Why does ingroup essentialism increase prejudice against minority members?

A study with British participants (N = 90) tested a potential mediator of the effect of essentialist beliefs about the national ingroup on prejudice against immigrants. Essentialist beliefs were defined as beliefs in genetic determinism, a basic assumption that group membership is “written in the blood” and that the groups’ boundaries and characteristics are determined by genetic and/or biological factors. Essentialist beliefs were expected to play an important role in the formation of prejudice. They were predicted to be associated with a reduction in the perceived possibility of immigrants’ adopting the mainstream culture. Further, it was expected that essentialist beliefs would be positively associated with perceptions of intergroup threat, which in turn would be associated with a stronger demand for immigrants adopting the mainstream culture. Taken together, essentialist beliefs were predicted to be associated with a greater discrepancy between the demand for and perceived feasibility of culture adoption. This discrepancy was hypothesized to mediate the effect of essentialist beliefs on prejudice against immigrants. Structural equation modeling analysis and mediation analysis supported the hypotheses, showing that essentialism attributed to the national ingroup results in people demanding something seemingly impossible from immigrants, and that this situation in which immigrants have little chance of fulfilling majority members’ expectations results in prejudice against them. Thus, results show that perceptions of the ingroup are associated with attitudes to the outgroup, and they outline an explanatory mechanism for the positive correlation between essentialism and prejudice which has been found in previous research. Theoretical and applied implications are discussed.     

An essentialism perspective on intercultural processes

Essentialist theories are the beliefs that there are immutable essences underlying observed differences between social groups (e.g. racial group, cultural group). This paper reviews the intergroup dynamics and intrapersonal processes associated with essentialism. It also explores the interplay between the two. By explicating the intricate relationship between these psychological processes, the current paper aims to advance our understanding of intergroup relations and identify their implications for the study of multiculturalism. We posit that although the commonly observed negative intergroup outcomes, such as prejudices and biases, can be the byproducts of basic cognitive processes associated with essentialist theories, the social power dynamics in a given society also play important roles in shaping the relationships between essentialism and intergroup outcomes. We then discuss the implications of this understanding to our increasingly multicultural world.     

Psychological essentialism and stereotype endorsement

Research on implicit person theories shows that people who believe that human attributes are immutable (“entity theorists”) are particularly prone to endorse social stereotypes and to explain them with reference to innate factors. We argue that entity theories belong to a broader set of beliefs that represent differences between people in terms of underlying essences. New measures of three essentialist beliefs (i.e., in the biological basis, discreteness, and informativeness of human attributes) were developed in a pilot study. In the main study, these beliefs were found to covary with entity theories, and to predict the endorsement and innate explanation of stereotypes. Essentialist beliefs predicted stereotype endorsement independently of popular stereotyping-related individual difference measures, and in a way that was not reducible to the effect of entity theories. We propose that research on implicit person theories can be placed within an encompassing framework of psychological essentialism.     

Essentialist beliefs about personality and their implications

Two studies examine implicit theories about the nature of personality characteristics, asking whether they are understood as underlying essences. Consistent with the hypothesis, essentialist beliefs about personality formed a coherent and replicable set. Personality characteristics differed systematically in the extent to which they were judged to be discrete, biologically based, immutable, informative, consistent across situations, and deeply inherent within the person. In Study 1, the extent to which characteristics were essentialized was positively associated with their perceived desirability, prevalence, and emotionality. In Study 2, essentialized characteristics were judged to be particularly important for defining people's identity, for forming impressions of people, and for communicating about a third person. The findings indicate that people understand some personality attributes in an essentialist fashion, that these attributes are taken to be valued elements of a shared human nature, and that they are particularly central to social identity and judgment.     

Psychological essentialism and attention allocation: preferences for stereotype-consistent versus stereotype-inconsistent information

People who believe that human attributes are immutable (entity theorists) display preferences for stereotype-consistent over stereotype-inconsistent information (J. E. Plaks, S. J. Stroessner, C. S. Dweck, & J. W. Sherman, 2001). In this article, the authors argue that entity theories are components of broader sets of beliefs that represent differences between people in terms of underlying essences. Consistent with expectations, the authors found that measures of essentialist beliefs (i.e., in the biological basis, discreteness, informativeness, and inherence of human attributes) covaried with the presence of entity theories. Essentialist beliefs as a set were related to stronger preferences for stereotype-consistent information, and this effect was not reducible to the effect of entity theories. The authors propose that research on implicit person theories can be placed within an encompassing framework of psychological essentialism.     

Essentialist beliefs about homosexuality: structure and implications for prejudice

The structure of beliefs about the nature of homosexuality, and their association with antigay attitudes, were examined in three studies (Ns = 309, 487, and 216). Contrary to previous research, three dimensions were obtained: the belief that homosexuality is biologically based, immutable, and fixed early in life; the belief that it is cross-culturally and historically universal; and the belief that it constitutes a discrete, entitative type with defining features. Study 1 supported a three-factor structure for essentialist beliefs about male homosexuality. Study 2 replicated this structure with confirmatory factor analysis, extended it to beliefs about lesbianism, showed that all three dimensions predicted antigay attitudes, and demonstrated that essentialist beliefs mediate associations between prejudice and gender, ethnicity, and religiosity. Study 3 replicated the belief structure and mediation effects in a community sample and showed that essentialist beliefs predict antigay prejudice independently of right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and political conservatism.     

Learning What is Essential: Relative and Absolute Changes in Children's Beliefs about the Heritability of Ethnicity

There are conflicting findings regarding the development of essentialist beliefs about social categories. The present studies address these findings by differentiating between the developments of the relative versus absolute essentialist status of categories. Participants were Israeli Secular Jewish and Muslim Arab kindergarteners, second graders, and sixth graders. Study 1 asked children which among alternative properties of a parent was most likely to transfer to a child. Findings showed that while kindergarteners did not systematically discriminate among properties, second and sixth graders privileged ethnicity. Study 2 asked children whether membership in various social categories was biologically or environmentally determined. Findings showed that kindergarteners and second graders, but not sixth graders, believed ethnicity to be biologically inherited. These results are discussed vis-à-vis different theories about the origins of social essentialism.     

In genes we trust: the biological component of psychological essentialism and its relationship to mechanisms of motivated social cognition

Three studies analyzed the biological component of psychological essentialism (laypeople's belief that social categories have an underlying nature/natural foundation) as it pertains to mechanisms of motivated social cognition. A new scale assessing the belief in genetic determinism is introduced as a measure of the biological component of essentialism. Results speak to the reliability and validity of the scale and show that essentialist beliefs are associated with basic social-cognitive motives and are also related to processes of stereotyping and prejudice. An experimental study found that rendering essentialist information salient elicits increased levels of prejudice and in-group bias, particularly in persons holding chronic essentialist beliefs.     

Human Natures: Psychological Essentialism in Thinking about Differences between People

‘Psychological essentialism’ is the belief that members of a category share deep‐seated properties that determine their identity. In the case of social categories, such beliefs have a variety of important implications. We review recent research that shows a central role for essentialist thinking in stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Special attention is paid to beliefs about race and ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, mental disorder, and personality. Lingering questions about essentialist thinking are discussed, and several directions for future research are suggested.     

Perceptions of immigrants: modifying the attitudes of individuals higher in social dominance orientation

Previous research has demonstrated that directly challenging people's beliefs about immigrants may result in even stronger anti-immigration attitudes, especially among those higher in social dominance orientation (SDO). In addition, inducing the perception that immigrants are part of a larger ingroup does not modify immigration attitudes. In three studies, the article explores conditions that can reduce prejudice toward immigrants among those high in SDO. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that focusing attention on group identity maintains prejudice, whereas focusing attention on others reduces prejudice among those higher in SDO. Study 3 extends the findings of the first two studies by demonstrating that focusing attention on others in a way that induces perception of similarity with immigrants maintains negative attitudes toward immigrants, whereas focusing on individual values reduces prejudice among those higher in SDO. Implications for how prejudice could be reduced among those high in SDO through de-emphasis on group identity are discussed.     

Can values moderate the attitudes of right-wing authoritarians?

This investigation explored how right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and endorsement of egalitarian beliefs may interact to determine attitudes toward immigrants, homosexuals, and African Americans. Study 1 (N = 239) found that RWA was negatively related to evaluations of immigrants for those who weakly endorsed egalitarian beliefs. In contrast, endorsement of egalitarian beliefs was associated with positive evaluations of immigrants for both low and high RWAs. RWA did not interact with egalitarianism to determine attitudes toward homosexuals or African Americans. Study 2 analyzed data from the 1992 National Election Study and replicated these effects in a young adult (age < or = 24) sample (n = 102) using moral traditionalism as a proxy for RWA. Partial support for the hypotheses also was found in the adult (age > or = 25) sample (n = 1,257). It is concluded that when tradition and/or social norms offer unclear positions, endorsement of egalitarian beliefs influences the attitudes of authoritarians.     

God’s categories: The effect of religiosity on children’s teleological and essentialist beliefs about categories

Creationism implies that God imbued each category with a unique nature and purpose. These implications closely correspond to what some cognitive psychologists define as an essentialistic and teleological stance towards categories. This study assessed to what extent the belief in God as creator of categories is related to the mappings of these stances to categories in different domains. Israeli secular and orthodox Jewish 1st and 5th graders responded to questions assessing these three types of beliefs. The results revealed that secular children did not differ from orthodox children with respect to their essentialist beliefs about the stability of animal category membership, and their teleological construal of artifacts. In turn, secular children did differ from orthodox children with respect to their essentialist beliefs about the stability of social category membership, and their teleological construal of both animal and social categories. These findings intimate that while essentialist beliefs about animals, and teleological beliefs about artifacts do not require cultural input in order to emerge, essentialist beliefs about social categories, and teleological beliefs about both animal and social categories do.     

Dynamic Interracial/Intercultural Processes: The Role of Lay Theories of Race

ABSTRACT This paper explores how the lay theory approach provides a framework beyond previous stereotype/prejudice research to understand dynamic personality processes in interracial/ethnic contexts. The authors conceptualize theory of race within the Cognitive–Affective Personality System (CAPS), in which lay people's beliefs regarding the essential nature of race sets up a mind-set through which individuals construe and interpret their social experiences. The research findings illustrate that endorsement of the essentialist theory (i.e., that race reflects deep-seated, inalterable essence and is indicative of traits and ability) versus the social constructionist theory (i.e., that race is socially constructed, malleable, and arbitrary) are associated with different encoding and representation of social information, which in turn affect feelings, motivation, and competence in navigating between racial and cultural boundaries. These findings shed light on dynamic interracial/intercultural processes. Relations of this approach to CAPS are discussed.     

Dispositional and Psychosocial Variables as Longitudinal Predictors of Acculturative Stress

As societies become more multicultural, citizens need to develop self‐regulatory mechanisms in order to successfully cope with the increasing levels of psychosocial stress related to acculturation. In this study, a longitudinal theoretical model was tested in order to evaluate the role of implicit theories of cultural intelligence, causal attributions, perceived social support, and cultural identity as predictors of acculturative stress. The research was carried out in Spain across three consecutive years with a multicultural sample of 292 students (natives and immigrants). The results confirm the proposed theoretical model using multi‐group structural equation modelling to test the equivalence of the longitudinal causal structure in immigrants and natives. Moreover, mediation analyses confirmed the mediating effect of cultural identity between the implicit theories of cultural intelligence and acculturative stress, as well as the mediating effect of perceived social support between causal attributions and acculturative stress. The model indicates the relevance of promoting psychosocial interventions with native and immigrant adolescents in intercultural contexts. In those interventions, it will be relevant to promote incremental implicit theories of cultural intelligence and internal causal attributions, as well as to highlight a more intercultural identity and to encourage greater social support networks.     

Essentialism and Nonnaturalist Normative Supervenience

In this essay I defend a kind of nonnaturalist normative supervenience, grounded in the essences of things. Essentialist theories, in fact, give us the tools to treat the nexus of normative supervenience as a nexus of metaphysical necessity, holding between the normative and the natural. In this context, essentialist grounding provides an explanation of normative supervenience that allows us to keep together both supervenience and nonnaturalism. Moreover, to achieve this significant result, I do not make use of hybrid properties, which are both normative and natural. Rather, I endeavour to show that the notion of hybrid property is based on an erroneous notion of grounding.     

Countering conspiracy theory beliefs: Understanding the conjunction fallacy and considering disconfirming evidence

Research suggests that a number of cognitive processes—including pattern perception, intentionality bias, proportionality bias, and confirmation bias—may underlie belief in a conspiracy theory. However, there are reasons to believe that conspiracy theory beliefs also depend in part on a failure to understand the probability of actual events allegedly supporting those conspiracy theories as well as a failure to entertain disconfirming evidence that may contradict those beliefs. Study 1 examines the relationships between general beliefs in conspiracy theories, belief in a novel conspiracy theory, conjunctive error propensity, and the propensity to consider disconfirming evidence. Study 2 investigates the roles of confronting both the propensity to make conjunctive errors and the failure to consider disconfirming evidence in changing conspiracy theory beliefs as well as attitudes associated with those beliefs. The results of both studies suggest that corrections to one's propensity to make conjunctive errors and mindful consideration of disconfirming evidence may serve as viable methods of self-persuasion pertaining to conspiracy theory beliefs.     

Young immigrants in Norway: The role of national and ethnic identity in immigrants’ integration

The present work investigates the endorsement, antecedents, relationships, and consequences of young immigrants’ social identities in Norway. Despite increasing numbers of refugees and immigrants entering Norway in recent years, little is known about the relationship between immigrants’ different social identities and their feeling of integration into Norwegian society. The main goal of the present research is to fill this gap by investigating whether relationships found in other European countries replicate in the Norwegian context. In line with theoretical considerations and earlier international findings, results from two studies with different immigrant groups (Study 1: high school students; N = 97; Study 2: university students; N = 93) show that the more young immigrants in Norway endorse their national (i.e., Norwegian) identity, the less they endorse their ethnic identity (e.g., Kurdish). We further show that perceived conflict between the two cultures cannot explain the negative relationship between national and ethnic identity. In addition, immigrants’ national identity endorsement is positively related to their dual identity endorsement (e.g., Kurdish-Norwegian). Positive contact with members of the receiving society predicts young immigrants’ feeling of being integrated in Norwegian society and this relationship is mediated by national identity. Results are discussed in terms of the crucial role social identities play in immigrants’ feeling of integration into European societies.     

Thirsty for H2O? Multiple essences and psychological essentialism

Within psychology, essentialism has often been understood as the imputation of a hidden natural underpinning that determines the identity and membership of a given category. This naturalistic understanding has failed to address the varied and multi-faceted manner in which essentialist beliefs function on a cognitive level. Specifically, such an understanding does not account for essentialist beliefs that are related to functional categories derivative of a particular individual's present needs or social context. A parsimonious theory of psychological essentialism that accounts for beliefs in essences with respect to all categories, including those believed to be “natural”, is found in the writing of James (The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, Dover, New York, NY, 1890/1950). After accounting for the manner in which James’ theory addresses the limitations of the naturalistic view and extends it, it is recommended that his theory be incorporated into future empirical study of psychological essentialism.     

Examining Correlates of Civic Engagement Among Immigrant Adolescents in the United States

Using a diverse urban sample of immigrant adolescents in the United States (N = 345) followed from 10^th grade (M_age = 15.69) to 12^th grade, this study examined the extent to which ecological assets (i.e., community connections and social network resources) predicted civic commitments (i.e., community engagement, social responsibility) as potentially mediated by fair society beliefs. The authors also examined whether ethnicity and generation status moderated these associations. As hypothesized, fair society beliefs were higher and predicted greater civic commitments only among Asian youth. Ecological assets were associated with greater civic commitments for all participants; these links were primarily direct for Latino immigrants and indirect (via fair society beliefs) for Asian youth. First-generation immigrants had more ecological assets and were more civically committed, however social network resources predicted fair society beliefs and community engagement only for second-generation youth. These differences indicate that immigrant youth are best understood as a heterogeneous group and suggest the need for further investigation of cultural variations in civic developmental processes.     

Psychological Essentialism and Nationalism as Determinants of Interethnic Bias

ABSTRACT

The present study examined whether individuals without strong national identity (i.e., low nationalism) would be susceptible to temporarily elicited essentialism to alter their mental representations of ethnic boundaries, and thus increase interethnic bias. To test these ideas we experimentally induced essentialist beliefs among Japanese subjects about the boundary between Japanese and Chinese ethnicities, while measuring the strength of nationalism as an individual variable. The results were generally consistent with predictions, suggesting that the activation of essentialist beliefs can strengthen interethnic biases among people without strong nationalism.