The immoral gene: Does it really exist?

Over the last years several European patents were opposed for protecting technology violating the morality requirement under Article 53(a) EPC. Attempts have been made by the Appeal Boards of the European Patent Office (EPO), as well as by amendments introduced into the Implementing Regulations of the European Patent Convention (EPC), to address this sensitive patentability requirement more precisely. The most recent hot topic coming up in this context is the patentability of stem cells. It is to be expected that this discussion will still go on in the field of biotechnological inventions for the next several years. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “The Ethics of Intellectual Property Rights and Patents,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 23–24 April, 2004.     

Does colour constancy exist?

For a stable visual world, the colours of objects should appear the same under different lights. This property of colour constancy has been assumed to be fundamental to vision, and many experimental attempts have been made to quantify it. I contend here, however, that the usual methods of measurement are either too coarse or concentrate not on colour constancy itself, but on other, complementary aspects of scene perception. Whether colour constancy exists other than in nominal terms remains unclear.     

Does symptomatic schizophrenia exist?

The question if there are "symptomatic schizophrenias" has been discussed since the 20s. Schizophrenic psychoses caused be definable and well known brain diseases are presented. All schizophrenic symptoms and syndromes, the first rank symptoms (K. Schneider) too, occur in somatically founded psychoses. The group of paroxysmal transition syndromes in the sense of aura prolongata (continua) and the episodic schizophrenic psychoses in psychomotor epilepsy may be a model for the schizophrenia research. Vital threatening, so-called pernicious catatonic schizophrenias are found on the basis of infectious brain diseases, sometimes only diagnosed in autopsy. Beside acute and reversible symptomatic schizophrenic psychoses there are, even if rarely, recurrent and chronic courses of symptomatic schizophrenias. That certain conditions for the developing of symptomatic schizophrenias are rarely realised, could be an explanation for their rarity. Some findings indicate that the limbic system is significant for symptomatic (and idiopathic) schizophrenic psychoses and the pre- and postpsychotic basic stages determined by dynamic and cognitive basic symptoms, which are phenomenologically very similar to aura symptoms released by stereoelectroencephalographic depth recordings (Wieser). The characteristic features of marked fluctuation, discontinuity and insteadiness of the cognitive thought, perception, psychomotor and cenesthetic phenomena do not speak against an organic brain disorder provided that the traditional process hypothesis is abandoned in favor of a neurobiochemic disorder, fluctuating on its part depending on endogenous as well as psychic-reactive factors.     

Does 'mental kinesiophobia' exist?

In this study the relevance of the concept of mental kinesiophobia (respectively cogniphobia or fear of mental exertion) for clients with chronic stress problems was explored. It was hypothesized that cognitive, chronic stress complaints, such as concentration problems or decreased problem solving abilities, could be catastrophized as signs of heightened personal vulnerability, with a chance of becoming permanent. As a consequence, mental exertion is avoided. This line of reasoning comes from the existing concept of kinesiophobia. This concept describes the avoidance behavior in chronic benign pain patients and refers to their fear of inflicting irreversible bodily damage due to physical exertion.An illustrative case of cogniphobia is presented. In an explorative pilot-study it was demonstrated that chronically stressed clients scored significantly higher on an experimental questionnaire measuring avoidance tendencies for mental exertion, compared with actively working employees. Consequences for treatment and suggestions for further study are discussed.     

Does “g” exist?

Is the nature of intelligence best understood as a single thing (“g”), or as a set of orthogonal variables? It is argued that a set of orthogonal variables is most likely to explain intelligence. Higher-order constructs like metacomponents, Executive Functioning and “g” are suggested to inevitably result from complex systems having interrelated parts. While such constructs may provide indices of the efficiency of such systems, they do not explain how the systems function. Further, neither parsimony, the pervasiveness of such constructs, nor biological reductionism provide adequate justification for invoking higher-order constructs as explanations of intellectual functioning.     

Does a quarterlife crisis exist?

In this study, the authors examined quarterlife crisis, defined in the popular press as an identity crisis that leaves recent college graduates depressed, anxious, and full of doubt. To determine if a unique crisis exists, 4 groups of young adults (recent high school [n = 23] and college [n = 117] graduates in the workforce, present undergraduate [n = 75], and graduate [n = 57] students) completed self-report measures assessing identity development, future time perspective, social support, coping, depression, anxiety, and job and life satisfaction. No support was found for a quarterlife crisis among these 4 groups. Working high school graduates displayed the highest anxiety, followed by present undergraduates. Depression was predicted by family support and identity commitment. Job satisfaction was associated with income and support from friends. Life satisfaction was associated with income, social support from friends and family, and identity commitment.     

Does the philosophy of medicine exist?

There has been a great deal of discussion, in this journal and others, about obstacles hindering the evolution of the philosophy of medicine. Such discussions presuppose that there is widespread agreement about what it is that constitutes the philosophy of medicine.Despite the fact that there is, and has been for decades, a great deal of literature, teaching and professional activity carried out explicitly in the name of the philosophy of medicine, this is not enough to establish that consensus exists as to the definition of the field. And even if consensus can be obtained as to what constitutes the philosophy of medicine, this does not mean that it exists as a field.     

Retrieval plus scanning: Does it occur?

In the two experiments reported here, we tested the retrieval-plus-scan model of delayed probe recognition by adding a second probe 2 sec after subjects had responded to the first probe. According to this model, the list items should still be in consciousness from the first probe at the time of the second probe. Consequently, on tests in which the first probe had been tested immediately, we expected to find the same pattern of performance on both first and second probes. On tests in which the first probe came after a filled delay, we expected the first-probe data to show the effects of retrieval and proactive interference. These effects should not be present on the second probe. The results of the first-probe data in both experiments were consistent with the retrieval-plus-scan model. The second-probe data did not fit the model, however. In the first experiment, the second probe on what had been delayed first-probe trials still produced intercept differences, indicating the presence of retrieval. In the second experiment, the effects of proactive interference were still present on the second probe. It is suggested that these results not only invalidate the retrieval-plus-scan model for delayed probe recognition but that they, along with other results, cast doubt on a scanning operation in immediate probe recognition.     

Inspection time: Does it measure intelligence?

The relationship between inspection time (IT) and intelligence id discussed in the context of the more general relationship between measures of mental speed and mental ability. Six issues are raised concerning IT, mental speed and intelligence: the size of the sample that have been studied; the inclusion of mentally-retarded Ss in these samples; the generality of IT; reaction time (RT) correlations with intelligence; IT and timed vs untimed IQ tests; and theoritical implications of the IT/IQ relationship. In the latter section, it is concluded that IT does not fit neatly into models accounting for RT/IQ correlates and that additional research will be required to obtain a better understanding of the nature of its relationship with intelligence.     

Does the corollary discharge of attention exist?

We discuss experimental support for the existence of a corollary discharge signal of attention movement control and its formulation in terms of the corollary discharge of attention model of attention movement (CODAM). The data is from fMRI, MEG and EEG activity observed about 200 ms after stimulus onset in various attention paradigms and in which the activity is mainly sited in parietal and extra-striate visual areas. Moreover the data arises from neural activity observed before report of a subject's experience occurs. The overall experimental support for the existence of a copy of the attention movement control signal generates, it is suggested, a viable route to explore the relation between this signal and human consciousness, as concluded in the paper.     

Inhibiting responses when switching: Does it matter?

In the present study, cued task-switching was combined with the stop-signal paradigm in order to investigate the interaction between response inhibition and task-switching. In line with earlier findings from Schuch and Koch (2003), the results show that switch and repetition trials following inhibited responses were processed equally fast. This confirms the hypothesis of Schuch and Koch (2003) that after signal-inhibit trials there is less interference, resulting in a disappearance of the switch cost. Furthermore, stopping performance was not affected by task-switching. The estimated stop-signal latencies were similar for switch and repetition trials, while the stop-signal delays were longer for switch compared to repetition trials. This result suggests that response inhibition and the inhibition processes in cued task-switching are not relying upon a common mechanism.     

Does recognition memory improve with age?

In order to test the hypothesis that recognition is a developmentally stable component of the memory system, age differences in recognition of faces were examined while controlling for nonmemory factors that might contribute to differences between the groups. Three groups of children (mean ages: 3 years, 4 months; 4 years, 9 months; and 6 years, 11 months) and a group of college students were tested on a recognition task and a similar matching task. The results indicated no change in recognition across the preschool years but an improvement from the later preschool period to the first grade. Further analyses indicated that this improvement was not due to changes in decision criteria or perceptual skills. These findings call into question the view that recognition is a developmentally invariant component of the memory system.     

Complex semantic processing in old age: does it stay or does it go?

Old adults' (N = 24) and young adults' (N = 24) speed of producing exemplars of semantic categories (i.e., semantic fluency) varying in difficulty was assessed both in a standard condition and in a "set-switching" condition where exemplars had to be produced from 2 categories in an alternating manner. "Retrieval-position function" parameters were used to assess speed of semantic access independent of nonsemantic factors. Results suggested age effects in nonsemantic components but not in semantic retrieval per se. Also, age deficits in set switching were relatively subtle. Findings are discussed with relation to issues of domain specificity of age effects as well as of the role of executive control during semantic retrieval and age differences therein.     

Face adaptation to gender: Does adaptation transfer across age categories?

We examined gender adaptation effects for the faces of children and adults and measured the transfer of these effects across age categories. Face gender adaptation is defined by a bias to classify the gender of a gender-neutral face to be opposite to that of an adapting face. An androgynous face, for example, appears male following adaptation to a female face. Participants adapted to male or female faces from the two age categories and classified the gender of morphed adult and child faces from a male–female morph trajectory. Gender adaptation effects were found for children's and adults’ faces and for the transfer between the age categories. The size of these effects was comparable when participants adapted to adult faces and identified the gender of either adult or child faces, and when participants adapted to child faces and identified the gender of child faces. A smaller adaptation effect was found when participants adapted to a child's face but identified the gender of an adult's face. The results indicate an interconnected and partially shared representation of the gender information for child and adult faces. The lack of symmetry in adaptation transfer between child and adult faces suggests that adaptation to adult faces is more effective than adaptation to child faces in activating a gender representation that generalizes across age categories.     

Feedback format: Does it influence manager's reactions to feedback?

This study investigated the influence of feedback format (text versus numeric/normative) on leaders' reactions to 360 degree feedback received from bosses, direct reports, and peers. Leaders who received numeric/normative feedback reacted more favourably than those who received text feedback regardless of the source. The reactions recipients experienced following feedback were relevant to changes in their number of development needs compared pre‐ and post feedback. Those who reacted negatively had a larger number of development needs reported post feedback while those who had positive reactions showed fewer development needs post feedback. These findings suggest that, contrary to predictions of feedback intervention theory (FIT), feedback that provided scores and comparative information was reacted to more positively than text feedback that provided only self‐relevant data. In addition, negative reactions to feedback were detrimental to future changes.     

Distinguishing clockwise from counterclockwise: Does it require mental rotation?

In three experiments, subjects were timed as they judged whether stimuli, presented in different angular orientations, represented clockwise or counterclockwise directions. In each experiment, there was also a control condition in which the subjects were required to make mirror image judgments relative to some canonical orientation. Analysis of reaction times suggested that, in the control tasks, the subjects generally rotated the stimuli mentally to the canonical orientation before making their decision. Mental rotation was invoked less frequently in the case of the experimental tasks, suggesting at least limited access to an orientation-free code representing the difference between clockwise and counterclockwise. This was most evident in Experiment 1, where the stimuli represented 1-h jumps of a hand on a clock face. It was less so in Experiment 2, where direction of motion was indicated in a static display. In Experiment 3, only a few subjects proved able to use an orientation-free, clockwise versus counterclockwise rubric in order to discriminate normal from backward letters.