the semantic considered.     

Prolegomena to Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision

In ‘belief revision’ a theory is revised with a formula φ resulting in a revised theory . Typically, is in , one has to give up belief in by a process of retraction, and φ is in . We propose to model belief revision in a dynamic epistemic logic. In this setting, we typically have an information state (pointed Kripke model) for the theory wherein the agent believes the negation of the revision formula, i.e., wherein is true. The revision with φ is a program *φ that transforms this information state into a new information state. The transformation is described by a dynamic modal operator [*φ], that is interpreted as a binary relation [ [*φ] ] between information states. The next information state is computed from the current information state and the belief revision formula. If the revision is successful, the agent believes φ in the resulting state, i.e., Bφ is then true. To make this work, as information states we propose ‘doxastic epistemic models’ that represent both knowledge and degrees of belief. These are multi-modal and multi-agent Kripke models. They are constructed from preference relations for agents, and they satisfy various characterizable multi-agent frame properties. Iterated, revocable, and higher-order belief revision are all quite natural in this setting. We present, for an example, five different ways of such dynamic belief revision. One can also see that as a non-deterministic epistemic action with two alternatives, where one is preferred over the other, and there is a natural generalization to general epistemic actions with preferences.     

The Logic of ADHD: A Brief Review of Fallacious Reasoning

This paper has two central purposes: the first is to survey some of the more important examples of fallacious argument, and the second is to examine the frequent use of these fallacies in support of the psychological construct: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The paper divides 12 familiar fallacies into three different categories—material, psychological and logical—and contends that advocates of ADHD often seem to employ these fallacies to support their position. It is suggested that all researchers, whether into ADHD or otherwise, need to pay much closer attention to the construction of their arguments if they are not to make truth claims unsupported by satisfactory evidence, form or logic.     

Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic

The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis, 65, 165–183, 2006). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision. While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, so far interrogative belief revision has only been dealt with in the metalanguage approach in which AGM was originally presented. In this paper, I show how to model interrogative belief revision in a modal object language using a class of operators for questions. In particular, the solution I propose will be shown to capture the notion of K-truncation, a method for agenda update in the case of expansion constructed by Olsson & Westlund. Two case studies are conducted: first, an interrogative extension of Krister Segerberg’s system DDL, and then a similar extension of Giacomo Bonanno’s modal logic for belief revision. Sound and complete axioms will be provided for both of the resulting logics.     

Revising the Logic of Logical Revision

Philosophical Studies -     

A Cognitive Theory of Graphical and Linguistic Reasoning: Logic and Implementation

We discuss external and internal graphical and linguistic representational systems. We argue that a cognitive theory of peoples' reasoning performance must account for (a) the logical equivalence of inferences expressed in graphical and linguistic form, and (b) the implementational differences that affect facility of inference. Our theory proposes that graphical representation limit abstraction and thereby aid “processibility”. We discuss the ideas of specificity and abstraction, and their cognitive relevance. Empirical support both comes from tasks which involve the manipulation of external graphics and tasks that do not. For the former, we take Euler's (1772) circles, provide a novel computational reconstruction, show how it captures abstractions, and contrast it with earlier construals and with Johnson-Laird's (1983) mental models representations. We demonstrate equivalence of the graphical Euler system, and the nongraphical mental models system. For tasks not involving manipulation of external graphics, we discuss text comprehension, and the mental performance of syllogisms. By positing an internal system with the same specificity as Euler's circles, we cover the mental models data, and generate new empirical predictions. Finally, we consider how the architecture of working memory explains why such specific representations are relatively easy to store.     

墨家逻辑推理模式的新解释

墨家是先秦诸多学派之一,墨家逻辑也是中国古代本土逻辑思想的典范之一。墨子及其后学创立了中国思想史上第一个＂以名举实,以辞舒意,以说出故＂的墨家逻辑体系,成为中国古代逻辑思想发展的优秀代表。墨家逻辑的主要推理模式包括：＂辟＂、＂侔＂、＂援＂、＂推＂等。墨家逻辑思想的研究开启了中国逻辑思想研究的先河,墨家逻辑思想研究是中国逻辑思想研究的核心内容之一。国际逻辑学界对作为非印—欧语言系统的中国逻辑的关注,显示了中国逻辑独立存在的价值。今天的中国逻辑思想研究处于现代逻辑发展与中国现代文化发展的交汇点上,需要我们从逻辑和中国文化的角度来研究中国逻辑思想。用逻辑的一般特性来分析墨家逻辑,依据工具性、形式性和有效性这三个方面,是解释墨家逻辑的一个新角度。     

On Moral Ignorance and Mistakes of Fact: a Response to Harman

Philosophia - Moral ignorance is always blameworthy, but “failing to realize” that P when you have sufficient evidence for P is sometimes exculpatory, according to Elizabeth Harman...