共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
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Timothy Chan 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):395-414
In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually
contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the
functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA),
the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean
assertions are absurd, and that BAA explains why they are. I shall argue that ATB implies that some Moorean assertions are,
in some fairly ordinary contexts, well justified. Thus BAA and ATB are mutually inconsistent. In the concluding section I
explore three possible ways of responding to the dilemma, and what implications they have for the nature of the constitutive
relationships linking belief, assent and behavioural dispositions.
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Timothy ChanEmail: |
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Thor Grunbaum 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(2):243-261
This article is about how to describe an agent’s awareness of her bodily movements when she is aware of executing an action
for a reason. Against current orthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent’s experience of moving has an epistemic
place in the agent’s awareness of her own intentional action. In “The problem,” I describe why this should be thought to be
problematic. In “Motives for denying epistemic role,” I state some of the main motives for denying that bodily awareness has
any epistemic role to play in the content of the agent’s awareness of her own action. In “Kinaesthetic awareness and control,”
I sketch how I think the experience of moving and the bodily sense of agency or control are best described. On this background,
I move on to present, in “Arguments for epistemic role,” three arguments in favour of the claim that normally the experience
of moving is epistemically important to one’s awareness of acting intentionally. In the final “Concluding remarks,” I round
off by raising some of the worries that motivated the denial of my claim in the first place.
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Thor GrunbaumEmail: |
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Donald W. Bruckner 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):307-324
An adaptive preference is a preference that is regimented in response to an agent’s set of feasible options. The fabled fox
in the sour grapes story undergoes an adaptive preference change. I consider adaptive preferences more broadly, to include adaptive preference formation as well. I argue that many adaptive preferences that other philosophers have cast out as irrational sour-grapes-like preferences
are actually fully rational preferences worthy of pursuit. I offer a means of distinguishing rational and worthy adaptive
preferences from irrational and unworthy ones. The distinction is based on the agent’s own appraisal of the adaptive preference.
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Donald W. BrucknerEmail: |
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Robert Stalnaker 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(2):189-209
This is a discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem
of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new information, but also for revising
one’s revision rules in response to potential new information. The emphasis in the paper is on foundational questions about
the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of putative counterexamples
to proposed constraints. Some specific constraints that have been proposed are criticized. The paper emphasizes the importance
of meta-information—information about one’s sources of information—and argues that little of substance can be said about constraints
on iterated belief revision at a level of abstraction that lacks the resources for explicit representation of meta-information.
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Robert StalnakerEmail: |
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Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):97-114
Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide
an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization
is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed
to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal
to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence
is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities
though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.
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Luca MorettiEmail: |
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Timothy Chappell 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):255-265
I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’
moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis.
However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative
way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection
to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’
相似文献
Timothy ChappellEmail: |
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Manuel Pérez Otero 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):357-376
Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion
is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist
reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know
that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the
subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly
accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke’s theory of concepts:
possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include (fallible) dispositions to project
them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns.
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Manuel Pérez OteroEmail: |
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Audrey Yap 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(2):157-173
It is a commonly held view that Dedekind’s construction of the real numbers is impredicative. This naturally raises the question
of whether this impredicativity is justified by some kind of Platonism about sets. But when we look more closely at Dedekind’s
philosophical views, his ontology does not look Platonist at all. So how is his construction justified? There are two aspects
of the solution: one is to look more closely at his methodological views, and in particular, the places in which predicativity
restrictions ought to be applied; another is to take seriously his remarks about the reals as things created by the cuts,
instead of considering them to be the cuts themselves. This can lead us to make finer-grained distinctions about the extent
to which impredicative definitions are problematic, since we find that Dedekind’s use of impredicative definitions in analysis
can be justified by his (non-Platonist) philosophical views.
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Audrey YapEmail: |
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Per Albert Ilsaas 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):313-316
The article is a brief response to Jacob Blair’s critique of David Rodin’s argument in War and Self-Defense that there are circumstances in which war conceivably could be justified not as self-defence, but as law enforcement or punishment.
It argues that while Rodin’s position potentially is less dilemmatic than Blair suggests, Blair nevertheless usefully highlights
tensions within it. Blair’s own argument in favour of ar as law-enforcement is suggestive, but in no way conclusive.
相似文献
Per Albert IlsaasEmail: |
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Tommaso Piazza 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):311-324
Many stored beliefs, like beliefs in one’s personal data or beliefs in one’s area of expertise, intuitively amount to knowledge,
and so are justified. This uncontroversial datum arguably tells against evidentialism, the position according to which a belief
is justified if it fits the available evidence: stored beliefs are normally not sustained by one’s available evidence. Conee
and Feldman have tried to meet this potential objection by relaxing the notion of available evidence. According to their proposal,
stored beliefs are dispositionally justified, because they are justified by the evidence one has the disposition to retrieve;
such evidence, as a consequence, is to be characterize as available, though in a derivative sense. Goldman has criticized
this proposal, by offering a counterexample to the claim that a disposition to generate a piece of evidence may qualify as
a justifier. In this paper I critically examine two possible replies to Goldman’s example stemming from Conee and Feldman,
and finally propose my own, based on a distinction, inspired by Audi, between dispositional evidence and the disposition to
have evidence. Though this proposal differs from Conee and Feldman’s one, I will conclude that it fits pretty well their intuitions.
相似文献
Tommaso PiazzaEmail: |
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Nancy E. Snow 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2006,9(5):545-561
Dual process theorists in psychology maintain that the mind’s workings can be explained in terms of conscious or controlled processes and automatic processes. Automatic processes are largely nonconscious, that is, triggered by environmental stimuli without the agent’s conscious awareness or deliberation. Automaticity researchers contend that even higher level habitual social behaviors can be nonconsciously primed. This article brings work on automaticity to bear on our understanding of habitual virtuous actions. After examining a recent intuitive account of habitual actions and habitual virtuous actions, the author offers her own explanation in terms of goal-dependent automaticity. This form of automaticity provides an account of habitual virtuous actions that explains the sense in which these actions are rational, that is, done for reasons. Habitual virtuous actions are rational in the sense of being purposive or goal-directed and are essentially linked with the agent’s psychological states. Unlike deliberative virtuous actions, the agent’s reasons for habitual virtuous actions are not present to her conscious awareness at the time of acting.
相似文献
Nancy E. SnowEmail: Phone: +1-414-9061084Fax: +1-414-2883010 |
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Patricia Sheridan 《Sophia》2007,46(3):263-275
Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact,
Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration
and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate
what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, I hope to bring
to light an otherwise unexpected continuity between moral sense theory and the moral rationalism to which it is usually opposed,
and, in so doing, draw attention to the anti-sceptical realism that lies at the heart of both accounts.
相似文献
Patricia SheridanEmail: |
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Barry S. Fagin Leemon C. Baird Jeffrey W. Humphries Dino L. Schweitzer 《Knowledge, Technology, and Policy》2007,20(4):231-242
Cryptography is an essential component of America’s national security infrastructure. Billions of dollars are spent on cryptosystems
every year, in both the public and private sector. Unfortunately, the field is rife with dubious claims, snake oil salesmen,
and outright fraud. This paper highlights the importance of skepticism and critical thinking in the role of evaluating and
procuring cryptosystems. We discuss our experiences in teaching future leaders about testing extraordinary cryptographic claims
by asking hard questions and show examples from our own experience. We believe that the rigorous application of skepticism
and critical thinking in cryptography are absolutely essential to the wise use of America’s resources and the security of
the nation.
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Barry S. FaginEmail: |
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Erin Eaker 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):455-457
This paper raises questions concerning Ted Morris’ interpretation of Hume’s notion of meaning and investigates the private
and public aspects of Hume’s notion of meaning.
相似文献
Erin EakerEmail: |
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Manfred Kupffer 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):225-238
Markus Werning attempts to refute Quine’s thesis that meaning is indeterminate. To this purpose he employs Hodges’ theorem
about extensions of cofinal meaning functions. But the theorem does neither suffice to solve Quine’s problem nor the problem
Werning mistakenly identifies with Quine’s. Nevertheless it makes sense to employ the methods used in Werning’s paper with
regard to Quine’s thesis, only that they tell in favour of the thesis instead of against it.
相似文献
Manfred KupfferEmail: |
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Yujin Nagasawa 《Sophia》2007,46(1):65-67
I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His
other attributes.
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Yujin NagasawaEmail: |
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Jeffrey Yoshimi 《Husserl Studies》2009,25(2):121-140
I develop a “two-systems” interpretation of Husserl’s theory of belief. On this interpretation, Husserl accounts for our sense
of the world in terms of (1) a system of embodied horizon meanings and passive synthesis, which is involved in any experience
of an object, and (2) a system of active synthesis and sedimentation, which comes on line when we attend to an object’s properties.
I use this account to defend Husserl against several forms of Heideggerean critique. One line of critique, recently elaborated
by Taylor Carman, says that Husserl wrongly loads everyday perception with explicit beliefs about things. A second, earlier
line of critique, due to Hubert Dreyfus, charges Husserl with thinking of belief on a problematic Artificial Intelligence
(AI) model which involves explicit rules applied to discrete symbol structures. I argue that these criticisms are based on
a conflation of Husserl’s two systems of belief. The conception of Husserlian phenomenology which emerges is compatible with
Heideggerean phenomenology and associated approaches to cognitive science (in particular, dynamical systems theory).
相似文献
Jeffrey YoshimiEmail: Email: |
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David Kishik 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):111-128
This is a paper about the way language meshes with life. It focuses on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, and compares it with
Leo Tolstoy and Saint Augustine’s confessions. My aim is to better understand in this way what it means to have meaning in
language, as well as meaning in life.
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David KishikEmail: |
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