Traces of reasoning with pragmatic schemas

Holyoak and Cheng's (1995) account of Wason's (1966) selection task was evaluated by testing participants' recognition memory for the rule. To accommodate the finding that participants' selections are systematically influenced by manipulating their perspective on the rule to be tested, Holyoak and Cheng put forward a development of Pragmatic Reasoning Schema (PRS) theory, according to which the rule being tested is mapped onto different schematic rules depending on the perspective taken. The instantiated schema then becomes the basis for reasoning, and the different schemas encourage the selection of different cases. We hypothesised that if participants interpret the rule by instantiating a particular schema, then they should falsely recognise a sentence corresponding to the instantiated schema a short time after performing the task. An experimental test provided limited support for this hypothesis.     

The emergence of inferential rules: The use of pragmatic reasoning schemas by preschoolers

This study contrasts the pragmatic view with the natural logic view regarding the origin of inferential rules in conditional reasoning. The pragmatic view proposes that pragmatic rules emerge first, and the generalizations of these produce formal rules. In contrast, the natural logic view proposes that the formal rules emerge first and serve as a core that is then supplemented by pragmatic rules. In an experiment, scenarios involving conditional rules in different contexts, permission and arbitrary, were administered to independent groups of preschool children. To rule out the matching bias [Evans, J. St. B. T., & Lynch, J. S. (1973). Matching bias in the selection task. Br J Psychol 64, 391–397] as a possible explanation of reasoning performance, children were given conditional rules with a negated consequent. The results show that in the arbitrary context modus tollens (MT) was unavailable, and the use of modus ponens (MP) was unstable. In contrast, children in the permission context reliably used both MP and MT. In addition, they realized that a conditional rule does not imply a definite answer when the consequent holds. These findings suggest that, in their explicit forms, pragmatic rules emerge earlier than formal rules and in particular, even as basic a rule as MP is generalized from a context-specific form to a context-general one in preschool children.     

Pragmatic reasoning schemas

We propose that people typically reason about realistic situations using neither content-free syntactic inference rules nor representations of specific experiences. Rather, people reason using knowledge structures that we term pragmatic reasoning schemas, which are generalized sets of rules defined in relation to classes of goals. Three experiments examined the impact of a “permission schema” on deductive reasoning. Experiment 1 demonstrated that by evoking the permission schema it is possible to facilitate performance in Wason's selection paradigm for subjects who have had no experience with the specific content of the problems. Experiment 2 showed that a selection problem worded in terms of an abstract permission elicited better performance than one worded in terms of a concrete but arbitrary situation, providing evidence for an abstract permission schema that is free of domain-specific content. Experiment 3 provided evidence that evocation of a permission schema affects not only tasks requiring procedural knowledge, but also a linguistic rephrasing task requiring declarative knowledge. In particular, statements in the form if p then q were rephrased into the form p only if q with greater frequency for permission than for arbitrary statements, and rephrasings of permission statements produced a pattern of introduction of modals (must, can) totally unlike that observed for arbitrary conditional statements. Other pragmatic schemas, such as “causal” and “evidence” schemas can account for both linguistic and reasoning phenomena that alternative hypotheses fail to explain.     

Pragmatic schemas and conditional reasoning in children

Solving problems involving conditional relationships has been postulated to play a central role in the development of deductive reasoning, which itself underpins much cognitive developmental theory. The traditional Piagetian and “natural logic” approaches to this topic have more recently been challenged by findings that are more readily explained in terms of the concept of pragmatic schemas. On this basis it was predicted that even young “pre-formal” children would be able to succeed in a Reduced Array Selection Task if the test statement (referring to a previously told story about bees living in a hive) was couched in such a way as to evoke an authorization or permission schema. This proved to be the case in the present study involving 54 nine- and ten-year-old children: The permission condition elicited 70% globally correct solutions, compared to the 11% elicited by the formal control condition. Moreover, this facilitatory effect of the permission condition carried over to a second trial conducted in a standard way across all the conditions.     

The elusive wishful thinking effect

Abstract

We define a desirability effect as the inflation of the judged probability of desirable events or the diminution of the judged probability of undersirable events. A series of studies of this effect are reported. In the first four experiments, subjects were presented with visual stimuli (a grid matrix in two colours, or a jar containing beads in two colours), and asked to estimate the probability of drawing at random one of the colours), and asked to estimate the probability of drawing at random one of the colours. The estimated probabilities for a defined draw were not higher when the draw entailed a gain than when it entailed a loss. In the fifth and sixth experiments, subjects read short stories each describing two contestants competing for some desirable outcome (e.g. parents fighting for child custody, or firms bidding for a contract). Some judged the probability that A would win, others judged the Desirability that A would win. Story elements that enhanced a contestant's desirability did not cause the favoured contestant to be judged more likely to win. Only when a contestant's desirability was enhanced by promising the subject of payoff contingent on that contestant's victory was there some slight evidence for a desirability effect: contestants were judged more likely to win when the subject expected a monetary prize if they won than when the subject expected a prize if the other contestant won. In the last experiment, subjects estimated the probability of an over-20-point weekly change in the Dow Jones average, and were promised prizes contingent on such a change either occurring, or failing to occur. They were also given a monetary incentive for accuracy. Subjects who desired a small change. We conclude that desirability effects, when they exist, operate by biasing the evidence brought to mind regarding the event in question, but when a given body of evidence is considered, its judged probability is not influenced by desirability considerations.     

The suppression of Modus Ponens as a case of pragmatic preconditional reasoning

The suppression of the Modus Ponens inference is described as a loss of confidence in the conclusion C of an argument “If A1 then C; If A2 then C; A1” where A2 is a requirement for C to happen. It is hypothesised that this loss of confidence is due to the derivation of the conversational implicature “there is a chance that A2 might not be satisfied”, and that different syntactic introductions of the requirement A2 (e.g., “If C then A2”) will lead to various frequencies in the derivation of this implicature, according to previous studies in the field of causal explanation. An experiment is conducted, whose results support those claims. Results are discussed in the light of the Mental Logic and Mental Model theories, as well as in the light of the pragmatic approach to uncertain reasoning.     

Social significance of tasks,routines, and pragmatic schemas in distribution activities

Past research on social marking and pragmatic reasoning schemas suggests that cognitive processing modes are first elaborated by children when they are carrying out regulating social routines in the course of which they learn to produce the responses that satisfy the demand of their environment. The data of the two experimental studies reported here with 4–5 year old children, for object distribution tasks, show that the social routines evoked by the objects to be processed have a dual effect, influencing both the representation of the partition to be made, as well as the procedures used to make them. It can be hypothesised that the utilization of routine-evoking tasks, which children are capable at a very young age, of accomplishing by activating efficient social-goal oriented procedures, promote the attribution of an operative meaning to the linguistic expressions used to characterize the states to be attained, and the transformations to be applied in order to attain them.     

The effect of figure on syllogistic reasoning

Several investigators of reasoning with abstract categorical syllogisms have noted that the four figures of the classical syllogism, which vary in the order in which terms occur in the major and minor premises, resemble the four three-stage mediation paradigms in paired associate learning. On the basis of the analogy, figure differences have been predicted and some support has been obtained for these predictions. The present paper proposes an alternative information processing explanation for figure effects based upon contradictions between the correct conclusions that follow from forward and backward processing of the premises. This explanation, in contrast to the associative explanation, successfully predicts which premise combinations will show figure effects as well as the nature of the specific errors which will occur.     

The effect of self-contradiction on fallacious reasoning

A serial task was used in which the possibility of making related valid and fallacious inferences was alternated over a series of trials. The hypothesis was investigated that if valid inferences are forced to contradict previously made fallacious inferences, then subsequent fallacious inferences will be withheld. The results showed that self-contradiction tended to extinguish fallacious inferences in an all-or-none manner without affecting valid inferences.     

The elusive matching bias effect in the disjunctive selection task

When reasoning with conditional statements (i.e., if [not] p then [not] q), for example when solving Wason's selection task, subjects tend to display matching bias: Options which match the entities named in the rule tend to be selected irrespective of whether this is logically appropriate. Recently, there have been suggestions that the underlying causes of matching bias reflect a general phenomenon that applies to many types of logical rule, not just conditionals. A study is reported in which performance is investigated for selection tasks with categorical or disjunctive rules. Although matching bias was clearly present for categorical rules, inverted matching bias was identified for disjunctive rules, calling into question the generality of the phenomenon and its explanations. In addition, performance at one task was not correlated with performance at the other, calling into question recent cognitive capacity accounts of selection task performance.     

The pragmatic circle

Classical Gricean pragmatics is usually conceived as dealing with far-side pragmatics, aimed at computing implicatures. It involves reasoning about why what was said, was said. Near-side pragmatics, on the other hand, is pragmatics in the service of determining, together with the semantical properties of the words used, what was said. But this raises the specter of ‘the pragmatic circle.’ If Gricean pragmatics seeks explanations for why someone said what they did, how can there be Gricean pragmatics on the near-side? Gricean reasoning seems to require what is said to get started. But then if Gricean reasoning is needed to get to what is said, we have a circle.     

Propositional reasoning and working memory: the role of prior training and pragmatic content

Working memory involvement in propositional reasoning was explored after different kinds of training. The training conditions aimed to reduce the impact of non-analytic heuristics and to enhance analytic inference processes according to mental logic theories, the mental model theory, and the theory of pragmatic reasoning schemata. Following an initial training phase, secondary task interference was investigated using concurrent spatial tapping (Experiment 1), random number generation (Experiment 2), and articulatory suppression (Experiment 3). A training condition practicing the construction and use of mental models via a truth table task increased the disruption of reasoning performance by random number generation and articulatory suppression, whereas the other training conditions did not affect susceptibility to secondary task interference. The results corroborate implications of the mental model theory of reasoning.     

A pragmatic account of a presuppositional effect

Two different theoretical accounts of a presuppositional effect in sentence interpretation were considered. One is a semantic account based on componential analysis. The other is a pragmatic account based on relevance theory which does not call for lexical decomposition. The two theoretical points of view were tested against each other by making use of a well-known riddle, studied by Noordman (1979), whose standard form is: “You are my son, but I am not your father. Who am I?” In the first experiment, a manipulation based on the replacement of a lexical unit with a paraphrastic expression that did not contain the critical semantic component failed to enhance performance, whereas in the second experiment, a manipulation of contextual information leaving the lexical unit unaltered was successful in modifying performance. Both results conform to the predictions of relevance theory, but are at variance with the predictions of the componential theory.     

The effect of social role on theory of mind reasoning

The aim of this project was to explore the effects of social status on Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning. Neurologically normal adults' ToM performance was manipulated experimentally by temporarily putting them in a higher or lower status condition. Half the participants ‘won’ a mock competition and subsequently acted as instructor and evaluator. The other half ‘lost’ and subsequently acted as learner. Participants then completed ToM and control tasks including embedded false belief tasks and cartoon comprehension tasks. The hypothesis tested was that social role manipulation could affect performance on ToM tasks independently of any effect on control tasks. Results show an interaction between assigned status and task type. That performance on theory of mind tasks can vary independently of performance on matched control tasks is consistent with the idea that ToM reasoning can change as a result of a change in social status.     

The effect of causal chain length on counterfactual conditional reasoning

We investigated German and Nichols' finding that 3‐year‐olds could answer counterfactual conditional questions about short causal chains of events, but not long. In four experiments (N =192), we compared 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds' performance on short and long causal chain questions, manipulating whether the child could draw on general knowledge to answer. We failed to replicate German and Nichols' result, finding instead that in two experiments (Experiments 1 and 3) there was no difference in performance on short and long causal chain questions and in two experiments (Experiments 2 and 4) children showed the opposite pattern: short causal chain questions were more difficult than long. These two unexpected patterns of results were replicated in a fifth study (N =97). Children with lower language ability found short causal chains more difficult than long. Performance by children with higher language ability was unaffected by the length of the causal chain they had to consider. We found no evidence that children showed precocious counterfactual thinking when asked about recent events in a causal chain and conclude that counterfactual thinking develops after 4 years of age.