儿童在错误信念任务上的知识偏差

采用3种任务考查儿童在错误信念（FB）推理中是否存在知识偏差。被试为60名3—5岁幼儿,结果表明,对于3岁及4岁儿童来说,FB任务是存在知识偏差的。知识偏差的大小与年龄呈负相关关系,3岁与4岁、4岁与5岁儿童的知识偏差的大小均有显著差异。     

解释水平视角下的乐观偏差效应

研究基于解释水平理论,考查心理距离对乐观偏差效应的影响。实验从心理距离的事件概率维度、时间距离维度、空间距离维度入手,采用自编的材料对677名被试进行测量,探讨心理距离的远近对乐观偏差产生的影响。结果表明,被试对未来生活事件的判断存在总体上的乐观偏差。在较远的心理距离条件下,被试表现出更大的乐观偏差;而在较近的心理距离中,乐观偏差效应明显减小。但在时间距离维度以及消极事件的概率维度上,表现出与总体乐观偏差不一致的现象。     

学习困难与一般初中生过度自信特点的比较

采用比较研究的实验范式,从偏离校准、优于常人、控制错觉和过分乐观三个效应上比较学习困难初中生和一般初中生的过度自信特点。结果显示:(1)在"偏离校准"效应上,学习困难初中生在困难任务中和学习一般初中生同样存在过度自信的认知偏差,但在简单任务中则存在不自信。(2)在"优于常人"效应上,学习困难初中生和学习一般初中生都存在过度自信的认知偏差。简单任务中,他们认为自己"优于常人",而困难任务中,他们认为自己"差于常人"。(3)在"控制错觉和过分乐观"效应上,学习困难初中生和学习一般初中生都存在过度自信的认知偏差。男生比女生的过度自信程度更大。     

自我和物体为参照系的心理旋转分离：内旋效应

采用虚拟的旋转不同角度左、右手模型,构建“左右手判断(Left and right hand judgment: LR)”任务和“相同－不同判断(same and different judgment: SD)”任务,考察这两种实验任务是否都存在内旋效应和角度效应,以此推论被试采用何种旋转策略。结果发现：（1） 两种实验任务结果均表现出显著的角度效应。（2）在LR任务条件下,存在显著的内旋效应,而在SD任务中不存在内旋效应。从而表明当人手图片作为心理旋转材料时,它具有双重角色。被试心理旋转加工时究竟选用何种参照系的旋转策略,与实验材料和实验任务两者都密不可分     

范畴三段论推理中信念偏差效应的实验研究

本研究利用三段论评价任务,分析了已有信念与三段论逻辑状态间的交互影响,探讨了三段论推理判断中信念偏差的存在与作用机制,同时从信念偏差角度对心理模型理论进行了初步验证。结果发现：1．范畴三段论推理的逻辑判断过程中存在信念偏差效应;2．信念偏差效应以逻辑状态与结论可信性交互作用的方式存在;3当逻辑结果与信念相一致时,信念会促进逻辑反应,反之则妨碍逻辑反应;4．信念偏差效应对逻辑有效、结论不可信的单模型三段论问题影响最大,而对逻辑有效、结论不可信的多模型三段论问题相对影响最小。     

幼儿是如何通过错误信念任务的:信念还是规则?

旨在研究错误信念任务的有效性。采用真实信念(TB)任务和错误信念(FB)任务,以知否问题和想法问题为检测指标,通过比较儿童在FB和TB任务上的表现,本研究发现4～6岁儿童在知否问题上存在正确反应、忽略推断和“是”反应偏差三种反应模式。儿童通过FB任务的方式也有三类:基于信念、基于规则,以及其它(可能是猜测或其它未知策略)。儿童在知否问题与想法问题上的通过率并无显著差异。     

复合汉字刺激心理旋转加工中的整体优先效应

以复合汉字为材料,通过两个实验探讨在心理旋转加工中是否存在整体/局部优先效应。实验一检验视知觉中的整体优先效应,实验二考察心理旋转加工中是否存在整体优先效应。结果表明:延长刺激呈现时间直至被试做出反应,在正镜像判断的纯视觉任务中不存在视觉整体优先效应;在心理旋转任务中,大汉字(整体)旋转条件反应时与小汉字(局部)旋转反应时差异不显著。这些结果说明复合汉字刺激心理旋转加工中不存在整体优先效应。     

被试自身人手初始状态对心理旋转加工的影响:眼动研究

利用眼动追踪技术,探讨在左右手判断任务条件下人手心理旋转加工是否受到被试自身人手初始状态的影响.两个实验的反应时数据和眼动数据均发现:(1)心理旋转加工受被试自身人手初始状态的影响,表现出一致性效应;(2)显著的内旋效应;(3)被试心理旋转加工时注视点取样存在着不均衡性.这些结果表明:在左右手判断任务中,心理旋转加工的对象是被试自身人手的表象,是自我参照的心理旋转,并且内旋效应是由被试对自身人手表象进行旋转时受到人手生理机制约束所致,而不是被试旋转刺激图片的表象由"生理机制约束知识"影响所致.     

先“自我中心”再“调整”:成人推理他人心理状态的加工过程

成人在某些情况下推理他人心理状态时也会像较小的儿童一样出现自我中心化。本研究通过控制完成心理理论任务的反应时间,比较成人被试在有/无时间压力情况下推理他人心理状态时行为表现上的差异。其中,实验1选取24名大学生被试进行指示交流任务(考察视觉观点采择),实验2选取76名大学生被试进行成人版意外地点任务(考察错误信念理解)。结果发现,在限制反应时间的条件下,被试会更加自我中心化。两个实验的结果支持了成人推理他人心理状态可能是一个两阶段的加工过程的假设,即先自我中心再调整:首先以自我心理状态进行自我中心锚定,然后(若自我和他人心理状态存在差异)克服自我中心,理解他人的心理状态。     

研究心理理论的新方法——失言识别任务

心理理论是对他人心理状态进行推论的能力。考察心理理论的经典范式是错误信念任务, 而青少年和成人在这种任务上可能出现天花板效应。为了测量青少年和成人的心理理论, Valerie E. Stone和她的合作者设计了失言识别任务。征求了Stone意见, 对失言识别任务的提出、构成、使用进行了介绍, 说明了该任务相对于经典范式的优势; 与此同时, 分析了失言识别任务范式存在的一些问题, 比如其效度指标问题, 与言语能力的分离问题, 失言识别任务与执行功能之间的分离等。未来研究可以尝试编制失言识别任务的本土化的量表, 并利用其探讨年长个体心理理论水平发展变化的规律。     

Older children's misunderstanding of uncertain belief after passing the false belief test

A four-location belief task was designed to examine children's understanding of another's uncertain belief after passing a false belief (FB) task. In Experiment 1, after passing the FB task, participants were asked what a puppet would do after he failed to find his toy at the falsely believed location. Most 4-year-olds and half of 6-year-olds children who passed the FB test showed difficulty in handling uncertain belief; answering that the puppet would then look for his toy at the current (moved-to) location. Eight-year-old children and adults all recognized that the puppet would look for the toy everywhere, or at random. In Experiment 2, 4- and 6-year-olds were presented two other search tasks; it was shown that preschoolers could use search strategies to solve a similar search problem when FB was not involved. This new aspect of post-FB understanding can be interpreted in terms of limited understanding of uncertainty in a less-knowledgeable individual and of limited ability to infer the consequences of belief-disconfirmation.     

Are belief‐based justifications associated with metalinguistic awareness? A cross‐sectional study in school‐age children

Previous research has consistently demonstrated that false‐belief (FB) understanding correlates with and predicts metalinguistic ability in preschoolers. Surprisingly, however, there is scant evidence on the question of whether this relation persists at later ages. The present cross‐sectional study sought to fill this gap by examining the association between FB understanding, belief‐based justifications and metalinguistic awareness. A sample of 150 children primary‐school children between 8 and 11 years of age were administered a test of receptive language, a second‐order theory‐of‐mind task and a comprehensive metalinguistic battery. The results of correlational and regression analyses showed that explicit metalinguistic awareness (in particular, performance in the Ambiguity and Phonemic Segmentation subtests) was significantly predicted by children's belief‐based responses to the justification question in the theory of mind task but only for children with small receptive vocabularies; in contrast, FB understanding made no independent contribution (either alone or in interaction with other measures). These findings complement and advance existing data by showing that, in school‐age children, the association between the 2 domains involves more mature, verbally explicit levels of FB understanding and metalinguistic awareness.

Highlights

• We examined the relation between metalinguistic awareness and theory‐of‐mind in primary‐school children.
• Metalinguistic awareness was associated to belief‐based justifications, but only for children with small vocabulary.
• In school‐age children the ability to provide verbal justifications plays a key role in the relation between theory‐of‐mind and metalinguistic awareness.

     

Destination memory and cognitive theory of mind in normal ageing

Destination memory is the ability to remember the destination to which a piece of information has been addressed (e.g., “Did I tell you about the promotion?”). This ability is found to be impaired in normal ageing. Our work aimed to link this deterioration to the decline in theory of mind. Forty younger adults (M age = 23.13 years, SD = 4.00) and 36 older adults (M age = 69.53 years, SD = 8.93) performed a destination memory task. They also performed the False-belief test addressing cognitive theory of mind and the Reading the mind in the eyes test addressing affective theory of mind. Results showed significant deterioration in destination memory, cognitive theory of mind and affective theory of mind in the older adults. The older adults’ performance on destination memory was significantly correlated with and predicted by their performance on cognitive theory of mind. Difficulties in the ability to interpret and predict others’ mental states are related to destination memory decline in older adults.     

The Shape Bias is Affected by Differing Similarity Among Objects

Previous research has demonstrated that visual properties of objects can affect shape-based categorization in a novel-name extension task; however, we still do not know how a relationship between visual properties of objects affects judgments in a novel-name extension task. We examined effects of increased visual similarity among the target and test objects in a shape bias task in young children and adults. Experiment 1 assessed college students with sets of objects whose similarity between target and test objects was either low or high similarity. Adults preferred shape when the similarity among objects was minimized. Experiment 2 tested 24-month olds in their use of the shape bias using the Intermodal Preferential Looking Paradigm. Children showed a shape bias only with items whose similarity to each other was low. These findings suggest that the visual properties of objects affect shape bias performance.     

Understanding children's and adults' limitations in mental state reasoning

Young children exhibit several deficits in reasoning about their own and other people's mental states. We propose that these deficits, along with more subtle limitations in adults' social-cognitive reasoning, are all manifestations of the same cognitive bias. This is the 'curse of knowledge' - a tendency to be biased by one's own knowledge when attempting to appreciate a more na?ve or uninformed perspective. We suggest the developmental differences in mental state reasoning exist because the strength of this bias diminishes with age, not because of a conceptual change in how young children understand mental states. By pointing out the common denominator in children's and adults' limitations in mental state reasoning we hope to provide a unified framework for understanding the nature and development of social cognition.     

Linking theory of mind and central coherence bias in autism and in the general population

Three experiments investigated whether 2 characteristic aspects of the psychological profile of autism, theory-of-mind deficits and weak central coherence, might be functionally related. Experiment 1 showed that in the general population, performance on a proposed test of theory of mind was inversely related to speed on the Embedded Figures Test, a measure of central coherence bias. Experiments 2 and 3 confirmed that poor theory-of-mind performance was linked to weak central coherence among typically developing children and among children with autism; however, the correlations between these measures were reliable only after accounting for differences in individuals' verbal mental ages. This pattern of results is interpreted in terms of a relationship between individual differences in theory of mind and central coherence bias, a relationship that is separate from any developmental differences in these domains.     

From synonyms to homonyms: exploring the role of metarepresentation in language understanding

Doherty and Perner (Metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind: just two words for the same thing? Cognitive Development, 13 (1998), 279–305) report that children’s understanding of synonyms and false belief is dependent on an understanding of the representational mind. Experiment 1 extends this finding by examining children’s understanding of homonyms. Children aged 3 and 4 years were asked to judge whether a puppet correctly selected the second member of a homonym pair. Performance on this task was strongly associated with performance on the false belief task even after chronological and verbal mental age had been accounted for. Experiment 2 incorporated two new tasks: a synonyms task and an adjectives task. Understanding of synonyms and homonyms significantly predicted performance on the false belief task. However, once chronological age was accounted for, only performance on the homonyms task did so. The difficulty experienced on the homonyms task was not due to a reluctance to acknowledge that the puppet can point to a different picture when the the same word label is used twice. Children had no difficulty on the adjectives task when the puppet had to point to a different picture described using the same adjective. The suggestion that the understanding of synonyms, homonyms and false belief are related by a common insight into the representational mind is therefore not supported.     

The accidental transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.     

Belief attribution despite verbal interference

False-belief (FB) tasks have been widely used to study the ability of individuals to represent the content of their conspecifics' mental states (theory of mind). However, the cognitive processes involved are still poorly understood, and it remains particularly debated whether language and inner speech are necessary for the attribution of beliefs to other agents. We present a completely nonverbal paradigm consisting of silent animated cartoons in five closely related conditions, systematically teasing apart different aspects of scene analysis and allowing the assessment of the attribution of beliefs, goals, and physical causation. In order to test the role of language in belief attribution, we used verbal shadowing as a dual task to inhibit inner speech. Data on 58 healthy adults indicate that verbal interference decreases overall performance, but has no specific effect on belief attribution. Participants remained able to attribute beliefs despite heavy concurrent demands on their verbal abilities. Our results are most consistent with the hypothesis that belief attribution is independent from inner speech.     

Shape constancy and theory of mind: is there a link?

In three experiments, children aged between 4 and 7 years viewed a circular disc oriented at a slant. The disc was made of luminous material and situated in a darkened chamber. Children of all ages exaggerated the circularity of the disc when they knew that the object was really a circle (the circle task), and the effect was greatest in the younger members of the sample. Crucially, however, a group of children in Experiment 3 who viewed an identical shape that they knew emanated from an actual ellipse did not exaggerate circularity. In the second experiment, children tackled three standard theory of mind tasks in addition to the circle task mentioned above. A significant correlation emerged (even with age partialed) between the extent of exaggeration made by those who knew that the shape was a circle and ability to pass the theory of mind tests. It seems knowledge of reality contaminates judgements of appearance in the circle task. This might be the same bias that features in realist errors in theory of mind tasks.